Indian Defence Review

Omar Abdullah’s decision to withdraw AFSPA from some parts of J&K should be taken as a welcome move. However it would have been far better for him to have first discussed this issue, within the state security set-up, more so with the military, rather than just the Home Minister in far away Delhi, before taking this decision. Possibly he has gone by the advice of his police chief who feels confident enough to handle the situation in areas from where AFSPA is to be withdrawn and this should be taken as an encouraging development. Hopefully, this decision is not to divert public attention away from the chief minister’s current political problems and is the result of a well examined ground situation. However this decision seems to have been stalled due to a differing perception by the UPA, which is a stake holder in the state.

So far 572 officers and more than 8750 troops have died since army was committed in counter-insurgency operations. The large number of militarys own casualties and the enormous quantity of weapons etc recovered from the insurgents should be sufficient proof of the vicious nature of this fight.

There is the possibility of terrorists shifting their operations or seeking temporary relief by moving out of areas under AFSPA, into those districts from where this Act is withdrawn. Therefore, police in areas from where this Act is revoked, has to be extra vigilant. At the same time army must pull out troops from such areas and move them to their barracks.

Incase insurgency resurfaces in districts from where the Act is revoked and the army is once again called upon to deal with it, it will take considerable time and effort to re-establish the intelligence grid, besides the political problems of re-invoking the Act in these areas. However, such problems should not deter us from withdrawing the Act from areas where peace prevails.

It is only when the situation gets outside the control of state police and the CPOs and normal laws are considered inadequate to deal with the level of violence, that the army is called in and that by itself is the rationale for AFSPA. Army does not step in on its own volition but is asked to do so.

Efforts are afoot in Delhi to dilute the AFSPA itself. Not only is the Home Minister keen to do this but some Human Rights activists too, are clamouring for its outright removal from the statute books. Suffice it be remembered that it is the Home Ministry’s and concerned state’s chestnuts, that the army is called upon to pull out from the fire. Both the state police and CPOs, are as well equipped as the military ( in the context of anti-insurgency operations ) and therefore on their own should be able to deal with the insurgency problems, especially when the Home Minister has donned the CPO hat!

Given the kind of powers available to the police, it along with CPOs should be able to handle well, the insurgency problems and there should be no requirement to call in the army. Why this is not so, is the issue on which Delhi needs to ponder.

Justice Jeevan Reddy Commission did recommend the scrapping of the AFSPA and instead incorporation some of the provisions of this Act, such as immunity to security personnel against arrest etc in the Unlawful Activities Act. It is reported that MHA had readily agreed with the Reddy Commission recommendations and forwarded the case to the PMO for consideration by the cabinet before it is placed in the Parliament.

From 1995 to 2010, nearly 1400 cases of violation of human rights were reported against the military. These were fully investigated through militarys internal investigation mechanism. Only 54 out of these had some substance.

Insurgency can survive, only where there is sympathy and support for its cause. Though where law and order situation is poor, insurgents can draw local support through coercion and acts of violence. In J&K there is alienation of the population too and this additional factor has a multiplier effect towards support to the insurgents. and their hostility towards the military ( called Indian army in the valley.) So in combating insurgency, this issue of local support to insurgents and hostility towards the army is very relevant. The effect of this cause is, that in almost every case of encounter with terrorists or where civilian casualties occur as a collateral damage, evidence will always be marshaled against the army. Now, for too obvious reasons, it is far more difficult for the locals to give false evidence against the police than the military.

Just three cases will adequately highlight this contention. In the North East, the secessionist elements in an attempt to force the government to withdraw AFSPA, drummed up the case of Manorma, alleging, torture, rape and murder. The human rights activists fell for this propaganda without ascertaining the facts. Manorma was a hard core terrorist and a PLA member involved in laying IEDs in which 6 civilians and 2 security personnel were killed. At the time of her arrest, one transmitter and two grenades were recovered. Two independent autopsies ( available with me ) ruled out torture and rape. The nature of bullet injuries confirmed the escape story. Further Imphal West Police Control Room on request had failed to provide a female constable.

The second is the case of alleged rape and murder of two women in Shopian, in J&K, where the local doctors confirmed rape and murder, consequent to an autopsy. Later when the bodies were exhumed and a team of independent doctors conducted the second autopsy, rape was ruled out and death was attributed to drowning. Yet in another case, charge of mass rape of 22 young girls in Kunan Poshpura village in J&K was leveled against the army. An independent inquiry by press council of India through BG Verghese and K Vikram Rao, after detailed investigations, termed the story as a complete hoax.

