Indian Defence Review

The India-Russia strategic relations with its embedded military ties have been, in the past 15 years, buffeted by the turbulence of international upheavals and domestic events. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war have quite dramatically altered the dynamics of this strategic relationship. The emergence of a unipolar world with the USA as the sole superpower impinged adversely on a once ‘special’ relationship and forced both Russia and India to review their geo-political calculations in the light of a changed geo-political environment.

While a brave front was kept up, the reality was that the capability of the Indian armed forces with 80% of its hardware from Soviet Union, remained severely compromised for an unacceptably long period.

Having earlier claimed for itself a leading role in the non-aligned movement(NAM) as a counterweight to the two superpower-led blocs, India found itself searching for identity and place in international affairs with the demise of one superpower. India had neither the economic clout nor any other attribute of power to be reckoned with in the world political arena. The rise of insurgency and secessionistic tendencies, both within the country and in its neighbourhood, shifted the focus of defence and security to internal stability. A fortress-mentality protectionist economic model, based on the Soviet pattern, was abandoned and India reached out to global donors for economic rejuvenation. In a suddenly unfamiliar scenario, India began to address its own economic vulnerabilities which stood out in stark contrast to the success of the Asian Tigers. Its somewhat diminished stature forced India to assess the world through the prism of its own interests.

At the same time the Russian domestic scene underwent major convulsions. The high residual costs of the collapsed Soviet model manifested itself with the economy in disarray and starvation on the streets. The Russian leadership abandoned its ideology based foreign policy and the special relations with India became a casualty. Russian leadership, dominated by ‘west’ oriented members, adopted a neutral stance towards India. Two schools of thought emerged. One comprising academics and defence industry professionals, were for continuing the special relations with India, which they argued, could stem the wave of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across the Central Asia. Additionally, the income accruing from India’s import of Russian arms would be crucial to Russia’s transition to a free market economy. The other school of thought, comprising foreign ministry incumbents, were of the opinion that Pakistan had a vital role in fulfilling Russia’s immediate concerns of foreign policy and security, and that Islamic fundamentalism, boiling over in Russia’s southern flank would be best tackled by working closely with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. That the second school prevailed was demonstrated by the change of policy by Russia in supporting the Pakistan sponsored UN resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. This policy somersault was followed by Russia severing all support to Najibullah in Afghanistan, much to the consternation of India. The strain in Indo-Russian relations was again manifest in Russia reneging on the cryogenic engine and transfer of technology deal under intense pressure from the USA. The huge debt run up by India for purchase of arms from the erstwhile Soviet Union, amounting to over $16 billion became another issue of dispute. The rupee-ruble exchange rate and the repayment scheduling developed into irritants in the relations and it was much later that a mutually agreeable deal was hammered out.

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries.

The demise of the Soviet Union resulted in many defence plants closing down in Russia and CIS countries and the impact on Indian armed forces was severe. Product support, just satisfactory in the good times, was completely curtailed. Spare parts and consumables like tyres and split-pins were in short supply and the Indian military had to drastically cut down on operational training to conserve available stocks for any contingency. While a brave front was kept up, the reality was that the capability of the Indian armed forces with 80% of its hardware from Soviet Union, remained severely compromised for an unacceptably long period. Many delegations from India went to Russia and the CIS countries, carrying suitcases filled with dollars and searching for spares and equipment urgently required to raise the availability of tanks, ships and aeroplanes from the alarmingly low levels of 25-30% to an operationally acceptable minimum of 50%. In Russia however, a near chaotic situation obtained, and the cash-strapped country arbitrarily raised the cost of spares by as much as 500-1000%. The Indians had to make emergency calls to South Block, Delhi, for release of additional funds to meet these inflated dollar demands.

During this period of uncertainty, no new weapon systems were procured by India. With an inherent lag in the procurement process of 3-4 years, items ordered in 1991-92 materialised only in 1996-97. While some indigenisation was attempted in India, success was limited and later, this attempt came under attack by Russia for infringement of the IPR convention. However there were some positives also during this difficult period. While Russia went along with other permanent members of the UN Security Council in condemning India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Russia did not impose any sanctions against India. Russia also progressed the deal to build two light water 1000 mega-watt nuclear reactors at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu. This was despite the USA putting pressure on Russia to scuttle the deal. This move helped in restoring some confidence among Indians that Russia still valued its relations with India. Again, during the Kargil operations in 1999, Russia set aside red tape to fly urgently required military spares and equipment into India.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations.

