Indian Defence Review

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Nagaland      

By the beginning of 1953, situation in Nagaland had turned volatile. Phizo toured the district and exhorted the people not to pay taxes. Assam Rifles men were ambushed and killed, government buildings and houses of loyal Nagas were set on fire, telephone lines were cut and bridges destroyed. One of the worst acts of violence, which took place in November 1954, was the massacre of fifty seven villagers of Yimpang by men of Pangsha village in Tuensang area in retaliation of the murder of a dak runner, who was the son of the village headman of Pangsha.

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The massacre was attributed to the Indian Army in a charge sheet produced by Phizo’s followers and was widely circulated by Rev Michael Scott, about whom enough has been said earlier.

The army patrol had mistakenly taken Haralu as a hostile. The insurgents made much of the incident to show the army as trigger-happy.

Nehru in Parliament refuted the charges; while refuting he said that the massacre had nothing to do with any of the Indian security forces, which were not present there at all. The incident highlights the extent to which Phizo and his followers could manipulate and distort facts.34

Recourse to Force

As raids and ambushes, particularly in Tuensang Division, continued despite the induction of more platoons of Assam Rifles and one battalion of the UP Special Armed Constabulary, it was decided to call in the army. In keeping with the understanding that the rebels are fellow citizens, the Chief of the Army Staff issued an Order of the Day in 1955: “You must remember that all the people of the area in which you are operating are fellow Indians – – – and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is reflection of India’s greatness.

Some of the people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of the area.

Some of the people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace of the area. You are to protect the mass of the people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people. You must, therefore do everything possible to win their confidence and respect and help them feel that they belong to India.”35

Troops of 181 Independent Infantry Brigade under Brigadier Sukhdev Singh, VrC were the first to move to Nagaland. The move began in July 1955 and by February 1956, all the four battalions of the brigade had moved to Nagaland. Two more brigades, 201 Infantry Brigade and 192 Infantry Brigade under Brigadiers Ram Singh and Niranjan Prasad, were moved to Mokokchung and Kohima sectors respectively.36 With the induction of additional formations, Major General RK Kochar was appointed GOC Naga Hills and Tuensang in April 1956.

Siege of Kohima

By 1956, the rebels had formed the FGN; simultaneously a military wing called the Naga Home Guard was formed. The rebels armed themselves with arms and ammunition from the dumps left behind by the British and Japanese forces after the World War II. The hostiles attacked Kohima from three different directions on June 10, 1956. They cut off telephone lines and electricity37 and besieged the town for nearly three days when Kohima remained cut off from rest of India and the greater part of the village remained under hostile control. Phizo had given instructions to assassinate men like Jasokie, who were moderate leaders. They were given protection inside army camps till Kohima was cleared of hostiles.38

In the early days of the counter-insurgency operations, the army suffered heavy losses.

On June 14 the hostiles under Kaito Sema had a marked success when they ambushed and killed Lt Col JR Chitins, commanding officer of 1/3 GR near Zunheboto. Chitnis had, in April 1956, busted the headquarters of Kaito in Satakha area and had inflicted heavy casualties on the Semas.39 Chitnis was the first officer recipient of Ashoka Chakra Class I in the Naga Hills. Army reinforcement were called forcing the hostiles to lift the seize and withdraw.

Initial Losses

Increased militant activities forced the government to declare Naga Hills as Disturbed Area. By the end of 1956 the army had recovered or captured large quantities of arms and ammunition at the cost of 135 killed and 442 wounded. This was a heavy price to pay for not firing first and lack of experience in fighting a guerrilla war.40

The grouping was intended to break the supply and intelligence network of the hostiles. It did have a positive effect on the counter-insurgency operations in the short term.

In the early days of the counter-insurgency operations, the army suffered heavy losses. In one of the worst setbacks, a road protection party of 9 PUNJAB was ambushed by hostiles on April 1, 1957 on road Kohima-Jaluke. 32 men were killed. It was a grievous blow, but the units were learning fast; counter-ambush drills were perfected, convoy protection was better organised and greater emphasis was laid on minor tactics and the use of ground.

The Unfortunate Killing of Haralu

An unfortunate incident took place on July 2, 1956, which was to have far reaching effect on how the army conducted operations. Dr. Haralu, a respectable old doctor was killed by a patrol of the army in the early hours of that day.41 The army patrol had mistakenly taken Haralu as a hostile. The insurgents made much of the incident to show the army as trigger-happy.

