Indian Defence Review

It is a great pleasure and an honour for me to be able to speak before you. Five months ago, I was accompanying our President of the French Republic, Mr François Hollande, on his State visit to India. It was his first bilateral visit in Asia. For us, the choice had been made: India is a major priority of our diplomacy. We therefore desired to mark the 15th anniversary of the Indo-French strategic partnership, concluded in 1998, in a memorable manner. On the occasion of this visit, compelling words were uttered by both sides. They are all the more important as they reflect a profound political and human reality, and an exceptional trust between our two countries. Fifteen years – that’s still adolescence. All indicators point to the Indo-French partnership growing further – in scope, in maturity, and in strength.

We share the same political vision. We share numerous common values: democracy, the rule of law, individual freedom, respect of fundamental rights and human rights. We are deeply attached to our national sovereignty and our strategic autonomy. We want peace and security in the world, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Our two countries consult each other on all major international issues. We do so in a spirit of mutual understanding, respect, trust, and even support, by taking into account our respective security interests. I can assure you that, apart from our Allies and European partners, there are few countries across the world with which we are prepared to go as far as we do with India.

Today, a tendency of diluting the concept of a strategic partnership has crept in with the loose use of words. I believe that with India, the concept has kept its full original meaning: because they trust each other, our two countries are moving forward together in intense cooperation in sensitive areas, such as defence, civilian nuclear energy, space, security and counter-terrorism.

Further, I would like to add that, in our two democracies, we are lucky that this exemplary relationship is firmly rooted in a political and popular support that goes beyond party lines. Continuity is therefore the rule. In France, as in India, we have witnessed political change and institutional situations that could be complex. We signed our strategic partnership in 1998, between a France whose President and government did not share the same political orientation, and Dr I.K. Gujral’s United Front government, which was approaching the end of its term. Thus, it was the following Indian government, headed by Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, that lay the foundations of this partnership, which was nurtured thereafter by the two successive governments of the current Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh.

I wish to pay special tribute to these three great Prime Ministers of India, who have shared the same vision of India’s relations with France. For our part, three Presidents and three different political majorities have forged a similar policy vis-à-vis India with as much determination. This continuity is our strength. It will be pursued in the future.

This morning I held discussions with the Hon’ble Raksha Mantri of India, Shri A.K Antony, and we will meet again this evening to continue these in-depth talks. This is our third meeting in thirteen months.

As I also wish to meet the men and women who ensure India’s defence, tomorrow I will travel to Gwalior to visit the Air Force Station. It is here that the Mirage 2000 squadrons supplied by France in the 1980s are based. They are currently being upgraded to bring them to the best current standards. I remember that these aircraft played a major role in the Indian victory during the Kargil war in 1999. Today is, in fact, the anniversary of this war.

As you can see, we thus have a solid foundation to go forward, particularly in the defence sector, and this gives me great pleasure.

The French Defence and National Security Strategy

I am also here today to present to the Indian authorities and yourselves, who represent the political and military community of Delhi, the main focal points of our new defence strategy. President Hollande, who, like his counterpart in India, is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, has recently cleared the document that we refer to as the “White Paper on Defence and National Security”. The White Paper is available in English. It is the fruit of several months of deliberation and debate, which have brought together the State, researchers, political personages, economic stakeholders as well as contributions from our foreign partners, including India.

I would like to state that I find it perfectly natural to elaborate on principles, missions and means that we will be implementing over the coming years. This is also the sign of the development of our defence relation. India has a right to know how its French partner is organising its security and defence. Over the past few weeks, I have made presentations on the White Paper in Washington and London, the United States of America and the United Kingdom being, of course, essential defence partners. I have also addressed this matter during the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore, as Asia bears major importance in our defence and security policy.

The previous White Paper dates back to 2008. Our strategic environment has since undergone deep transformation, and so has our economic environment. Two imperatives of sovereignty had to be reconciled: our strategic autonomy and our financial sovereignty, at a time when the threat level has not dipped but the crisis in Europe has weakened our public finances.

President Hollande has set the course: we will have a new military and industrial strategy that will guarantee our strategic autonomy. On an average, this accounts for a defence spending of 1.8% of France’s GDP till 2020, according to NATO norms. Despite the economic crisis, France is thus making the necessary effort to remain one of the major military powers of the world.

