Indian Defence Review

De-militarisation is a process that consists of several logical steps: ceasefire, authentication, demarcation, withdrawal, re-deployment and verification. It is a concept that formal and informal working groups, researchers and defence analysts have concurred as one of the best possible solutions to the Siachen problem. Reams of paper have been consumed in determining the process and procedures of verification, authentication and lines of redeployment. Ideas have been discussed in official Government to Government talks, Track II meets and think tanks. Use of technology and methodology to map, confirm and monitor have been deliberated upon threadbare, and in some cases, a general consensus has even been arrived at. So where then is the stumbling block?

On April 06, 2012, an avalanche wiped out the battalion headquarters of the 6th Northern Light Infantry (NLI) at Gyari, located west of the Saltoro Ridge in the Siachenarea, instantly burying 138 Pakistani soldiers and civilians under several feet of snow. The victims included the Commanding Officer, a Company Commander and the Medical Officer.

Having lost over a hundred soldiers in the unfortunate accident, General Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief was distraught during his visit to the area as any military leader would have been. His remarks in subsequent days, about the demilitarisation of Siachen evoked a fair deal of response from varied quarters.

A Sudden Change of Heart?

We fully appreciate the loss of soldiers. In fact, we can empathise completely, having been in similar situations while serving in very high altitude terrain and extreme conditions. For the families of soldiers, be they Indian or Pakistani, the void created by the departure of a dear one is similar howsoever stoically they may attempt to bear it. But these are occurrences that Armies and families are prepared for, fully cognizant of the hazards of service involved.

So why this sudden change of heart, one may ask. It is certainly not to gain sympathy because the world over, people acknowledge the tragedy and share their concern. It is more as if an incident is being used as an opportunity to stoke the fire once again. It is only coincidental that the timing of the avalanche happens to be two months prior to the scheduled round of talks on Sir Creek and Siachen in June 2012.

In any number of articles, blogs and television news channels, citizens from different walks of life and analysts agree with the view that the two nations and their armies are engaged in a futile conflict in some of the most inhospitable terrain. They also tend to voice similar opinions about converting the area into a zone of peace thereby reducing the avoidable casualties and decreasing the financial burden. Some go to the extent to say that the area does not have any significance as it lies in a wasteland of snow and ice, where not a blade of grass grows.

It is necessary therefore, to re-visit some of the salient issues in order to clear misperceptions that may have crept in and clou ded the minds of officials in the Government and people at large.

The Roots of Conflict

The name ‘Siachen’, in Balti, refers to a land abundant with wild roses (sia – rose and chen – place or bush of thorns). The Siachen Glacier is located on the eastern Karakoram Range of the Himalayas. The main glacier is sandwiched between the Saltoro Ridge to its West, and the main Karakoram Range to its East. The Siachen glacier is 76 km long, with its width varying from one kilometre to 2.5 km. It is at an altitude ranging from 3,600 m to 5,700 m. The dominating Saltoro Ridge ranges in height from 17,880 to 25,330 feet (5,450 to 7,720m).

India controls the whole Siachen glacier complex with troops deployed on the Actual Ground Position Line and controls the area from NJ 9842 (the end point of the Line of Control fixed in the 1972 Shimla Agreement) to Indira Col on the Karakoram Range. Pakistan claims the area from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Reaching the Indian Army positions on the Saltoro Ridge, trudging over ice moraines, negotiating crevasses in such rarefied air is a herculean task in itself.

The roots of the conflict over Siachen lie in the non-demarcation of the boundary North of NJ 9842. The 1949 Karachi Agreement and the 1972 Shimla Agreement presumed that it was not feasible for humans to survive North of NJ 9842. In July 1949, the UN-led delegation convened an Indo-Pak conference at Karachi to delineate the ceasefire line in Kashmir. Lt .Gen. S K Sinha, who as a junior officer at that time, was the Secretary of the Indian delegation at that conference recalls, “It took us seven days of hectic discussions to delineate an agreed 740 km ceasefire line on a quarter-inch map, from Lalealli in the South to NJ 9842 in the North. No one at that time thought that military operations could take place at the forbidding heights beyond NJ 9842. In any case, the ceasefire line was only something temporary. After plebiscite, it would become easy to be wise after the event. It would have been better if the line beyond NJ 4982 had not been left vague.”

