Nature had been generous to the man who was destined to be the Army’s first Indian Commander-in-Chief. Six-feet tall, muscular but slim, he had a remarkable uprightness of bearing that singled him out from others. Field Marshal Manekshaw, reminiscing about the period when both were in Delhi – Cariappa as Chief and Manekshaw as Director of Military Operations – told the author: “Wherever he went, there was no doubt that he was the Jangi Lat. . . . When he walked down the corridor, the whole world knew that there was the Army Chief walking down. When he visited any state, any country, they could make out that that was the Army Chief. He gave all of us dignity by the way he carried himself”. The ability to impress those around him is a great asset to any commander.
Within days of assuming command, he began a tour of the forward areas, using an Auster Light Observation Aircraft. One of the first places to claim his attention was Naoshera. With his experienced eye, he at once saw the importance of a feature called Kot. Lying about 8 kilometres North-East of Naoshera, it overlooked the Naoshera Tawi Valley. Cariappa ordered Usman to capture it with all possible speed.Mounted after due preparation, the operation to seize Kot—appropriately codenamed ‘Kipper’25 —was a complete success. Kot and its adjacent positions were held by about 500 of the enemy deserters from the state forces and personnel from the Pakistan Army. Surprise was the keynote of Usman’s plan and about 150 of the enemy were killed. When his men reached the objective, they came upon an officers’ mess with a sumptuous breakfast, laid out but untouched.
The success at Kot, after the Jhangar debacle raised the morale of the Indian troops. But the enemy was chagrined at the loss of this important position. An attack on Naoshera was the only way out. This attack came at dawn on 6 February. The action that followed has been called the biggest battle of the Jammu & Kashmir campaign. The enemy threw in all he had and Usman had to use every weapon and every man to push him back. Estimates of enemy strength used in the assault range between 11,000 and 15,000. Whatever the actual number, it was a well-planned attempt to take the town by sheer weight of numbers. Usman had five battalions at Naoshera (3 [Para] Maratha LI, 1 Rajput, 3 [Para] Rajput, 2/2 Punjab, 1 Patiala)26, one squadron of armoured cars from 7 Light Cavalry and a battery each of field and mountain guns.
The enemy threw in all he had and Usman had to use every weapon and every man to push him back.
Though Usman had received reports that a major attack was in the offing, the enemy was able to achieve complete surprise. During the night of 5/6 February, large numbers of the enemy crawled up vital points unobserved and at first light, four of Naoshera’s picquets were attacked simultaneously. The attacks were well-co-ordinated and were supported by mortar and machine-gun fire. Among the places attacked were Kot and two localities South of Naoshera. The full fury of the attack, however, fell upto Tain Dhar, a feature to the North of Naoshera, held by a company of 1 Rajput. Usman could not reinforce the threatened locality as 3 (Para) Maratha LI, the only reserve with him, had been sent out early that morning on routine road-opening operations. A radio signal was flashed to recall the battalion, but till its return the situation was critical.
Tain Dhar was the vital ground of the defences, being the highest feature in the area. With first light, the Rajputs observed a seething mass of humanity creeping up the ridge. A barrage of fire began. But, in spite of heavy casualties, wave after wave of the enemy kept surging against the defences. At one of No. 2 picquet’s posts, three waves of the enemy were stopped on the barbed wire. Some of the attackers however managed to get through, and reaching the ‘sangar’ grabbed the Bren gun on the picquet. By then, of the 27 men on the picquet, 24 were dead or wounded. Of the three survivors, two fell soon after in hand-to-hand fighting. However, the last man did not throw up his hands and kept fighting. Fortunately, a company from 3 (Para) Rajput now reached Tain Dhar and the enemy was thrown back.
Naik Jadunath Singh, won undying fame that morning. He was in command of a section. During the first moments of the assault, he had been hit in the thigh. But when he saw a group of the enemy charging his post, he jumped out of his trench with his light machine gun”¦
Lieutenant Kishen Singh Rathore, who led this company, later received the MVC. A junior leader in Rathore’s company, Naik Jadunath Singh, won undying fame that morning. He was in command of a section. During the first moments of the assault, he had been hit in the thigh. But when he saw a group of the enemy charging his post, he jumped out of his trench with his light machine gun and began to blaze away at the yelling tribesmen, then only 15 yards away. In the face of murderous fire, the enemy retreated in confusion. The battle claimed Jadunath’s life and it was later seen that his body bore eight wounds. The Government acknowledged this non-commissioned officer’s valour with a posthumous award of the PVC.
Another instance of bravery at Tain Dhar must be recorded here. That the act was performed by a non-combatant makes it all the more remarkable. Seeing the peril from the horde of Pathans attacking the picquet, a sweeper picked up the rifle of one of his wounded comrades and fired away at the enemy for all he was worth. When his ammunition gave out, he snatched a sword from the hand of a dying tribal and killed three of the enemy.
The other picquets were also subjected to attack by masses of yelling hostiles. Artillery, mortars and machine guns had a field day engaging them as they came up in an endless stream. The valley was cleared by 1500 hours though fighting continued at Kot throughout the day and the night of 6/7 February. The enemy paid heavily for its senseless attacks. Close upon a thousand dead were counted. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was captured, though only three prisoners were taken.27 Indian casualties were 33 killed and 102 wounded. Artillery played a dominant role in the defence of Naoshera that day, the 25-pounders and the 3.7-inch howitzers scattering most of the attacks. The Air Force also provided support during the battle, its Dakotas flying three sorties from Jammu.
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Pakistan had dubbed the attacks on Indian territory in Jammu & Kashmir a holy war, a Jehad by Muslims against the infidels. That an Indian Muslim led the defenders of Naoshera was thus a matter of significance. It not only gave the lie to the two-nation theory of Jinnah and his followers, but also turned Usman into a hero overnight.
It is said that after the loss of Jhangar, Usman vowed that he would not sleep on a cot until he had retaken it. In fact, the defeat there rankled in every Indian heart, and preparations now began for retaking it. Operation ‘Vijay’ was the code name given to the plan that Kalwant Singh formulated for the purpose. The enemy was known to have one brigade in the Naoshera-Jhangar area. The defences of Naoshera would also have to be manned while the task force advanced to Jhangar, 26 kilometres away. More troops were thus needed for Operation ‘Vijay’ and the second week of February saw 19 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier Yadunath Singh (later Major General Singh mvc), move into Naoshera.20 This formation consisted of 2 Rajputana Rifles, 4 Dogra, 1 Kumaon Rifles, 28 and 37 Assault Field Company. To direct the operation from close quarters, Kalwant Singh moved his tactical Headquarters to Naoshera and Cariappa came over to Jammu with a few of his staff officers.
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