Indian Defence Review

On 3 Apr, 1989 Ross Munro published an article on India – as the Superpower Rising, primarily focusing on its military might. It talked about India quietly transforming itself into regional superpower with a dominant military. The hypothesis was researched by many. Some scoffed at such an idea. They said since Rajiv Gandhi visited China and the relationship with China was improving, India should seriously consider cutting its force levels. Coincidentally that year, Pakistan launched cross border terrorism to gain Kashmir and weaken India. Over the next decade, thousands perished in India as the consequence that nearly brought the two countries to the brink of war. Certainly India showed no sign of superiority or power in dealing with Pakistan. Operation Parakram that ensued took the wind out of the prophecy. When India pulled its troops back after staying nearly one year at the brink, Pakistan took the credit of having deterred India from taking a drastic step. Indian Army whined about the significant loss of superiority over its adversary in combat power.

Diplomacy and credible military are the means of achieving peace and stability; together they constitute the elements of power projection. There cannot be power without economic strength. Strong economy cannot obtain power without the muscle of the military to secure.

India then took a different turn focusing on its economy and building strategic capability. Over the next two decades India established a consistent economic growth of 8%. A triad nuclear weapon delivery capability is in the making so also a credible command and control structure. Building a blue-water navy was seen as a necessity. Long strategic reach of its air arm supported by aerial tankers is today a reality. Professionalism of its military is acknowledged and it’s potential to be of stabilising influence. India’s space programme is growing steadily. It has established ability to recover space capsule reliably and accurately. Lunar orbital mission is given a go-ahead and manned missions are under study. India is one among very few countries that have proven ability to design, produce and launch satellites.

India’s global mission is dictated by our Constitution. It states that India shall “endeavour to promote international peace and security; maintain just and honorable relations between nations; foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples”. India is still to take the lead towards regional stability for which peace is essential. Diplomacy and credible military are the means of achieving peace and stability; together they constitute the elements of power projection. There cannot be power without economic strength. Strong economy cannot obtain power without the muscle of the military to secure. The military has no legs witout indigenous capability – the capability to design, develop and produce. Such a capability is not possible without the vision, effort and attitude. Attitude is dictated by national Morale and Will.

An American strategic analyst observed: “India’s armed forces are powerful, but they play a smaller role in security policy-making than their counterparts in almost all other countries”. This attitude must change. Military diplomacy is an important part of external relations that needs to be recognised and vigorously pursued. The world is not necessarily friendly to a weak and vulnerable state. India has a destiny to fulfill.

More hill tops are physically guarded these days than ever in our history. Besides, ITBP and BSF have been raised just for the purpose of the strength of which is continually expanding. This syndrome has prevented out-of-box solutions like effective monitoring by other means or deterrence of severe punishment if infringed.

Thus we see India reaching out to take a regional role and a power in its own right. Prime Ministers have expressed India’s regional interests over an area that stretches from the Gulf of Aden in the West to Japan in the East. Regional interests do not mean much unless India is ready to face regional responsibilities. The crucial decade would witness whether India faces such a responsibility boldly or withdraws to battling internal politics and turmoil. India must pursue independent policy that would nurture trust and interdependence with nations in the region particularly, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. The US National Intelligence Council Report -2004 states that “rise of India will present strategic complications for the region. India seeks to bolster regional cooperation both for strategic reasons and the desire to increase its leverage with the West. As India’s economy grows, governments in SE Asia – Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and other countries may move closer to India to help build a potential geo-political counter weight to China while India will seek to strengthen its ties in the region without excluding China”.

The Defence forces had to handle clandestine threats such as the Purulia arms drop, terrorist activities like aircraft hijacking, fighting piracy over the high seas and poaching in our coastal waters, counter infiltration of smugglers and terrorists from across our borders and now combat global terrorism. It is now the declared policy of the Government that internal security is to be one of the primary duties of the military. The three services need also rise to meet any contingencies arising such as natural calamities, civil disturbance when it goes beyond the control of the police and in combating terrorism. The military must be ready to manage essential services like communication, railways, aviation, harbour and ports if they get seriously affected by civil disturbances. It is necessary that they are familiar and fully integrated with civil in order that the take over when inevitable would be smooth. Airspace management of civil and military over the entire country should be integrated and yet each maintains its independent role. Where and when necessary, the military must be prepared to support the police and para-military forces in their operations against terrorism. This calls for a very capable, integrated and highly trained military.