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Pakistan permitted several expeditions in the general area of the Siachen glacier to reinforce its claim on the area, as the mountaineers were required to obtain a permit from Pakistani authorities. The objective clearly was to create a precedent to assume de facto control over the area. Pakistan also embarked upon a cartographic aggression wherein they tried to establish that the area west of the line joining NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass was a part of Pakistan territory. Based on intelligence reports that indicated the likelihood of the area being occupied by Pakistani troops, India launched Operation Meghdoot on April 23, 1984. Pakistan quickly responded with counter deployments but within a few days, the Indians were in control of most of the approaches to the Siachen glacier. Two passes — Sia La (18,000 ft) and Bilafond La (19,000 ft) — were secured by India while a few heights in the Gyong La (16,000 ft) remained under Pakistan’s control. Both sides have made several attempts to displace each other’s forces but in vain.

Aggressor Status

Some try to justify the occupation of the Saltoro by saying that India did not wrest the Siachen, it was unoccupied. That is more of a technicality and could be argued in a court of arbitration, if ever one is constituted. However, the fact is that India is convinced about what was meant in the Karachi and Shimla Agreements and has no doubt whatsoever, that it has only occupied its own territory.

Lt. Gen. Jahan Dad Khan, who was General Officer Commanding, 10 Corps of Pakistan from 1980 to 1984, writes in his book, ‘Pakistan Leadership Challenges’, that they had sent a Company of the elite Special Services Group to occupy Bilafond La in the summer of 1983, which they effectively accomplished. In their report they indicated they had observed some Indian troop activity of the Ladakh Scouts in the Siachen glacier area. Although their Company had to return to base in September as they were not equipped or provisioned for the winter, the Pakistan Army firmed up its plans to deploy forces by May 1984 on the Saltoro. It was a different matter that when their forces reached the location, they found the Indian troops already deployed there. General Dad Khan writes, “This was a great setback for Pakistan. We had obviously failed to appreciate the timing of the Indian move and our intelligence agencies had failed to detect the brigade size force in the area in April 1984.”

There are some who debate that India’s response to the Pakistani cartographic aggression should have been in similar terms or tackled diplomatically, and not by physical means. According to Lt. Gen. M L Chibber, then Indian Northern Army Commander, routine patrolling by Indian troops had already commenced seeing Pakistan’s motives in the early 1980s. The problem precipitated on August 21, 1983, when a protest note was handed over from the Pakistan Northern Sector Commander stating that the Line of Control joins with the Karakoram Pass and the area west of this belongs to Pakistan. The Indians then swung into action.

The sequence of events brings out quite clearly that India did not act unilaterally. In fact, on reflection one can say with pride that the Indian establishment displayed sagacity, vision and political will in deciding to go ahead, and to the Indian Armed Forces for executing the mission with professionalism and unmatched courage in the face of adversity.

During the recent debates in the electronic media, subsequent to General Kayani’s offer of the so-called proposal to resolve the Siachen issue, every Pakistani expert guest on the TV channels prefaced his or her views with, “…India’s aggression and illegal occupation of Siachen in 1984 …” or words to that effect. It is this hurt that they tried to avenge in Kargil in 1999 but failed. This was also evident during the several rounds of Siachen Talks that have been concluded between both countries.

Significance of Siachen

General Chibber has succinctly stated that the Siachen glacier is a wedge that keeps the two adversaries apart. If one were to concede the Pakistani view that the line north of NJ 9842 does indeed join with the Karakoram Pass, it would literally amount to the Chinese presence in the Shaksgam valley moving southwards to the Nubra valley. With the reported activity of Chinese troops involved in building projects in Gilgit and Baltistan, the general area right down to the Shyok valley will become a collusive playground and a zone for future exploitation by the Chinese and Pakistanis through the Khunjerab and Karakoram passes.

