Geopolitics

India Russia: Strategic Relations
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Issue Vol 23.1 Jan-Mar2008 | Date : 03 Dec , 2011

A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences.

The acme of this relationship between the two countries was the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. One of the provisions of the Treaty was the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and for immediate mutual consultations in case either country was subjected to external attack. Some analysts have argued that this particular provision dissuaded China from ‘leaning’ on our northern borders when almost the entire Indian military was engaging the Pakistanis during the 1971 war. There were many occasions during the war when aeroplane loads of war-waging material was flown into our airbases as replenishments. India accomplished its war objectives and it did so by employing weapons which were predominantly of Soviet origin. The propaganda value of Soviet weapons having humbled western arms was immense and came as a big boost to the Soviet military industrial complex.

A symbolic but powerful gesture of the closeness of relations came in the form of an offer to send an Indian cosmonaut into space. Two IAF pilots were trained in the Soviet Union and on 4th April 1984, the first, and till now only, Indian cosmonaut, Sqn Ldr Rakesh Sharma was launched into space aboard a Soviet spacecraft. It was a thrilling experience for the Indian population to hear in real-time an Indian cosmonaut out there in space engaging the Indian Prime Minister in a lively conversation.

Russia today has a growth rate of 6-7%, a GDP nearing $ 1.5 trillion and the worlds largest energy reserves including 13% of proven oil finds, 34% of natural gas and 25% of all coals. But because of the perma-frost conditions that obtain, it costs $14 to extract a barrel of oil in Russia as compared to $4 in Kuwait.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all weapon systems and military equipment were sold to India at ‘friendship’ prices that were substantially lower than the cost of similar systems available in the western market. Product and spares support, however, was less than efficient. The Soviet system of production, with factories and facilities spread far and wide, neccesitated a long lead time for Indian demands to be centrally collected, vetted and despatched. The Soviets were strong in standardisation of equipment but similar parts/equipment fitted on different aircraft had different part numbers. This resulted in over-accumulation of such stocks in India. In later years this led to items for, say MiG-23 being located in MiG-21 equipment depots and many more such instances. The quantum of ‘dead’ or non-moving stocks in our inventory was high and even at ‘friendship’ prices, a lot of money went waste. And as regards time delays in getting spares, our own system of procurement, mostly inflexible and procedure driven, also contributed in keeping our aeroplanes on the ground. The Army and the Navy also probably have similar experiences.

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Air Marshal Narayan Menon

Air Marshal Narayan Menon

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