Indian Defence Review

Indian troops fought well at Chhamb. One cannot, however, help saying that the higher commanders did not acquit themselves too well.

Around noon, Lieutenant General Sartaj Singh arrived on the scene and ordered a counter-attack to roll up the enemy bridgeheads from North to South. The Darh Crossing was retaken by 5/8 Gorkha Rifles, supported by a squadron from 72 Armoured Regiment. The Raipur Crossing was recaptured with a two-pronged attack by 3/4 Gorkha Rifles and a company of 10 Garhwal Rifles. The operation was over around midnight. Dawn revealed the fierceness of the struggle. The whole area was littered with Pakistani dead and six of their tanks lay abandoned.

This was the last Pakistani attempt to gain a foothold East of the Manawar Tawi. Soon after this action the Pakistani high command withdrew the additional resources it had brought into this sector. Major General Iftikhar Khan was killed in a helicopter crash on 10 December. Surprisingly neither 10 Division nor 15 Corps exploited the enemy’s inactivity and the depletion of its resources. From 11 December till the cease-fire no worthwhile task was undertaken by 10 Division to regain lost territory. .

Indian troops fought well at Chhamb. One cannot, however, help saying that the higher commanders did not acquit themselves too well. When the warning regarding the enemy attack was given, they did not make all-out efforts to strengthen the defences, or redeploy their resources. An even greater error was to ignore direct observation reports being sent in a steady stream by forward troops. Caught off balance, they did little to rectify the faulty deployment. The situation demanded bold action but the divisional commander contented himself with moving battalions and companies or squadrons, instead of dealing with brigades and armoured regiments. This led to ineffective and indecisive command and control. The corps commander took a firm hand only on 10 December. On the other hand, the enemy commander showed commendable flexibility. Having achieved surprise by using the Northern approach, he switched to the South when he found himself firmly checked at Mandiala Crossing.

The poor showing in this sector warranted a thorough investigation to avoid a repetition of the errors that led to the loss of Chhamb. But no such action appears to have been taken, and India lost this valuable territory under the Simla Agreement.

As in 1965, Indian casualties in this sector were heavy. Of the 440 killed, 23 were officers and 20 JCOs. Among the 723 wounded, 36 were officers and 35 JCOs. The missing and the prisoners numbered 190: Five among them were officers and three JCOs. Losses in equipment included 17 tanks and 10 guns destroyed and 1 tank and 12 guns damaged. Pakistan’s casualties were not announced but Major General Fazal Muqueem Khan has confirmed in his book, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, that they were heavy.The Pakistan Air Force was quite active in this sector. The Indian Air Force began its support to ground troops on 4 December. It was in low key to start with but was later stepped up. The high-water mark was reached on 9 December, when 48 sorties were used against Pakistani concentrations. This time round the Manawar Tawi provided a visible forward line of own troops from 7 December onwards.

Punch

Punch was another objective on which the enemy expended considerable effort: Its defence was the responsibility of 93 Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier (later Major General) M.V. Natu, a formation under 25 Infantry Division commanded by Major General Kundan Singh. The ravines and jungle-clad hills of the region were ideal for infiltration. The CFL ran West of the town of Punch and then swung East to form a bulge in the Kahuta-Haji Pir Pass area (see Fig. 14.2). This bulge, North of Punch, was used by Pakistan in 1965 to infiltrate the Sallaudin force into the Kashmir Valley. She used it again in 1971 in her bid to annex Punch.

Click to buy: Indian Army After Independence

Both sides had strong defensive positions—on the CFL. Kahuta, about 13 kilometres North of Punch as the crow flies, was Pakistan’s administrative base in this area. India had captured the Haji Pir Pass in 1965 and reopened the Uri-Punch road. However, under the Tashkent Agreement, she had returned the pass and the bulge to Pakistan. Thus, Indian ground communications with Punch were only from Rajauri, in the South. Two roads linked these towns: one ran by way of Mendhar and Balnoi while the other went via Thanna Mandi and Surankot. From August onwards, Indian patrols had observed warlike preparations on the Pakistan side, around Kahuta and South of it. This prompted Western Command to reinforce Punch, which was done by inducting 33 Infantry Brigade from 39 Infantry Division of 1 Corps on 25 November.

Major General Akbar Khan, the Commander of Pakistan’s 12 Infantry Division, planned to take Punch with an outflanking move from the East, using two infantry brigades. In a preliminary operation, the Indian defence line North-East of Punch was to be breached by capturing the posts at Danna, Shahpur and Gutrian. Thereafter his two brigades were to infiltrate Southward, reach the Surankot-Punch road and then attack Punch from the South-East, where it was expected to be least defended. Meanwhile, Indian picquets on other parts of the CFL were to be kept engaged by diversionary attacks. The plan was bold in concept but it failed for two reasons. First, Akbar Khan did not take into account the reaction of the Indian garrison, which had defensive positions North and West of his line of advance. Secondly, he made little or no provision for the resupply of his forward troops.