Occupation of the Saltoro and Siachen provides a buffer to Ladakh and in military parlance, the much needed depth to important mountain passes that are gateways to Ladakh and onto Kashmir. There are a number of ‘experts’ who point out that it is futile to hold on to the positions on the Saltoro ridgeline because they are important only tactically and has are of no strategic significance. They are obviously unaware of the prevailing conditions in Siachen and the unequal advantage that accrues to a defender deployed in prepared positions on heights at 18,000 feet and above. Whereas no position is ever considered impregnable by a determined body of soldiers, get in touch with a survivor of any such attack that either failed or succeeded, and ask him about his tribulations and his brush with death at close quarters. The professionals in the Pakistan Army are not naïve to have attempted to capture pickets on the Saltoro over and over again despite heavy casualties. If ever there was a tactical gain that was instrumental in providing exponential dividend to a strategic cause, this is one.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, our positions in the Siachen sector were being developed and the Armed Forces were trying to improve their operational preparedness in terms of weapons, equipment, clothing, logistics, air support or maintenance. The Indian forces are now actually in such a strong, controlling position that they enjoy overwhelming operational and psychological superiority to even put pressure or indirectly influence Baltistan and Shaksgam – in military terms, a threat in being.

Casualties

“Why this senseless unconcern for human lives at unforgiving altitudes and extreme climatic conditions?” is a question which is very often asked of military officers. It is generally believed that commanders are so mission oriented that they do not care how many casualties are suffered as long as success is achieved. Nothing could be further from the truth. The relationship and bond that units and sub-units establish while operating in adverse conditions like Siachen can truly be experienced when one physically stays and ‘lives’ there for a period of time. When six to eight soldiers including an officer live together in a fibre glass hut, share food and hot cups of tea, share the loo, see each other’s face morning, noon and night, rope up on a patrol as one team, then they learn to care and live and die for each other.

Right up the chain of command, there is an urgency to make living conditions comfortable, improve facilities for forward medical treatment and early evacuation, and procuring the best clothing and equipment. Credit must be given to the helicopter pilots of the Indian Air Force and Army Aviation along with their maintenance and support staff who have conducted casualty evacuation operations with unparalleled zeal and casualties, which had always been the gravest concern, have reduced drastically. Operational casualties have become almost negligible after the Ceasefire was set in motion in November 2003.

Maximising combat effectiveness with minimum casualties is an oft-repeated Army concept of operations. Every life is precious, and units that de-induct from their tour of duty in Siachen without a single or a few casualties consider it a proud professional achievement, especially if their men have suffered no serious cold injuries. Till the mid-1990s, it was not uncommon for units to record fatal and non-fatal casualties ranging from 20 to as many as 50. Since 1984, the Indian Army has suffered well over 1,000 casualties in Siachen. However, the current casualty figure is about 10 per year.

The armed forces express their gratitude to the many well wishers and sympathisers on TV talk shows, who have displayed concern over the high casualty figures. But then, one need not get unduly sentimental over occupational hazards. There is a job to be carried out and the Army has the mandate to do it and so far, it has not let the nation down. It is a different matter altogether when Pakistani analysts talk of high casualties on the Indian Army as a justification for India to de-militarise the area. Some of them are under a false notion that their willingness to de-militarise is a concession being given to India. While we sympathise with the loss of lives in the recent avalanche at Gyari in POK, as we do in the case of any natural calamity, we should not allow aroused sentiments to overtake logic and reason in resolution of a complex problem. Incidentally, in 2010, Ladakh experienced an unexpected and massive cloudburst in which scores of locals including an entire post of the Indian Army was swept away under colossal mudslides.

