Indian Defence Review

Under cover of heavy shelling, which began soon after nightfall on 3 December, the leading battalions of Akbar Khan’s assault brigades moved East and then South, to get to their initial objectives. By 2200 hours the battalion making for Danna had taken an Indian outpost and the second battalion had contacted the picquets at Shahpur and Gutrian. The follow-up battalions advanced soon after, without waiting for the fall of these positions. One of these battalions was required to secure the heights overlooking Mandi, while the other was to make for the Thanpir and Chandak features overlooking the Kalai Bridge on the Surankot-Punch road.

Under cover of heavy shelling, which began soon after nightfall on 3 December, the leading battalions of Akbar Khans assault brigades moved East and then South, to get to their initial objectives.

A detachment of 3 Jammu & Kashmir Militia,5 that had been holding Thanpir, was unfortunately moved out during the early part of the night to reinforce the Shahpur and Gutrian posts before the troops ordered for its relief had arrived. Thus, when the enemy reached Thanpir, it found the post unoccupied, except for some non-combatants. Later, when the relieving troops arrived, the enemy was already in occupation of Thanpir, and they suffered heavy casualties.

From Thanpir, the Pakistanis fanned out and occupied the Nagali and Chandak features. The next morning, they ambushed a BSF patrol near the Kalai Bridge. As a consequence, all traffic on the Surankot-Punch road came to a halt. Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, the radio set of their forward observation officer ceased to function and they could not bring the vehicles halted on the road under artillery fire. The second enemy battalion was also able to reach Mandi, but could do little damage.

Major General Kundan Singh ordered a reserve battalion to move from Jaranwali Gali to Punch during the night of 3/4 December. This battalion was now given the task of clearing Chandak and Thanpir. The Pakistanis at these places were in a tight corner as they had no artillery support and were without food. During the afternoon, those at Chandak began to march back towards Thanpir. The Pakistani troops that had reached Nagali comprised a company of infantry and a platoon from their Special Service Group. They had earlier made their presence felt by opening up on the wagon lines of an artillery unit in the area. A group from 9 (Para) Commando6 soon drove them away after inflicting heavy casualties.

By 1000 hours on 5 December, the enemy was withdrawing from Nagali and Chandak and had fallen back on Thanpir. Meanwhile, Indian troops holding Danna had stood their ground despite repeated attacks throughout 4 December and the night of 4/5 December. The enemy suffered heavy casualties, its assault battalion losing its commanding officer. Mines and effective artillery support helped the defenders in a big way.

The attack on Shahpur and Gutrian also failed. These failures on both axes isolated the enemy’s forward troops. At Thanpir, there was utter confusion after the battalion occupying it lost its commanding officer. About 1600 hours on 5 December this battalion withdrew to Kirni, leaving behind large quantities of arms and equipment. The battalion that had reached Mandi also fell back on the night of 5/6 December.

By this time the Pakistani offensive was virtually over. Their troops investing Danna, Gutrian and Shahpur, however, remained in position till 7 December, when they also withdrew. Some elements of their Special Service Group had managed to infiltrate far behind the CFL. They were also mopped up within a few days.

After the failure of their offensive, the Pakistanis became apprehensive of an Indian riposte towards Haji Pir Pass. But the Indian command had no plans for a major counter-offensive in this sector, though the divisional commander did order limited operations along the CFL to improve his defensive posture. In an operation mounted on the night of 10/11 December, some features of tactical importance opposite Madarpur, South-West of Punch, were captured. However, another operation on the night of 13/ 14 December proved a costly failure. It was mounted against Daruchian by 14 Grenadiers and the battalion suffered about 160 casualties, including all the assault company commanders.

By this time the Pakistani offensive was virtually over. Their troops investing Danna, Gutrian and Shahpur, however, remained in position till 7 December”¦

As pan of the attack on Daruchian, Major General Kundan Singh had ordered his para commando group to eliminate six enemy guns which were supponing this position. These 122-mm Chinese-made weapons were located on a ridge near the village of Mandhol. The paratroopers’ operation was a complete success.

