Indian Defence Review

Southwestern Sector

The sector, terrainwise, looks like the oblongish first quadrant of a circle, its vertical represented by the Ichhamati running north to south, its base resting on the sea, and its circumference formed by the Padma and lower Meghna. Halfway between the Ichhamati and the Padma runs the Madhumati. The main road and rail communications ran between these rivers. One such artery ran from Kushtia to Jessore and from thence to Khulna between the Ichhamati, and the Madhumati, and the other from Kushtia to Madhukhali and thence to Faridpur between the Madhumati and the Padma. A few laterals linked these arteries, with ferry services across the Madhumati, with one another, and with the Indian road network across the Ichhamati.

…the master plan described earlier envisaged crippling the Pakistani war machine in the eastern wing and liberating the entire territory within three weeks. The task before Aurora was not as easy as appeared after its swift execution.

Niazi was defending the sector with Pakistan 9 Infantry Division, consisting of two infantry brigade groups under Gen Ansari, apart from the paramilitary forces manning the border. 57 Infantry Brigade Group was to deny the northern approaches to Hardinge Bridge and Kushtia by deploying one battalion each along the Ichhamati at Berhampore and Meherpur to block the routes of ingress from India by the Berhampore-Paksay and Plassey-Meherpur-Kushtia roads, with the third battalion at Kushtia. This battalion was later drawn towards the area between Chaudanga and Jhenida when the Indians captured Jiban Nagar and were developing a thrust northwards. 107 Infantry Brigade Group was concentrated along with Headquarters 9 Infantry Division and divisional troops in defence of the Jessore fortress. Jessore, an important communications centre, was heavily fortified and well stocked to fight a last-ditch battle.

After deploying one battalion each at Benepole and Satkhira to deny expected Indian entry routes along the Bongaon-Benepole Jessore and Basirhat-Satkhira-Daulatpur-Khulna roads, the rest of the troops, consisting of about two battalions and divisional troops, were deployed in defence of Jessore. The fortifications were originally sited to cover the obvious appoaches along the main routes, but the action fought on 22 November at Bayra and the newly developing threat from an unexpected direction made some re-adjustments necessary. Ansari accordingly reorganised his defences west of Jessore by linking various marshes and pulling in troops earlier deployed forward in the Chaughacha area, and he possibly got a battalion’s worth of reinforcements from Rajshahi. There were thus good chances of the newly organised Jessore defences holding out.

A little background history of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division and its commander is necessary at this stage. This formation was raised after the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 in the vicinity of Gujrat to form part of the Pakistani Strike Force North. It was hurriedly inducted into East Pakistan by air when Tikka Khan’s crackdown was imminent. This formation left its integral armour and artillery in West Pakistan as it was felt that such heavy weaponry would not be needed to crush a civilian rebellion. On induction, the formation was employed with its own brigades east of the Meghna from Sylhet to Chittagong, but it appears that as part of a later rationalisation of command and control of operational sectors.

The sense of isolation from their homes in West Pakistan, the uncertainty of early return and lack of news about their families increased the soldiers anxiety, as prisoners revealed later.

Niazi moved Headquarters 9 Infantry Division to Jessore to command the southwestern sector. Ansari had just replaced Maj Gen Shaukat Riza, who had moved with the division to East Pakistan. The two brigades, 57 and 107 Infantry, originally belonged to Pakistan 14 Infantry Division. So the division commander and the formations were new to each other.

Pitted against Ansari was Gen Raina, in command of the newly raised II Corps. Raina had proved his mettle as a brigade commander at Chushul against the invading Chinese in 1962. He had an admirable soldiering reputation and was expected to achieve solid results. Under him was Maj Gen Dalbir Singh, commanding Indian 9 Infantry Division, and Maj Gen Mohinder Singh Barar in command of 4 Mountain Division.

