Indian Defence Review

India is now the world’s fifth highest defence spender, but statistics can be disingenuously deceptive. In terms of percentage of GDP, it is the lowest since India was last subjected to an ignominious military drubbing by China in 1962, and now stands at just 1.58 per cent of GDP. The allocation for 2018-2019 was Rs 1.21 lakh crore less than that demanded by the armed forces. As pointed out by some analysts, it is not even adequate for committed liabilities, leave alone modernisation and new acquisitions. Indeed, the establishment approach towards military acquisitions appears to suggest that it does not consider war a possibility and is instead misplacing confidence in foreign policy initiatives to keep war at bay.

The term ‘two-front war’ has been bandied about in Indian public discourse for around a decade, although the Indian military discussed and debated it behind closed doors well before that. As far as the Indian Air Force (IAF) is concerned, it had kicked up a moderate storm in February 2014 by telling the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence that it would be challenging to manage a two-front war with the strength of its combat fleet down to 34 squadrons. The media had avidly played this up as a sensational bit of news and the issue has remained in the public domain since then, deriving new impetus in March 2016 with Air Marshal Dhanoa, then Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS) telling media “Our numbers are not adequate to fully execute an air campaign in a two-front war scenario”. However, a year and a half later, as the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), on 08 October 2017, Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa declared that the IAF was ready for a two-front war, adding almost parenthetically, that the probability of such a war was low. The Chief’s iteration has not been taken seriously by the military-strategic community as the combat capability of the IAF is on a constant decline and, if anything, has actually waned since the time that he, as the VCAS had declared that a two-front war was difficult to manage. This article focuses on building the combat potential of the IAF to cope with a two-front war.

The Threat

According to World Air Forces 2018 published by Flight Global, China has 1527 combat aircraft, India 804 and Pakistan 410. More significantly, in recent years, China has been focusing on dual-use airports in Tibet from which offensive and defensive missions could be launched. During a period of over two decades, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has been modernised through a clever mix of support to indigenous aerospace industry and licensed-production of Russian aircraft.

A PLAAF Air Division holds around 72 aircraft. After the 2015 reorganisation, Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs are home to air assets deployable against India. Chengdu MR has two fighter divisions with J-7H, J-7II, J-10A, Su-27SK and J-11 combat aircraft and a transport division, whereas Lanzhou MR has two fighter divisions equipped with J-7H, J-7II, J-8F, J-8H, JH-7A, J-11 and J-11B and a bomber division with H-6 aircraft. Thus, of the 1527 combat aircraft mentioned earlier, around 300 fighters and 72 bombers could be tasked against India. The fighters with better performance namely the Su-27, J-10, J-11/ J-11B and J-20 under induction, can be expected to be effective from the high elevation airports in Tibet while the others may be severely constrained operationally. In future, the J-20 and FC-31, fifth-generation, multi-role, stealth aircraft could be expected to join the fray.

A new long range bomber (H-20) with nuclear capability is under development, but is not expected to complement China’s nuclear triad before 2025. However, the PLAAF has not much of real war experience and its likely performance in actual combat is an area of uncertainty.

On the other hand, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is well trained, has battle experience and retains a high sense of pride in its professional capabilities. Till the 1980s, the United States (US) and thereafter, China, supplied aircraft and equipment to the PAF which currently has 22 combat squadrons comprising about 410 fighter aircraft. According to Flight Global, it holds around 70 JF-17s, 45 F-16s, 69 Mirage IIIs, 90 Mirage Vs and 136 F-7s. The JF-17 is a Chinese design co-produced in Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra and Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group, China and is claimed to be a fourth-generation, multi-role aircraft. There are reports of another 100 being on order. The PAF plans to acquire a total of 250 to replace its Mirage IIIs and F-7s. Some of these would be Block 2 version with 4.5 generation features while some more would be Block 3 and are expected to have fifth-generation characteristics. The PAF is also said to have placed an order for 36 Chinese J-10 (4.5 generation) aircraft. The J-10 is expected to be inducted as the FC 20, an advanced PAF-specific variant. Thus, while the PAF has a smaller inventory, about half that of the IAF, it is well-equipped and trained, and could be expected to display high morale.