Chicken’s Neck

Soon after the Pakistani air-strikes, orders went out for offensive operations to commence within 48 hours. However, the operations which were to support 1 Corps had to be given up or curtailed. As we have seen, 10 Division remained on the defensive after being-pushed out of Chhamb. The deficiency in 1 Corps resulting from the despatch of 33 Brigade to Punch was made good by placing 168 Brigade of 26 Division under 39 Division. This, in turn, led to the cancellation of 26 Division’s advance towards Sialkot and the only important mission this formation undertook was the capture of ‘Chicken’s Neck’.

About 170 square kilometres in area, this narrow strip of Pakistani territory has a small neck in the South, from which a jagged head, with a beak-like point, extends Northwards. The beak points towards Akhnur, with its important bridge over the Chenab. Before Major General Z.C. Bakhshi took over 26 Division, the strip was often referred to as ‘the Dagger’ on account of its shape and the threat it posed to Akhnur. To remove this kind of thinking, he told everyone in his command that the name would thenceforth be Chicken’s Neck and that he was soon going to wring it (it is called Phulkian Salient by the Pakistanis).

Access to the salient from the Pakistani side was over ferries on the Chenab in the South and its defences were generally oriented towards the North and East

The Neck was important to the Pakistanis also. Their Marala Headworks lay South of it and it was a base for infiltration into the Akhnur-Jammu area. Access to the salient from the Pakistani side was over ferries on the Chenab in the South and its defences were generally oriented towards the North and East. Pakistan’s 15 Division was responsible for this area and Indian intelligence had estimated that the Neck was held by about four companies of Chhamb Rangers and a regular battalion, with some tanks in support.

Like his operation against the Haji Pir Pass in 1965, Bakhshi managed to achieve complete surprise in his attack on Chicken’s Neck. His orders to 19 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Mohinder Singh, were to infiltrate from the South so as to block the enemy’s route of withdrawal and thus demoralize it before taking its main defences. The brigade was supported by armour and had a group from 9 (Para) Commando under command.

The operation began at last light on 5 December and was successfully completed within 48 hours. However, due to the over-cautious advance of the leading elements and the sandy nature of the terrain. which slowed down the resupply column, the enemy was able to pull out the major portion of its troops from the salient.

After this operation, 26 Division contented itself with small raids on the border outposts opposite its area. The troops released after the completion of the Chicken’s Neck mission remained unused till the cease-fire.

The Shakargarh Bulge

Lieutenant General K.K. Singh, GOC 1 Corps. was Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters before assuming command of this formation in October 1971. He was, therefore, closely associated with the planning of the operation he was to undertake later. Initially, he set up his Headquarters at Pathankot but moved it to Samba on 2 December. On the morning of 4 December he met Lieutenant General Candeth at Dina Nagar. At this meeting it was decided that the offensive would be mounted on the night of 5/6 December.

Before we describe the Corps’ operations it would be worthwhile to take a look at the area in which it operated. The terrain was flat, except for the foothills in the North. The only major river in the area was the Ravi. To its West flowed several minor rivers: Ujh. Tarnah, Bein. Karir, Basantar, Degh Nadi and Aik Nala. Like the Ravi all of them flowed from Indian territory into Pakistan.

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Pakistan’s 1 Corps held the area. From its base at Sialkot, a line of defences ran Eastwards. An anti-tank ditch covered the international boundary up to the Degh Nadi. Thereafter, the Supwal Ditch covered the gap between the Degh Nadi and the Basantar. All major towns had anti-tank ditches, which were integrated into a belt of defences running from the Degh Nadi to Zafarwal, Dhamthal and further down (see Fig. 14.3). Extensive but indifferently laid minefields barred the likely Indian approaches. Communications were fairly good in dry weather.

Besides its three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54), 1 Corps had two independent armoured brigades (2 and 16), two independent artillery brigades (41 and 31, less a medium regiment), and about two engineer brigade equivalents. The infantry divisions had no integral armour but had their own complement of artillery and engineer elements, besides the ancillary units. The corps had a locating battery and an air OP squadron (less a flight). Headquarters 1 Corps had Number 8 Tactical Air Centre of Indian Air Force affiliated to it.The corps’ battle order looked impressive but its defensive commitments tied it down considerably. The orders to the corps commander were to contain the enemy offensive in his area frontally and then deliver a riposte against enemy lines of communication so as to force it back. In case the enemy did not launch an offensive, K.K. Singh was to advance into the Shakargarh Bulge East of the Degh Nadi and capture the objectives mentioned earlier.

