Indian Defence Review

If we do not use the military power to ensure peace by projecting it outside, then wont we be condemned to go on suffering the loss of life and property, and of opportunity to develop and prosper?

Thus, the national security situation demands two basic active philosophies—forceful, persuasive and inevitable – good governance, and a truly synergistic response (sans ego, prejudice and political brakes) for dealing with internal security even through use of military force; and readiness to step out of national confines on part of the military force to deal with external-internal problems affecting security. The latter, in particular, involves some very strong and enduring ties and tie-ups with the international community through diplomacy, politico-economic ties and so on. An object lesson of power projection was the Bangladesh episode, while the Sri Lanka IPKF episode showed how not to attempt it. Such projection ventures need to be executed against troublesome opponents/tormentors through operations that hit them hard, exact heavy price and compel them to rein in their interference and involvement. Examples are retaliatory strikes, hot pursuit, selective strikes at camps, curtailment of access (as in case of the LTTE), deportment of recalcitrant elements, joint operations, participation in international efforts (as in Afghanistan) – all on smaller scale to begin with, bigger things will start suggesting themselves later.

There is legitimate threat of escalation of such aggressive action, leading to a nuclear threshold, as so facilely suggested. This unidirectional logic is so easy to contemplate. But will lesser irritants really lead to nuclear unleashing? Will the international community allow it? Does it rob us of our retaliatory threat? Would casualties be indeed that prohibitive and nullify achievement? Wouldn’t Pakistan suffer far greater damage, threatening its very existence? All these are part of nuclear dialectics. If this type of miniature nuclear arsenal is going to rule out conventional wars (using only non-nuclear weapons), then why build up our armies, weaponry and other wherewithal? If we do not use the military power to ensure peace by projecting it outside, then won’t we be condemned to go on suffering the loss of life and property, and of opportunity to develop and prosper? Is our cultural, historical, psychological status-quo approach proving more helpful and promising than changing it to suit the emerging needs of saving life, property, strife, violence and development?

We have a historical and cultural inheritance of treating monetary and material benefit and conservation as more important than human life, and human safety and security. Our tremendous endurance levels (mainly of the poor and ordinary citizens) and scant regard for human life (where is the dearth of man power in Indian thought and philosophy?) have always benefited the well-to-do, which includes the great Indian middle class. In the cosiness of their confines they do not care for the lives of the more numerous poor and helpless in our democracy. So the attitude – why bother to go out of your way to set security right for the less or underprivileged by disturbing the elite and their comfort levels – has gripped us. We justify some very strange paradoxes through our historical and cultural baggage and philosophical burden. The British, who did not have these curtailments proved to be India’s strategic visionaries, by ensuring its security through their projection of military power in Afghanistan, Tibet, Burma and Sri Lanka, and later, extending it to Persia and the Middle East.

Also read: Doing business with the Indian Defence Regime

Internal security needs the support of good governance. Firstly being apolitical seems to have been stretched to mean total neutrality on part of the military, reducing it to a mere onlooker of the havoc caused by internal security strife across the country. The root trouble in all cases is political manipulation of interests, bad governance and reluctance to solve people’s problems. When all these come to a head, the hot potato is dropped in the military’s lap, and continues to remain there for long periods, with additional legal safeguards provided to the military (life AFSPA) to cook in its own fat. Manipur, Assam, J&K and the NE are a great shame to the nation and its governance. The military has its political aspect of stake in good governance. To that extent it is a political animal, and not apolitical in the sense of its neutrality in entirety. Its political aim is good governance in the interest of national security, both internal and external, which it must insist on as a political entity of the nation. How long is the military going to live under the shadow of the politician’s apprehension of a military coup and confine itself to apolitical neutrality when the security situation because of bad or weak governance goes on deteriorating?

But how can it insist on good governance and resort to the politics of good governance? It must develop its powers of assertion, persuasion, public arguments and ask for scope to be heard – by the Parliament, Parliament Committee on Defence, Cabinet Committee and so on. It has to face the eventuality of taking a stand sooner than later, in public interest. The Chief may resign – which means the next fellow will take over, but will convey the desired message that things in the elected government are murky. He may ask for voluntary retirement, which will make no difference. His disobedience or reluctance may cause his removal by the government, which would be equally bad and unproductive.

Coping with dissonance, dissent, plain speaking, assertion, disobedience and differences of opinion, acceptance or rejection of military advice, etc are, therefore, best left to developing forums, conventions, platforms, methodologies and procedures to conduct and resolve them at appropriate levels and stages.7 It will be unwholesome, even unfair, and non-productive to keep military power and its leadership away from national security concerns, deprive them of their legitimate political say, and treat them as were weapon wielding menials. It is ridiculous that a big behemoth of an armed force put up by the nation, incorporating missiles, mechanization and nuclear weaponry, holding the hot potatoes dropped by politicians, serving a government which has failed to provide good governance, and apolitically witnessing the loss of common men’s lives and property and peace, has no place and little part in the nation’s power structure to ensure security and peace.

Notes

1. Andre Betielle in “Chronicles of Our Time”, Penguin Books, 2000.
2. Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Krishnaswamy in Indian Defence Review, April 2007.
3. Stephen P Cohen in “India : Emerging Power”, OIJP, 2001.
4. Gurmeet Kanwal in Deccan Herald 4 June 2007, “Creeping Instability Around India”.
5. P C Dogra in “Treat to Security”, Manas Publications, 2007, “How Secured Is India? Destablising Factor”.
6. Brig (Retd) Kiran Krishan in “Treat to Security”, Manas Publications, 2007, “Subconventional Warfare – Doctrinal Issues”.
7. Andre Betielle in “Chronicles of Our Times”, Penguin Books, 2000.
8. “The success of democracy or, indeed, of any social institution, depends not only on good laws but also on favourable customs. It is these customs that give expression to the habits of the heart, — and if only the laws change, leaving the customs a they were, no new form of governance can be expected to achieve its objectives”.