Indian Defence Review

At the recent Combined Commanders Conference, the Prime Minister asked for urgent review of Task Force Reports for indigenous production – another monologue statement egged on perhaps because of approaching elections. Yes the Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2013 is an improvement from the past as far as private industry participation in defence sector is concerned but ironically the improvement is only ‘slight’. Even the observations by ASSOCHAM and CII on DPP 2013 are yet to be addressed by the government. The little improvement is despite Manibhai Naik, CMD of L&T pointing out the malady explicitly to the Prime Minister through a letter in 2011 saying, “Defence Production (MoD) Joint Secretaries and Secretaries of Defence Ministry are on the Boards of all PSUs — sickest of sick units you can think of who cannot take out one conventional submarine in 15 years now with the result that the gap is widening between us and China and bulk of the time we resort to imports out of no choice.

The defence industry which could have really flowered around very high technological development and taken India to the next and next level of technological achievement and excellence is not happening. “Manibhai also rued to the media stating he had raised one simple question in almost all the corridors of power and asked them what comes first: the honourable existence and sovereignty of our country or constantly feeding the sick public sector units at the great cost to the weakening India’s defence and borders and deaths of lots and lots of our soldiers wherever there is a conflict. He added, his failure lies in the fact that he couldn’t change the mindset of the MoD.

The fact is that the mafia in India’s defence-industrial complex and its nexus with the ministry is well known, monthly pay packets et all – presided over by a ‘clean’ Defence Minister, similar to the ‘clean’ Prime Minister who looks away as his government goes from one horrendous scam to the other. Media subterfuge is too well orchestrated, one example being that while a former Air Force Chief is attacked and tarred in the Westland Helicopter deal, no one dares question who was the DG (Acquisition) in MoD who actually signed the deal, though the latter by virtue of his appointment manages the ‘cuts’ and who they would go to. Any wonder why despite numerous defence scams over the years, no bureaucrat has ever been punished? Any wonder why no one is questioning what about the money ‘already paid’ in the Westland Helicopter deal and what about spare parts of the helicopters already bought?

Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary in his article ‘Adrift Without a Strategic Culture’ dated 12 March 2013 sumws up the situation by saying, “We courted military defeat in 1962 at China’s hands because our assertive political positions were not backed by credible military strength….. what would explain our unwillingness to recognize the depth of these threats even today and take appropriate steps to build our defences politically and physically?

Pakistan uses the instrument of terrorism against us but we think that we can bring this to an end through dialogue. We let Kashmiri separatists meet Pakistani leaders in Delhi and Islamabad … We let China dictate management of our bilateral relations. China allows itself to question India’s territorial integrity, but we hesitate to respond to its provocations. We have procrastinated in building adequate defence capability …. inordinately slow in developing our strategic programs. Our failure to build an indigenous defence manufacturing base shows the fragility of our strategic thinking. We have reduced our defence expenditure to 1.7 % of GDP in the last budget….. That we produced Chanakya almost 2400 years ago is not sufficient ground to claim that today’s India possesses a strategic culture.” Trefor Moss, writing in ‘The Diplomat’ on 25 March 2012 also succinctly pointed out, “The problem is the incoherence of India’s defense establishment, from industry through to government – therein lies the inferiority. It’s a danger to Indian security that has nothing to do with China, and that’s within India’s own power to put right.”

The fact of the matter is that despite several so called initiatives, the stated goal of self reliance in defence production remains elusive. India has been consistently importing around 77 percent of its armament and hardly any worthwhile technology has been developed indigenously. Despite considerable potential with the Private Sector, its participation in Defence has been minimal. Imports too are replete with hiccups.

In July this year, reports emerged of MoD is conducting internal probe into allegations of irregularities involving a top retired army officer in the proposed procurement of 145 x M-777 ultra-light howitzers from the US in a deal worth $847 million. The internal probe is reportedly on the basis of an anonymous letter received by MoD. The issue is whether the anonymous letter can succeed in further delaying the procurement or its cancellation altogether, the howitzers having been fully trial evaluated and selected. The timing of the anonymous letter is perfect when as per MoD, the deal that was hanging since 2010 was on “the verge of finalization”.