Vladimir Putin as the PM and then as the President has regrouped and revamped the splintered military industrial complex in Russia. Russia has once again emerged as a major arms exporter. Putin also reinvigorated the India-Russia relations. During his visit to India in October 2000, major weapon deals worth over $3 billion-under negotiations for a long time-were finalised. The India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission was upgraded from the level of defence secretaries to the level of Defence Minister on the Indian side and the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of defence exports on the Russian side. In the last five years the major weapon systems acquired or contracted for include the Su-30 MKI multi-role fighters, IL-78 aircraft as platforms for the Indian AWACS, Mi-171V helicopters, Kilo-class submarines, frigates, Ka-31 AEW helicopters, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov now renamed as INS Vikramaditya, MiG-29K carrier compatible fighters, T-90 tanks, AAMs, anti-tank and anti-ship missiles and various types of radars. The value of the projects under the defence cooperation programme till 2010 is $10 billion +. It is estimated that nearly 800 Russian defence production facilities would be kept in operation by Indian defence contracts. It is entirely another matter that an ageing manpower, obsolescent machinery and dependence on exports, mainly to India and China are pointers to looming problems in the making, both for the Russian military industrial complex and for countries largely dependent on Russia for weapon systems. Before analysing the current situation it would be instructive to examine the background that gave rise to the special military relationship between India and Russia.

Pakistan has been a beneficiary of US benevolence for a long time. The doctrinaire approach of Eisenhower and Dulles gathered Pakistan into the ambit of SEATO and CENTO. Weapon systems from the Western bloc flowed into Pakistan, ostensibly to counter the communist threat. Military linkages strengthened between Pakistan and the USA. Despite Pakistan’s known animosity and its so-called ‘unfinished agenda’ of wresting control over the state of J&K, India’s protests to the USA were dismissed, and assurances given that these weapons would not be used against India. India’s stand that no gun has yet been fabricated that would shoot only in one direction was vindicated by later events. And the USA was reluctant to sell weapons to India for fear of offending Pakistan. Britain and France laid down unacceptable conditionalities for transfer of arms and technology to India. Left with no other alternative India turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons, immediately attracting criticism for having allegedly abandoned its non-aligned status. The Soviet Union willingly gave Mi-4 helicopters, AN-12 and IL-14 transport aircraft and later agreed to set up MiG-21 production facilities in India at Nasik for airframes, at Koraput for aero-engines and Hyderabad for avionics. The military debacle of 1962 underscored the requirement for better war preparedness and modern weapon systems. The USA established a chain of radars along the northern belt, but its offer of a ‘defence umbrella’ was not acceptable to India. A request for F-104 Starfighter jets was turned down by the USA.

The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country.

India once again turned to the Soviet Union for its requirements of weapons. More variants of the MiG-21 were inducted and over a period of time the IAF’s combat force included the Su-7, the MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and the MiG-29. The helicopter force comprised Mi-4, Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-24/35 gunships and the heavy lift Mi-26. IL-14, AN-12, AN-32 and the IL-76 constituted the transport segment. The army got the T-54 and T-55 tanks, the amphibious PT-22 and PT-76. Later the T-72 tanks were inducted. 130 mm artillery guns, multi-barrel rocket systems for short range area saturation and a host of other infantry weapons were operationalised by the army. Pechora and OSA SAMs, Kvadrat misiles, Schilka tracked AA guns and the twin barrel Zu guns were procured for air defence. The Indian Navy inducted Soviet submarines, OSA missile boats, Petya patrol crafts, Nanuchka corvettes, Kashin class destroyers, landing crafts and motor torpedo boats. The Soviet military supplies programme included transfer of technology in various fields and has helped Indian scientists, engineers and technicians in creating a defence industrial base in the country. But one of the drawbacks has been the over-dependence on imported design with consequential negative effects on our own research and development sector and the stunting of indigenous genius.

The Soviet largesse towards India was not based on any altruism but grounded in realpolitik and cold logic. A friendly India meant greater credibility with, and easier access to, many developing third world countries. A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences. A dependable India could be an important bulwark against the US-Pakistan, China-Pakistan and US-China strategic and quasi-strategic alliances. And a dependent India in an economic partnership where the advantage lay with the Soviets could be a profitable long term investment. It can be seen that in this special relationship, India’s needs were matched by Soviet Union’s strengths and Soviet Union’s requirements were matched by India’s strengths. As long as the international geo-political equilibrium was not unduly disturbed, this relationship was destined to flourish.

A strong India could become a significant counter-weight to China with whom Soviet Union had developed major differences.

The acme of this relationship between the two countries was the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971. One of the provisions of the Treaty was the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and for immediate mutual consultations in case either country was subjected to external attack. Some analysts have argued that this particular provision dissuaded China from ‘leaning’ on our northern borders when almost the entire Indian military was engaging the Pakistanis during the 1971 war. There were many occasions during the war when aeroplane loads of war-waging material was flown into our airbases as replenishments. India accomplished its war objectives and it did so by employing weapons which were predominantly of Soviet origin. The propaganda value of Soviet weapons having humbled western arms was immense and came as a big boost to the Soviet military industrial complex.