The current status of the military in India falls well short in its ability in coping with all the demands described. Mr K Subramanium rightly conveyed his apprehension in demanding that “a high power commission to go into the entire question of role of Indian Armed Forces for the 21st century, their sizes, composition, equipment, personnel policy, training and their relations with other friendly powers. That is to be the first step in modernising the Indian Armed Forces”. The Sixth Report of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence conveyed similar apprehension while recommending that the government should urgently set up a formal institutional mechanism with adequate support structures to monitor the state of our Defence preparedness and to oversee progress on Defence programme modernisation /upgradation /acquisition/ re-equipment apart from achieving speedy decision-making on crucial issues affecting national security. Modernisation is not just about inducting modern weapon systems and advanced technology. It is also to do with running the military in a most cost-effective manner, as a professional service and not as government jobs. Regrettably, the pulls are towards the latter that must be desisted.

Current Status and Remedies

Structure and Credibility

No reform in the decision-making structure of the military has been made since instituted by Lord Ismay in 1947. While the size, elements, composition, structure, capability and posture of the Indian Defence Forces should be dictated by national objectives, what we have today is that inherited from the British Raj at the end of the World War II. Modern weapons are acquired and they just replace the earlier weapons without any changes in the structure of the forces or their overall sizes. No serious analysis has been done to the ratios in the sizes of Army, Air Force and Navy in spite of Revolution in Military Affairs driven by technology and globally evolving military tactics and strategies.

Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence.

Today, India possesses one among the world’s largest military manpower but relatively poor in firepower and in certain operational capabilities such as mobility and ability to conduct operations effectively overseas. Chinese invasion of 1962 has left a serious scar on our military thinkers and planners as well as those who influence. The scar is about having to physically guard every inch of our border. Failure of intelligence and monitoring the border led to Kargil infiltration and so in the case of Chinese invasion. Such instances make us rush troops and leave them there permanently to guard but not putting enough effort to improve intelligence. More hill tops are physically guarded these days than ever in our history. Besides, ITBP and BSF have been raised just for the purpose of the strength of which is continually expanding.

This syndrome has prevented out-of-box solutions like effective monitoring by other means or deterrence of severe punishment if infringed. We need to obtain the cost of guarding our borders and explore means of doing it more cost-effectively. We need to have developed special weapons and mobility means in hills. We have not explored seriously unmanned means to monitor and gather intelligence along and across the borders that could reduce troop deployment. Our Forces have not acquired adequate skills in languages which are vital for intelligence gathering and analysis, especially learning Chinese language.

When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT).

Learning the foreign language opens up the possibility to understand the thinking process and their strategy and not merely translating books and papers. We waste effort on non-productive effort. For example, a large body of government employees of nearly 100 is kept busy translating engineering manuals in the Air Force written in English to Hindi which are never read!

Equipment

Combat systems availability for training and operations is poor though the inventory is large. Among major powers, other than members of erstwhile Soviet Union and China, Indian Forces probably have the largest non-available inventory. Significant proportion of equipment held by Indian Forces is obsolete or awaits spares. Management of logistics chain is primitive. CAG has criticised all the three Services for holding large stock of unusable and wasteful inventory costing hundreds of crores of rupees and a sizeable proportion of combat equipment lying unfit for operations. When the Air Force puts up a procurement case, the number required is examined most critically. Every single accretion has to be justified. That is how we come up with an odd figure of 126 (MRCA) or 66 (AJT). But it makes no sense if the Air Force cannot maintain serviceability better than 50 or 60%. If that be the case, we could well have procured less but put more money to ensure better availability. Indian Air Force serviceability and availability are lower than international norms.

A civil airline with less than 85% availability would fold up. The US Air Force minimal availability demanded is of the order of 71% while some fleets are as high as 90%. Japanese Self Defence Forces maintain 85% operational serviceability. Israeli Air Force is selective and mathematically models their supply chain balancing costs and operational requirement. It is bad economics to ever have nearly 50% of the work horses unavailable. Indian Army routinely charters civil airlines to transport its personnel going on leave from J&K to the plains of Delhi while the IAF transport fleet stands on ground needing spare parts.

Indian Army routinely charters civil airlines to transport its personnel going on leave from J&K to the plains of Delhi while the IAF transport fleet stands on ground needing spare parts.

The long waiting time to repair and overhaul is mainly due to want of spares. At times, it takes years to even contract for spares. For want of spares, ‘cannibalisation’ is resorted to – pulling out parts from the guts of an aircraft and fit these on another as almost routine! Besides being an unhealthy practice, it increases the quantum of work many fold. Serious attention is required by the government to go into the depth of the reasons and remedies. The government must have a mechanism to periodically review the equipment and training status and shortfalls in programmes implementation. This recommendation also figures in the Sixth Report of the Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence.

