Indian Defence Review

The IAF’s squadron strength is less than three-fourths of its sanctioned strength and its stated doctrine mandates it to carry out its own strategic tasks, endeavour to gain air dominance in war and apply air power to support operational objectives on land and at sea. Maximising the effect of air power in joint operations would result from the three services being able to have a common, “joint” view of how its instrumentality should be applied keeping in mind air, land and maritime strategies so as to achieve maximum gains in war. As of now, the single service philosophies are not fully in synchronisation although, as in the past, in actual wars, innovative and improvised application of air power in joint operations may still do India proud.

Man’s first heavier-than-air flight was twelve decades ago and the use of aircraft for military purposes are almost as old. Quite unsurprisingly, initial inventiveness was limited to conscripting aircraft into air arms under armies to support land campaigns. Spectacular advances in aviation technology and the matching anthesis of air power theory in the course of military campaigns starting with World War I, led to the inexorable progression of supporting air arms into independent air forces. Some of the larger militaries have supporting air elements for surface (land and sea) forces in addition to air forces which, in addition to their independent roles and tasks, operate jointly with surface forces.

The strategic impact of air power in standalone operations is significant although no one would argue that air forces can fight and win wars on their own. Conversely, in the present day, no surface campaign could be waged successfully without substantial integration of air forces. Indeed, a sizeable proportion of air power application contributing to a joint campaign could actually be made in areas geographically far removed from the kinetic conflict over land or sea.

The history of jointmanship between air forces and surface forces has not been seamless nor has it been painless. In the Indian context, the quantum and the mechanics of air support that the Indian Air Force (IAF) should provide to the Indian Army and the Indian Navy, has been a matter for disagreement between the three services. This is so despite the officer cadre of all the services receiving their initial training jointly in the National Defence Academy (NDA), attending staff course jointly in a tri-service Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and educing higher level military tenets jointly at the National Defence College (NDC). At all these institutions as also through myriad opportunities for the three services to interact in exercises and actual wars, the issue of air power in joint operations has remained an area of ‘agreeing to disagree’ although that disagreement has not prevented some spectacular use of air power in operations conducted jointly with surface forces. This article addresses the use of air power in joint operations in the Indian context.

Doctrine and Joint Operations

The Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) produced a ‘Joint Doctrine of the Armed Forces’ in 2006 as a classified document and a revised version was released in 2017, as a declassified one. The Joint Doctrine aims to “coalesce, synthesise and harmonise the tenets, beliefs and principles of the different Services into one common, officially enunciated and accepted guideline for carrying out Joint Operations.” This doctrine purports to be the last word on integration and jointmanship. However, in actual fact, the differences between single service perceptions continue to exist and may have been exacerbated since the government declared its intent to establish theatre commands.

Much before the release of Joint Doctrine, in 1995, the IAF had prepared for itself a classified Air Power Doctrine which it revised in 2007 with lessons learnt from the war in Kargil et al. In 2012, an unclassified “Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force” was promulgated. The preface of that document lists three aerial campaigns namely Counter Air, Counter Surface Force and Strategic. It professes that “Airpower remains the lynchpin of any joint application of combat power in modern warfare.” The IAF sees its mission as “To acquire strategic reach and capabilities across the spectrum of conflict that serve the ends of military diplomacy, nation building and enable force projection within India’s strategic area do influence.” On a flippant note, while the term “jointmanship” can be found in the Joint Doctrine, it does not exist in the IAF doctrine where the term used instead is “jointness”!

Philosophical Divergence

The establishment of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was a step towards the laudable objective of enhancing jointmanship including, et al, closer commonality of thought on the use of air power in joint operations. However, a jarring note was introduced by General Bipin Rawat a few months after he took over as the first CDS. Speaking at a seminar in Delhi, he surprised analysts by stating, “Do not forget that the Air Force continues to remain a supporting arm to the armed forces, just as artillery support or the engineer support the combatant arms in the Army. They will be a supporting arm.” These were unsettling words for the IAF, the world’s fourth largest, as they purported to render it an arm subservient to the Indian Army, discounting a century of air power application, dismantling lessons learnt from military history and rejecting acquired wisdom of major militaries that have employed air power over countless campaigns. His words, spoken at a think-tank betrayed his belief about air power employment in joint operations. The iteration was unfortunate inasmuch as it came at the height of the theatre command debate.

Fortunately, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS), speaking later, played down the statement thus, “It is not a supporting role alone. Air power has a huge role to play. In any of the integrated battle areas, it is not an issue of support alone. A whole lot of things go into any air plan that is made. And those are the issues that are under discussion.” Some other veterans (air force and army) were not so subtle and expressed their criticism of the CDS volubly. However, that failed to bring forth from the CDS any clarification that his statement was in the context of what support the Indian Army needed from the IAF and did not preclude other strategic and independent roles and tasks of the IAF.