The defensive deployment could at a pinch cover the requirement of a flanking attack on the Pakistanis by anyone of the unengaged armoured brigades.

The initial deployment of the corps was as follows:

1. 36 Division – South-East of the Ravi, in the Thakurpur-Gurdaspur-Dina Nagar area.
2. 39    Division – North of the Ravi, in the Madhopur-Bamial-Dayalachak area.
3. 54 Division – Around Samba, between the Bein River and the Degh Nadi.

The corps’ flanks were covered by 11 Corps in the South and by 15 Corps in the North. However, the former was thin on the ground in the area immeiliately to the South of 1 Corps’ boundary with it and its defences had to be catered for.

Lieutenant General K.K. Singh’s plan required 54 and 39 Divisions to advance South from their bases, while 36 Division was to strike Westward in case the situation warranted. The defensive deployment could at a pinch cover the requirement of a flanking attack on the Pakistanis by anyone of the unengaged armoured brigades. The Pakistani Army remained on the defensive in this sector. But it had considerable offensive potential and the corps commander deployed the following formations for the defence of his area of responsibility:

1. 168 Infantry Brigade (26 Division), 323 Infantry Brigade (39 Division) and 16 Cavalry (less a squadron);
2. 87 Infantry Brigade (39 Division) and a squadron of 16 cavalry in the Bamial-Parol sector; and,
3. 18 Infantry Brigade (36 Division) with a squadron of armour from 14 Independent Armoured Brigade in the Thakurpur-Gurdaspur sector.

Pakistans 1 Corps held the area. From its base at Sialkot, a line of defences ran Eastwards. An anti-tank ditch covered the international boundary up to the Degh Nadi.

Pakistan’s 1 Corps working out of Sialkot area had deployed its integral assets in a defensive role as follows:

1. 15 Infantry Division was deployed between the Chenab and the Degh Nadi guarding the Marala-Chapral, Suchetgarh and South-Eastern approaches to Sialkot with an infantry brigade each.
2. Initially, 8 Independent Amroured Brigade (four regiments and one armoured infantry battalion) was held centrally in the Chawinda area awaiting the Indian 1 Corps’ offensive pattern to emerge. Once it did it shifted its weight Eastwards to their 1 Corps’ limit of penetration.
3. With the Degh Nadi forming the inter divisional boundary, 8 infantry Division was deployed to its East. Its infantry brigades held Zafarwal, Dhamthal, Narowal and Shakargarh in strength converting each into a strongpoint covered by all-round protective minefields and anti-tank ditches. Its fourth brigade (14) was in reserve.

39 Infantry Division

The offensive got off to a good start. Pakistan’s border outposts were cleared during the night of 5/6 December. However, 39 Division got stuck soon after. This division, under Major General B.R Prabhu, was to advance on Shakargarh between the Bein and the Karir Rivers. The divisional commander had none of his own infantry brigades with him. For this operation, he was given 72 Infantry Brigade, with four battalions, from 36 Division. The rest of his order of battle comprised 2 Independent Armoured Brigade (T-55) less a regiment, 1 Dogra (mechanized), a brigade plus in artillery and two regiments plus of engineer resources. Opposing him initially were elements of covering troops from 3 Independent (ad hoc) Armoured Brigade backed up in depth by one infantry brigade.

The division was required to make a two-pronged advance. One column was to advance by way of Dehlra and Chakra and the other by way of Khaira, Harar Khurd and Giddopindi. The leading infantry battalion (3 Sikh LI), supported by a squadron of 7 Cavalry, was to establish a bridgehead at Harar Khurd. In the dark, however, the group lost its way and reached a village about four kilometres North-West of the objective. This did not, by itself, affect the overall plan but the group was thereafter held up at a minefield. When the armour got bogged in the mines, it was pulled back and 3 Sikh LI were told to advance after last light on 6 December.

Progress was again slow. The infantry could only get as far as Giddarpur by the morning of 7 December. Around noon that day, the armour reached an unguarded minefield near Parni, across which a bridgehead was established.

