Indian Defence Review

The recent Maoist attack in Sukma created some turbulence in the hierarchy once again. The media focused on delayed retrieval of dead bodies of the security personnel killed, because of bad weather hampering movement of helicopters, plus shabby arrangements for treatment of wounded who escaped on foot. This time the STF was struck but then the CAPF have faced the brunt umpteen times in the past. The next day, Maoists burned some 17 vehicles of road construction, and in the third consecutive incident five policemen were killed and seven injured in a landmine blast.

We witness a period of higher concern after every incident, which is short-lived and then everything is back to square one. There are some wise men who say Maoists are desperate to uplift their sagging morale, their sporadic actions are restricted to the rural belt and that the issue will get resolved in next two-three years. Interestingly, the latter was stated by Chidambaram, then Home Minister in 2010 and more significantly, is told to visitors by Chief Ministers of the affected states presently too. Yet, when the Maoists struck this January in far south Kerala, it was not the first time. We may ignore this by saying it was just another incident linked with money making but should we ignore their creeping influence in a state where the Popular Front of India (PFI) is headquartered and the consequences of such handshake, even as we ignored the nexus between the Maoists and the PLA of Manipur as another stray occurrence?

The Home Minister has been calling in recent months that: CAPF should infiltrate the Maoists organization; DMs and SPs with ‘zeal’ should be posted in these areas, and; there is need to evolve a new policy to counter the Maoists, and the like. But, looking at the ground situation, doesn’t it strike you why after all these years we have not been able to evolve a requisite policy against the Maoists and implement it? What is holding back the CAPF and why are they suffering loss of lives repeatedly? Is it possible that all DMs and SPs are without zeal in the affected states? Why does the Home Minister have to make such calls? And, much more importantly with the declared unambiguous Maoist strategy to capture power through armed struggle by 2050, guerilla warfare and mass attack tactics, training videos to shoot down helicopters, ideology spread in some 20 states affecting 40 percent of the population including intellectuals plus educational institutions like DU and JNU, and well planned perception management optimizing media, isn’t it outright naïve to believe that the issue will get resolved in next two-three years.

So where exactly is the problem? The states say law and order is their subject, which is fair enough. But first, what is the genesis of the Maoists problem if not lack of governance for which the states are directly to blame. General VK Singh, MoS (External Affairs) and MoS (Oversees Indians Affairs), when serving as Army Chief, had stated that while the Army had kept violence at subdued levels in J&K, the state administration had not capitalized on it.

Sure Farook Abdullah went hopping mad and made berserk statements but isn’t this true? Why the situation in J&K has not improved, other than Pakistan’s continuing proxy war, is because of endemic corruption in the administration and more importantly, radical support that the low level politicians enjoy to get elected and to remain in power, and in turn it is these MLAs that form the political edifice on which the Chief Minister presides.

The home truth is that insurgency has become a lucrative industry where everyone makes money, Centre pours in enormous amounts of funds, and there is little accountability. Remove the Pakistan factor and the rest is applicable to the Maoists affected states too. If this were not the case, why have these states not implemented Article 5 and 9 of the Constitution in letter and spirit to address part of the grievances? Why have no new police stations come up in areas devoid of administration and rule of law despite being sanctioned years back?

Isn’t it ironical that in 2011, CRPF discovered Bodiguda village (29 kms from Begrampur Town and Police Station) for the first time since India’s Independence and the villagers who have never seen or heard of electricity or water taps, schools or dispensaries, men or machines, have grown up believing the Naxals are the government? How many more Bodigudas are there in the Naxal belt? Why is it that despite some 160 odd CAPF battalions (including 135 CRPF battalions) deployed in Maoist affected belt in non-election period, the States are unable to deal with the problem? Why is it that the population by and large cannot be provided security from the hardcore Maoists? Yes, the police versus population ratio are poor in India but what are these states doing about it and why is it that an appropriate counter insurgency grid cannot be optimized with so many CAPF units and the Centre promising to provide more when required?

Why is it that while the BSF and ITBP have been given designated areas in the Maoist belt, the CRPF has not, especially when 90 percent of the CAPF battalions provisioned are CRPF? With pro-active operations at premium, could part of the CRPF be integrated into the counter insurgency grid? And hopefully there is not much truth in the grapevine about state level officials paying protection money to the Maoists for their own security and the DM of Malkangiri stage managing his own abduction.

Let us examine the most important question – can individual states effectively handle the Maoist insurgency that is spread across multiple states? Compared to handling routine law and order, the states need to counter the Maoist insurgency in synergized fashion simultaneously at the socio-political, moral and physical planes, population being the centre of gravity and military operations only being part of the response. Can the states do it individually? The political response will be a definite yes, citing J&K and the Northeast. But how are military operations conducted in J&K and Northeast?

