On 26th March 2024, the Balochistan Liberation Army’s (BLA’s) Majeed Brigade attacked PNS Siddique, which is the second largest Naval base in Pakistan after the PNS Mehran. PNS Siddique is co-located with the Turbat International Airport. In order to commence the infiltration into PNS Siddique, the armed assailants launched the attacks from three different positions of the airport.
According to Makran Commissioner Saeed Ahmed Umrani, there was a heavy exchange of gunfire and explosions and six perpetrators were neutralized by the security forces. No known damages to the Naval instalment were reported. A Balochistan Frontier Corps soldier was reported to be killed. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that in the joint clearance operation by the security forces the terror attack was foiled.
This attack was preceded by another attack which the Majeed Brigade had orchestrated on the Gwadar Port Authority Complex on 20th March 2024. According to the statement released by the ISPR in regards to it, seven militants were neutralized post their attempt to enter the complex, while two soldiers were known to have lost their lives.
The recent change in BLA strategy
In the past, the BLA has often resorted to a guerrilla style offensive, which would be attack and scamper. The recent orchestration however, states otherwise. In the most current attacks it could be observed that the Baloch militancy has switched gears to a more military style of tactical approach. In this kind of approach, the BLA has profusely used its central units, which includes the death squad Majeed Brigade of a 12 member contingent operating simultaneously with BLA’s Special Tactical Operations Squad and Fateh Squad. Women are also reported to have been recruited by the BLA.
Additionally, the frequency of BLA’s series of orchestrated attacks has increased noticeably.
Over the years BLA has managed to create a strong and intrinsic ecosystem of HUMINT while garnering support of various insurgent groups with similar goals. The commonalities in the interest stem from the Pakistan- China relationship, which threatens the locals to be marginalized in their own regions,while their natural resources are exploited. Additionally, Pakistan’s heavy handed military crack down on civilians, which has led to massive relocations of the inhabitants, resettlement of military and Chinese citizens in those areas, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary abduction of citizens by law enforcement agencies and several human rights violations against the civilians have all nurtured strong resentment and extreme hate towards the Chinese and the Pakistani government amongst the people of Balochistan, Sindh, Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJK) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
The change in BLA’s tactics was apparent when the fightingfrom the mountainous terrains found its way to urban areas in 2017. During this time period, the BLA started to recruit cadre with literate backgrounds unlike in the past when the recruitment comprised mainly the followers of chieftains from the Marri tribe. There are reports of Balochistan Student Organization Azad (BSOA), being covertly active in terms of nurturing the BLA ideologies. By 2022, BLA released a 32 pagereport “From the battlefield to last victory” through its media channel Hakkal. The report gave a detailed account of the weapons procured, the number of personnel Killed in Action (KIA) of Pakistani law enforcement agencies and the number of individuals martyred from the outfit. This also provides with necessary information of the evolving cadre of the group.
The other element to factor in, as far as their tactical change, can be derived from the organization’s shift from a low intensity attacks on railway tracks, electric towers etc to a more sophisticated ambitious points of target such as the Pakistan Naval Ship (PNS) Siddique (Naval shore establishments are also designated as ‘ships’), Gwadar Port authority and various military and government establishments.
Since the exit of the American and NATO forces from Afghanistan, groups like BLA have managed to acquire the weapons left behind by them. This has been a vital addition to their inventory and has exceedingly improved their complex guerrilla technique and IED capabilities.
The tactics now employed have switched to the group barging into potential target areas, holding security personnel hostage and prolonging the duration of the attack to inflict maximum damage. The deployment of Majeed Brigade also spells the do or die attitude where the cadre is prepared to sacrifice their lifefor the success of their operation. The Panjgur attack on FC camps (2022), Naushki attack (2022) and Pakistan stock exchange attack (2021) bear the above elements of the change in tactical operations by BLA.
Interestingly, the two attacks of 2022 were clubbed under BLA’s operation Ganjal (named after one of its commanders)
Additionally, BLA has been targeting the pro Pakistan informers and neutralizing anyone whom they may see as a threat.
The BLA has two separate groups which are led by Hyrbyair Marri and the other led by Bashir Zeb. Prior to Zeb, Aslam Baloch had headed the group and was also the founder and leader of the Majeed Brigade. He is also credited with forming the umbrella group BRAS in conjunction with Baloch Liberation Front (BLF). Later, the Sindhudesh Revolutionary army (SRA) also aligned with BRAS. This formidable alliance has allowed BLA to gain its reach in the previously BLF dominated areas along with the aid from its allies to successfully carry its operations on large frequency.
There are reports of collaboration between the BLA and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) surfacing. This venture has provided both groups to orchestrate attacks in a joint operational mechanism.