The statement by the CDS underscored the divergent mindsets of the two services. The Indian Army sees a commander as someone who commands forces and assets placed directly under his command. Prima facie, this concept makes sense and is simple to understand but the converse side of this coin is knotty as the Indian Army also sees anything not under its command as not readily available to it when it needs it. The repercussion on employment of air power is that an Army Commander would like to have air assets physically in a geographical area under his command, with the manning and support crew under his command for undertaking missions at short notice.

Flowing from this philosophy, the Indian Army had contended in 1986, that all IAF helicopters with offensive roles be placed under its command as those roles were in support of the land forces. However, as it lacked the wherewithal and expertise to maintain and administer the helicopter fleets, it was decided by the government that the administrative control was to remain with the IAF while the operational control shifted to the Indian Army. This arrangement was formalised under a document titled ‘The Joint Implementation Instruction 1986’. However, its consummation was a less than satisfying experience for either service. We have moved on considerably since then but the philosophical divergence of the Indian Army wanting to have air assets under its command and the IAF insisting on the indivisibility of air assets, continues to adversely affect the progress on the establishment of theatre commands.

Theatre Commands and Joint Operations

The theatre command concept is expected to bring about the much-needed levels of integration and jointmanship among the three services. While the media had been pointing out that the IAF has reservations about the concept, successive Chiefs of Air Staff and several IAF veterans including a retired CAS, have generally held that the IAF was not opposed to the concept of theatre commands per se, but had issues with the way their establishment was being envisaged and indeed, their advisability in the Indian context.

Theatre commands of the United States (US), Russia and China are frequently quoted as examples to mimic. However, it is significant to note that the US has about 20 times more aircraft than India while Russia’s and China’s figures are five times ours. The IAF’s inventory is around 30 squadrons against a sanctioned strength of 42. We have a real two-front threat and Exercise Shaheen, conducted every year jointly by the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) since 2011, is a constant reminder to us of this two-front scenario. Juxtapose that fact with the way Exercise Gagan Shakti was conducted by the IAF in 2018. The stated objective of the exercise was to rehearse a two-front war scenario but it was conducted serially in two phases on the two different fronts, one a time. It is easy to deduce that the IAF does not have adequate combat aircraft assets to deploy on two fronts simultaneously, leave alone split them into six parts — three land theatres, one Air Defence Command, one Maritime Command, and the Andaman and Nicobar Command and still perform strategic tasks. The apportioning of aircraft assets to theatre commands (and the operative word here is ‘command’) for joint operations would mean piece-meal allocation to each command in numbers that may not meet the full requirement of any. The IAF’s aircraft are largely multi-role and apportioning them off “under command” deployment amongst six theatres, would negate the basic attributes of air power of flexibility and concentration. The IAF’s reservation about theatre commands is that it wants the current approach to be modified to defer to the facts of small numbers and basic principles of air power.

General Guilio Douhet, the earliest and the finest air theorist wrote ‘Il Dominio Dell’aria’ (or ‘The Command of the Air’) a century ago (first published in Italy in 1921). One of his concepts, the need to establish “command of the air” as the first objective in any campaign, remains true even today albeit with some nuanced modifications and an ambition toned down from a total command of the air to air supremacy, air superiority, favourable air situation and shades in between. Even if local and temporary air superiority are to be aimed for, a dwindled down, 30-squadron IAF would find it difficult to achieve when its combat aircraft are stretched out over six theatre commands. So, the IAF’s contention is the need for a methodology that permits the service to carry out its primary strategic tasks and air defence of the nation’s territorial and maritime expanse under its centralised control while meeting needs of six theatre commands. With the current squadron strength, that appears impossible.

In any war scenario, the IAF has to mandatorily execute Offensive Counter Air, Air Defence and Strategic campaigns, which are its primary campaigns. These need to be done alongside Counter Surface Force operations which, in the Air Land concept include Air Interdiction and Battlefield Air Strike and in the Maritime Air Operations context, Anti-shipping Strikes and Coastal Strikes. These are largely tactical but may acquire a strategic hue and for these, flying effort rather than aircraft, can be assigned temporarily to theatres, depending on how that theatre’s operations are progressing. A centralised control for prioritisation of scarce, multi-role aircraft would make more sense than “under command” assets which one theatre commander would be loathe to part with, even temporarily, to another theatre as his battle(s) would always be of supreme importance to him.

Modern fighter aircraft that the IAF is acquiring are multi-role and tying them down to one role or one theatre’s geographical limits detracts from exploiting the inherent flexibility of air power. Aircraft could be allocated to a theatre or utilised from another theatre’s geographical territory depending on how operations were progressing over the whole front or fronts. That would be the epitome of optimising the use of air power for joint operations and could be achieved by their deployment and redeployment as dictated by the priorities of the theatres and the pressures they are under. If that has to happen, control over air assets has to be centralised and not through theatre commanders. Army operations are largely tactical in nature while the IAF is, by dint of its aircraft and structure, a strategic force. Consigning a strategic force in small parts under tactically oriented theatre commands, would leave the IAF incapable of executing its own strategic roles while shackling its tactical efficacy drastically.