Training

Indian Armed Forces have some of the finest institutions for teaching on all facets and ideally tailored to educate people from different parts of the country under one roof. The stages of training have evolved over years of experience. However, the level of untrained manpower in operational Units is high due to inability to cope with the turnover. An operational Unit could have as much as 20% of its manpower unskilled. This brought in a process in the IAF to categorise personnel based on skills and experience. High skills are vital for functioning of industrial based Units such as BRDs.

it makes no sense if the Air Force cannot maintain serviceability better than 50 or 60%. If that be the case, we could well have procured less but put more money to ensure better availability.

It is very difficult for the military to maintain skill levels as that of civil industries because of turnover of personnel every four years. Considering that the civil has acquired the ability to provide quality engineering services, the Services should consider outsourcing industrial activities in stages. Government decision is awaited in creating the National Defence University, an institution that would cover advanced education in Defence. All ranks of one star and above must possess post graduation on professional subjects as a policy.

Force Composition

The size of Forces is equally important as the composition and capability. There is a slight danger of the focus shifting to extending the reach and capabilities of our Forces without ensuring the ability to protect homeland. For example, it is not true if the Air Force believes that equipping for longer reach and advanced munitions would meet the contingencies that may arise in supporting the Army in the Himalayas. Tankers, AWACS and long range missiles will not help when precision strikes are needed in deep gorges of the mountains or in fortifications that are not easy to locate. Weather in valleys and hill tops close down after a few hours in the morning. Air Force may not have the capability to reconnoiter and deliver weapons under cast. Similarly, helicopter and transport aircraft mobility get seriously restricted in cloudy weather conditions and at night.

High altitude airfields like Leh become unapproachable quite often. Under these limitations how would the Air Force fight? There is a need to develop special navigation and approach system; to develop special sensors and weapons that can be delivered under cast; develop special capabilities to provide mobility to the Army day, night and in all weather in the hills. The challenge on the Air Force is to provide 24×7 support and capability to combat in the Himalayas. This calls for formidable effort. Acquiring 45 or 65 squadrons will not serve the purpose unless focused specifically on these issues.

Tankers, AWACS and long range missiles will not help when precision strikes are needed in deep gorges of the mountains or in fortifications that are not easy to locate.

Similarly, the Navy could seek to be a blue water Force with the ability to patrol beyond 1,000 nm and the strategic straits. But, the thousands of square kilometers of coastal area need to be protected against threat of clandestine nature that terrorises and weakens our country. Substantial investments and innovation are necessary to protect our coasts, the economic activities, strategic assets like oil rigs and pipe lines and against smuggling and poaching. Coast Guards need to be suitably strengthened and the working and responsibilities of Coast Guard and the Navy need integration. Army must develop means to improve war fighting capabilities day and night over the hills. Innovative methods are necessary to be able to deploy in all weather in the hills, a comprehensive logistics capabilities to support, lethal and effective targeting capability and special weapons that are light, accurate, lethal that can be launched against target that are entrenched.

Expanding force levels is not the answer. Every man added increases pressure on logistics disproportionately. Services must develop special sensors and means to paralyse enemy communication and power sources. Develop capabilities to focus destruction without collateral damage. Most importantly, acquire excellent and comprehensive intelligence gathering capabilities which lead to 50% of winning the war! These do not call for expansion but improving the inventory, quality and management. Our investments must flow on to these areas. Capabilities to surprise should be inherent that calls for professionalism and high standards of training and preparedness.

Indigenous Capability

Recently, the DRDO has been criticised for delays and cost over-runs. Criticism alone would not do since it can only demoralise. We need to make a fresh start. We need to focus on priorities and form Project Teams from the Services that would closely interact with the design teams and guide. We need to learn the art of acceptance. We cannot jump to the moon in a single stage. We need to phase development and production, enhancing capabilities in phases than expecting wonders in one go. The flow of budget and related resources must allow for such a process to be adopted. JSQR, ASR or NSR should be the guidelines and not be used as the sledge hammer to reject indigenous effort.

The government must formulate National Doctrine on Defence. The Doctrine in turn would guide the long term plans ““ equipment, infrastructure, organisation, force structure and methods of employing the forces.

We need cost-effective evaluation of the output of DRDO and PSUs in deciding inductions. For example, the first batch of LCA or Arjun tank or LAH or IJT could be well utilised to train the operators and get the right feedback to improve the next batch. Services should not expect to go to war with the first batch of the production models. In fact, such process is adopted in all countries that build indigenous capabilities. We should explore outsourcing part of R&D and also encourage in-sourcing that would optimally utilise the infrastructure and resources of DRDO and the Services. We do not need to work on hypersonic planes but we need indigenously developed and produced laser-guided weapons and UAVs and such like equipment that has large demand.