The killing of Dr Haralu overshadowed the brutal killing of Sakhrie by the followers of Phizo. Nehru made a statement in the Parliament regretting the incident. The killing highlighted the difficult terms of engagement under which troops were operating.

Grouping of Villages: The Indian Experience in Naga Hills

During the period 1957-59, a number of measures, both military and political were taken to persuade the hostile Nagas to give up their struggle. One such measure was the grouping of villages that was adopted in early 1957. The villagers were allowed to go out during day and cultivate their fields under escort but had to return to the barricaded villages before nightfall. The grouping was intended to break the supply and intelligence network of the hostiles. It did have a positive effect on the counter-insurgency operations in the short term.

Another step taken by the civil administration was to raise a force of Naga militias or village guards, who knew the ways of the hostiles. The government armed them with muskets and rifles and supplied them uniforms.

But a large number of villagers were separated from their land and immediate surroundings around which their lives were built. Mr BN Mullick, the Intelligence Bureau Chief, who exercised considerable influence on the formulation of policy for the administration of frontier areas because of his proximity with Nehru, supported the grouping experiment wholeheartedly.

In his assessment the grouping of villages was enough to break their (Nagas) spirit of defiance, if there was any.”42 But there are others who hold the view that the grouping produced more hostiles and added to their rank rather than breaking their spirit of defiance

Raising of Village Guards

Another step taken by the civil administration was to raise a force of Naga militias or village guards, who knew the ways of the hostiles. The government armed them with muskets and rifles and supplied them uniforms. The chiefs and headmen controlled the force. The hostiles considered them a greater threat than the army columns.

Even as the government took military and political initiative concurrently, violence continued sporadically. The Naga insurgency was far from being subdued. Army continued to operate aggressively.

There were several cases where the militia fought the rebels, and though there were a few cases of betrayal, on the whole they acquitted themselves well.43

Political Initiative: Creation of Naga Hills–Tuensang Area

The separation of Naga Hills district from Assam and forming it into a separate administrative unit along with Tuensang sub division of NEFA with effect from December 1, 1957 and placing it under the MEA to be administered by the Governor was a timely political initiative, which compromised the influence of secessionists amongst the Nagas. This was all the more important for the announcement of the separation from Assam and creation of an enlarged district as it came soon after a resolution was passed by the Naga People Convention held at Kohima in August 1957 and attended by 4,000 delegates and their supporters, opting for a settlement within the Indian Union, which substantially nullified the resolution of plebiscite adopted earlier by the NNC convention held in 1951.44

Even as the government took military and political initiative concurrently, violence continued sporadically. The Naga insurgency was far from being subdued. Army continued to operate aggressively. Large number of hostiles surrendered in 1957 and 1959. Their numbers had been greatly reduced but the hostile Nagas proved to be skilful guerrilla fighters and retaliated by ambushing army patrols whenever opportunity came their way.

The JCO, despite his injury due to hostile fire, led his men to the hostile hideout and killed three of them. He was posthumously awarded the Ashoka Chakra Class I”¦

Nari Rustomji in his fascinating book ‘The Imperilled Frontiers’ wrote: “ it was soon a matter of doubt as to who was softening whom. It will serve no purpose to revive old memories, but it is recognised to everybody’s shame, that it was the darkest chapter in the history of Naga Hills. – – – Fierce and relentless revenge was the main motivating force during the black and senseless period.”

Action at Purr and Downing of the Air Force Dakota

Although the strength of hostiles had been considerably reduced by relentless army operations, the guerrillas were still capable of raiding isolated army posts in inaccessible areas. They actually attacked Purr, an isolated post, some 166 km from Kohima, located at the northern tip of a high mountain range running North to South and parallel to the international border with Myanmar.

The hostiles encircled the post with about 500 men of whom 125 were armed with three light machine guns and rifles of sorts and the rest with traditional weapons such as spears, bows and arrows and daos. They opened fire early in the morning of August 25, 1960 and kept it up throughout the day. They had destroyed the three bridges on the Tizu and placed 20 men on each to prevent reinforcement reaching the post, which was occupied by approximately 100 men. The firing continued the next day when they came to within few yards of the post, but withdrew when fired upon by the defenders of the post In the afternoon of the next day, two Dakotas dropped supplies, which fell into the hands of the hostiles.

