Indian Defence Review

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries.

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in many defence plants closing down in Russia and CIS countries and the impact on Indian armed forces was severe. Product support, just satisfactory in the good times, was completely curtailed. Spare parts and consumables like tyres and split-pins were in short supply and the Indian military had to drastically cut down on operational training to conserve available stocks for any contingency. While a brave front was kept up, the reality was that the capability of the Indian armed forces with 80% of its hardware from Soviet Union, remained severely compromised for an unacceptably long period. Many delegations from India went to Russia and the CIS countries, carrying suitcases filled with dollars and searching for spares and equipment urgently required to raise the availability of tanks, ships and aeroplanes from the alarmingly low levels of 25-30% to an operationally acceptable minimum of 50%. In Russia however, a near chaotic situation obtained, and the cash-strapped country arbitrarily raised the cost of spares by as much as 500-1000%. The Indians had to make emergency calls to South Block, Delhi, for release of additional funds to meet these inflated dollar demands.

During this period of uncertainty, no new weapon systems were procured by India. With an inherent lag in the procurement process of 3-4 years, items ordered in 1991-92 materialised only in 1996-97. While some indigenisation was attempted in India, success was limited and later, this attempt came under attack by Russia for infringement of the IPR convention. However there were some positives also during this difficult period. While Russia went along with other permanent members of the UN Security Council in condemning India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Russia did not impose any sanctions against India. Russia also progressed the deal to build two light water 1000 mega-watt nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. This was despite the USA putting pressure on Russia to scuttle the deal. This move helped in restoring some confidence among Indians that Russia still valued its relations with India. Again, during the Kargil operations in 1999, Russia set aside red tape to fly urgently required military spares and equipment into India.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations. During his visit to India in October 2000, major weapon deals worth over $3 billion-under negotiations for a long time-were finalised. The India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission was upgraded from the level of defence secretaries to the level of Defence Minister on the Indian side and the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of defence exports on the Russian side. In the last five years the major weapon systems acquired or contracted for include the Su-30 MKI multi-role fighters, IL-78 aircraft as platforms for the Indian AWACS, Mi-171V helicopters, Kilo-class submarines, frigates, Ka-31 AEW helicopters, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov now renamed as INS Vikramaditya, MiG-29K carrier compatible fighters, T-90 tanks, AAMs, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles and various types of radars. The value of the projects under the defence cooperation programme till 2010 is $10 billion +. It is estimated that nearly 800 Russian defence production facilities would be kept in operation by Indian defence contracts. It is entirely another matter that an ageing manpower, obsolescent machinery and dependence on exports, mainly to India and China are pointers to looming problems in the making, both for the Russian military industrial complex and for countries largely dependent on Russia for weapon systems. Before analysing the current situation it would be instructive to examine the background that gave rise to the special military relationship between India and Russia.