Prabhu now ordered 2 Armoured Brigade to break out to the rear of the Harar Kalan-Harar Khurd line. The brigade commander gave the mission to 1 Horse with 1 Dogra (less a company) under command. However, this group soon encountered a second minefield and heavy fire. Without allowing for adequate reconnaissance, the brigade commander launched 1 Dogra and one squadron of armour against Harar Kalan during the night. The attack failed despite heavy casualties of 24 dead and 65 wounded.

At this stage, it was decided to turn this position. During the afternoon of 8 December an outflanking move was begun after breaching a minefield. Unfortunately, after two of the tanks had crossed over, a third blew up on an odd mine. Apprehending attack by tank-hunting parties, the two forward tanks were abandoned. Two trawls, used for the breaching, were also left behind after an attempt to bring them out failed. The brigade commander could have saved the situation by ordering some infantry across the breach but this was not done. The divisional commander too did not intervene. The setback in 39 Division affected 54 Division operating West of the Karir. Dehlra and Chakra, East of this river, had been earmarked as the initial objectives of 39 Division. Its failure to take them exposed the Eastern flank of 54 Division, which had reached a point West of Dehlra on the night of 7 December. The corps commander had, therefore, to order 54 Division to reduce the Dehlra-Chakra position.

Progress was again slow. The infantry could only get as far as Giddarpur by the morning of 7 December.

On 10 December, 72 Brigade attacked Harar Kalan after due preparation and captured it. However, exploitation further South was again held up on a minefield on the other side of the village.

About this time, Lieutenant General K.K. Singh began to have second thoughts about his tasks. There were two reasons for this. First, he realized that 36 Division had a better chance of reaching Shakargarh than 39 Division. Secondly, the situation in the Chhamb-Akhnur sector was aftecting his order of battle To reinforce that sector, the Army Commander had moved a battalion from 168 Infantry Brigade to Akhnur on 10 December and the rest of that brigade had also been placed on a few hours’ notice to move there. At the same time, 54 Division had been ordered to earmark an infantry brigade to replace 168 Brigade in the Ramgarh-Samba area in case the latter moved out. In view of this commitment, further operations by 54 Division would depend on the situation in the Chhamb-Akhnur sector. To launch 36 Division against Shakargarh, the Corps Commander transferred to it most of 39 Division’s combat strength, except for72 Brigade and 7 Cavalry, which he placed under 54 Division. At the same time, he ordered the Headquarters of 39 Division to take over the Ramgarh-Samba area.

54 Infantry Division

As we have seen earlier, the situation in the Chhamb-Akhnur sector had stabilized by 11 December. Thereafter, the battalion sent to this sector from 168 Brigade reverteel to it and 54 Division was freed of the commitment of sending out a brigade.

Major General W.A.G. Pinto, GOC 54 Division, had under him three infantry brigades (47, 74 and 91), 16 Independent Armoured Brigade, under Brigadier A.S. Vaidya (later General A.S. Vaidya, mvc, COAS), less 16 Cavalry, 18 Rajputana Rifles (Mechanized) less two companies, 90 Independent reconnaissance squadron (AMX-13) and two engineer regiments. Of the three divisions under 1 Corps, Pinto had the strongest artillery with four medium regiments. The division’s mission was to capture the Zafarwal-Dhamthal line and then be prepared to go for Deoli and Mirzapur. Facing it were the covering troops of 3 Independent Armoured Brigade, thereafter elements of 24 Infantry Brigade and at the third obstacle 8 Independent Armoured Brigade.

The division’s route of advance lay between the Karir and Basantar Rivers. It came up against the first minefield on 6 December when Pinto ordered 47 Brigade, commanded by Brigadier A.P. Bhardwaj, with 4 Horse under command, to establish a bridgehead across it in the Dudwan Kalan-Bari-Darman area. A calculated risk was taken in trawling the minefield in a dust-haze before last light and, by 1745 hours, a squadron of armour was across and the Bari Line was secured by the evening of 7 December. That night the bridgehead was further enlarged. Dudwan Kalan was captured by 16 Madras with 17 Horse in support, and a company of 18 Rajputana Rifles took Ghamrola by first light.