Dalbir Singh had been in command for a couple of years and was responsible for the execution of the limited Indian contigency plan in East Pakistan. He knew the terrain and the Pakistani capability in the sector extremely well and exuded confidence. He had acquired the reputation of being an aggressive personality as he was ever ready to attack whatever the occasion, whether at mess parties or in military exercises. He was a big, burly man, a good infantry soldier who was expected to undertake copybook fighting with verve and dogged persistence, even against heavy odds.Indian 9 Infantry Division had at the start of Yahya Khan’s war got sucked into the Bayra salient, secured in the defensive operation carried out in the area, and was in contact with the reorganised Jessore defences along the marshes west of the town. This had closed other options of out-manoeuvering the Jessore defences. Dalbir Singh therefore started, rather bull-headedly, a series of hammering attacks to achieve a breakthrough. Starting at first light on 4 December, the pounding continued till late 6 December, but still there was no sign of a dent in the defences.

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When the Chief was beginning to lose his patience at the sluggish progress Dalbir Singh’s persistence paid. After putting up a stubborn and determined stand for two days, Ansari decided to vacate Jessore. Why he took this decision, when his troops were well entrenched, holding out stoutly and inflicting heavy casualties, and no encroachment on his defence line had yet been effected, is not discernible. Brig distinguished himself in this battle by personally leading the attack from the northwest which eventually achieved the breakthrough. He was wounded in the action. It is significant that though the Pakistanis vacated Jessore by dawn on 6 December, it was not occupied by the Indians till late on the 7th afternoon.

The Pakistanis had prepared a series of delaying positions in the built-up area along the main road. The terrain astride the road was marshy and the Indian advance encountered stiff resistance.

After the fall of Jessore, Ansari and his headquarters and divisional troops fell back first on Magura, and later crossed the Madhumati river, covering the ferry crossings, while 107 Infantry Brigade Group withdrew to Khulna leaving a covering force of about a batallion group to delay the Indian advance. Contrary to Fazal Mugeem’s assertion that after the capture of Jessore the Indians resumed their advance towards Khulna with a fresh division, Dalbir Singh continued the attack with 32 Infantry Brigade. The Pakistanis had prepared a series of delaying positions in the built-up area along the main road. The terrain astride the road was marshy and the Indian advance encountered stiff resistance.

Further delay was caused by demolitions of bridges and culverts all along the route. In characteristic Indian Army style, Dalbir Singh systematically cleared the delaying positions step by step in deliberate attacks supported by air and a heavy concentration of artillery. The slow march towards Khulna continued till the main Pakistani defences were contacted at Daulatpur on 11 December. It took four days for the division to cover a distance of about 30 miles against an opposition of no more than about one battalion strength.

In the process the whole of Indian 9 Infantry Division was built up, but its full combat power could not be exploited because room for deployment was lacking.

Daulatpur was connected with Khulna by a narrow strip of continuous built-up area extending in all about ten miles. It was flanked by marshes in the west and the Bhairab river in the east, making it difficult for the defences to be outflanked. Dalbir Singh perforce tackled the defences frontally, and the operation for the capture of the Daulatpur-Khulna strip turned into a hard slogging match. Between 11 December, when contact was made, and 15 December a series of attacks were launched on Daulatpur, held by Pakistan 6 Punjab, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. But practically no dent was made in the defences. In the process the whole of Indian 9 Infantry Division was built up, but its full combat power could not be exploited because room for deployment was lacking.

An outflanking move was attempted on the night of 15/16 December with 42 Infantry Brigade crossing the Bhairab to the east and then working south up to the junction of the Bhairab and Atrai, where a crossing was to be effected towards the west to establish itself on the main road. By the morning of 16 December, 2 Sikh Light Infantry, the leading battalion, had occupied some positions overlooking the main road, but the subsequent crossings met stiff opposition. Efforts were still on to push the crossings when the ceasefire was effected. By then the division had also managed to nibble three of the forward localities at Daulatpur frontally. The Indian Air Force was very active throughout the operations and gave a good account of itself by providing timely and close support. So zealous were the airmen in executing their task that, according to Fazal Muqeem, they destroyed two Indian gunboats which were trying to enter Khulna harbour. Some of the officers and crew of the boats were taken prisoner by the Pakistanis.

