Indian Defence Review

Omar Abdullah’s decision to withdraw AFSPA from some parts of J&K should be taken as a welcome move. However it would have been far better for him to have first discussed this issue, within the state security set-up, more so with the military, rather than just the Home Minister in far away Delhi, before taking this decision. Possibly he has gone by the advice of his police chief who feels confident enough to handle the situation in areas from where AFSPA is to be withdrawn and this should be taken as an encouraging development. Hopefully, this decision is not to divert public attention away from the chief minister’s current political problems and is the result of a well examined ground situation. However this decision seems to have been stalled due to a differing perception by the UPA, which is a stake holder in the state.

So far 572 officers and more than 8750 troops have died since army was committed in counter-insurgency operations. The large number of militarys own casualties and the enormous quantity of weapons etc recovered from the insurgents should be sufficient proof of the vicious nature of this fight.

There is the possibility of terrorists shifting their operations or seeking temporary relief by moving out of areas under AFSPA, into those districts from where this Act is withdrawn. Therefore, police in areas from where this Act is revoked, has to be extra vigilant. At the same time army must pull out troops from such areas and move them to their barracks.

Incase insurgency resurfaces in districts from where the Act is revoked and the army is once again called upon to deal with it, it will take considerable time and effort to re-establish the intelligence grid, besides the political problems of re-invoking the Act in these areas. However, such problems should not deter us from withdrawing the Act from areas where peace prevails.

It is only when the situation gets outside the control of state police and the CPOs and normal laws are considered inadequate to deal with the level of violence, that the army is called in and that by itself is the rationale for AFSPA. Army does not step in on its own volition but is asked to do so.

Efforts are afoot in Delhi to dilute the AFSPA itself. Not only is the Home Minister keen to do this but some Human Rights activists too, are clamouring for its outright removal from the statute books. Suffice it be remembered that it is the Home Ministry’s and concerned state’s chestnuts, that the army is called upon to pull out from the fire. Both the state police and CPOs, are as well equipped as the military ( in the context of anti-insurgency operations ) and therefore on their own should be able to deal with the insurgency problems, especially when the Home Minister has donned the CPO hat!

Given the kind of powers available to the police, it along with CPOs should be able to handle well, the insurgency problems and there should be no requirement to call in the army. Why this is not so, is the issue on which Delhi needs to ponder.

Justice Jeevan Reddy Commission did recommend the scrapping of the AFSPA and instead incorporation some of the provisions of this Act, such as immunity to security personnel against arrest etc in the Unlawful Activities Act. It is reported that MHA had readily agreed with the Reddy Commission recommendations and forwarded the case to the PMO for consideration by the cabinet before it is placed in the Parliament.

From 1995 to 2010, nearly 1400 cases of violation of human rights were reported against the military. These were fully investigated through militarys internal investigation mechanism. Only 54 out of these had some substance.

Insurgency can survive, only where there is sympathy and support for its cause. Though where law and order situation is poor, insurgents can draw local support through coercion and acts of violence. In J&K there is alienation of the population too and this additional factor has a multiplier effect towards support to the insurgents. and their hostility towards the military ( called Indian army in the valley.) So in combating insurgency, this issue of local support to insurgents and hostility towards the army is very relevant. The effect of this cause is, that in almost every case of encounter with terrorists or where civilian casualties occur as a collateral damage, evidence will always be marshaled against the army. Now, for too obvious reasons, it is far more difficult for the locals to give false evidence against the police than the military.