The Dakotas flew very low and one of them crash-landed between Meluri (near Purr) and Laphori, another small village to the east of Meluri. The ill-fated Dakota was hit by ground fire by the hostiles,46 which forced it to land in a paddy field. It was piloted by Flight Lieutenant Anand Singha and had a crew of eight airmen. The pilot and the crew were captured by the hostiles and taken to their camp, where they were treated well. The defenders fought bravely till reinforcement from 4 Sikh Light Infantry arrived. Early on 28 August, five IAF fighters strafed the hostile positions inflicting heavy casualties, which forced them to lift the siege.47

Operations by the Assam Rifles

The depredations of the Naga hostiles included arson, loot and murder. There were a number of ambushes on road Kohima-Imphal. The Assam Rifles had a number of successful operations in 1960-61. In April 1961, in a memorable action against the hostiles, Subedar Kharka Bahadur Limbu of 8 Assam Rifles laid down his life while raiding a hostile camp in a jungle ravine, which was barricaded by a long palisade covered by bamboo stakes.

The JCO, despite his injury due to hostile fire, led his men to the hostile hideout and killed three of them. He was posthumously awarded the Ashoka Chakra Class I for his exceptional courage.48

By the end of 1961, the total casualties among the security forces rose to more than 200 officers and men killed and 400 wounded. The figures do not include civilian casualties. The high casualty figures are indicative of the constraint under which the security forces were operating.

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On the other hand, the insurgents enjoyed the element of surprise. 49 The charge of being ‘trigger happy’ against troops by some critics is not borne out by facts and is misplaced.

The Chinese were getting extremely belligerent and confrontation in NEFA had already taken place. The fear of a possible China-Pak nexus was ever present and it was considered prudent to tackle the volatile internal situation at the earliest.

The Pulling out of Troops to meet the Chinese Threat

1962 was a watershed in the history of the North-east. The Chinese attack in NEFA and Ladakh required army units in Nagaland to pull out to face the Chinese threat. 23 Mountain Division, which had taken over the counter-insurgency operation in Nagaland in 1960, moved out and its responsibilities were taken over by Headquarters of the Inspector General of Assam Rifles, which established its tactical headquarters at Kohima.50

Formation of the State of Nagaland

The new state of Nagaland was formed to take the wind out of rebel’s demand for independence. The IB and the Government of Assam were against it because the precedent might encourage other tribes to raise similar demand. Besides, the constitution had not envisaged a state of the size of Nagaland having a population of just 5,00,000. BN Mullick, the IB chief, expressed his apprehension to Nehru.

According to the agreement, the security forces were not to undertake any jungle operations, raid camps, search villages, arrest anyone, take aerial action or patrol beyond 1000 yards of security posts and 100 yards astride roads.

But a set of circumstances had developed which forced Nehru to accept the proposal. The Chinese were getting extremely belligerent and confrontation in NEFA had already taken place. The fear of a possible China-Pak nexus was ever present and it was considered prudent to tackle the volatile internal situation at the earliest.51

Raising of Headquarters 8 Mountain Division

After the 1962 war, it was decided to raise Headquarters GOC Nagaland, which would be specially trained for mountain warfare and counter- insurgency. The name Headquarters GOC Nagaland was changed to Headquarters 8 Mountain Division, which was raised at Ranchi in 1963.52 The first GOC was Major General KP Candeth. The Division was responsible for counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Manipur.

Change in Tactics by Hostiles

In the beginning of 1963, the hostiles who had slipped across the border to East Pakistan returned to Nagaland, and brought modern rifles, machine guns and explosives. This introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The Pakistanis had advised them to change their tactics, not to attack army posts as it meant more casualties for them but to attack trains and such soft targets.

On April 9, 1963, the hostiles blew up the railway track near Dimapur. Six passengers of the passing train were killed and 20 injured. This was only the beginning. In order to impede the peace talks, which had started in 1964, a series of explosions took place targeting North East Frontier Railway in Assam in February and April 1966.53 The railway track in Dhansiri near Nagaland-Assam border was blown up, but fortunately there was no casualty.

After the cessation of hostilities, all was apparently quiet in Nagaland but the hostiles had stepped up their activities in Manipur, particularly in Ukhrul sub-division.

