Indian Defence Review

Pakistan has been a beneficiary of US benevolence for a long time. The doctrinaire approach of Eisenhower and Dulles gathered Pakistan into the ambit of SEATO and CENTO. Weapon systems from the Western bloc flowed into Pakistan, ostensibly to counter the communist threat. Military linkages strengthened between Pakistan and the USA. Despite Pakistan’s known animosity and its so-called ‘unfinished agenda’ of wresting control over the state of J&K, India’s protests to the USA were dismissed, and assurances given that these weapons would not be used against India. India’s stand that no gun has yet been fabricated that would shoot only in one direction was vindicated by later events. And the USA was reluctant to sell weapons to India for fear of offending Pakistan. Britain and France laid down unacceptable conditionalities for transfer of arms and technology to India. Left with no other alternative India turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons, immediately attracting criticism for having allegedly abandoned its non-aligned status. The Soviet Union willingly gave Mi-4 helicopters, AN-12 and IL-14 transport aircraft and later agreed to set up MiG-21 production facilities in India at Nasik for airframes, at Koraput for aero-engines and Hyderabad for avionics. The military debacle of 1962 underscored the requirement for better war preparedness and modern weapon systems. The USA established a chain of radars along the northern belt, but its offer of a ‘defence umbrella’ was not acceptable to India. A request for F-104 Starfighter jets was turned down by the USA.

The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country.

India once again turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons. More variants of the MiG-21 were inducted and over a period of time the IAF’s combat force included the Su-7, the MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and the MiG-29. The helicopter force comprised Mi-4, Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-24/35 gunships and the heavy lift Mi-26. IL-14, AN-12, AN-32 and the IL-76 constituted the transport segment. The army got the T-54 and T-55 tanks, the amphibious PT-22 and PT-76. Later the T-72 tanks were inducted. 130 mm artillery guns, multi-barrel rocket systems for short range area saturation and a host of other infantry weapons were operationalised by the army. Pechora and OSA SAMs, Kvadrat misiles, Schilka tracked AA guns and the twin barrel Zu guns were procured for air defence. The Indian Navy inducted Soviet submarines, OSA missile boats, Petya patrol crafts, Nanuchka corvettes, Kashin class destroyers, landing crafts and motor torpedo boats. The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country. But one of the drawbacks has been the over-dependence on imported design with consequential negative effects on our own research and development sector and the stunting of indigenous genius.

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries. A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences. A dependable India could be an important bulwark against the US-Pakistan, China-Pakistan and US-China strategic and quasi-strategic alliances. And a dependent India in an economic partnership where the advantage lay with the Soviets could be a profitable long term investment. It can be seen that in this special relationship, India’s needs were matched by Soviet Union’s strengths and Soviet Union’s requirements were matched by India’s strengths. As long as the international geo-political equilibrium was not unduly disturbed, this relationship was destined to flourish.