Indian Defence Review

Current Status and Remedies

Structure and Credibility

No reform in the decision-making structure of the military has been made since instituted by Lord Ismay in 1947. While the size, elements, composition, structure, capability and posture of the Indian Defence Forces should be dictated by national objectives, what we have today is that inherited from the British Raj at the end of the World War II. Modern weapons are acquired and they just replace the earlier weapons without any changes in the structure of the forces or their overall sizes. No serious analysis has been done to the ratios in the sizes of Army, Air Force and Navy in spite of Revolution in Military Affairs driven by technology and globally evolving military tactics and strategies.

Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence.

Today, India possesses one among the world’s largest military manpower but relatively poor in firepower and in certain operational capabilities such as mobility and ability to conduct operations effectively overseas. Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence. The scar is about having to physically guard every inch of our border. Failure of intelligence and monitoring the border led to Kargil infiltration and so in the case of Chinese invasion. Such instances make us rush troops and leave them there permanently to guard but not putting enough effort to improve intelligence. More hill tops are physically guarded these days than ever in our history. Besides, ITBP and BSF have been raised just for the purpose of the strength of which is continually expanding.

This syndrome has prevented out-of-box solutions like effective monitoring by other means or deterrence of severe punishment if infringed. We need to obtain the cost of guarding our borders and explore means of doing it more cost-effectively. We need to have developed special weapons and mobility means in hills. We have not explored seriously unmanned means to monitor and gather intelligence along and across the borders that could reduce troop deployment. Our Forces have not acquired adequate skills in languages which are vital for intelligence gathering and analysis, especially learning Chinese language.

When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT).

Learning the foreign language opens up the possibility to understand the thinking process and their strategy and not merely translating books and papers. We waste effort on non-productive effort. For example, a large body of government employees of nearly 100 is kept busy translating engineering manuals in the Air Force written in English to Hindi which are never read!

Equipment

Combat systems availability for training and operations is poor though the inventory is large. Among major powers, other than members of erstwhile Soviet Union and China, Indian Forces probably have the largest non-available inventory. Significant proportion of equipment held by Indian Forces is obsolete or awaits spares. Management of logistics chain is primitive. CAG has criticised all the three Services for holding large stock of unusable and wasteful inventory costing hundreds of crores of rupees and a sizeable proportion of combat equipment lying unfit for operations. When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT). But it makes no sense if the Air Force cannot maintain serviceability better than 50 or 60%. If that be the case, we could well have procured less but put more money to ensure better availability. Indian Air Force serviceability and availability are lower than international norms.

A civil airline with less than 85% availability would fold up. The US Air Force minimal availability demanded is of the order of 71% while some fleets are as high as 90%. Japanese Self Defence Forces maintain 85% operational serviceability. Israeli Air Force is selective and mathematically models their supply chain balancing costs and operational requirement. It is bad economics to ever have nearly 50% of the work horses unavailable. Indian Army routinely charters civil airlines to transport its personnel going on leave from J&K to the plains of Delhi while the IAF transport fleet stands on ground needing spare parts.

Indian Army routinely charters civil airlines to transport its personnel going on leave from J&K to the plains of Delhi while the IAF transport fleet stands on ground needing spare parts.

The long waiting time to repair and overhaul is mainly due to want of spares. At times, it takes years to even contract for spares. For want of spares, ‘cannibalisation’ is resorted to – pulling out parts from the guts of an aircraft and fit these on another as almost routine! Besides being an unhealthy practice, it increases the quantum of work many fold. Serious attention is required by the government to go into the depth of the reasons and remedies. The government must have a mechanism to periodically review the equipment and training status and shortfalls in programmes implementation. This recommendation also figures in the Sixth Report of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence.

Training

Indian Armed Forces have some of the finest institutions for teaching on all facets and ideally tailored to educate people from different parts of the country under one roof. The stages of training have evolved over years of experience. However, the level of untrained manpower in operational Units is high due to inability to cope with the turnover. An operational Unit could have as much as 20% of its manpower unskilled. This brought in a process in the IAF to categorise personnel based on skills and experience. High skills are vital for functioning of industrial based Units such as BRDs.

it makes no sense if the Air Force cannot maintain serviceability better than 50 or 60%. If that be the case, we could well have procured less but put more money to ensure better availability.