The framework of our action has a name: strategic autonomy. This is a permanent goal, which, in fact, we share with India. This is a principle that we apply in our relations with our NATO allies and European partners.

What does strategic autonomy mean for France? National sovereignty depends on the State’s autonomy of assessment, decision-making and action. This does not imply that we are cloaked in isolation or unilateralism. It is just the reverse. We intend to cooperate with our partners and our allies for the world’s security. We respect international law. This is both a choice and a necessity. But we intend to remain in control of our decisions and our actions with regard to defence and security.

The primary mission that structures our forces is, of course, the protection of French territory and people. This capacity for protection is inextricably linked to nuclear deterrence and external intervention. It has been enriched over several years now with a cyber defence posture that will grow increasingly.

Our independent nuclear deterrence capacity is based on a total of less than 300 nuclear warheads, which can be launched from two components: a permanent deep waters submarine component composed of four nuclear-propelled submarines equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles; the other component, which is airborne, is composed of two squadrons of Mirage 2000N and Rafale fighter aircraft. In the near future, all of these will be Rafale aircraft. The Rafale embarked on the nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle can also contribute to nuclear deterrence.

This deterrence capacity protects France from all State-led aggressions or threats against its vital interests. It thus also guarantees our autonomy of action and decision-making, particularly countering blackmail attempts against our vital interests. It is strictly defensive and its use would be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of legitimate defence. It is the ultimate guarantee of the security, protection and independence of France. But it also contributes to the security of our Allies. Our nuclear deterrence applies the principle of strict sufficiency, France having never participated in a nuclear arms race. The reliability and safety of our weapons is ensured through a nuclear test simulation programme since our ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The intervention of our forces in a theatre of operations outside our national territory, i.e. force projection, provides France with the strategic depth indispensable for its security. As of today, we do not have a direct threat to France’s land borders. But in today’s world, our security does not stop at our borders. Moreover, our history has never stopped being mingled with that of the world. For us, this means protecting the French established outside France – sometimes in dangerous zones – defending our strategic interests and carrying out our international responsibilities in the service of peace and security in the world. In this regard, I would like to salute the Indian armed forces that are participating in essential peacekeeping missions under UN command, in several crisis-ridden countries, particularly in Africa and Lebanon, often paying the price of blood, as in Sudan recently.

France wants to leave no doubt on its resolve and capacity to act, and in conformity with international law. Our engagement against Al-Qaeda-affiliated terrorists in Mali this year has amply shown this. The priority zones for us are not only the European periphery, the Mediterranean basin, Sahelian Africa to equatorial Africa, the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, but also much farther in Asia, as recently recalled by our engagement in Afghanistan.

It is clear that, taking into account current threats, we no longer need massive capabilities as were deployed during the Cold War in the face of the Soviet menace. However, we do need robust, swift, mobile and professional means.

Over and above the capabilities that we additionally devote to the constant protection of French territory, we are thus ready to be engaged in stabilisation and crisis management missions in all their diversity, a total of 7000 men spread over three theatres of operations, along with the associated air and naval units.

While retaining the capacity to fulfil a part of our responsibilities in already existing theatres of operations, we also keep a joint force for major coercive action that is capable of first entry in a theatre of operations. Composed of around 15,000 land troops, this force can combine 45 aircraft and a carrier vessel battle group, which includes projection and command ships and a nuclear-propelled attack submarine. These are autonomous, equipped and trained capabilities for such theatres of operation, backed by performing equipment. This force will also incorporate reinforced intelligence and cyber defence capabilities as these are our priorities, as well as special forces, drones and mid-air refuellers for the air force. The White Paper is precise: in the event of an open crisis in Asia, France, in keeping with its international responsibilities, would contribute on the political and military fronts alongside its allies to respond to it.

Experience shows that in most situations, we would be led to act as part of collective multinational operations, associating our allies and our partners. France will be in a position to exercise the responsibilities of a Framework Nation with the associated command and control means. Of course, as a priority, we would be associated with our main NATO allies, or our European partners, whom we would like to see assuming increasing responsibility in defence matters. This is the orientation of the initiatives that we are taking with them, by developing concrete projects in a pragmatic manner, to strengthen European defence strategy and optimise its use of financial resources in the defence sector.