On February 17, 1966, a bomb exploded in a train at Farkating killing 37 passengers and injuring 50. On April 20, a time bomb exploded in a railway coach at Lumding railway station, killing 56 people and injuring 127. Three days later another explosion in a train standing at Dipha station killed 40 and injured 61.54

Agreement on Suspension of Hostilities and its Impact on Army Operations

As a consequence to the peace talks suspension of hostilities came into effect from midnight of September 5, 1964. The agreement was favourable to the hostiles and put the security forces at great disadvantage. According to the agreement, the security forces were not to undertake any jungle operations, raid camps, search villages, arrest anyone, take aerial action or patrol beyond 1000 yards of security posts and 100 yards astride roads. They were free to patrol the international border, but within three miles of it. The underground rebels were to refrain from sniping and ambushing, imposing fines, kidnapping and recruiting, indulging in sabotage, raiding or firing on posts, moving about in uniform or with arms and approaching within 100 yards of security post.55

The terms of agreement, which were loaded in favour of the hostiles, were violated blatantly. Taxes were imposed on civilian population and young boys were recruited in the underground army and sent to East Pakistan and China for guerrilla training. The army accepted the restrictions imposed on them but was not at all happy about these. In fact, Major General Candeth had warned the Governor that the agreement in the form it was proposed would result in hostiles gaining the upper hand and the prestige of the army would be lowered.56

This introduced a new dimension to the conflict. The Pakistanis had advised them to change their tactics, not to attack army posts as it meant more casualties for them but to attack trains and such soft targets.

After the cessation of hostilities, all was apparently quiet in Nagaland but the hostiles had stepped up their activities in Manipur, particularly in Ukhrul sub-division. A vehicle convoy of CRPF was ambushed near Mile 52 on Road Imphal-Tamenglong on July 12, 1967. Two JCOs and 21 other ranks were killed. Only one survived to tell the story. The hostiles who were 200 strong took away 19 rifles, two sten guns and 734 rounds of ammunition. In another incident, 16 Jat having received information from an apprehended hostile that a group was present in Tenjang in Tamenglong sub-division, despatched a column of one officer, two JCOs and 35 other ranks to deal with the hostiles.

On reaching a nearby village, the local schoolteacher confirmed the information. But as night fell, the column was attacked by the hostiles and killed the officer, both the JCO and 17 other ranks. Nine were wounded. To add insult to injury, the hostiles took away four light machine guns, 18 rifles, three sten carbines, one pistol and two 2-inch mortars.57 The one redeeming action during this period was by 9 Bihar, which got the better of hostiles in an ambush and recovered one light machine gun, two rifles and large quantities of ammunition from them.

Operation at Jotsoma and Lessons Learnt

Thinousilie, who had led a gang of rebels to China, returned in mid-January 1968 with five 60 mm mortars, five rocket launchers, two medium machine guns, seven light machine guns, 400 semi automatic rifles, 750 mines, 750 grenades and five wireless sets.58 They had established a camp near Jotsoma, in a bowl surrounded by steep hills, well covered so that it could not be spotted even from the air. The camp was raided by 9 Bihar.

Two companies of Assam Rifles had established stops on escape routes. 17 Madras was to lay a cordon in a semi circle, but were ambushed by hostiles who were fleeing from the camp. One officer, two JCOs and 23 other ranks of 17 Madras were killed. One officer and 18 other ranks were wounded. The same battalion had lost one officer, and 16 other ranks on March 20, 1968 in southern Manipur. It was time for introspection for the units, which had to lay greater stress on minor tactics, physical fitness and sub unit level drills.

As it so often happens in most insurgencies, a split in the underground Naga ranks was inevitable. Power and money corrupts and Naga insurgents, who proudly proclaimed their revolutionary halo, were no exceptions.