The Indian Air Force was very active throughout the operations and gave a good account of itself by providing timely and close support.

It is said that Brig Malik Hayat Khan, commander of 107 Infantry Brigade Group responsible for the defence of Khulna, was greatly perturbed when Niazi ordered him to suspend hostilities and surrender his men and equipment to General Officer Commanding 9 Infantry Division. He had kept the division at bay on his own for a good ten days, and yet the real fight for Khulna had not begun. He was justifiably confident of holding out for another week or so till the much-promised American help materialised. He felt badly let down by the Pakistani higher command, he said later in interrogation.

Up north, 4 Mountain Division, under the command of Gen Barar, had established a foothold in the general area of Jiban Nagar and Darsana and was poised to attack Kot Chandpur with a view to developing a thrust towards Kaliganj. 4 Mountain Division was raised by the British in the Second World War and had many epic-making battles to its credit in the Middle East campaigns and in Italy. This formation faced the Chinese in NEFA in 1962, although not with credit. But its failure was not due to any fault of its own as described in many an “untold story.”

Within a few minutes it lost five tanks and suffered very heavy casualties in men. As transpired later, this engagement took place with the rear elements of Pakistan 57 Infantry Brigade, which was to cross the Padma and move northward to join Pakistan 16 Infantry Division deployed in the northeastern sector.

In the 1965 conflict, this division fought the crucial battle at Khem Karan and was mainly responsible for frustrating Ayub Khan’s Grand Slam plan of marching on to Delhi. It has always represented the best fighting quality of the Indian Army. Barar took over only a couple of months before the battle and was thus fairly new to the formation. Although he was professionally well qualified, he came in for notice only when he was selected to be Military Assistant to Gen P. P. Kumaramangalam, then Chief of the Army Staff. His subsequent rapid rise had set a trend for the personal staff’s divine right to find room in the military higher command. Although he himself had not seen much fighting after independence he had taken over a seasoned and war-tried formation which needed no nursing.

Barar held the salient of Jiban Nagar with 62 Mountain Brigade and captured Darsana and Kot Chandpur by 5 December. Instead of developing a thrust towards Kot Chandpur and their advancing on Jhenida along the main road axis, he executed a brilliant move towards the north. A road block was established between Chaudanga and Jhenida with a combat group of ark infantry battalion and an armoured squadron. Several attempts by the enemy to break through the block were foiled. Instead of falling back on Jhenida, the force deployed west of the block had perforce to be diverted towards Kushtia. Meanwhile, 41 Mountain Brigade, led by Brig Michigan, made a dash for Jhenida along a very difficult dirt track and took the town by surprise on 6 December. Ansari was so taken a back by the speed of the Indian advance that not only was he not able to reinforce Jhenida in time but also lost his nerve and decide to evacuate Jessore, the strongest fortress in East Pakistan, itself.

Barar did not give him any respite. 62 Mountain Brigade was pushed through towards Magura with the utmost speed and took the town by 8 December, to see Ansari and the remnants of Pakistan 9 Infantry Division fleeing across the Madhumati. By now Ansari’s forces had split in three. 107 Infantry Brigade had withdrawn to Khulna in the south, 57 Infantry Brigade made its way to Kushtia to the north on the capture of Jhenida, and whatever of the remainder of divisional headquarters and troops Ansari could gather fell back across the Madhumati towards Faridpur. Pakistan 9 Infantry Division had ceased to be a cohesive fighting formation and Ansari had lost control of it.

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After the capture of Magura, 62 Mountain Brigade under Brig Rajendra Nath commenced advancing on Faridpur. The enemy had demolished the bridge over the Kumar and withdrawn east of the Madhumati, leaving some delaying elements west of it. These elements were however energetically eliminated, the brigade occupied the west bank of the river by the evening of 9 December, and preparations were afoot for an assault crossing the next day.