The PLAAF and PAF have been conducting joint exercises since 2011 under a series named ‘Shaheen’. The sixth edition of ‘Shaheen’ was held in China’s Xinjiang province during September last year. The series is a constant reminder to the IAF of the possibility of a two-front war scenario. Exercise Gagan Shakti held in April this year, was a two-week endeavour by the IAF to self-assess its war waging capability vis-a-vis the potential adversaries.

Exercise Gagan Shakti 2018

Exercise Gagan Shakti is a serial, biennial one, but undoubtedly the 2018 edition was conducted at a scale not seen before. One of the aims would certainly have been to demonstrate a resolve to fight on two fronts simultaneously, if it became necessary. It was, however, not conducted on both fronts concurrently as far as its core combat potential was concerned. The first phase was focused on the Western borders of India after which the Northern borders became the significant area of operations. A rational question that can be asked is why not exercise on both fronts simultaneously? Hopefully, the establishment will appreciate that a two-front war may not be an easy proposition with the present holdings of the IAF, despite the hype that the media has created about how the exercise related to practicing for a two-front war.

Combat Aircraft – The IAF’s Tenuous Leading Edge

Until the 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) selection process was forsaken in 2015, the oft repeated refrain of the IAF was that it would achieve a 42-combat squadron strength by 2022. However, after the MMRCA exited the reckoning, the date vaulted forward to 2032. According to Air Chief Marshal Dhanoa, “We need 42 squadrons for full spectrum of operations. But it does not mean that we cannot fight a two-front war with the existing strength. We have a Plan B for reduced strength, there are ways in which we can carry out the task.”

The figure of 42 squadrons has been brandished so liberally and so frequently that public perception is that if the IAF were to achieve 42-squadron strength, it would be eminently placed to take on China and Pakistan simultaneously. It is worth noting that 42 squadrons are what is sanctioned currently; in reality, the IAF requirement is much more. In a report by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, the figure of 45 squadrons was mentioned en passant as an IAF requirement. However, the IAF is possibly keeping its actual math on the back-burner essentially because even the 42-squadron dream appears to be far from fulfilment. In the distant future, if and when the IAF actually achieves a 42-squadron strength, it would be time to mull over its genuine needs and arrive at a reasoned figure which is likely to be much higher than 42.

A squadron is nominally 18 operationally deployed aircraft with three in reserve. A quick mental calculation would show that 42-squadron strength would mean close to 900 aircraft. The present strength is barely 31 squadrons which is around 650 aircraft, a little less than the figure ascribed by Flight Global. Of these, around two squadrons worth of aircraft (about 40) would drop away every year as they reach the end of their life. In his farewell press briefing, the previous CAS, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha reportedly said that the IAF required 400 single/twin-engine MMRCAs although 300 would be acceptable keeping in mind the high cost of modern aircraft. So how will this requirement be met, if at all?

In April this year, a Request for Information (RFI) was released by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for acquisition of 110 combat aircraft. In contrast with an earlier RFI issued in 2004, this document is 72 pages long and covers substantial ground not just about the aircraft performance and parameters, but about life cycle costs, Transfer of Technology, offsets et al. Its notable feature is that it has widened the scope to include single and twin-engine aircraft. The two single-engine contenders are Lockheed Martin F-16 Block 70 and Saab Gripen E while the prominent twin-engine one is Dassault Rafale. 36 of these are already on order and Dassault can be expected to underscore the advantages of scaling up from 36 to a larger number (savings in training costs, spares inventories and maintenance facilities).

Boeing has been very voluble even before the RFI issuance about the F/A-18 E/F. The E and F denote single-seat and twin-seat versions respectively; both the versions are known as Super Hornet and thus there are two Super Hornets in the fray. The Typhoon, manufactured by a consortium of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo called Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH is the European gladiator in the ring while the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG company will field the MiG-35. Of these, the Rafale and the Typhoon had both cleared the earlier MMRCA flight trials. Speedy and incisive decision-making is crucial to getting the best or even the second best multi-role combat aircraft inducted into the IAF at the earliest.