There is a Unified HQ (same as in the Maoist belt) and there is a unified operational command by Assam Rifles in the Northeast and by the Army in J&K. the Assam Rifles and the Army do not seek clearance from the Chief Minister for everyday operations, even major ones, albeit the Chief Minister is kept informed when considered appropriate. The big contrast is in the Maoists affected states where the CAPF are placed under the DGP of the State who is subservient to the Chief Minister. This is a sure recipe for reactive operations and even leakage of plans since the administration is involved. It is not a question of loyalty to the nation but remember the political edifice linked to radical support and you can guess the inhibitions.

The next big question is whether the DGP of the state has the proficiency to plan and handle the strategy to be adopted with the massive forces. Ask the CAPF and they say definitely not, even as the MHA is ambivalent. The CAPF say that they are in the present state because the IPS officers in-charge of the planning the strategy for them are no experts but are holding all senior appointments of the CAPF. Such is their hold that they have not let the CRPF, BSF and ITBP officers come up beyond an odd Additional Director General appointment despite the fact that the CRPF is some 343 battalions strong and are the lead force for counter insurgency operations.

The IPS officers have experience in law and order, not counter insurgency as they have not served in battalions engaged in counter insurgency operations. Is there any reason why the CRPF should not be given their own officers at senior levels? It is time the political hierarchy takes a call on this even as we have had the practice of picking up the DGP of any state and put him as DG of the NSG where the cutting edge is provided by the army on deputation. Little wonder the then DG NSG told the force enroute to Mumbai for the 26/11 attack that he wants the terrorists alive.

Have we not learnt from the greenhorn IPS officer posted as SP at Raipur whose order to go jungle bashing for 72 hours without any specific aim caused the loss of 76 CRPF personnel at the hand of Maoists in April 2010? The CAPF lament that with the hold of the IPS over them, the DGP of a state may be considered competent enough to handle them, which he is not. Take Chhattisgarh, which has the maximum number of CAPF battalions, 45 at all times that were boosted to 135 battalions during last elections. Do you really think the DGP can develop the required strategy, optimally employ such large force of more than 45 CAPF battalions, and have dynamic intelligence acquisition, psychological operations and perception management plans in play, where the Centre has actually failed to do so? The fact is that in the Maoists affected states, the CAPF are being thrown around in penny packets.

Agreed the Centre is transferring powers to States; some 42 percent now and progressively more. But does it have to include what is considered a threat to internal security at national level. Our MHA is no different from the MoD, latter without military expertise and therefore sans a national security strategy. So, it is easy for MHA to pass on responsibility so there is no accountability. Despite all the brouhaha about modernization of CAPF, isn’t it pathetic to see encounter sites showing pictures of CAPF personnel sans even helmets and bullet proof jackets.

Why does our MoD and MHA not have an institutionalized set up for strategic thinking? Why is it that our MHA is not organized for perception management while the Maoists play it full hilt? Why is it that the MHA does not think of a unified operational command set up all the way up to cover the Maoist belt, to be manned by career specialists? Is the authority of the States of J&K and in the Northeast jeopardized by proper operational unified commands? Why are we unable to work out a comprehensive and holistic counter Maoist strategy at national level? Why is it that instead of simply proliferating the number of CRPF battalions, no thought has been given to reorganize at least two third of the 343 CRPF battalions into an effective counter Maoist force, taking a cue from successful counter insurgency models like the Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles?

The country has had enough of this Centre versus State debate, the negative consequences of which are not being addressed at all. Take for example the NCTC which should have been established a decade back. Safeguards can be built against misuse albeit this is misnomer when the political authority so wants. Witness Nehru’s spying on kith and kin of Netaji Subhash Chander Bose and now even relatives of Shaheed Bhagat Singh claiming they are under surveillance past so many years. But does it mean that we are not going to have the NCTC? Digital India is all very well but as and when we do get the NATGRID operational, don’t we need the NCTC and state level SCTCs to convey real time information and have the NCTC work out short, medium and long-term assessment based on all source intelligence obtained at home and abroad?

Finally, the above may ruffle plenty feathers but if we are to have some cohesion in dealing with the Maoist insurgency, it is important to address these issues. And the CAPF may not be considered IPS, but they are the ones who have to take the Maoist insurgency head on. The CAPF, especially the CRPF, must be given their due. Their potential needs to be honed and then optimally utilized. The alternative is for the elephant to keep ambling on but that would be short circuiting India First.