A symbolic but powerful gesture of the closeness of relations came in the form of an offer to send an Indian cosmonaut into space. Two IAF pilots were trained in the Soviet Union and on 4th April 1984, the first, and till now only, Indian cosmonaut, Sqn Ldr Rakesh Sharma was launched into space aboard a Soviet spacecraft. It was a thrilling experience for the Indian population to hear in real-time an Indian cosmonaut out there in space engaging the Indian Prime Minister in a lively conversation.

Russia today has a growth rate of 6-7%, a GDP nearing $ 1.5 trillion and the worlds largest energy reserves including 13% of proven oil finds, 34% of natural gas and 25% of all coals. But because of the perma-frost conditions that obtain, it costs $14 to extract a barrel of oil in Russia as compared to $4 in Kuwait.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all weapon systems and military equipment were sold to India at ‘friendship’ prices that were substantially lower than the cost of similar systems available in the western market. Product and spares support, however, was less than efficient. The Soviet system of production, with factories and facilities spread far and wide, neccesitated a long lead time for Indian demands to be centrally collected, vetted and despatched. The Soviets were strong in standardisation of equipment but similar parts/equipment fitted on different aircraft had different part numbers. This resulted in over-accumulation of such stocks in India. In later years this led to items for, say MiG-23 being located in MiG-21 equipment depots and many more such instances. The quantum of ‘dead’ or non-moving stocks in our inventory was high and even at ‘friendship’ prices, a lot of money went waste. And as regards time delays in getting spares, our own system of procurement, mostly inflexible and procedure driven, also contributed in keeping our aeroplanes on the ground. The Army and the Navy also probably have similar experiences.

All Soviet aircraft were extremely robust and airframes could withstand a lot of aerodynamic punishment. While the aero-engines were powerful, their fuel efficiency was lower than engines of western design. The Sukhoi-7 ground attack aircraft which was the mainstay of the IAF during the 1971 war, had an engine which developed 9600 kgs of thrust with afterburner, but guzzled fuel. In avionics the Soviets lagged behind Western countries. ‘Ergonomics’ as applied to making the cockpit comfortable for the pilot, was not high on the Soviet designers priorities. ‘Tropicalisation’ of the cockpits appeared to be an afterthought in most Soviet aircrafts. In 1970 an IAF doctor’s study revealed that pilots flying the Su-7, on an average lost 1000-1500 gms of body mass after a 1hour flight in summer conditions. The Soviets, however, were willing to make changes to suit Indian requirements. They were quick to respond to operational needs also. In September 1971, the IAF realised that the Su-7 did not have any armament to attack concrete structures. A message was apparently sent to Moscow. On the night of 6/7 December, a transport aircraft unloaded large boxes at Adampur airbase. These boxes contained a number of brand new S-24 rockets which the IAF had not trained with earlier. The necessary literature regarding release conditions and other firing parameters was included. The next morning, a Su-7 aircraft loaded with the S-24 rockets attacked the Sulaimanke barrage on Sutlej river across the border from Fazilka. Many in the IAF came to know about these potent weapons only after the war. Similar such examples can be found in the Army and Navy also when the Soviets went out of their way to extend assistance. The only discordant note would be that it was an entirely one-sided give and take relationship with India always at the receiving end. But it was a warm relationship. Things are a bit different now.

While Russia has been the predominant supplier of arms to India, this level of dependency is not in Indias national interest. The steps in progress to diversify our weapon sources, are steps in the right direction and can be considered to be, one can state with the luxury of hindsight available to us now, the rectification of a six decade old strategic defect.

The fundamental changes in the world balance of forces have had a direct bearing on the India-Russia relations. Russia is struggling to regain its lost status and stature. India strives to emerge as a major player in its own right. Both countries have established or are in the process of establishing new equations with other major players, but in the new world order all the equations are influenced by the only superpower’s omnipresence. In this matrix of relationships the underlying factor is that no country can achieve its objectives in confrontation with the USA. And the USA can be ruthless if challenged.

Russia today has a growth rate of 6-7%, a GDP nearing $ 1.5 trillion and the worlds largest energy reserves including 13% of proven oil finds, 34% of natural gas and 25% of all coals. But because of the perma-frost conditions that obtain, it costs $14 to extract a barrel of oil in Russia as compared to $4 in Kuwait. And Russian economy is over-reliant on extracting energy and other natural resources. With a land mass five times the size of India, Russia has a population of only 142 million and that too is shrinking at the rate of 350,000 every year. Russia is headed for a demographic catastrophe. Russia fears that Siberia and the far east would soon be over-run by migrant Chinese labour and no immediate solutions are in sight.