The raiding party of 9 Bihar had succeeded in approaching the camp perimeter stealthily but an alert sentry gave the alarm and most of the hostiles escaped the dragnet carrying their arms and secret documents. 9 Bihar captured some hostiles and a diary in which the details of movements of the hostile gang to and from China were recorded. This confirmed the China link of Naga hostiles and was used by the Government to nail China’s interference in Nagaland. The raid highlighted the skill of Nagas in guerrilla tactics, and at the same time it exposed the weakness of army units in training and minor tactics. There was another lesson. The cessation of hostilities had developed a sense of complacency amongst troops, for which they paid a heavy price.59

Split in Naga Insurgency

As it so often happens in most insurgencies, a split in the underground Naga ranks was inevitable. Power and money corrupts and Naga insurgents, who proudly proclaimed their revolutionary halo, were no exceptions. The genesis of the rift lay in personal ambitions and jockeying for power. Although Phizo had started the Naga movement, Sema tribesmen under Kaito Sema had borne the brunt of fighting ever since the army was called out. Kaito, the former head of the rebel army, was removed from his post of defence minister in the underground army in 1964 for his advocacy to forge links with China and criticism of the Peace Mission.

When Mowu Angami was made the chief of the underground army, the injustice rankled Kaito. Both craved for a greater share of money and power and had their loyal followers amongst the rebels; personal ambition, the craving for power and tribal loyalties combined to create a situation, which led to the split in the underground on tribal lines. Kaito and his followers formed a parallel Revolutionary Government of Nagaland (RGN).

This confirmed the China link of Naga hostiles and was used by the Government to nail Chinas interference in Nagaland.

The split, which came in 1967, was to have far reaching consequences for the underground movement. Kaito wanted to quicken the pace of settlement with the central government on the basis of giving up the demand for independence. The followers of Phizo blamed 8 Mountain Division for masterminding the bloodless coup.60

Capture of Mowu Angami

When the split occurred, Mowu Angami was in China and had no inkling of the cataclysmic changes that had taken place in the underground movement. In the early 1968 it became clear that he with his gang were planning to return to Nagaland, additional troops were moved into Nagaland so as to capture them near the international border itself. Patrols were sent out to locate the gangs. The international border with Myanmar was sealed by deploying troops on likely routes of ingress. Reports started coming from mid-January 1969 about the move of gangs led by Isak Swu and Mowu Angami through Myanmar heading towards Nagaland.

“¦the total casualties among the security forces rose to more than 200 officers and men killed and 400 wounded.

Besides the army, supporters of Zuheto Sema, who was heading the breakaway RNG were also desperately looking out for Mowu Angami and his gang. Zuheto feared that if Mowu Angami succeeded in entering Nagaland and contacted his underground colleagues, the balance of power would shift in his favour. Mowu and his gang entered Nagaland on the night of March 6, 1969 in the area due East of Zunheboto.

On March 8 two scouts of the gang were captured by a patrol of 14 Raj Rif, who revealed the direction in which the gang was moving. 13 Guards, 22 Maratha Light Infantry, 8 Madras and two companies each of 13 Raj Rif and 4 Bihar were moved to lay a cordon around Lukhami area. Mowu Angami and his gang were trapped in the cordon and all escape routes were blocked by troops. One battalion surrounded the camp itself.

The circumstances of Mowu’s capture are still shrouded in mystery but from various accounts, the breakaway Kaito faction, led by Zuheto Sema, facilitated Mowu’s capture. Mowu and his men were helpless as they were obviously tricked into handing their weapons to Zuheto. The followers of Phizo accused Zuheto and his followers for treacherously tricking Mowu and his gang, as they were unaware of the rift that had occurred in the underground during their long absence in China.

The capture of Mowu Angami and his gang was a dramatic event of the counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland. Notwithstanding the role played by Zuheto in the capture of Mowu, the leadership of Major General Rawley, GOC 8 Mountain Division, was crucial. He not only coordinated the military operation but also simultaneously influenced the political, bureaucratic and administrative decisions.

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After his capture Mowu was flown to Delhi in an IAF Dakota for interrogation. His gang totalling 169 including 22 Myanmarese surrendered with a rich haul of weapons and ammunition; five light machine guns, ninety 7.62 rifles, 47 sten guns, six 7.62 pistols, ten .303 rifles and four 60 mm mortars.62

The capture of Mowu Angami and his gang was a dramatic event of the counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland.

Isak Swu and his gang evaded arrest by breaking themselves into small groups, but around 90 of them were captured with their arms over a period of time.63 Not wanting to risk the same fate as Mowu, they made their way to camps in Myanmar.

Another Attempt to Send a Gang to China Foiled

The army achieved a remarkable success in December 1974 in foiling the attempt of a large gang of Naga hostiles to cross the border with Myanmar and head for Yunan in China for training and bringing replenishments. The operation has already been described in Chapter 10.

