Indian Defence Review

The first major engagement in this sector took place in the early hours of 13 December, when the leading brigade put in a silent attack and captured Parbat Ali after a stiff battle.

The para commandos crossed into Pakistan after dusk on 5 December. The task given to them was to raid Umarkot, a canal-bridge in its vicinity, Chachro, Virawah and Nagar Parkar. However, for some reason, Southern Command cancelled the operations in the Umarkot area and the group heading in that direction was recalled. The raid on Chachro took place in the early hours of 7 December. The commandos cleared the town, capturing nearly 20 prisoners and a good quantity of arms and ammunition. On the following night they operated against Virawah and later against Nagar Parkar, after which they returned to their base. Hardly any advantage, however, was taken of their good work. The formation advancing from the direction of Dali-Khinsar had been ordered to occupy Chachro after the raid. But its troops arrived a day later. The enemy had by then returned, with the result that the town had to be fought over again.

By the evening of 8 December, the leading brigade had arrived in front of a high feature called Parbat Ali. The enemy had a screen position here, behind which lay the main Naya Chor defences. The latter were held by about two battalions of infantry, with armour in support. That day the Pakistanis attacked the leading Indian elements, but were thrown back. The follow-up brigade had, by this time, fetched up in the Parche-ji-Veri area, though the duckboard track was still far behind and the forward troops were without water.

By 11 December the follow-up brigade was also leaning on Parbat Ali. An attempt by Anand’s solitary squadron of armour to outflank this position failed. To give more punch to 11 Division, a brigade group from 12 Division, together with two squadrons of armour, was now ordered to this sector. However, in a situation where the troops already with 11 Division could not be maintained, the additional brigade would only add to the administrative difficulties.

The first major engagement in this sector took place in the early hours of 13 December, when the leading brigade put in a silent attack and captured Parbat Ali after a stiff battle. The enemy left behind 57 dead and 35 prisoners. It later put in three counter-attacks to retake the position, failing each time.

Meanwhile, efforts continued to push forward the duckboard road and to build up for the attack on Naya Chor. On 15 December, a probing mission against its defences was severely mauled. In fact, the Pakistanis had by this time reinforced this sector with a brigade group, which included a regiment of armour, from their 33 Infantry Division. Anand’s chances of taking Naya Chor had thus receded sharply. On13 December, he had sent a battalion group from Chachro to develop a threat towards Umarkot from the South-East. The group made good progress and reached Hingrotar on 16 December. However, the next day, before the field guns supporting the battalion could catch up with it, the enemy attacked, forcing it to fall back to Chachro.

The cease-fire came while 11 Division was still building up for its projected attack on Naya Chor. The BSF had done well in the Bikaner and Kutch sector, capturing about 50 enemy border outposts ‘which had either been vacated by the Rangers or Mujahids, or where opposition was light’.18 At one stage, around 8 December, Army Headquarters had suggested to General Bewoor that one brigade group of 12 Division be sent to Kutch to operate towards Badin, South of Hyderabad, but administrative problems precluded a quick switch-over. Bewoor, however, ordered the para commandos to raid Badin on 12 December. Later, when it was discovered that there was no suitable route for infiltration towards Badin, he ordered raids on Islamkot and Diplo.

It was for the first time in the history of Indo-Pak conflicts that a decision to end hostilities was not dictated by the UN or an external mediator. President Yahya Khan kept his people in suspense for several hours after the Indian announcement.

Making a 64-kilometre advance from Nagar Parkar during the night of 16/17 December a commando group raided Islamkot at dawn but found that the enemy had left the town a week earlier. Later, on the way to Diplo, the group shot up an enemy motor detachment. By the time the commandos could dispose of the captured material and send back the prisoners, it was too late to go for Diplo before the cease-fire, and they exfiltiated to their base.

The Rajasthan campaign ended before Southern Command could reach the green belt in Sind. The extent of territory it captured was quite large – ­12,200 square kilometres – but it was all a sandy waste.19 Better results might have accrued had some of the basic principles of warfare not been disregarded. Instead of concentrating the available resources on a worthwhile axis at a time, an advance on two divergent axes was undertaken simultaneously. Planning lacked imagination as was shown by the last-minute scramble for engineer stores and personnel. There could be no better proof of the low state of Indian intelligence than its failure to discover the condition of surface communications in territory that was only a few kilometres from the border. On the other hand, 12 Division took no notice of the information given by the civil authorities regarding Pakistan’s preparations opposite Longewala and Sadhewala.

CEASE-FIRE

On 16 December, after the surrender of his Army in East Pakistan, President Yahya Khan made a broadcast to his people that it was merely the loss of a battle and that the war would go on. The Indian Government, however, had no intention of prolonging the conflict as that would mean further loss of life and property and suffering for countless people. Accordingly, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced in the Parliament on 17 December that Indian armed forces had been given instructions to cease operations from 2000 hours that day on all fronts in the West.

It was for the first time in the history of Indo-Pak conflicts that a decision to end hostilities was not dictated by the UN or an external mediator. President Yahya Khan kept his people in suspense for several hours after the Indian announcement. However, the realities of the situation must have dawned upon him soon enough, for he accepted the cease-fire before the deadline fixed by India. It is unlikely,that he was not aware about the reinforcement of the Western theatre by India, with troops withdrawn from the East. A part of 11 Corps had begun moving to Punjab, and the first troops had arrived there on 13 December.

Some people later asserted that India wanted to destroy West Pakistan after finishing the campaign in the East and that the cease-fire was announced under-pressure from a particular country or countries. The author asked Field Marshal Manekshaw whether there was any truth in this assertion. “There was no pressure on me or the Prime Minister,” he said. “And I can’t believe that any country can put pressure on Indira Gandhi”.

NOTES

1. Northern Command was created later and made responsible for the Jammu & Kashmir region.
2. Its one infantry brigade was with their 23 Infantry Division.
3. Defence of the Western Border, by Major General Sukhwant Singh, p. 12.
4. According to one source, the guns of the two forward batteries of this regiment were damaged when the depth battery engaged the enemy in the direct lay.
5. Now Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry.
6. This battalion was under 15 Corps.
7. The regiment is also known as the Poona Horse.
8. Defence of the Western Border, by Major General Sukhwant Singh, p. 41.
9. Ibid., p. 143.
10. lbid., p.138.
11. Ibid., p.159.
12. Ibid., p. 192.
13. Major General Sukhwant Singh was Deputy Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters at the time. In his book Defence of the Western Border (pp. 237-8), he says that when he visited Longewala after the cease-fire, he was told by the Collector of Jaisalmer that he had informed 12 Division on 30 November 1971, of the evacuation of villages on the Pakistan side of the border and had also reported that the Pakistanis were improving the tracks in their territory leading to Longewala and Sadhewala. Obviously no notice was taken of this information.
14. Ibid., pp. 212-3.
15. Ibid., p. 214.
16. One group of this battalion was assigned to 12 Infantry Division to operate in an airborne role in the Rahimyar Khan area. After the cancellation of that mission, this group remained unutilized till the cease-fire.
17. The division originally had only its integral Engineer regiment and an independent field company.
18. Defence of the Western Border, by Major General Sukhwant Singh, pp. 230-1.
19. Ibid., p. 231