Transport Fleet

While combat aircraft are the leading edge of any air force, for a country as vast as India, with its two fronts stretching from one extreme of the country to the other and with large expanses of terrain difficult and time consuming to traverse by land transport, air transportation is vital.

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Exercise Gagan Shakti included Inter-Valley Troop Transfers (IVTT), Special Heliborne Operations, Air Landed Operations and Special Operations to simulated objective areas. IVTT operations were carried out in coordination with the Indian Army in Uttar Bharat Hills and at the Tezu-Walong in the North East sector, enabled by the presence of Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs) at these strategic locations. According to the MoD, “The aim of the IVTT exercise was to validate the capability of the IAF and the Indian Army to quickly transfer and redeploy acclimatised troops in the simulated objective area.

C-130J Super Hercules

These operations are conducted to reposition troops from one valley to another to counter any evolving threat and to surprise or offensively exploit the weakness of the adversary.” C-130J and AN-32 tactical transport aircraft and Mi-17V5/ ALH helicopters were used for the missions. A notable use of the C-130J was the landing at Mechuka, an ALG in Aruncahal Pradesh at an elevation of over 1800 metre with artillery guns. During the exercise, a battalion level airdrop exercise was undertaken; 560 paratroopers along with their combat vehicles and cargo platforms were dropped by six C-130Js and seven An-32s.

The An-32, of which the IAF was the launch customer, has been the workhorse of the IAF in transport roles. During Exercise Gagan Shakti, a large-scale mass casualty air evacuation drill involved two An-32s taking off from Air Force Station Chabua and landing at Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose International (NSCBI) Airport in Kolkata with lying casualties. A total of 125 were procured and around 100 are still in service. Their versatility for military roles is commendable and contribution to combat capability comprehensive.

The IAF purchased six C-130J Super Hercules in early 2008 and exercised its option to buy six more in 2013. It lost one in an accident in 2014 but ordered a replacement in 2016. The C-130J is the latest model of the C-130 turboprop tactical airlift aircraft and the IAF’s total of 12 aircraft is what will provide special mission capability with one squadron based in Panagarh and the other in Hindon. The two-front connotation is evident from the peacetime location of the two squadrons.

The IAF’s C-17 Globemaster III is its real strategic airlift platform. It can take-off from a runway just 7,600 ft long, carry a payload of 72.5 tonne, fly 2,400 nautical miles, carry out flight refuelling and land on a 3,000-ft unpaved or paved runway by day or night. It is thus capable of landing at the ALGs in the North East and has demonstrated this in the past. It has an astonishing capability of being able to go backwards on a two-degree slope, a big asset in restricted area operations in the ALGs. In a simulated exercise during Gagan Shakti, 88 “casualties” were airlifted from Leh to Chandigarh. A C-17 was converted for this role by fixing support structures for stretchers in the main cabin. The IAF already has ten and an eleventh one will join it in August 2019, the last one to do so.

In recent years, India realised that building a respectable combat potential would include airlift capabilities in addition to front line fighter aircraft. Undoubtedly, these aircraft, albeit in small numbers, represent an enhanced capability to move large number of troops and equipment from one ‘front’ to another or even within the same one as in the case of IVTT. Do we need more of these two types? Possibly the answer from the IAF would be a firm and loud ‘Yes’, but, given the overall picture, it would seem prudent to wait until the more critical and perilous shortfall of fighter aircraft is met.

The Mi-17V5 helicopter deserves a special mention as far as the heli-lift capability of the IAF is concerned. India has already received 151 of these starting in 2008 and a deal for 48 more is expected to be signed this year although the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) had cleared the deal in September 2015. Again, these numbers are not totally satisfying for a country with more than 3,000,000 sq km of territorial expanse and land borders of 15,106 km with its seven land neighbours including China and Pakistan but will have to make do until the Defence Budget grows more munificent.