Nothing has really changed over the past three decades plus.

In 1980, 17 x 5.56 assault rifles from 11 countries were tried out to equip the then three PARA (Commando) battalions and three PARA battalions of the Parachute Brigade. While MoD was on the ‘verge of finalizing the deal’ after an excruciating delay, the Defence Minister received an anonymous letter alleging the Corps Commander under whom the trial had been conducted had been paid $10,000 to facilitate the G 41 of Germany come first.

Eventually, the money set aside to equip the abovementioned six battalions in the Army’s Sixth Plan lapsed, the 17 assault rifles were given to the DRDO who took 15 years to produce the current 5.56 INSAS which is nowhere close to state-of-the-art and the Army is forced to go for import of 66,000 assault rifles – a shame to our defence industry, which may yet be stymied by another anonymous letter. Indigenous development has also failed to produce a worthwhile carbine, as also a light machine gun. Through such idiotic delays based on anonymous letters, we are actually playing into the hands of our adversaries.

Anthony’s emphasis on propriety is understood but the penchant to ban firms at the drop of the hat ‘without alternate arrangements’ to fulfill voids in time is senseless and amounts to disloyalty to the nation. While impropriety must be dealt with and individuals punished, it is criminal to stonewall military modernization with enlarging China-Pakistan collusive threat and the widening gap between the PLA and Indian Military.

Unquestionably DRDO has had milestones like the missile program, however, overall they have been demonstrating incompetence and lack of accountability through failed / failing / inordinately delayed projects while sucking in enormous amount of funds. A major reason for this is that rather than focusing on major projects critical to Defence, their effort all along has been to somehow grab every conceivable project, eyeing fiscal benefits. We may gloat on the achievement of successfully test firing an underwater Brahmos missile from a fixed platform but how come we did not think of a matching platform in the submarines that are currently being developed under license in the country. What a shame that our navy will possibly get an operational submarine with capability to fire underwater Brahmos earliest by 2030 only.  Is this the best coordination that this government is capable of? Then, where is the government’s plan to leapfrog technology?

The Government is obviously content to such sate of affairs rather than giving directions as to what should be handled by the DRDO and what the Private Sector should do. The irony of the situation is that the DRDO resorts to large scale outsourcing while taking the pie.  Why is it that our defence exports are lower than even a country like Pakistan? In 1994, South Korea evinced interest in our indigenous bridge laying tank. They were looking at some 20-24 in number. The Indian response was that we could provide two pieces per year. Can you imagine ROK waiting for 10-12 years to meet immediate defence requirements?

To compound the lack of direction and patronage by the Government, there is no institutionalized vision within the Private Sector (CII, FICCI, ASSOCHAM) as well. They do have various groups in place but these are adhoc, personality based and lack cohesion. There is lack of mechanism to ensure appropriate industry grouping within the private sector to take on major defence projects including absence of demonstrated capability to act as integrator in such projects. This situation is unlikely to change unless the Government gives focused directions including a decision as to what the Private Sector should take on and then provide patronage and R&D funding.

India aspires to be a global power yet the money we spend on R&D is miniscule compared to other global players including China. This has been pointed out by the venerable Prime Minister in the past but then what has his government done about it? To top it, majority R&D budget in Defence is secured by the DRDO despite DRDO resorting to large scale outsourcing for practically all its projects.

Lack of institutionalized thinking mechanism on such issues within MoD is also responsible for this. “Wings of Fire”, a book authored by President Abdul Kalam (much before he became President) identified five major technology voids essential for India’s growth. One of them was ‘engines’. What have we done about it over the years? Has there been any Government focus on the issue? Whether the ALH or the LCA, why do we continue to depend on imported engines. Mere earmarking of funds for offloading to Private Sector has no meaning if not backed by focused directions.

