Indian Defence Review

Jhangar was attacked at dawn on 24 December. The enemy had taken care to cut the Jhangar-Naoshera road the previous day at two places, and last-minute attempts by Usman to reinforce Jhangar proved abortive. Wave after wave of yelling tribesmen charged the defences despite the hail of fire that greeted them. The Mahar machine-gunners covered themselves with glory that day. They kept mowing down the enemy till they were overwhelmed and cut to pieces by the infuriated tribesmen.

That some of the commanders had not yet taken full stock of the enemys capabilities was apparent when the newly arrived Marathas were sent on a mission a day after their last company had arrived.

The battle was over by 0800 hours and the survivors made for Naoshera in small parties. Four armoured cars had gone out to escort convoys from and to Jhangar. The enemy ambushed these convoys at the road-blocks. Besides the armoured cars, 79 other vehicles were lost to the enemy. The weapons lost included 17 mortars (2- and 3-inch), 19 machine guns (light and medium) and 70 rifles. The casualties totalled 158, including 5 officers and 2 JCOs. Due to bad weather, the Air Force could not intervene in the battle.

Jhangar was lost due to unpreparedness and the refusal of those in authority to face the fact that it was Pakistan they were fighting and not the tribals from the Frontier. There could be no other explanation for not providing artillery support or basic defence stores, like mines and wire to the Jhangar garrison.

Poor intelligence was another problem faced by the Indian Army—­there was hardly any intelligence organization within the theatre. Even Prime Minister Nehru was constrained to remark to the Army Chief that commanders in Kashmir had an amazing lack of information. He suggested co-operation with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad’s men22 in this regard. With the realization of its shortcomings, the Indian Army now adopted certain measures. Among these was the establishment of an intelligence bureau under the Delhi and East Punjab Command. Another measure was the setting up of administrative Headquarters at Pathankot and Srinagar. Till then only ad hoc arrangements existed for the day-to-day administration. These decisions and their implementation took time. The enemy was not going to wait. In fact, the victory at Jhangar spurred it to greater effort. Russell’s forecast that the enemy was not likely to make large-scale attacks against established garrisons had proved wrong: in the attack on Jhangar, the enemy had used 3,000 men. Russell was to be proved wrong again at Naoshera.

Cariappa was the seniormost Indian officer in the Army. His arrival immediately saw more purpose-oriented decisions being taken at least in the Jammu district.

The enemy reached Naoshera on the evening of 25 December and besieged the garrison. Then, bypassing the town, a number of the enemy went towards Beri Pattan to cut off Naoshera from Jammu. After bringing Naoshera under mortar fire, two attempts were made that night to infiltrate its defences. When these were repulsed, the enemy broke off the engagement and occupied positions commanding the approaches to the town. Its strength between Naoshera and Jhangar was estimated at 5,000; another 2,000-3,000 were reported to be investing the Naoshera-Beri Pattan route.

Towards the end of December, 3 (Para) Maratha Light Infantry23 joined 50 (Para) Brigade. To enable the brigade to devote itself entirely to the task of driving the enemy from the vicinity of Naoshera, 80 Brigade was also inducted into this sector. The latter would guard the lines of communication. That some of the commanders had not yet taken full stock of the enemy’s capabilities was apparent when the newly arrived Marathas were sent on a mission a day after their last company had arrived. It was risky to send out a newly inducted unit without giving it a chance to shake down. As if this was not enough, the battalion was not provided any artillery support. The mission failed, and the battalion lost seven men, including the commanding officer, who was wounded and evacuated. This reverse emboldened the enemy, and that very day (4 January) it descended upon Naoshera, though only to be chased back with artillery and mortar fire. Two days later, he came again, in much larger numbers. 5,000 men were thrown against Naoshera that day and all the resources of the garrison had to be brought into play to repel the attack.

Around this time, an important change took place in the command set-up. Due to the ban on the entry of British officers into Kashmir, Russell had been under a severe handicap ever since he took charge of the operations in Jammu & Kashmir. For over two months, he had been directing the operations without being able to visit his forward troops. Such a restriction would be unacceptable to any commander. Russell now suggested to the Government that either an Indian should take over his assignment or the restriction on him should be removed. The ban having been imposed by London, the Indian Government chose to bring Lieutenant General Cariappa from Eastern command to relieve Russell.24 The change-over took place on 20 January.

Nature had been generous to the man who was destined to be the Armys first Indian Commander-in-Chief. Six-feet tall, muscular but slim, he had a remarkable uprightness of bearing that singled him out from others.

A new commander can make a lot of difference to a theatre of operations. Besides the freedom to visit any place in his command, Cariappa enjoyed other advantages over Russell. The latter was a seasoned general and an earnest commander but, as an Indian, Cariappa could identify himself more intimately than Russell could ever do with the cause for which Indian officers and men were shedding their blood in Jammu & Kashmir. Cariappa was the seniormost Indian officer in the Army. His arrival immediately saw more purpose-oriented decisions being taken at least in the Jammu district. There was nothing that he could do for 161 Infantry Brigade group isolated then in the Kashmir Valley, snowbound in deep winter.