Indian Defence Review

The JCO, despite his injury due to hostile fire, led his men to the hostile hideout and killed three of them. He was posthumously awarded the Ashoka Chakra Class I for his exceptional courage.48

By the end of 1961, the total casualties among the security forces rose to more than 200 officers and men killed and 400 wounded. The figures do not include civilian casualties. The high casualty figures are indicative of the constraint under which the security forces were operating.

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On the other hand, the insurgents enjoyed the element of surprise. 49 The charge of being ‘trigger happy’ against troops by some critics is not borne out by facts and is misplaced.

The Chinese were getting extremely belligerent and confrontation in NEFA had already taken place. The fear of a possible China-Pak nexus was ever present and it was considered prudent to tackle the volatile internal situation at the earliest.

The Pulling out of Troops to meet the Chinese Threat

1962 was a watershed in the history of the North-east. The Chinese attack in NEFA and Ladakh required army units in Nagaland to pull out to face the Chinese threat. 23 Mountain Division, which had taken over the counter-insurgency operation in Nagaland in 1960, moved out and its responsibilities were taken over by Headquarters of the Inspector General of Assam Rifles, which established its tactical headquarters at Kohima.50

Formation of the State of Nagaland

The new state of Nagaland was formed to take the wind out of rebel’s demand for independence. The IB and the Government of Assam were against it because the precedent might encourage other tribes to raise similar demand. Besides, the constitution had not envisaged a state of the size of Nagaland having a population of just 5,00,000. BN Mullick, the IB chief, expressed his apprehension to Nehru.

According to the agreement, the security forces were not to undertake any jungle operations, raid camps, search villages, arrest anyone, take aerial action or patrol beyond 1000 yards of security posts and 100 yards astride roads.

But a set of circumstances had developed which forced Nehru to accept the proposal. The Chinese were getting extremely belligerent and confrontation in NEFA had already taken place. The fear of a possible China-Pak nexus was ever present and it was considered prudent to tackle the volatile internal situation at the earliest.51

Raising of Headquarters 8 Mountain Division

After the 1962 war, it was decided to raise Headquarters GOC Nagaland, which would be specially trained for mountain warfare and counter- insurgency. The name Headquarters GOC Nagaland was changed to Headquarters 8 Mountain Division, which was raised at Ranchi in 1963.52 The first GOC was Major General KP Candeth. The Division was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Manipur.

Change in Tactics by Hostiles

In the beginning of 1963, the hostiles who had slipped across the border to East Pakistan returned to Nagaland, and brought modern rifles, machine guns and explosives. This introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The Pakistanis had advised them to change their tactics, not to attack army posts as it meant more casualties for them but to attack trains and such soft targets.

On April 9, 1963, the hostiles blew up the railway track near Dimapur. Six passengers of the passing train were killed and 20 injured. This was only the beginning. In order to impede the peace talks, which had started in 1964, a series of explosions took place targeting North East Frontier Railway in Assam in February and April 1966.53 The railway track in Dhansiri near Nagaland-Assam border was blown up, but fortunately there was no casualty.

After the cessation of hostilities, all was apparently quiet in Nagaland but the hostiles had stepped up their activities in Manipur, particularly in Ukhrul sub-division.

On February 17, 1966, a bomb exploded in a train at Farkating killing 37 passengers and injuring 50. On April 20, a time bomb exploded in a railway coach at Lumding railway station, killing 56 people and injuring 127. Three days later another explosion in a train standing at Dipha station killed 40 and injured 61.54

Agreement on Suspension of Hostilities and its Impact on Army Operations

As a consequence to the peace talks suspension of hostilities came into effect from midnight of September 5, 1964. The agreement was favourable to the hostiles and put the security forces at great disadvantage. According to the agreement, the security forces were not to undertake any jungle operations, raid camps, search villages, arrest anyone, take aerial action or patrol beyond 1000 yards of security posts and 100 yards astride roads. They were free to patrol the international border, but within three miles of it. The underground rebels were to refrain from sniping and ambushing, imposing fines, kidnapping and recruiting, indulging in sabotage, raiding or firing on posts, moving about in uniform or with arms and approaching within 100 yards of security post.55

The terms of agreement, which were loaded in favour of the hostiles, were violated blatantly. Taxes were imposed on civilian population and young boys were recruited in the underground army and sent to East Pakistan and China for guerrilla training. The army accepted the restrictions imposed on them but was not at all happy about these. In fact, Major General Candeth had warned the Governor that the agreement in the form it was proposed would result in hostiles gaining the upper hand and the prestige of the army would be lowered.56

This introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The Pakistanis had advised them to change their tactics, not to attack army posts as it meant more casualties for them but to attack trains and such soft targets.