AWACS, AEW&C and Flight Refuelling Aircraft

Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) was an important strand of the wide reach Exercise Gagan Shakti endeavoured to portray. During the exercise, Su-30s took off from Kalaikunda (Eastern coast) and engaged multiple targets over the area of Lakshadweep (2,500 km away) before returning to a base in South India. The aircraft were refuelled on its way to Lakshadweep as well as during the return flight after the mission.

India’s current flight refuelling capability is six Il-78 MKIs procured from Uzbekistan in 2002. Each can replenish three aircraft at a time and up to eight Su-30MKIs in one sortie. Jaguars and Mirage 2000s are the other IAF aircraft that can carry out flight refuelling while the Netra Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft is the latest to demonstrate this capability. However, the serviceability is less than 50 per cent and efforts are on to procure six more. Unfortunately, two tenders floated in the past have come to naught. In January this year, a new RFI was sent out and one hopes that it fructifies soon as FRA would be critical to shifting from one front to another and for maritime strikes and operations related to far flung territories such as the Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.

The IAF has reportedly directed Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) that the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft being developed around an A-330 platform since 2015 have the additional role of FRA. Debatably, such an aircraft will lead to sub-optimal attainment of either role while meeting the urgently required numbers of both AWACS and FRA. However, if and when the DRDO manages to produce an AWACS/FRA hybrid aircraft, its merits and demerits could then be analysed vis-a-vis two differentiated platforms for the two roles. Six AWACS, possibly with dual role, are expected to be produced by DRDO to augment the current IAF holding of three Phalcon AWACS Il-76 aircraft with Israeli electronics. Given DRDO’s track record, it may be prudent to start looking around for six new AWACS aircraft although earlier plans for two more Phalcons was grounded as both the Russians and the Israelis almost doubled the price of their individual shares.

Conclusion

India is now the world’s fifth highest defence spender, but statistics can be disingenuously deceptive. In terms of percentage of GDP, it is the lowest since India was last subjected to an ignominious military drubbing by China in 1962, and now stands at just 1.58 per cent of GDP. The allocation for 2018-2019 was Rs 1.21 lakh crore less than that demanded by the armed forces. As pointed out by some analysts, it is not even adequate for committed liabilities, leave alone modernisation and new acquisitions. Indeed, the establishment approach towards military acquisitions appears to suggest that it does not consider war a possibility and is instead misplacing confidence in foreign policy initiatives to keep war at bay.

In contrast, Pakistan proposed a 20 per cent hike in its military spending this year while China declared a defence budget increase of 8.15 per cent in March this year. The figures need to be seen in the context of the defence forces telling a Parliamentary Committee on Defence in March this year that the current budget barely accounts for inflation and tax payments. In the case of the IAF, the capital budget allocation is inadequate even to meet the commitments already existing and do not cater for any new acquisitions. This fact impinges on all the modernisation plans of the IAF.

The most disquieting apprehension in the context of building IAF’s combat potential is about combat aircraft acquisition. The obvious advantages of twin-engine over single-engine (higher safety, greater operational ceiling, higher performance and payloads) may have to be disregarded in favour of the lower cost of a single-engine platform. Inarguably, life cycle costs will be the prominent factor in the selection process once the operational flight tests narrow down the field to a short list. However, the perceived political value of ‘Make in India’ in an election year, would also play a role. The situation is ripe for deriving the maximum technology transfer by playing one contender against the others. However, the inescapable imperative is that the 110-aircraft RFI be brought to a logical conclusion speedily and the selected aircraft inducted into the rapidly dwindling IAF at the earliest.

Only the passage of time will reveal whether India will actually face a two-front war. The only certainty is that the IAF will do its best and live up to its motto of touching the sky with glory. One hopes that the Cassandras who hint at another ignominious outcome for India if the present trend of declining combat potential continues, are proved wrong. The only way to prevent that would be a change in the government’s perception on IAF modernisation.