Joint Exercises

As a build up to the creation of theatre commands, cross postings between the three services have been planned in increasing numbers. At the end of May 2023, the Department of Military affairs (DMA) issued instructions mandating that all military exercises and war games in future would have elements from all three services, stressing that even the 2024 edition of Exercise Vayu Shakti (which hitherto has been an IAF standalone affair) would be a tri-service exercise. This approach is in conformity with the government’s plan to establish theatre commands and, more importantly, promote jointmanship amongst the three services.

The number of joint exercises has increased gradually and in the recent past there was one to practise multimode insertion of strategic forces into the Eastern sector at short notice. Between February and April 2023, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) conducted a large scale joint Exercise Kavach in which the Indian Army, the Indian Navy, the IAF and the Indian Coast Guard participated. Air landed operations, heli-borne operations and the rapid insertion of troops from mainland Indian bases were practised as air power in joint operations. In May 2023 a joint exercise was carried out with elements of the Indian Army’s 50^th Independent Para Brigade (an airborne infantry formation also called Shatrujeet Brigade) and the IAF which deployed C-130J Super Hercules, the C-17 Globemaster and AN-32 aircraft to carry out troop insertion in an integrated exercise to validate the transport element of air power in joint operations.

In the maritime context, during May and June 2023, the IAF carried out a six-hour long mission in the Indian Ocean by four Rafale jets and an eight hour mission by a Su-30 to demonstrate its capability of applying air power in joint operations over the sea away from the mainland. Around the same time, the Indian Navy also carried out an exercise in the Arabian Sea with the coordinated deployment of its two aircraft carriers along with a diverse fleet of ships, submarines and 35 aircraft. The exercise highlighted the aspect of air power in joint maritime operations and is significant in view of China flexing its muscles in recent months not just in South China Sea, but also in the Indian Ocean.

Concluding Remarks

The creation of the Army Aviation Corps in 1986 and the government’s decision during the 1970s to move the Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) role and aircraft from the IAF to the Indian Navy, have possibly left the IAF psyche wary of further erosion of control of its aircraft and assets. It has fighters and transport aircraft with global reach. Its Su-30MKI, Rafale and Jaguar operating from Andaman and Nicobar and/or supported by air-to-air refuelling, can extend their reach beyond Indian Ocean and even into South China Sea. Its transport fleet includes the C-17 Globemaster, C-130J Super Hercules and Il-76 aircraft which have global reach. The theatre command concept troubles the IAF as these strategic assets may get tethered to the largely tactical visions of individual commands responsible for their defined geographical boundaries.

Canada went through uniting the three services through an act in 1968, but had to undo that ‘reformative’ action over the succeeding years until by 2011, it was back to where it started. The US had to thrust the Goldwater Nichols Act in 1986, down the throats of unwilling individual services to quell inter-service rivalry. However, in the US, the structural changes that accompanied the Goldwater Nichols Act, were significant in sustaining the joint dispensation. The US Secretary of Defence is the head of the US Department of Defence which is the executive department of the US defence forces. He exercises command and authority over the military second only to the President who is the Commander-in-Chief. The current and the two Secretaries of Defence immediately preceding him are former military men as have been a majority of past Secretaries of Defence. By law, the Secretary is a member of the National Security Council.

India has its DMA in place and the related theatre commands are in the process of being formed. However, these two steps are unlikely to bring about jointmanship doctrinally, philosophically, operationally and organisationally which is what ought to have been brought about first. In April 2018, the Ministry of Defence formed the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) and the National Security Advisor (NSA) was appointed as its chairperson. The present NSA, who has held that position since 2014, is an Indian Police Service officer with no defence background. The NSA’s DPC mandate included preparing drafts on national security strategy, strategic defence review and doctrines, improving defence manufacturing ecosystem and a concomitant defence plan et al. A coherent, well-contemplated national security strategy and a defence plan would have served to crystallise thoughts on the nation’s defence. None of these documents have been prepared even after five years.

The IAF’s squadron strength is less than three-fourths of its sanctioned strength and its stated doctrine mandates it to carry out its own strategic tasks, endeavour to gain air dominance in war and apply air power to support operational objectives on land and at sea. Maximising the effect of air power in joint operations would result from the three services being able to have a common, “joint” view of how its instrumentality should be applied keeping in mind air, land and maritime strategies so as to achieve maximum gains in war. As of now, the single service philosophies are not fully in synchronisation although, as in the past, in actual wars, innovative and improvised application of air power in joint operations may still do India proud. Whether the establishment of theatre commands will help the services move closer to synchronised thought processes on employment of air power in joint operations, is open to conjecture.