After the cessation of hostilities, all was apparently quiet in Nagaland but the hostiles had stepped up their activities in Manipur, particularly in Ukhrul sub-division. A vehicle convoy of CRPF was ambushed near Mile 52 on Road Imphal-Tamenglong on July 12, 1967. Two JCOs and 21 other ranks were killed. Only one survived to tell the story. The hostiles who were 200 strong took away 19 rifles, two sten guns and 734 rounds of ammunition. In another incident, 16 Jat having received information from an apprehended hostile that a group was present in Tenjang in Tamenglong sub-division, despatched a column of one officer, two JCOs and 35 other ranks to deal with the hostiles.

On reaching a nearby village, the local schoolteacher confirmed the information. But as night fell, the column was attacked by the hostiles and killed the officer, both the JCO and 17 other ranks. Nine were wounded. To add insult to injury, the hostiles took away four light machine guns, 18 rifles, three sten carbines, one pistol and two 2-inch mortars.57 The one redeeming action during this period was by 9 Bihar, which got the better of hostiles in an ambush and recovered one light machine gun, two rifles and large quantities of ammunition from them.

Operation at Jotsoma and Lessons Learnt

Thinousilie, who had led a gang of rebels to China, returned in mid-January 1968 with five 60 mm mortars, five rocket launchers, two medium machine guns, seven light machine guns, 400 semi automatic rifles, 750 mines, 750 grenades and five wireless sets.58 They had established a camp near Jotsoma, in a bowl surrounded by steep hills, well covered so that it could not be spotted even from the air. The camp was raided by 9 Bihar.

Two companies of Assam Rifles had established stops on escape routes. 17 Madras was to lay a cordon in a semi circle, but were ambushed by hostiles who were fleeing from the camp. One officer, two JCOs and 23 other ranks of 17 Madras were killed. One officer and 18 other ranks were wounded. The same battalion had lost one officer, and 16 other ranks on March 20, 1968 in southern Manipur. It was time for introspection for the units, which had to lay greater stress on minor tactics, physical fitness and sub unit level drills.

As it so often happens in most insurgencies, a split in the underground Naga ranks was inevitable. Power and money corrupts and Naga insurgents, who proudly proclaimed their revolutionary halo, were no exceptions.

The raiding party of 9 Bihar had succeeded in approaching the camp perimeter stealthily but an alert sentry gave the alarm and most of the hostiles escaped the dragnet carrying their arms and secret documents. 9 Bihar captured some hostiles and a diary in which the details of movements of the hostile gang to and from China were recorded. This confirmed the China link of Naga hostiles and was used by the Government to nail China’s interference in Nagaland. The raid highlighted the skill of Nagas in guerrilla tactics, and at the same time it exposed the weakness of army units in training and minor tactics. There was another lesson. The cessation of hostilities had developed a sense of complacency amongst troops, for which they paid a heavy price.59

Split in Naga Insurgency

As it so often happens in most insurgencies, a split in the underground Naga ranks was inevitable. Power and money corrupts and Naga insurgents, who proudly proclaimed their revolutionary halo, were no exceptions. The genesis of the rift lay in personal ambitions and jockeying for power. Although Phizo had started the Naga movement, Sema tribesmen under Kaito Sema had borne the brunt of fighting ever since the army was called out. Kaito, the former head of the rebel army, was removed from his post of defence minister in the underground army in 1964 for his advocacy to forge links with China and criticism of the Peace Mission.

When Mowu Angami was made the chief of the underground army, the injustice rankled Kaito. Both craved for a greater share of money and power and had their loyal followers amongst the rebels; personal ambition, the craving for power and tribal loyalties combined to create a situation, which led to the split in the underground on tribal lines. Kaito and his followers formed a parallel Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN).

This confirmed the China link of Naga hostiles and was used by the Government to nail Chinas interference in Nagaland.

The split, which came in 1967, was to have far reaching consequences for the underground movement. Kaito wanted to quicken the pace of settlement with the central government on the basis of giving up the demand for independence. The followers of Phizo blamed 8 Mountain Division for masterminding the bloodless coup.60

Capture of Mowu Angami

When the split occurred, Mowu Angami was in China and had no inkling of the cataclysmic changes that had taken place in the underground movement. In the early 1968 it became clear that he with his gang were planning to return to Nagaland, additional troops were moved into Nagaland so as to capture them near the international border itself. Patrols were sent out to locate the gangs. The international border with Myanmar was sealed by deploying troops on likely routes of ingress. Reports started coming from mid-January 1969 about the move of gangs led by Isak Swu and Mowu Angami through Myanmar heading towards Nagaland.