Operation Golden Bird

In 1995, based on information informally shared with Myanmar Army, the Indian Army carried out Operation Golden Bird in the Mizoram-Chin Hills on Indo-Myanmar border to interdict a large consignment of weapons intended for NSCN (IM), PLA and ULFA, which was to be transported by porters from bases in the CHT in Bangladesh to Manipur in India. The weapons were being escorted by the NSCN (IM) through the ill defined Indo-Myanmar border in this region; a part of the consignment was to be delivered in Myanmar to anti-government insurgents in the Chin Hills.

The operation had to be quickly coordinated under Eastern Command through its various subordinate headquarters.

There was no formal contact between the two armies; only general information that Myanmar troops would be in the vicinity across the international border in the area.

The operation had to be quickly coordinated under Eastern Command through its various subordinate headquarters. The Assam Rifles sector commander closest to the scene was nominated force commander and a scratch force of Assam Rifles and Sikh Light Infantry was quickly assembled and placed under the force commander. The operation was launched with speed and determination. The insurgent group was intercepted and engaged in a series of running clashes on both sides of the border by the Indian and Myanmar forces, resulting in a number of insurgent casualties and seizure of weapons.

The insurgent group was intercepted and engaged in a series of running clashes on both sides of the border by the Indian and Myanmar forces, resulting in a number of insurgent casualties and seizure of weapons.

Golden Bird was a successful operation and an encouraging example of what even a little military cooperation between India and Myanmar could achieve.64 However, the operation did not end as planned initially. With the Indian Government conferring the Nehru Award for international understanding on Aung San Swu Kyi right in the midst of the operations, the Myanmar Army was so outraged that it unilaterally withdrew from the offensive.

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Mizoram

While the Nagas were preparing for their journey to China, insurgency broke out in Mizoram, which took the country by surprise. In a swift, meticulously planned and executed guerrilla attacks the Mizo rebels overran virtually the entire territory of Mizoram. The insurrection was code named ‘Operation Jericho’. The Indian response and some of the important counter-insurgency initiatives have been analysed here.

The Use of Air Power against MNF

The MNF launched Operation Jericho on the night of 28 February / 1 March 1966. By 3 March, 1 Assam Rifles at Aizwal was under siege by nearly 4000 MNF volunteers. It was decided to land reinforcement by helicopters, but the sniping by hostiles was so intense that the helicopters could not land. Air strikes by fighter aircraft were the only way out to break the siege. Fighters strafed hostile positions at 1130 hours on 5 March. The strafing was repeated in the afternoon, which forced the hostiles to lift the siege.65

By the end of the month the security forces were in full control, but there were small pockets of insurgents who were capable of harassing actions and reprisals against loyal Mizos.

The Assam Rifles post at Lungleih was also attacked on 1 March. It put up a gallant fight and held out for four days before ammunition and water ran out. Attempts to supply the post by air failed and on 5 March, the post was overrun by the hostiles. One officer and 66 other ranks were taken prisoner.66 At Demagiri in the South, the hostiles gained control over the entire village except the Assam Rifles post, which held out with great courage. Here again, fighter planes had to be called to strafe the hostile position. From 9 to 13 March fighter planes of the IAF strafed the hostile positions, forcing them to scatter.67

Army Brigade Moves in  

The entire 61 Mountain Brigade of four battalions and supporting arms moved into Mizo Hills by 15 March. Having secured the three major towns, the Brigade sent out columns to engage insurgent groups in other parts of the district. By the end of the month the security forces were in full control, but there were small pockets of insurgents who were capable of harassing actions and reprisals against loyal Mizos.

Besides 61 Mountain Brigade, additional troops from Assam Rifles were moved into Mizo Hills. 18 Assam Rifles was deployed in the South with its headquarters at Lungleih. By mid-April, 19 Assam Rifles was deployed in Mat River area with its headquarters at Serchip. 6 Assam Rifles, which was at Agartala, was also inducted into Mizo Hills by October 1966.68. In order to effect better command and control over large Assam Rifles component in Mizo hills, the DIG Range established his headquarters at Aizwal on November 21, 1966, by which time the army was well established and the chain of command was properly organised.69

With the induction of a number of armed police detachments, new posts were established all over Mizo Hills.