“¦charge of mass rape of 22 young girls in Kunan Poshpura village in J&K was leveled against the army. An independent inquiry by press council of India through BG Verghese and K Vikram Rao, after detailed investigations, termed the story as a complete hoax.

Nothing reinforces this point more than the recent statement (absurd as it is ) of Mustafa Kamal, an important functionary of National Conference, that army is behind the recent grenade attacks in the valley. It is in such hostile environments that the military is called upon to undertake anti insurgency operations. Since the army does not have even the police powers, it would be impossible for it to operate, without the cover of AFSPA, in an environment where the sympathy of the local population is with the insurgents. In every case of encounter or of collateral damage, false evidence will pile up against the military.

Counter-insurgency operations are both difficult and unsavory. They often involve night raids on insurgents hide outs where exchange of fire is inevitable. Since the initiative is always with insurgents and death could be lurking behind any corner, bush or a house, it makes troops edgy and sometimes prone to over reaction, especially when they see their comrades fall to insurgents bullets. Often during crossfire between the army and the insurgents innocents can get hurt though not always by friendly fire yet invariably and always blame is rested on the military. During firefights in built up areas insurgents often shoot locals in the firm belief that the blame will invariably rest on the army. Where intelligence is poor innocents can get hurt.

So far 572 officers and more than 8750 troops have died since army was committed in counter-insurgency operations. The large number of military’s own casualties and the enormous quantity of weapons etc recovered from the insurgents should be sufficient proof of the vicious nature of this fight. Now if troops are deployed is these operations without the cover of AFSPA or provided with one in its diluted form, the military will be rendered toothless and there will be too much caution, hesitation and procrastination in going the whole hog after the insurgents, especially where there are chances of collateral damage taking place. Faced with the specter of serious danger to life and the added possibility of being dragged into endless court cases, some as accused and some others as witnesses, for the rest of their military careers, with all manner of evidence piled against them, there will be too much caution and dithering.

Were the military to acquire an attitude of caution and hesitancy, it will become an ineffective weapon of last resort in internal security situations and loose the ability to meet fully, the challenges of external threats to national security. It is this aspect of the danger of military’s attitudinal change and blunting of their soldierly instincts and attributes which the higher commanders must apprise the government and resist committing troops without the cover of AFSPA.

It is not to say that there have been no human rights violations. But the fact is that violations of human rights by officers and troops, even against insurgents is unacceptable by the army higher commanders. Every such case reported is thoroughly investigated and the results of such investigations are indeed revealing. From 1995 to 2010, nearly 1400 cases of violation of human rights were reported against the military. These were fully investigated through military’s internal investigation mechanism. Only 54 out of these had some substance. This resulted in innumerable court-marshals, where punishments ranged from life imprisonment to termination of services. More than 37 officers were punished. Where else can one find such internal cleansing.

If Delhi and the state government feels confident that between the state police and the CPOs, it is possible to handle the insurgency problem in J&K, then military would be only too happy to return to the barracks”¦

Admittedly there are a few cases which have not been resolved, such as the Pathribal incident where 5 allegedly innocents were shot dead. It was a joint operation by police and the army. Consequently the SSP Anantnag ( Farroq Khan ) and other police personnel were suspended and charge sheeted . The SSP has since been promoted and others reinstated. What does this say of the validity of the case! Yet there is no reprieve for the military personnel and sanction for their prosecution is being sought from the Government of India.

If Delhi and the state government feels confident that between the state police and the CPOs, it is possible to handle the insurgency problem in J&K, then military would be only too happy to return to the barracks and undertake its long neglected normal training. In this case army need take care of only the LoC. That will automatically result in revocation of AFSPA.

The issue of unmarked graves in J&K is being drummed up without being aware of the ground realities. During the early stages of insurgency in J&K i.e. 1989 – 90, large bodies of insurgents (who had crossed over to PoK were found returning after indoctrination and training) had to traverse through the areas of Poonch and Rajouri to get to the valley. These groups were intercepted, South of the Pirpanjal and hundreds of them died in fierce encounters with the security forces. The police could not get anyone to identify the dead bodies and these were buried with the help of the locals. In other cases insurgents, some from PoK / Pak and some locals died in encounters, within the valley, well away from their homes and as such police could get no one to identify the dead bodies.

Finally abrogation or dilution of provisions of AFSPA will definitely effect army’s ability to conduct, efficiently and purposefully anti-insurgency operations, under such conditions. In the past even temporary ceasefires in the North East have helped insurgents to re-organise, re-group and consolidate their positions to reappear with greater and added vigour. J&K problem calls for a political solution: integration and assimilation of its people into the national mainstream. It is here that we have miserably failed these last 63 years.