Indian Defence Review

But the above is only one part of empowering the CDS to ensure integration vertically either way. The more important requirement is to grant him full operational powers, without which, his authority over the Services HQ would be incomplete. Presently, HQ IDS only deals with Out of Area Contingencies (OOAC), which is not enough. Incidentally, in a meeting chaired by the current President as Defence Minister in 2005, the then Services Chiefs were fully for appointment of a CDS but then individually they appear to have been ‘won over by the bureaucracy. In the said meeting, the then Army Chief wanted not only the CDS but wanted him given “full operational powers”. Immediately post retirement, he changed stance to say that the time to appoint a CDS was not now because we have yet to solve our internal security problems, as if the two are related and as if we will ever solve our internal security challenges given consistency in our inability to manage social change, corruption and pitting communities against each other for political gains.

The then Naval Chief and Chairman COSC was fully for the CDS and showed his anguish about the Chairman COSC having been quietly taken out of the loop between the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the National Security Advisor (NSA) – another silent bureaucratic coup. Surprisingly, the same Naval Chief and Chairman COSC post retirement writes that we should not be ‘hankering’ over CDS and we should not throw the baby (PC COSC) out of the bathwater. One of the reason quoted by him is ‘step by step’ approach as we have been in a time wrap. This will only increase the happiness of our enemies; take 66 years to appoint a toothless PC COSC and perhaps another 66 to appoint a CDS, no matter if the map of India undergoes a change. Even if we are in a time wrap, it does not imply that we start taking one shaky step once every six decades. All the more reason a shakeup is urgently warranted.

Military integration has to be enforced vertically and horizontally across the board. Connected with this is the crying need to go in for Integrated Theatre Commands and Integrated Functional Commands, which are unlikely to come through without a CDS. Former Army Chief, General S Padmanabhan had said, “There is no escaping the military logic of creating suitably constituted Integrated Theatre Commands and Functional Commands for the armed forces as a whole.” In UK, the debate over the CDS raged for l8 years, till the government forced a CDS on the military. Unfortunately, the warped bureaucratic control over the military instead of political control (as it should be) has led to keeping the military out of strategic and security related decision making and in keeping the Services in separate compartments. The appointment of a PC COSC is ostensibly in line with the task force headed by the Ambassador Naresh Chandra to undertake a review of national security. Ironically, every time India woke up to order a security review was after a crisis; Sino-Indian War of 1962, lndo-Pak War of 1965, Mizo uprising of 1966, Kargil conflict of 199 and the 26 / 11 Mumbai terrorist attack.

If we had the strategic culture, a Comprehensive Defence and Security Review should have been institutionalized every five years. The Committee has recommended establishment of two additional commands; Special Force and Aerospace. If media is to be believed, plans are afoot to give the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC), Special Forces Command and Aerospace Command respectively to the Army, Navy and Air Force on permanent basis. This will be another serious mistake albeit it will increase the happiness of MoD to keep the Services in separate compartments. In fact, given the need for military integration across the board, it will be prudent to have requisite permanently posted representation in the newly sanctioned Mountain Strike Corps.

The impression created in respect of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommendations is that less than appointing a CDS everything has been implemented. Nothing could be further from the truth. The major implementation failings, mostly advertent, are: one, no CDS appointed; two, HQ IDS created as a separate HQ instead of merging it with MoD; three, Chairman COSC gradually eased out from the loop of control of SFC ;  four, DIA stopped from its authorized mandate of operating trans-border intelligence sources; five, ANC remains toothless without requisite forces under its command; six, Directorate General of Armed Forces Medical Services (DGAFMS) and Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) not brought under HQ IDS. Ironically, the Parliamentary Committee on Defence is as toothless as any other committee whose recommendations get largely ignored. However, in the case of the Naresh Chandra Committee, as per certain sources, select members were briefed at the time of constituting the task force as to what should be the eventual recommendations – situating the appreciation as said in the military. Public perception building was suitably organized, one example being that while the previous Air Chief immediately post retirement had stated that he was not for a CDS in “present form”, this was hyped and portrayed as saying he was against appointment of a CDS. This has apparently become the ploy in the existing dispensation, example being the Track Two Team discussing Siachen, briefed ‘only’ to work out “how to withdraw” without going into “why” and “when”.

At a time when we are faced with heightening threats, jointly by China and Pakistan, the need for appointing a CDS was never more. The system of committees is at best adhoc. Plenty has come in the media in recent months on the state of our defence forces including the widening gap compared to the PLA. There have been suggestions that only an Act of Parliament like the Goldwater Nichols Act or like the Berlin Decree that can break the logjam but in our case, it is difficult to identify a political leader or a bureaucrat who could push for such an Act of Parliament. Paradoxically, the government-appointed task force had no active Services representation. Interacting is difierent from having full time active Services members. Interacting with Services is not the same as having full time members on a task force. A PC COSC is no substitute for a CDS. The former will make little difference to existing arrangement. It is surprising that the Naresh Chandra Committee did not recommend ‘full’ integration of HQ IDS with the MoD, in addition to a appointing a PC COSC even if constraints had been put on them. Such an arrangement could indeed have been a step forward.

Without integrating HQ IDS with MoD, appointment of a PC COSC is just another embellishment. Are we not playing into the hands of our enemies? Addressing the Combined Commander’s Conference in 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had stated, “Reforms within the Armed Forces also involve recognition of the fact that our Navy, Air Forces and Army can no longer function in compartments with exclusive chains of command and single service operational plans”. The PC COSC can certainly not provide the required synergy in the Services, which in turn adversely affects national synergy without which we cannot adequately cope with threats to our security in any segment of the conflict spectrum including the asymmetric and proxy wars that we are already engaged in.

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The bottom line is that if appointment of a PC COSC is a win-win situation, it is only a triumph for the bureaucrats in MoD. What India actually needs is a CDS with full operational powers urgently keeping in mind the rapidly expanding threats to our security. The next government would do well to start working on a roadmap for it.