In April 1967, a sector headquarters at Lunglawn named Lima Sector, was established and the DIG of Assam Rifles was made its commander. It had two Assam Rifles battalions, two regular infantry battalions and one BSF battalion under its operational control. At the same time the state’s range headquarters retained administrative control over all Assam Rifles battalions in Mizo Hills, which it exercised from its main headquarters at Silchar.70

Operation Blanket

By April 1966, 61 Mountain Brigade was mounting numerous combing operations both in the interior and in the border areas. The MNA was on the run and a large number escaped to CHT. During the monsoons, the insurgents reorganised themselves and once the rains abated they infiltrated back into Mizo Hills. With the induction of a number of armed police detachments, new posts were established all over Mizo Hills. However, it was difficult to keep an eye on all the small villages; some willingly and some under coercion continued to give food and shelter to hostiles; so a new concept was evolved, code-named Operation Blanket, which envisaged each company or equivalent of Assam Rifles or army to establish two posts of about 20 men each next to villages within its area of responsibility.

The sub-posts were to be self-contained for a fortnight and sufficiently mobile to reach remote villages threatened by hostiles. The aim was to instil confidence in small villages and gain information about the hostiles and terrain.

The scheme proved a partial success; the villages were too numerous for the troops to keep an eye on all, and therefore, support to the hostiles could not be entirely cut off. 71

The failure of Operation Blanket led to reappraisal of the situation. It was then decided that the only way to totally isolate the guerrillas from the inhabitants would be to group a number of villages into large hamlets, which could be easily protected.

Operation Accomplishment

The failure of Operation Blanket led to reappraisal of the situation. It was then decided that the only way to totally isolate the guerrillas from the inhabitants would be to group a number of villages into large hamlets, which could be easily protected. This would also enable the security forces to operate freely in the depopulated areas. Accordingly in the beginning of 1967, security forces began the task of grouping of villages, code-named Operation Accomplishment. Initially the hostiles did not react, but on February 3, 1967, one of the platoons of the Assam Rifles, while escorting the villagers from jhoom cultivation to Lungdai group centre, was ambushed in which six riflemen were killed.

The success of the grouping scheme is debatable. According to one view ‘the insurgents, instead of being denied shelter, received more support from the people. They could get safe shelter and food more easily in the regrouped villages than from old ones, from where these people had been forcibly evicted. The insurgents were more welcome in the regrouped villages than the old ones.’72

The grouping of villages had become so unpopular that when the orders for grouping in the central and South-western part of the hills was given, some Mizos challenged the order in the Guwahati High Court on the grounds that it was violative of the fundamental rights. The court immediately ordered a stay, which forced the government to withdraw the order for implementing the third phase of operation. In Nagaland the authorities had hurriedly degrouped all the Naga villages in the face of bitter opposition, yet those that had been regrouped would remain so in Mizoram.73

Political Initiatives

After the defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war, the insurgents lost their main support base. The government seized the opportunity and enacted the North-east (Reorganisation) Act, which among other things gave union territory status to the Mizo Hills. Indira Gandhi at Aizwal formally inaugurated the Union Territory of Mizoram on January 21, 1972.

In a matter of a few days a large number of MNF personnel were apprehended and arms, ammunition and cash were seized.

However, insurgency continued in Mizoram even after the elections to the newly formed legislative assembly, in which Mizo Union won an absolute majority.

Resumption of Operations in 1982

It may be recalled that Laldenga had opened dialogue after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, which had led to suspension of operations from August 1, 1980. But Laldenga continued to make unreasonable demands and to put pressure on the government, he had issued instructions to escalate violence. The government, therefore, decided to end the talks in 1982 and resume operations.

On January 20, 1982, Laldenga was informed of the termination of talks, and as agreed he was lifted by IAF aircraft from Delhi to Silchar and then taken to Pavva in South Mizoram by helicopter, from where he was escorted to Bangladesh border.74 MNF was declared an unlawful organisation and Unlawful Activities Act was promulgated.

At that time 57 Mountain Division had two brigades; 71 Mountain Brigade in the North and 311 Mountain Brigade in the South. The operations were launched on the night of January 20, 1982. In a matter of a few days a large number of MNF personnel were apprehended and arms, ammunition and cash were seized.75 Two more mountain brigades i.e. 123 and 202 were inducted subsequently. 123 Mountain Brigade was deployed to prevent MNF personnel access to Jampui Hill Range to escape to Bangladesh.76

To be continued…