Homeland Security

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Northeast - II
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Issue Book Excerpt: Lost Opportunities | Date : 16 Apr , 2011

With the induction of a number of armed police detachments, new posts were established all over Mizo Hills.

In April 1967, a sector headquarters at Lunglawn named Lima Sector, was established and the DIG of Assam Rifles was made its commander. It had two Assam Rifles battalions, two regular infantry battalions and one BSF battalion under its operational control. At the same time the state’s range headquarters retained administrative control over all Assam Rifles battalions in Mizo Hills, which it exercised from its main headquarters at Silchar.70

Operation Blanket

By April 1966, 61 Mountain Brigade was mounting numerous combing operations both in the interior and in the border areas. The MNA was on the run and a large number escaped to CHT. During the monsoons, the insurgents reorganised themselves and once the rains abated they infiltrated back into Mizo Hills. With the induction of a number of armed police detachments, new posts were established all over Mizo Hills. However, it was difficult to keep an eye on all the small villages; some willingly and some under coercion continued to give food and shelter to hostiles; so a new concept was evolved, code-named Operation Blanket, which envisaged each company or equivalent of Assam Rifles or army to establish two posts of about 20 men each next to villages within its area of responsibility.

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The sub-posts were to be self-contained for a fortnight and sufficiently mobile to reach remote villages threatened by hostiles. The aim was to instil confidence in small villages and gain information about the hostiles and terrain.

The scheme proved a partial success; the villages were too numerous for the troops to keep an eye on all, and therefore, support to the hostiles could not be entirely cut off. 71

The failure of Operation Blanket led to reappraisal of the situation. It was then decided that the only way to totally isolate the guerrillas from the inhabitants would be to group a number of villages into large hamlets, which could be easily protected.

Operation Accomplishment

The failure of Operation Blanket led to reappraisal of the situation. It was then decided that the only way to totally isolate the guerrillas from the inhabitants would be to group a number of villages into large hamlets, which could be easily protected. This would also enable the security forces to operate freely in the depopulated areas. Accordingly in the beginning of 1967, security forces began the task of grouping of villages, code-named Operation Accomplishment. Initially the hostiles did not react, but on February 3, 1967, one of the platoons of the Assam Rifles, while escorting the villagers from jhoom cultivation to Lungdai group centre, was ambushed in which six riflemen were killed.

The success of the grouping scheme is debatable. According to one view ‘the insurgents, instead of being denied shelter, received more support from the people. They could get safe shelter and food more easily in the regrouped villages than from old ones, from where these people had been forcibly evicted. The insurgents were more welcome in the regrouped villages than the old ones.’72

The grouping of villages had become so unpopular that when the orders for grouping in the central and South-western part of the hills was given, some Mizos challenged the order in the Guwahati High Court on the grounds that it was violative of the fundamental rights. The court immediately ordered a stay, which forced the government to withdraw the order for implementing the third phase of operation. In Nagaland the authorities had hurriedly degrouped all the Naga villages in the face of bitter opposition, yet those that had been regrouped would remain so in Mizoram.73

Political Initiatives

After the defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war, the insurgents lost their main support base. The government seized the opportunity and enacted the North-east (Reorganisation) Act, which among other things gave union territory status to the Mizo Hills. Indira Gandhi at Aizwal formally inaugurated the Union Territory of Mizoram on January 21, 1972.

In a matter of a few days a large number of MNF personnel were apprehended and arms, ammunition and cash were seized.

However, insurgency continued in Mizoram even after the elections to the newly formed legislative assembly, in which Mizo Union won an absolute majority.

Resumption of Operations in 1982

It may be recalled that Laldenga had opened dialogue after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, which had led to suspension of operations from August 1, 1980. But Laldenga continued to make unreasonable demands and to put pressure on the government, he had issued instructions to escalate violence. The government, therefore, decided to end the talks in 1982 and resume operations.

On January 20, 1982, Laldenga was informed of the termination of talks, and as agreed he was lifted by IAF aircraft from Delhi to Silchar and then taken to Pavva in South Mizoram by helicopter, from where he was escorted to Bangladesh border.74 MNF was declared an unlawful organisation and Unlawful Activities Act was promulgated.

Book_Lost_OpportunitiesAt that time 57 Mountain Division had two brigades; 71 Mountain Brigade in the North and 311 Mountain Brigade in the South. The operations were launched on the night of January 20, 1982. In a matter of a few days a large number of MNF personnel were apprehended and arms, ammunition and cash were seized.75 Two more mountain brigades i.e. 123 and 202 were inducted subsequently. 123 Mountain Brigade was deployed to prevent MNF personnel access to Jampui Hill Range to escape to Bangladesh.76

To be continued…

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Brig (Dr) SP Sinha

Brigadier (Dr) SP Sinha, VSM (Retd)

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2 thoughts on “Counter-Insurgency Operations in Northeast – II

  1. I was (then Capt. R K Mehta) B Company Commander of 4 Sikh Light Infantry and it was my Company which lifted the siege of Purr Post. My Company was on the outskirts of Purr Post during the strafing by the Ouragan (French Dassault) Jets of IAF and my troops were probably mistaken as Hostiles and we came under fire, took shelter in the thick forest. The strafing was not effective since the Hostiles were under tree cover around the Post; it was only the ground link which was successful.
    My Company moved from our location near Kohima and had to cover hostile terain on foot (approximately 75 miles) from Phek-Meluri-crossing River Tizu in full Monsoon spate by improvised means since the suspension bridge had been destroyed by the Hostiles, to reach Purr.After the link with the Post my Company was tasked to rescue Flight Lt. Singha and his Crew who had been captured after the Dakota crashed.
    Unfortunately lot of inaccuracies have crept in the official records of this Operation.

  2. I commanded 8 AR at Tuensang (Nagaland) in late eighties. The effect of local men on operational assignments was great. Whatever be the reasons the spirit of Raising AR units with organization specific to an area was destroyed by shifting and moving them. Complete information networks were done away with.AR contributed in a big way to the growth of areas where raised and deployed. One wonders if it will continue to have same effect after being converted to a shifting force.

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