Cost Effectiveness

Theoreticians and economists simply cannot understand the reason for this so called wasteful expenditure. Now that there is a ceasefire in place and no fighting is in progress, why do we drain our resources on maintaining hundreds of troops on icy glaciers and snow-covered mountains, they inquire. They forget history and the eternal debate on national security vis-à-vis development. Nations grow, prosper and develop when the sanctity of their borders is intact and when their security forces are capable of thwarting external aggression as well as ensuring internal stability. We learnt our lesson within the first two decades of attaining Independence. It has taken us five decades since the ‘Himalayan blunder’ to be somewhat self-reliant, create limited deterrent capability and acquire the status of being economically and militarily confident. Yet India’s defence budget is barely two per cent of its GDP.

To put things in perspective, the expenditure in Siachen is an integral part of the defence budget. No special allocation is made separately for it. There was a time when we spent a large sum of money to procure special mountaineering clothing and equipment for troops in Siachen that appeared to be disproportionate to the general expenditure for the rest of the Army. The general public is unaware that the Army has progressed manifold in catering for the requirements of its soldiers operating in equally difficult high altitude terrain in both Northern and Eastern Commands. Special rations and special clothing are equally applicable to other areas at similar altitudes.

Infrastructure in the Siachen sector has developed over the years, pipelines for kerosene and water have been laid and better facilities have been organised in every sphere of activity. Therefore, the expenditure incurred now is more in the form of maintenance and regular improvements. It is not to say that the expenditure is not heavy but more prudent to realise that it is only marginally higher than what the Army budgets for other extreme high altitude areas.

If one were to ask whether the money has been gainfully utilised and proportionate results achieved, the answer would be affirmative. In fact, the defence of the Siachen sector is so foolproof, that it provides far greater dividends. But a more pertinent question would be, “What would be the effort required in terms of resources in warlike and other material, not to forget the lives that will be lost, if we were forced to recapture these positions?” The answer is short and simple – prohibitive, both in terms of cost and in the number of officers and men who will pay the ultimate price. In 1999, in Kargil, we lost about 500 of our gallant young officers and soldiers in addition to the monetary cost of the conflict. This does not take into account the despondency and despair in the families of the dead and wounded. If at all you draw up a matrix to compute factors or pros and cons, just remember to give the factor of regaining lost positions a proportionally much higher weightage. The bottom line is that national security cannot be measured on cost-benefit ratio scales.

De-militarisation

De-militarisation is a process that consists of several logical steps: ceasefire, authentication, demarcation, withdrawal, re-deployment and verification. It is a concept that formal and informal working groups, researchers and defence analysts have concurred as one of the best possible solutions to the Siachen problem.

Reams of paper have been consumed in determining the process and procedures of verification, authentication and lines of redeployment. Ideas have been discussed in official Government to Government talks, Track II meets and think tanks. Use of technology and methodology to map, confirm and monitor have been deliberated upon threadbare, and in some cases, a general consensus has even been arrived at. So where then is the stumbling block?

The primary cause of disconnect is the sequence of the process of de-militarisation. Whereas India insists on authentication as the first step, the Pakistanis want the Indian troops to withdraw to pre-1972 positions before any further discussions can take place. Their contention is that demarcation or authentication must follow re-deployment to mutually agreed lines or out of a zone of disengagement. In their scheme of things, in a de-militarised zone it does not matter who was where, for the activity is not restricted to just the line but in the whole zone. The intention is obvious, even to a casual viewer who is not well versed with the nuances of military terms and processes, and that is the Pakistanis do not want to acknowledge the existence of the current locations of the Indian Army on the Saltoro, the Actual Ground Position Line. In some of the rounds of talks on Siachen, despite recognizing the Indian concern, the Pakistani officials have given vent to their frustrations by stating that the Indians were only interested in authentication for establishing their legal and moral claims.

