Indian Defence Review

“¦the total casualties among the security forces rose to more than 200 officers and men killed and 400 wounded.

Besides the army, supporters of Zuheto Sema, who was heading the breakaway RNG were also desperately looking out for Mowu Angami and his gang. Zuheto feared that if Mowu Angami succeeded in entering Nagaland and contacted his underground colleagues, the balance of power would shift in his favour. Mowu and his gang entered Nagaland on the night of March 6, 1969 in the area due East of Zunheboto.

On March 8 two scouts of the gang were captured by a patrol of 14 Raj Rif, who revealed the direction in which the gang was moving. 13 Guards, 22 Maratha Light Infantry, 8 Madras and two companies each of 13 Raj Rif and 4 Bihar were moved to lay a cordon around Lukhami area. Mowu Angami and his gang were trapped in the cordon and all escape routes were blocked by troops. One battalion surrounded the camp itself.

The circumstances of Mowu’s capture are still shrouded in mystery but from various accounts, the breakaway Kaito faction, led by Zuheto Sema, facilitated Mowu’s capture. Mowu and his men were helpless as they were obviously tricked into handing their weapons to Zuheto. The followers of Phizo accused Zuheto and his followers for treacherously tricking Mowu and his gang, as they were unaware of the rift that had occurred in the underground during their long absence in China.

The capture of Mowu Angami and his gang was a dramatic event of the counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland. Notwithstanding the role played by Zuheto in the capture of Mowu, the leadership of Major General Rawley, GOC 8 Mountain Division, was crucial. He not only coordinated the military operation but also simultaneously influenced the political, bureaucratic and administrative decisions.

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After his capture Mowu was flown to Delhi in an IAF Dakota for interrogation. His gang totalling 169 including 22 Myanmarese surrendered with a rich haul of weapons and ammunition; five light machine guns, ninety 7.62 rifles, 47 sten guns, six 7.62 pistols, ten .303 rifles and four 60 mm mortars.62

The capture of Mowu Angami and his gang was a dramatic event of the counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland.

Isak Swu and his gang evaded arrest by breaking themselves into small groups, but around 90 of them were captured with their arms over a period of time.63 Not wanting to risk the same fate as Mowu, they made their way to camps in Myanmar.

Another Attempt to Send a Gang to China Foiled

The army achieved a remarkable success in December 1974 in foiling the attempt of a large gang of Naga hostiles to cross the border with Myanmar and head for Yunan in China for training and bringing replenishments. The operation has already been described in Chapter 10.

Operation Golden Bird

In 1995, based on information informally shared with Myanmar Army, the Indian Army carried out Operation Golden Bird in the Mizoram-Chin Hills on Indo-Myanmar border to interdict a large consignment of weapons intended for NSCN (IM), PLA and ULFA, which was to be transported by porters from bases in the CHT in Bangladesh to Manipur in India. The weapons were being escorted by the NSCN (IM) through the ill defined Indo-Myanmar border in this region; a part of the consignment was to be delivered in Myanmar to anti-government insurgents in the Chin Hills.

The operation had to be quickly coordinated under Eastern Command through its various subordinate headquarters.

There was no formal contact between the two armies; only general information that Myanmar troops would be in the vicinity across the international border in the area.

The operation had to be quickly coordinated under Eastern Command through its various subordinate headquarters. The Assam Rifles sector commander closest to the scene was nominated force commander and a scratch force of Assam Rifles and Sikh Light Infantry was quickly assembled and placed under the force commander. The operation was launched with speed and determination. The insurgent group was intercepted and engaged in a series of running clashes on both sides of the border by the Indian and Myanmar forces, resulting in a number of insurgent casualties and seizure of weapons.

The insurgent group was intercepted and engaged in a series of running clashes on both sides of the border by the Indian and Myanmar forces, resulting in a number of insurgent casualties and seizure of weapons.

Golden Bird was a successful operation and an encouraging example of what even a little military cooperation between India and Myanmar could achieve.64 However, the operation did not end as planned initially. With the Indian Government conferring the Nehru Award for international understanding on Aung San Swu Kyi right in the midst of the operations, the Myanmar Army was so outraged that it unilaterally withdrew from the offensive.

Counter-Insurgency Operations in Mizoram

While the Nagas were preparing for their journey to China, insurgency broke out in Mizoram, which took the country by surprise. In a swift, meticulously planned and executed guerrilla attacks the Mizo rebels overran virtually the entire territory of Mizoram. The insurrection was code named ‘Operation Jericho’. The Indian response and some of the important counter-insurgency initiatives have been analysed here.

The Use of Air Power against MNF

The MNF launched Operation Jericho on the night of 28 February / 1 March 1966. By 3 March, 1 Assam Rifles at Aizwal was under siege by nearly 4000 MNF volunteers. It was decided to land reinforcement by helicopters, but the sniping by hostiles was so intense that the helicopters could not land. Air strikes by fighter aircraft were the only way out to break the siege. Fighters strafed hostile positions at 1130 hours on 5 March. The strafing was repeated in the afternoon, which forced the hostiles to lift the siege.65

By the end of the month the security forces were in full control, but there were small pockets of insurgents who were capable of harassing actions and reprisals against loyal Mizos.

The Assam Rifles post at Lungleih was also attacked on 1 March. It put up a gallant fight and held out for four days before ammunition and water ran out. Attempts to supply the post by air failed and on 5 March, the post was overrun by the hostiles. One officer and 66 other ranks were taken prisoner.66 At Demagiri in the South, the hostiles gained control over the entire village except the Assam Rifles post, which held out with great courage. Here again, fighter planes had to be called to strafe the hostile position. From 9 to 13 March fighter planes of the IAF strafed the hostile positions, forcing them to scatter.67

Army Brigade Moves in  

The entire 61 Mountain Brigade of four battalions and supporting arms moved into Mizo Hills by 15 March. Having secured the three major towns, the Brigade sent out columns to engage insurgent groups in other parts of the district. By the end of the month the security forces were in full control, but there were small pockets of insurgents who were capable of harassing actions and reprisals against loyal Mizos.

Besides 61 Mountain Brigade, additional troops from Assam Rifles were moved into Mizo Hills. 18 Assam Rifles was deployed in the South with its headquarters at Lungleih. By mid-April, 19 Assam Rifles was deployed in Mat River area with its headquarters at Serchip. 6 Assam Rifles, which was at Agartala, was also inducted into Mizo Hills by October 1966.68. In order to effect better command and control over large Assam Rifles component in Mizo hills, the DIG Range established his headquarters at Aizwal on November 21, 1966, by which time the army was well established and the chain of command was properly organised.69