Military & Aerospace

Indo-French Defence Partnership Enables Strategic Autonomy
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Issue Net Edition | Date : 26 Jul , 2013

Regarding military capabilities, properly speaking, I would like to underscore some of the priorities defined in our White Paper.

These capabilities for identification and offensive action are essential for counterattacks.

First, cyber defence. Already well identified in the 2008 White Paper, it has become a major priority. We are endowing ourselves with technical intelligence capabilities in this field to identify the source of the attacks, assess the offensive capacities of the potential adversaries, and be capable of countering them. These capabilities for identification and offensive action are essential for counterattacks. We will be earmarking considerable funds, with the organisation of cyber defence integrated with the armed forces, along with offensive and defensive capacities to prepare for and support military operations.

Another priority: intelligence. Knowing and anticipating is a must for assessing situations for ourselves and taking informed decisions. We will thus continue to develop our space capabilities, whether national or shared with European partners, with regard to signals intelligence and imaging. They should serve not only for the preparation and conduct of military operations, but also for deterrence, as well as when confronted with ballistic threat, which necessitates early warning capabilities.

In the background, we are, of course, reaffirming our industrial ambition. It is an integral part of our strategic autonomy. Over the course of decades, we have built a national industrial base as few countries have done. You have rightly pointed this out, Ambassador Sood, in your introductory address. It covers the main areas of activity. You know of the major French industrial groups: Dassault, Eurocopter, MBDA, Nexter, Safran, Thalès, and many more. They are all present in India. The economic situation in Europe is not satisfactory. But we will do our utmost to preserve and even develop our defence industry in this tough period.

The priority in this area for the decade to come will therefore be research and development. It will also be competitiveness and the strengthening of our industrial and technological base in both France and Europe. Equipping and modernising our armed forces will contribute to this goal.

Our ambition is clear. We intend to maintain the skills of French industry at a level of global excellence so that we can be in a position to continue developing new technologies and new types of armament, by incorporating all innovative technologies, both civilian and military. For this, technological monitoring and funding upstream studies are strategic. Exports, of course, are an important aspect of this industrial strategy. Enhancing cooperation in Europe will be encouraged, with the aim of developing specialised and complementary competitive clusters. I would like to add that this is what we can also do with India, if it so wishes. I’ll come back to this later.

Threats for France and India

Our analysis has been conducted in a realistic manner. The defence policy that stems from it will enable us to tackle today’s threats and prepare for those that tomorrow will bring. Some of these threats are known and immediate, such as terrorism and cyber attacks. Others are nascent but we can foresee them: that would be, for example, Iran if it were to become nuclear-armed. Our history has taught us that strategic surprises are always possible. Military surprise, with the emergence of an unforeseen threat, or political and/or economic upheaval, which drastically changes our security environment. Who could have foreseen or anticipated the 2008 and 2011 financial crises, or even the Arab revolutions?

 …globalisation, technological progress, the cross-cutting nature of current or impending threats are such that today we are more exposed to threats that are similar on several counts.

Geography and history are such that India and France do not share the same security contexts. But globalisation, technological progress, the cross-cutting nature of current or impending threats are such that today we are more exposed to threats that are similar on several counts.

Further, Asia today is one of the most dynamic regions of the world. Its stability and growth have become essential to the prosperity of Western economies. The major French industrial groups have massively invested in Asia, especially India, where 350 companies hold a total investment stock of 18 billion dollars, accumulated over a few years. This trend will continue. Your stability and your security thus guarantee our economic interests.

But Asia’s security and stability are not assured. The structures of collective security are yet to attain maturity. Our American allies have drawn their conclusions, with their “pivot” or “rebalance” towards Asia. We think that this can be a positive development. Our enhanced engagement in Asia, particularly with India, and in the adjacent zones of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, are similarly oriented. The defence partnerships that we are establishing with numerous countries illustrate this: Japan, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam. And, foremost, India, of course, but I’ll come back to this.

For a ten-year timeline, we have identified three major types of threats.

First, what we call “threat of strength”. They are always present and assume new forms. The resurgence of conflicts between States remains plausible. In this regard, some States pursue a power policy, and their growing defence budgets are a good indicator.

In the Middle East region – what you call West Asia – which is currently undergoing great upheaval, Iran is attempting to acquire the means that will enable it to possess nuclear weapons. This would be a threat to the stability and security of the Gulf, and therefore for those of all the countries depending on fossil fuel from this region. The most threatened States may use force to prevent this dangerous development, paving the way for the possibility of a large-scale crisis. Others will be tempted to embark on a nuclear arms guarantee race, which would trigger a grave proliferation crisis.

France has entered into defence treaties with several Arab States of the Gulf and established a permanent military base in Abu Dhabi with land, naval and air forces. It will fully contribute to the security of the Gulf if this region were threatened. But we still hope that Iran will understand that its refusal to negotiate sincerely will lead it nowhere, except failure and evermore severe sanctions. India, which has major interests in the Gulf, can play a very important role in this regard.