Crumbling Pakistan’s Peace: TTP, ETIM and the Gul Bahadur Group
On 26th March 2024, a suicide bomber orchestrated an attack on the Chinese engineers in Shangla district, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The engineers were associated with the Chinese linked projects in the north-west part of Pakistan. While no group has claimed the attack, the suspicion fell on TTP and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). It is a plausible claim by Pakistan and China, bearing in mind the close alliance between the groups. Also, worth mentioning, most groups of such nature, harbouring anti-Pakistan and anti-China sentiments along with their own unique ideologies have recently been reported to have worked in collaboration, directly or indirectly. Hence prior to the probe, the possibility of a fighter from any such outfit could pass on as a perpetrator.
The Hafiz Gul Bahadur group is worth mentioning. Bahadur is a militant commander who came from the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. He has been closely associated with the Haqqani Network and has participated in several Taliban operations against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Post9/11 attacks and the US war on terror led to the relocation ofseveral Haqqani to North Waziristan.
During this time Bahadur provided safe havens to members of the Haqqani Network and Arab associates of Al-Qaeda. Even though Bahadur didn’t formally align with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), he is known to have provided the necessary aid to the outfit as required. He founded a group named Shura Mujahideen-e-Waziristan, which claimed neutral stance in the conflict against the TTP by Pakistani security forces. However, he remained in support of both the TTP and Al-Qaeda.
Gul Bahadur had diplomatically managed to maintain his relations with Pakistani forces, the Haqqani Network, TTP, and Al-Qaeda.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s faction has garnered many recruits from Jani Khel area of Bannu district and members of the Dawartribe, owing to its ties to the Afghan Taliban, TTP, and his experience in the combat background. Since the residence of some affiliated tribes is on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border,the group members can easily cross between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Similarly, to the approach with TTP, the Pakistani government tried to establish agreements with the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group in 2006. According to the agreement, the Gul Bahadur would steer clear of Pakistan and stop from conducting attacks within its territory. This also included the dispatching of fighters into Afghanistan. However, this didn’t prevent Gul Bahadur from sending militants into Afghanistan.
By 2014, at the time of operation Zarb-e- Azb, Bahadur developed closer alliance with the TTP. Reports of the Gul Bahadur group receiving funds and support from Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network have also made the news. In order to discourage the influence of the ISIS Khorasan (ISK) in the region, the Taliban have been trying to leverage the playing field by bolstering the TTP and the Gul Bahadur group. This is likely to not sit well with the Pakistani administration.
Along with TTP and other insurgent groups, the Gul Bahadur group has also presented itself as a serious threat to Pakistan and seeks to align with anti Pakistan groups.
ETIM is another example of an organization which formed in the area against the Chinese presence.
In their case, the group seeks to free Xinjiang from the Chinese rule and plans to set “East Turkistan” within China. Since its conception, ETIM has maintained close ties with the Taliban, Al-Qaida and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. China’s ill treatment of the Uighurs is also similar to treatment which Pakistan has meted to the people of Balochistan, Sindh, POJK and KP. The insurgents emerging from such communities have derived similar aim through the congruence in similar sentiments for the nations of China and Pakistan.
It is apparent that the rise in terrorism and the insurgent attacks have shaken the foundation of Sino-Pak brotherhood on the Pakistani soil. Since the attack on Chinese nationals in Shanglain March 2024, China has suspended work on three of their hydropower projects: the Dasu dam, the Diamer-Basha dam, and the Tarbela 5th Extension. This can serve serious implications for both China and Pakistan, whose aspirations of CPEC progressing forward may be hindered. Large portion of CPEC passes through Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, where various groups have started war against the Pakistani state. As a result, the Pakistani law enforcement are in no position to ensurethe security of Chinese assets or personnel.
Conclusion
According to various reports, 245 incidents of terror attacks and counter-terror operations took place in the first quarter of 2024, this includes 432 fatalities and 370 injuries among civilians, security forces and insurgents.
In both KP and Balochistan provinces, KP has suffered 51%while Balochistan has seen 41% of all fatalities in the first quarter of 2024, according to the security report by the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS).
There is a high uptick in terrorism and insurgent attacks in Pakistan, especially when the government instead of placating the situation has decisively tried to meet the insurgents and its people with a more aggressive approach.
It is hard to determine how Pakistan’s approach and uncertainty with its own national security may impact its internal atmosphere as well as its Iron brother- China, who is already pulling out of certain projects in Pakistan.
With the newly elected PM Shehbaaz Sharif, making strong counter statements against the insurgents and the terror groupsand Pakistani ISI cosying with the ISK, it is no doubt that Pakistan has painted an easy bull’s eye on itself.
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