Power means the sum total of capabilities, with the help of which things can be manipulated to one’s own advantage, be it individual or nation. Along the strands of capabilities is the power of the military, a vital component of national power. Power has an intimate linkage with violence, use of force, its looming presence and threat of use, which it is ill advised to ignore. Andre Betielle1 says, “we are dealing with power when some men are able to impose their will on others, despite the latter’s resistance. In the social context, a relation of power is a relation of command and obedience. Commands may of course be implicit and obedience rendered with a show of affection, but it would not make sense to talk of command and obedience unless they are backed by the use of force, or what is more commonly the case, the threat of its use.”
National power, in its security sense, deals with two environs – internal and external. Each causes, promotes, sustains and/or controls insecurity in the other. In the last two decades or so, internal security has posed as much concern as the external threats one. The country’s power structure has had to rely progressively more and more on the military power to cope with the worsening situation across the country from the Northeast to J&K, with possibilities of it being drawn into the Naxalite–Maoist circuit from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh, and Sri Lanka, where the ethnic conflict continues unabated across the Tamil waters.
The days of idealism, enthusiasm for the unity-in-diversity theme, secularism, democratic spirit of political conduct, etc have, over these sixty years, given way to our real inherent, inborn socio-psychological traits of factionalism, diversity, self-interest, greed for the national cake and corruption
The days of idealism, enthusiasm for the unity-in-diversity theme, secularism, democratic spirit of political conduct, etc have, over these sixty years, given way to our real inherent, inborn socio-psychological traits of factionalism, diversity, self-interest, greed for the national cake and corruption—to the extent that “implicit commands and their obedience rendered with a show of affection” have disappeared, and the state has had to take over the burden of ensuring obedience through the use of force. That is where the military comes in.
The line between law and order, and security threat has been becoming thinner. What some states consider as law and order problems have assumed or have the potential to assume national security dimensions. Internal security concerns with law and order beginnings turn into national security threats, thus involving both the states and the centre. The centre cannot or does not interfere with the state government in internal security as law and order is state subject. States lack resources, grasp and scope of dealing with problems with national security connotations. The centre can only offer resources to the states in terms of intelligence, finance, force, etc. The use of force is progressive, i.e. CPOs and PMF (CRPF, ITBP/BSF, Assam Riffles) to Rashtriya Rifles and ultimately the military. So all these forces are involved in dealing with internal security (IS) situation with the Army also drawn in. It generates confusion with regard to responsibility, authority, command and control.
Internal security problems are increasing by the day. The states tend to call in the military pretty early, so as to save themselves from further exertion and use of force by the state police, for the fear of failure. It will be of interest to note that in Karnataka, at a place called Hubli, there was disturbance and violence at its Idgah Maidan in the heart of the city every year on 15 August regarding public flag hoisting between the Hindus and Muslims, which invariably resulted in the Army being called in from the nearest cantonment at Belgaum. It virtually became an annual ritual, till the Station Commander Belgaum Cantt demanded that permanent accommodation with ancillaries be constructed for the Army for a company worth of soldiers at Idgah Maidan. The practice has now stopped. In the late 1950s, the Rajasthan administration is said to have asked for military help in dealing with anti-social elements cooped up on a hillock near Sirohi, for which a company under a subaltern from Jodhpur was sent, at the approach of which, the trouble makers melted away.
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Karnataka almost asked for military help from the unit located in Bangalore to deal with Veerappan. Internal Security is directly related to external security. The obtaining situation, where internal security is worsening, makes external security that much more dangerous. Kargil is a case in example. J&K and the Northeast have gobbled up a very large chunk of the country’s military forces that may not be available to meet an external threat. We seem to be fast approaching a stage where it becomes essential to tackle the external threat that is causing and abetting internal security. We are paying an increasingly heavy price for maintaining internal security. We have expanded over military force to reach beyond a million strength – woven into its missile system, nuclear wherewithal and mechanisation, and risen to regional power dimensions. The rise also carries its obligations. Non-exploitation of that power dimension will adversely affect our own national security, regional security and bring into question our credibility, confidence and reliability levels.
We have expanded over military force to reach beyond a million strength ““ woven into its missile system, nuclear wherewithal and mechanisation, and risen to regional power dimensions. The rise also carries its obligations. Non-exploitation of that power dimension will adversely affect our own national security.
Former IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy writes,2 “Independent India’s commitment to international law and security are enunciated in its constitution.” Stephen Cohen3 says that “India is uniquely unassertive towards others”. “As instability creeps up to India’s borders, it can choose to shape the environment through selective intervention” opines Gurmeet Kanwal.4 He goes on to add, in the context of Afghanistan “India must not shy away from its responsibility even if it becomes necessary to intervene militarily”. There are nearly twenty million Bangladeshi refugees in the NE, while the Bangladesh government flatly denies this, but yet many in its intelligentsia claim Bangladeshi Lebensraum in Assam.5 Pakistan has been waging sub-conventional war6 in J&K for nearly two decades. Tamil Nadu is open to Sri Lankan Tamil refugees (150,000 at one time), with liberal mixture of LTTE cadres, who have manufacturing facilities of arms and ammunition in the state as well as, assured medical treatment, support and sympathy. With all these, the Indian external security is becoming more and more fragile, and it IS more dangerous.
The Army has to cope up with both the country’s external as well as internal security. It has to prepare itself for both the roles. It lacks a strategic culture in dealing with security at the national level with adequate weightage demanded by its external as well as internal aspects. It had been alien to the concepts and imperatives of the idea and practice of nationhood till the British and the West evolved, spread and made it a global phenomenon in the last two centuries. Culturally and historically we have been an inward looking, complacent, absorptive, hierarchical people— militarily removed from the aggressive use of force to ensure defence of our land, people and values, lost in our phenomenal diversity—and unused to exercise military power and its effective projection both within and outside our country, to obtain peaceful defence for ourselves. Moreover unleashing of violence and causing destruction does not qualify to be called proper and justified use of force. Use of force must have deterrence and persuasion. Between these two means there is a series of mixes and variables from economic, political, sociological, diplomatic and other such elements, along with the military power.
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