Foreign companies have plenty new technology to offer. Looking at the vast and lucrative Indian Defence Sector, they are more than willing to provide Transfer of Technology (ToT) and even the Source Code. However, having signed memorandums with Indian private companies, they are disillusioned as the find they still have to latch onto the DRDO / PSUs if they are to get any business in the defence sector.

Talk to IBM and they will tell you they were the first ones to introduce push button telephones in India, hoping tremendous sales profits but within six months BEL tinkered with the product, made a small change and grabbed all future orders. Globalization gives us the opportunity to absorb latest technologies, however, this would only be possible if Government takes on the mantle of facilitator, removing existing roadblocks and the bottlenecks for FDI in defence.

Finally, coming to the penchant of venerable Prime Minister in making monologues he and his government have no intention to follow up. The same Prime Minister while addressing the Combined Commanders Conference nine years back in 2004 had stated, “Reforms within the armed forces also involve recognition of the fact that our navy, air force and army can no longer function in compartments with exclusive chains of command and single service operational plans” but what exactly has really been done to synergize the three services?

Presently the military does not even have common data structures, symbology and interoperable protocols – little effort has been made to develop a ‘system of systems’ approach. The much hyped Project DCN (Defence Communications Network) outsourced to HCL Information Systems Ltd will only provide a highway for the three Services. Why is development of common software not part of this project? Is this a deliberate ‘step by step’ approach to keep the Services in separate compartments as long as possible? The crying need to expeditiously implement recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report and the follow up Group of Ministers (GoM) Report has been effectively sabotaged.

The higher defence structures remain largely dysfunctional and sans integrating the military in strategic decision making. HQ integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was raised but not permitted to merge with MoD as intended least the multiplying skeletons in MoD be exposed. No wonder former diplomats say that moment a bureaucrat gets placed in MoD his first priority is to find out where the money is and what procurements are in the offing, even if he cannot understand a thing about strategy and military terms through his tenure. The Chief of Defence Staff was never appointed and where is the question of Integrated Theatre Commands? The DGMS (Directorate General of Medical Services) and DGQA (Directorate General of Quality Assurance) were not placed under HQ IDS because the DGMS benefits healthcare of politicians at will and tremendous fiscal gains can be made through DGQA – both personal and collective.

Even the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee for appointing a Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) have now been shelved since the Defence Minister and his coterie of bureaucrats feel they have effectively neutralized VK Singh, former Army Chief, early leaks of current Army Vice Chief being elevated as Permanent Chairman of COSC just before he retires is now passé.

Paradoxically, sabotage of the KRC and GoM reports was not limited to the above. It went way beyond to the detriment of national security. The KRC Report had specifically stated, “A Kargil-type situation could perhaps have been avoided had the Indian Army followed a policy of Siachenisation to plug unheld gaps along the 168 km stretch from Kaobal Gali to Chorbat La.” So look at the irony of the recent clamour to demilitarize Siachen itself, as was being orchestrated by the PMO and the NSA. Does the Prime Minister have an answer to this? Then what about the deep intrusions by Chinese in Depsang and Chumar that have been facilitated by not placing the ITBP deployed in these areas under command the army?

Mr Prime Minister save your breath from these boring monologues. We know you don’t mean an iota of what you say and as for pussyfooting about following up on task forces, you might as well read Manoj Joshi’s article ‘Shutting his ears to change’ dated 22^nd November in Mail Today, that would tell you how your coterie is dealing with the latest task force headed by Naresh Chandra. But then there was never any indication your jaundiced coterie, focused on retaining power and personal gains, is concerned about national security in the first place. You don’t have to tell the military there will be cuts in the defence budget till the economy revives, for it is already known how much your government can revive the latter. You have effectively consigned the county to the ‘boiling frog syndrome’. If you don’t get it, ask Warren Buffet..