Some failing States can no longer discharge their responsibilities. This becomes a strategic phenomenon of a new magnitude. It is clear that terrorism becomes its first beneficiary.

I mentioned threats of strength. Second, there are the “threats of weakness” of States. Some failing States can no longer discharge their responsibilities. This becomes a strategic phenomenon of a new magnitude. It is clear that terrorism becomes its first beneficiary.

This is true of Africa, and this is what justified our intervention in Mali earlier this year. The challenge went well beyond the safety of this friendly country. Europe’s security would have ben directly affected if Al-Qaeda had established a sanctuary in the Sahel. And this would have reinforced the entire international terrorist network, from West Africa to South Asia. After military victory, the country must now be stabilised and rebuilt. I would like to thank anew our Indian friends for their support in the entire combat phase and that which is opening up today. We are ready to share with India the military lessons drawn from this action against terrorism. High risks exist beyond Mali in the other countries of the Sahel region and the entire geographic axis that runs from Pakistan to the North Atlantic. In other words, in our opinion, we haven’t seen the last of terrorism in this region.

This also holds for South Asia. I am, of course, referring to Afghanistan, where we were engaged for several years in extremely tough zones situated next to the Pakistani border. We have passed the baton to the Afghan forces when the situation on the ground allowed it. With the transition and the new mission of NATO in 2014, a new phase will start when the Afghans will have to be in charge of their security. We will remain at their side, through civilian cooperation projects and the training of security forces. Their elections will take place in the same year. The Afghan authorities that will then emerge will bear a heavy responsibility. They will be able to count on the support of the friends of Afghanistan to ensure that terrorism and fanaticism do not regain foothold in this country whose people are seeking the path of peace and democracy.

And then, how can we not express here our concern regarding certain developments in Pakistan? Everyone knows that terrorists continue to be present in Pakistan and that international terrorist networks take advantage of certain relays. The alleged handlers of the Mumbai attacks still roam free. This concentration of terrorist elements is all the more worrisome as this is in a country armed with nuclear weapons. India’s dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir sometimes serves as a pretext excuse for destabilising actions against you. In this context, France encourages dialogue between India and Pakistan as this is the only way to resolve these disputes.

I was mentioning threats of strength and the risks of weakness. Third, there are threats linked to globalisation, such as cyber attacks and piracy, which attacks what we call the “global commons”. These are the two extremities of the spectrum: on one hand, criminal networks and powerful States controlling technologies that, in their hands, constitute threats for the whole world. On the other, groups using rudimentary but effective means, which threaten, for example, the security of sea routes that are essential for the global economy. France and India are cooperating positively in this matter.

…cyberspace is now a full-fledged battleground. Information is methodically collected to make large-scale attacks possible in a situation of conflict. Attacks could paralyse entire sectors of a country’s activity or economy and lead to a disaster.

Here, I would like to stress on the security of cyberspace. Our States, our societies, our economies are today largely alive due to digital infrastructure. Often ill-protected, they are targets of hacking for spying purposes. Even more serious is the fact that these attacks now aim to destroy or manipulate through remote control. Infrastructure that is vital for the functioning of our societies and our States – even that of weapons systems – can be targeted. States and criminal networks are behind these attacks. Let’s state things as they really are: cyberspace is now a full-fledged battleground. Information is methodically collected to make large-scale attacks possible in a situation of conflict. Attacks could paralyse entire sectors of a country’s activity or economy and lead to a disaster. Such attacks could hence constitute real acts of war. We must protect ourselves and be prepared to identify the assailants and respond to them. The cooperation between close countries that share the same values in this matter is necessary. The 2013 French White Paper fully recognises this situation and therefore draws the consequences. And, in this regard, I am delighted that during the State visit, we initiated a new Indo-French dialogue on cyber security, which was recently implemented.

France and India: a defence cooperation for our strategic autonomy

I would like to dwell on the important place that India occupies in our White Paper. This place is important because we consider that, apart from our closest Western and European allies, there is no other country that is mentioned in the same terms in various contexts. The White Paper highlights India’s economic emergence, and the privileged bilateral relation, enshrined in the strategic partnership established in 1998, which enables us to cooperate in areas that involve the major interests of the two countries. In the South Asian region, India appears to us as a factor of stability. And, as you know, we support the reform of the United Nations Security Council that would make room for new permanent members, which would include India.

The defence relations between our two countries go well beyond the 1998 strategic partnership, even if it constitutes the current framework of our defence relations, along with the 2006 defence agreement.

I am, of course, referring to the French soldiers in India, who in the 18th and the early 19th centuries, shared their know-how, and fought alongside Indian princes, among others, against the British. I would also refer to Tipu Sultan, the Scindias of Gwalior – a city that I will visit tomorrow – and Maharaja Ranjit Singh. The history of the world would have been different if the outcome of the wars had been different. But the world has long changed; the British quit India in 1947, and have now become our closest defence partner in Europe.

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The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

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Jean-Yves Le Drian

Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister of Defence of the French Republic

 

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