Budget and Expenditure

It is suspected that the government finds it convenient to park budget provisions in MOD in order that this could be diverted when required to higher priority areas. Otherwise there cannot be a reason for surrendering substantial proportion of Defence budgets year after year. Over a period of five years, the Air Force surrendered one full year’s capital budget. While the Services are focused on spending the budget, similar enthusiasm is lacking in controlling expenditure. We need good database on cost of equipment and cost of activities without which it will not be possible to effectively outsource that which could bring in higher efficiency and performance.

“¦the DRDO has been criticised for delays and cost over-runs. Criticism alone would not do since it can only demoralise. We need to make a fresh start.

Every activity should be costed and cost-accounting and should be pursued as followed in the West. The cost of manpower and related infrastructure is increasing exponentially. Improved quality of life demands greater expenditure and attention to the needs of personnel. Over 60% of the services go towards manpower costs. Western nations spend not more than 40% of the budget on manpower. There is no way to reduce manpower costs without reducing manpower! Services must treat reducing manpower in the same light as capability enhancement. We need an attitudinal change. Currently it appears impossible to emulate Israeli Defence Forces in this regard. Their example could serve as an inspiration!

Wasteful Effort

Defence Estate Department has a very large inventory of land having no use for the military. Military possesses huge land and related infrastructure unwanted or most sparingly used – that cost a great deal in terms of manpower and expenditure to maintain. Airfields uneconomical are owned and maintained by the Air Force. The military possesses large useless inventory that has been criticised by CAG. Weapon systems beyond useful life are maintained at extraordinary effort and cost since they are not replaced in time. We operate at least four different aircraft and use five different engines that had become obsolete and do not fly anywhere else in the world! Upgradation of the Air Force fleet comes at the near end of the life of a weapon system when there is no replacement in sight – to give it a fresh life. This is a bad strategy.

The West talks about mid-life upgrades and never an upgrade at the end of life! Our MIG-21 upgrade, the BISON project has still not been completed. It is now a race to complete the upgrade before the technical life gets over! There is plenty of scope to improve interoperability between the three services. Many systems used by the three services have many commonalities. Currently, the logistics systems followed by the services are not linked. A spare which one service needs may be in surplus with another but there is no way to know it. Facilities are duplicated or even triplicated without being aware. Besides improving efficiency, costs and manning could be significantly reduced through integration among the Services.

Future Military Operations

It would be impossible to hide large forces, ships and large fleet of aircraft from detection in future. While force deployments would be known, only the intention could be concealed. Strategic forces would be continually tracked and communication monitored. Collateral damage to civilian lives and property would not be tolerated by international community.

Among major powers, other than members of erstwhile Soviet Union and China, Indian Forces probably have the largest non-available inventory.

Economic assets in the country are growing geometrically and are highly vulnerable. These have to be defended strongly from attacks by air and sea. The air defence network should gear up to cover the essential and vulnerable areas and points.

Quality would be the element and not quantity. The man behind the gun and the machines would be irreplaceable and would need to be given best protection possible. A modern soldier would be better qualified, educated and trained. Manpower cost would escalate rapidly.

Concepts and capabilities must be validated through training followed by realistic exercises. Cost and time would be the important drivers in assessing efficiency of all activities

A serious study is needed to arrive at the optimum mix of forces. Such an exercise must ensure that core competency is not diluted or duplicated, integrating operations, logistics, administrative and training support between the services and enhancing interoperability.

Transformation

The government must formulate National Doctrine on Defence. The Doctrine in turn would guide the long term plans – equipment, infrastructure, organisation, force structure and methods of employing the forces. Short term plan must be guided by government directives that would specify tasks that the military is likely to undertake over the next 10 years. It is not mere technology upgrade and acquisitions but a single focus by the three services in meeting the objectives dictated by the government jointly in an optimal and cost-effective manner. Services must build joint capability – the ability to achieve desired operational effects under the specified conditions in a combined optimal way with the right choice of systems and personnel. Interoperability of every system between the Services must be ensured. Since time would be always at premium, speed and effectiveness are most essential.

Concepts and capabilities must be validated through training followed by realistic exercises. Cost and time would be the important drivers in assessing efficiency of all activities – of the military in being and the military at war. The Department of Defence of US formed the Office of Force Transformation to deal with evolving concepts, processes, organisation and technology to meet the emerging challenges. It evolves and encourages new ideas through experimentation and exercises. It studies and assesses lessons learned on battlefields from every part of the world. India could possibly create such a department within the Joint HQ. We should hope for healthy debate in the Parliament on the capabilities of our military and budget allocations which would enhance accountability and performance.