The air-strike came promptly at first light. Jaisalmer had only two Hunters in serviceable condition but the Air Force put them to good use. Sortie after sortie was flown. The tanks around Longewala and those strung on the track leading to it were sitting ducks. Guided by the air observation pilots in their tiny Krishaks, the Hunters shot them up. The air action continued throughout 5 December. Surprisingly, the Pakistan Air Force did not show up. By midday, 17 tanks and 23 other vehicles had been written off. It later transpired that the enemy had launched this offensive without arranging for air-support or even ground air-defence weapons.
Plans captured from the tanks showed that the Pakistanis had wanted to outflank the Indian troops deployed in the Tanot-Kishengarh area. They expected to have breakfast at Ramgarh and dinner at Jaisalmer. Coming as they did without any air-cover and, as it later turned out, without enough water and food, their venture was extremely foolhardy. But it did mess up General Bewoor’s plans.13 Had the Pakistani thrust come on 6 or 7 December when 12 Division would have been plodding through the desert towards Rahimyar Khan, the consequences would have been much more serious.
Plans captured from the tanks showed that the Pakistanis had wanted to outflank the Indian troops deployed in the Tanot-Kishengarh area.
The Army Commander now had two options. He could contain the enemy on the Longewala axis and go ahead with his offensive, with the knowledge that the enemy had already committed most of its armour and would not be able to divert it to Rahimyar Khan in time to interfere with the Indian advance. Alternatively, he could direct his assault force on Longewala. But he did neither, and ordered the entire division to adopt a defensive posture.14 To reinforce it, he sent a troop of anti-tank guided missiles out of his reserve.
On 6 December, enemy artillery kept shelling Longewala intermittently. A second Pakistani column was sighted South of Kharotar that day. An air mission sent to strafe it reported that the column had bogged in the sand on the Gabbar-Longewala axis. This was the second prong of the Pakistani offensive but it had lost direction in the desert and converged on its first column.
Manekshaw was riled when he saw that no advantage was being taken of the enemy’s discomfiture. On his urging, Bewoor ordered 12 Infantry Division to go on the offensive and “destroy the enemy force quickly and, if possible, by last light on 8 December”. 15 Bewoor, however, stipulated that the divisional plan should be based on brigade attacks and that Khambata should submit it for his approval by 1100 hours the next day (7 December).
This dithering angered Manekshaw. There was no question of set-piece attacks as visualized by the Army Commander; all that was required was bold pursuit before the enemy recovered its breath and got away. As a last resort, Manekshaw, sent a personal message to Khambata on 7 December to get on with the job.
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In spite of this, the pursuit began after the enemy’s withdrawal was well under way. The Pakistanis were quick to act. They replaced the commander of their 18 Division, responsible for mounting the offensive. The new commander seized the initiative and promptly ordered a withdrawal. According to Pakistani accounts, there was no pursuit of their forces.
Khambata’s advance was slow. There was, however, some rear-guard action near the border and thereafter about 640 square kilometres of empty desert was captured. According to Indian estimates, Pakistan lost 24 tanks, five field guns, four air-defence guns and 138 vehicles in the offensive.
After the Longewala episode, Bewoor asked for a change in his task as he felt that the resources with him were inadequate for the capture of Rahimyar Khan. Manekshaw was at first adamant, but the slow pace of the ‘pursuit’ made him change his mind. Bewoor’s recommendation was to leave one brigade of 12 Infantry Division in the Jaisalmer area, send one to reinforce 11 Division and another to the Kutch sector. Manekshaw accepted the transfer of only one brigade as he did not want to jeopardize the security of Northern Rajasthan, where he foresaw a threat from Pakistani reserves held around Multan.
Opposite 11 Division, too, the enemy had just one brigade group with paramilitary personnel holding border outposts. Major General Anand deployed one infantry brigade group in his firm base in the Gadra Road-Munabao area, while the rest of his division was held in the rear. In the shape of armour he had one independent squadron. To assist him, 10 (Para) Commando (less a group)16 was to operate in a ground role against enemy lines of communication. This unit was, however, directly under Southern Command for operational purposes. The success of the division depended largely on the speed with which the rail-track between Munabao and Khokhropar could be made operational.
The divisional plan envisaged the capture of Khokhropar and Gadra City on D plus one day. A firm base was thereafter to be established by the leading brigade for a divisional attack on Naya Chor, the main enemy position before Umarkot. The leading brigade was to complete this task by D plus two days, and Naya Chor was expected to fall in the next six days. The main axis of advance was to be Munabao-Khokropar-Parbat Ali, while a subsidiary thrust was to make for Khinsar and Chachro.
The advance began on the evening of 4 December. The enemy Air Force was very active but despite its efforts the division took its initial objectives by 5 December. The leading brigade took Khokhropar against light opposition and the brigade holding the firm base took Gadra City and Khinsar. At the same time a camel battalion (17 Grenadiers), deployed North of the main divisional axis, made good progress. By 7 December it had taken several enemy posts opposite the Myajlar-Sundra area and was thereafter ordered to consolidate its gains and guard this axis against infiltration.
Anand’s difficulties surfaced soon after the initial successes. The road beyond Khokhropar was found to be a desert track. Indian intelligence had reported it earlier as a tarmac highway. This meant the laying of a duckboards. The division’s engineer resources were woefully inadequate for this task. The requirement of duckboard, originally estimated for a 10-kilometre stretch, now shot up to 60 kilometres. Laying the duckboard track required much effort due to the sand-dunes that ran across the track and were as high as 50 metres at some places. To augment the division’s engineer capability,17 a Railway Engineer Group (TA) and an Army Engineer Regiment were rushed in. At the same time, a Road Maintenance Unit and two Pioneer Companies were sent to the divisional area.
By 7 December the leading brigade had taken Parche-ji- Veri, on the route to Naya Chor and on the Southern axis, Dali and Mahendro-or-par were also taken. That day the Engineers were able to run the first train to Khokhropar but it was strafed from the air soon after its arrival.
Surprising to see that the role of 2nd Bn BSF is completely ignored in the narration. This battalion had established bridgehead across the salt flats of Suigam sector and had attacked and overrun the towns of Virawah and Nagar Parkar. Assistant Commandant T. P. Singh was awarded Sena Medal and the commandant, Lt Col L B Kane was awarded VSM for these crucial battles, establish firmbase from which 10 Para conducted further ops.