Indian Defence Review

One of ULFA’s high-profile KFR operations was the kidnapping of the executive director of Food Corporation of India (FCI, a public-sector undertaking in India) P. C. Ram in 2007 in Assam. ULFA demanded a ransom of Rs. 21 crore. P. C. Ram was eventually killed in the crossfire during a rescue attempt. However, investigations later revealed that another group, the NDFB pro-talk faction, was also involved in this KFR episode in planning and sharing the ransom.27 Surprisingly, P. C. Ram, FCI executive director, had earlier escaped from his captors when he was kidnapped by Naga rebels while he was posted in Dimapur in Nagaland in 2002.

ULFA’s funding mainstay is kidnapping and extortion from individuals, businessmen and industries. There existed two conflicting views about ULFA, one as a ‘revolutionary organisation’ and the other as an ‘extortionary criminal enterprise’.28 However, after the arrest of its chairman, Arabinda Rajkhowa, and subsequent talks in 2011, ULFA splintered into a pro-talk faction and an anti-talk faction, or ULFA (I). The legacy of kidnapping is now shouldered by ULFA (I), which is active now.

Similarly, insurgent outfits in other parts of the north-east region, like Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur, used KFR operations to finance their operations. Nagaland-based groups, like NSCN (Isak Muivah) and NSCN (Khaplang); Tripura-based National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFTBiswamohan Debbarma faction); and Manipur-based People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), have been actively involved in KFR operations. However, non-availability of insurgent group–wise granular data creates an imperative to compile the KFR data state-wise from SATP, which would clearly indicate the trends in the above-mentioned states (Table 2). This exercise could create a counterargument questioning the data as ‘not insurgent-specific’. However, non-existence of other dominant players, like criminal gangs, apart from the groups mentioned above in KFR operations in these states would render support to and further strengthen the argument that indicated abductions necessarily reveal insurgent links.

The number of incidents of abduction has been steadily growing in Assam, Manipur and Nagaland. However, incidents in Tripura have decreased. This could be attributed to the fact that the number of active groups in Manipur and Nagaland are higher compared to those in Tripura.30

Figures on release percentage of insurgent abductions in the North East are not available in the open domain. Hence, a narrower approach to this study and further defining the ultimate motive for this phenomenon may not be possible. However, given the above spate of repeated kidnappings every year by different groups points to a high success rate of this phenomenon.

A highly successful terrorist modus operandi would make other similar groups gravitate towards such a model, which is what is exactly unfolding in the North East. Another factor that could buttress the financial gains theory of KFR operations in the North East is the repeated participation, which signifies a higher success rate in terms of eliciting a ransom payment response either fully or partially. Hence, the above signifies the intent of the north-east insurgent groups in KFR operations as purely ‘financial’ to fund their operations. This is another reason for the premiums of KFR insurance cover for companies operating in the North East to go up.31 This could be testimony to the fact that the secondary victims are chosen from companies that could reciprocate only with a financial ransom instead of a political one.

Conclusions 

KFR operations in India closely resemble the typologies associated with other terrorist movements, namely political, political & financial and purely financial. While the north-east groups indulge primarily due to financial gains, others, such as the Maoists, have both political and financial demands to fund their operations.

The gravity of the KFR operations by terror groups could be more intense and deep as most of the incidents, particularly in India’s northeast, go unreported due to fear or full compliance with the ransom conditions. The recorded incidents are likely to be a fraction of actual incidents, most of which go unreported. The government does not have a central database for all KFR operations related to terror groups and insurgents. This could act as a major deterrent, and the greatest challenge for any scholarly research in the future to further demystify this KFR phenomenon in India.

Groups that have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government have taken to KFR operations to fund their sustenance. For instance, ULFA earlier used to send demand notices to the targeted entities. However, to bypass the legal provisions under the ceasefire agreement during the mid-2000s, ULFA started issuing receipts, which makes the contribution technically voluntary instead of coerced extortion, which is prohibited under the ceasefire rules. Similarly, NSCN factions have also adopted this tactic as they are in talks with the government. NSCN factions and ULFA are the only organisations in the world that issues receipts for extortion payments to evade ceasefire protocols. Similarly, the NDFB, which was the brain behind the 2007 P. C. Ram KFR operation, partnered with ULFA as they were in talks with the government. These actions actually are a translation of a thought process with the core motive being funding for their illegal activities.

Except for the Maoists, other terror and insurgent groups strongly resemble the characteristics and functioning of criminal enterprises with respect to KFR operations. KFR operations in India have revealed that the notions of terror groups and the north-east insurgent groups are evolving and fluctuating from secession to predation.