The benefits of de-militarisation are not lost on any rational thinking person. The area can be transformed into a peace park or a laboratory for scientific experiments,. ; the environment can be protected and mountaineering expeditions can be flagged off. Moreover, casualties can be avoided and the national exchequers of both countries can be eased a trifle. There is, however, a caveat. What if the agreement is flouted and the positions are occupied by the Pakistan Army? There are proponents who advocate that there should be adequate safeguards built into the agreement to include punitive action, if the aggrieved nation so desires. In practice, punitive action is easier said than done, more importantly generating the political will to authorise it.

If one was to put one’s finger on just one factor that had an overarching impact on the resolution of the Siachen problem, it would be mutual trust or rather, the lack of it.

The Trust Factor

The level of mistrust between India and Pakistan in general and the Indian and Pakistani Security Forces in particular is so deep-rooted that it will take the better part of two generations to overturn. The mistrust began amongst the leaders of the two countries and the people, especially those living in the border regions, even prior to Independence. The Standstill Agreement in 1947 and later, the Karachi Agreement of 1949 was violated by Pakistan. General SK Sinha reflects that the MiniMarg area beyond the ceasefire line but South of the Burzilbai Pass was to be kept demilitarised to deny Pakistan infiltration routes into Tilel Valley, that lay North of the Shamsabari Ridge in Kashmir. Pakistan soon violated the clause of MiniMarg’s demilitarisation.

The trust gorge has only widened as events have unfolded. Starting with the proxy war in 1989, the façade of the Lahore Declaration was smattered by the illegal occupation of Kargil heights in 1999. The alleged role of the ISI in a number of terrorist actions in India would make an exhaustive list. The attack on the Parliament, blasts in many towns and trains and to top it, the Mumbai terrorist attack on 26/11 are bitter reminders. Calibrating the proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir, aiding infiltration from many borders, providing financial and moral support to ‘tanzeems’ and sleeper cells in India and unwillingness to expel terrorism from their soil are at the base of the rampant mistrust.

Yet there are many peace promoters, intellectuals amongst them, who philosophise that India should undertake a unilateral withdrawal from Siachen. There are also some military officers who were hawks while in service but have apparently become doves post retirement. Track II diplomacy does not mean that you give in or give up what is rightfully yours, just to show progress. Many a time, veteran diplomats and analysts justify the compulsions of the Pakistani establishment, saying that Pakistan will have a difficult task in selling the peace to its people or that it will look like a defeat or give them a face-saving option. Why for heaven’s sake? Let the Pakistani establishment explain the ground realities to its people. On the contrary, every Pakistani commentator has held forth a view that Indian forces must withdraw from the area illegally occupied by them in 1984.

What is the compulsion to resolve the problem in such a hurry? Yes, we certainly need to address the issue and keep it alive as part of the dialogue process. Had the Pakistanis been occupying the Saltoro Ridge, would they have withdrawn from it unilaterally without extracting their pound of flesh? Caution must be exercised in our keenness to convert it into a peace park so as to ease the burden on the exchequer and provide relief to our soldiers. Some film makers spent several days in the Siachen sector trying to understand how our soldiers operate in such hazardous areas. They appreciate the difficulties which our men face and that each tenure of duty takes away years of their lives. Some feel that we must de-militarise the area so that our men do not suffer. Noble thoughts but our well-meaning citizens should not forget the reason for our soldiers going there in the first place.

The two countries are constantly engaged in the Composite Dialogue process since a long period of time in spite of intermittent breaks due to unforeseen events or political compulsions at home or abroad. Siachen is only one amongst those issues albeit the least intractable. It would be in the fitness of maintaining momentum of the dialogue that both sides focus on those issues that are less contentious such as economic and commercial cooperation, drug trafficking, promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields and even the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project. Concurrently, the talks should continue on terrorism, Sir Creek and Siachen.

The present tone, tenor and unresponsive attitude of Pakistan, especially with respect to the acknowledgement of the Mumbai terrorist attacks and displaying no inclination to cease cross-border terrorism exudes no confidence or trust. Resolution of the Siachen dispute is possible purely on an edifice of trust which has to be built up gradually by both countries through meaningful Confidence Building Measures in letter and spirit.