It is very difficult for the military to maintain skill levels as that of civil industries because of turnover of personnel every four years. Considering that the civil has acquired the ability to provide quality engineering services, the Services should consider outsourcing industrial activities in stages. Government decision is awaited in creating the National Defence University, an institution that would cover advanced education in Defence. All ranks of one star and above must possess post graduation on professional subjects as a policy.

Force Composition

The size of Forces is equally important as the composition and capability. There is a slight danger of the focus shifting to extending the reach and capabilities of our Forces without ensuring the ability to protect homeland. For example, it is not true if the Air Force believes that equipping for longer reach and advanced munitions would meet the contingencies that may arise in supporting the Army in the Himalayas. Tankers, AWACS and long range missiles will not help when precision strikes are needed in deep gorges of the mountains or in fortifications that are not easy to locate. Weather in valleys and hill tops close down after a few hours in the morning. Air Force may not have the capability to reconnoiter and deliver weapons under cast. Similarly, helicopter and transport aircraft mobility get seriously restricted in cloudy weather conditions and at night.

High altitude airfields like Leh become unapproachable quite often. Under these limitations how would the Air Force fight? There is a need to develop special navigation and approach system; to develop special sensors and weapons that can be delivered under cast; develop special capabilities to provide mobility to the Army day, night and in all weather in the hills. The challenge on the Air Force is to provide 24×7 support and capability to combat in the Himalayas. This calls for formidable effort. Acquiring 45 or 65 squadrons will not serve the purpose unless focused specifically on these issues.

Tankers, AWACS and long range missiles will not help when precision strikes are needed in deep gorges of the mountains or in fortifications that are not easy to locate.

Similarly, the Navy could seek to be a blue water Force with the ability to patrol beyond 1,000 nm and the strategic straits. But, the thousands of square kilometers of coastal area need to be protected against threat of clandestine nature that terrorises and weakens our country. Substantial investments and innovation are necessary to protect our coasts, the economic activities, strategic assets like oil rigs and pipe lines and against smuggling and poaching. Coast Guards need to be suitably strengthened and the working and responsibilities of Coast Guard and the Navy need integration. Army must develop means to improve war fighting capabilities day and night over the hills. Innovative methods are necessary to be able to deploy in all weather in the hills, a comprehensive logistics capabilities to support, lethal and effective targeting capability and special weapons that are light, accurate, lethal that can be launched against target that are entrenched.

Expanding force levels is not the answer. Every man added increases pressure on logistics disproportionately. Services must develop special sensors and means to paralyse enemy communication and power sources. Develop capabilities to focus destruction without collateral damage. Most importantly, acquire excellent and comprehensive intelligence gathering capabilities which lead to 50% of winning the war! These do not call for expansion but improving the inventory, quality and management. Our investments must flow on to these areas. Capabilities to surprise should be inherent that calls for professionalism and high standards of training and preparedness.

Indigenous Capability

Recently, the DRDO has been criticised for delays and cost over-runs. Criticism alone would not do since it can only demoralise. We need to make a fresh start. We need to focus on priorities and form Project Teams from the Services that would closely interact with the design teams and guide. We need to learn the art of acceptance. We cannot jump to the moon in a single stage. We need to phase development and production, enhancing capabilities in phases than expecting wonders in one go. The flow of budget and related resources must allow for such a process to be adopted. JSQR, ASR or NSR should be the guidelines and not be used as the sledge hammer to reject indigenous effort.

The government must formulate National Doctrine on Defence. The Doctrine in turn would guide the long term plans ““ equipment, infrastructure, organisation, force structure and methods of employing the forces.

We need cost-effective evaluation of the output of DRDO and PSUs in deciding inductions. For example, the first batch of LCA or Arjun tank or LAH or IJT could be well utilised to train the operators and get the right feedback to improve the next batch. Services should not expect to go to war with the first batch of the production models. In fact, such process is adopted in all countries that build indigenous capabilities. We should explore outsourcing part of R&D and also encourage in-sourcing that would optimally utilise the infrastructure and resources of DRDO and the Services. We do not need to work on hypersonic planes but we need indigenously developed and produced laser-guided weapons and UAVs and such like equipment that has large demand.