India has a vibrant economy but poor imple-mentation of policy has led to a distorted development pattern with a sizeable segment of the the population still denied basic health, education and infrastructure. But a new India is emerging, harder and more self-assertive, a young India more open to new ideas, having divested itself of the baggage of anti-colonialism which was etched deep in the psyche of earlier generations, a confident India able to take a more pragmatic view of the world.

New India and new Russia search for new paradigms to accommodate an old relationship. The warmth of 1971 has long faded and circumstances that obtain now have injected a Moscow chill into the relations.

Russia, outmanoeuvred by the USA, and apprehensive of the creeping NATOisation of its former republics, is forging a strategic coalition with China, unmindful of Indian interests. The Su-30 MKI technology, funded by India, has been transferred to China, which has become a major importer of Russian hi-tech weaponry. China, with ex-Soviet Union scientists and engineers working in its defence facilities is producing fighter aircrafts, now being fitted with Russian engines, and exporting them to Pakistan in a clear violation of an earlier understanding with India. All major weapon deals between India and Russia have run into cost and time over-runs. The INS Vikramaditya still languishes in Russian waters and a firm delivery date is yet to materialise with Russia citing earlier underassessment of refurbishment costs as the cause of delay. The Akula-II nuclear submarine will take considerably longer to join the Indian Navy on lease for 10 years. The upgrade of two IL-38 aircrafts was delayed by nearly 2 years and the final product arrived in India minus the avionics and the weapon systems. India has had to agree to raise the annual cost escalation for all major deals including the Su-30 project, from 2.8% to 5 %. The Ayni airbase near Dushanbe, Tajikistan, developed by India, probably will be denied to India at Russia’s behest. An element of coercion is evident.

A recent trend is jointness in defence production. Brahmos has been a success story, indicating that joint design and production is the way ahead. However in the 5th generation fighter deal, supposed to be a joint design and production programme, India came on board only after the design was frozen. The medium lift transport aircraft will also be a joint effort. Memorandums of Understanding have been signed for additional nuclear reactors at Kudakulam. Agreement has been reached by the two countries on India’s access to the navigational signals of the Russian Global Navigation Satellite System(GLONASS) as also to a part of the GLONASS radio frequency spectrum. The two countries will also co-operate in the joint satellite project “YOUTHSAT”. Russian help will be available for India’s moon mission ‘CHANDRAYAN’.

From a military viewpoint it is strategically imperative for India to diversify the sourcing of imported weapon systems and therefore vital to progressively reduce dependency on Russia without adversely affecting the operational preparedness of our armed forces.

There are compulsions on both sides, Indian and Russian to continue the strategic relationship, but in a changed environment, the contours of the relations must also harmonise with India’s national interests. While India has expressed many times over, her gratitude for Russian arms and equipment and Russia’s support for the Indian cause in Kashmir and now India’s quest for permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Russia has been indicating its displeasure over India’s improving relations with the USA. India’s relations with other countries and events like the nuclear dialogue with the USA are matters sovereign to India and cannot brook interference from any third country. And while Russia has been the predominant supplier of arms to India, this level of dependency is not in India’s national interest. The steps in progress to diversify our weapon sources, are steps in the right direction and can be considered to be, one can state with the luxury of hindsight available to us now, the rectification of a six decade old strategic defect. This strategic defect has also been one of the causes for our DRDO’s less than satisfactory performance till now. It can only be hoped that the Rs 15,0000 crores that the DRDO has asked for over 10 years, at the rate of Rs 15,000 crore per year starting 2010, will put India on a track to achieve substantial self-reliance in our military requirements. Joint ventures with Russia ought to give impetus in our efforts towards self-reliance. Technology transfers have to be a mandatory provision for any future defence deal.

The much delayed LCA programme and the shrinking combat aircraft holdings of the IAF has compelled India to float global request for proposals for 126 fighter aircrafts in an expected mega deal of $ 7 billion. Russia, realizing it is not a front runner to clinch this deal, has indicated its displeasure by downgrading the visit status of our senior ministers. The Russian aircraft contending for this fighter deal is an upgraded version of an outdated design. Should the Russian aircraft be short-listed, India will have to carefully analyse Russia’s capability to provide product support over its life-cycle, given the direction in which Russia;s military industrial complex is headed. Had the design of the Russian aircraft been contemporary, joint production would have been a win-win situation.

As and when the 126 aircraft deal is finalised, and if Russia is not the supplier, the reverberations will impact on the India-Russia strategic relationship and both the Indian and Russian establishments will have to employ all their diplomatic skills to manage the fallout. In the new world order, both India and Russia will have to learn to manage their strategic relationship in consonance with their national interests.

From a military viewpoint it is strategically imperative for India to diversify the sourcing of imported weapon systems and therefore vital to progressively reduce dependency on Russia without adversely affecting the operational preparedness of our armed forces. The India -Russia strategic relations can continue to be energised through jointness in defence production, space, nuclear and scientific co-operation and energy research.