Indian Defence Review

Army Post at Siachen

 Pakistan’s Aims and Plans – II

It appears that Pakistan’s ‘Plan-X’ was prepared after a widely read fortnightly of New Delhi reporting on Exercise Brass Tacks gave brief comments on certain offensive plans for Northern Kashmir (POK) conceived during this exercise. The details of planning, if authentic, amounted to an astounding breach of security as sensitive material of this kind could not have become available to a news magazine in the normal course. True or false, this news item caused alarm bells to ring rather shrilly in the highest echelons of Pakistan’s defence planners. It seems, soon after the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was asked to produce comprehensive plans to counter such a threat.

The periodic eruption of violent anti-Indian sentiments had now become a permanent feature in the Kashmir Valley.

After prolonged deliberations, JCSC submitted a plan which would pre-empt any Indian offensive in Northern Kashmir and in addition make her recoil from the Saltoro Crest Line and Siachen Glacier. This operation was codenamed ‘Plan-X’. The aim of this operation was to seize and hold logistics support bases vital for maintenance of troops deployed on the Saltoro Crest Line, Siachen and Southern Glaciers, by a surprise attack with a view to:

The main features of ‘Plan-X’ made available to India by an Intelligence Agency of a third country appeared to be:

• To achieve surprise ‘Plan-X’ was to be see executed in deep winter, preferably at a time when flights between Thoise and the rest of India are unable to operate and Ka Khardungla is blocked.
• Capture of forward positions of Partapur Co garrison astride axis Siari-Tortuk and De logistics support bases for Southern Glaciers by infiltration across the LC.
• Hell-landing/drop of specially equipped and trained troops east of Partapur-Thoise and Siachen Base Camp; with the task of capturing Thoise Airfield complex and Siachen Base Camp simultaneously.
• Interdiction of Khardungla by SSG after blowing up sections of road and important w culverts on either side of the pass.
• Actual concentration of troops and simulation of major attacks at an appropriate time in Dras, Kargil, Gurez, Tangdhar and Punch Sectors with a view to tying down Indian reserve formations.

• Raids and destruction of staging camps and gun positions located on the Siachen Glacier. Exert maximum pressure on Indian posts located on the crest line from both sides of the LC. Capture Sia La on the crest line in the northern Glacier area, if possible.
• Step up guerrilla and terrorist activity, raid airfields and radar facilities in the valley on given code words.
• Activate major disturbances and widespread rioting in all major towns of Kashmir Valley and Jammu Division.
• All forces to be prepared and trained to operate for a period of eight days without re-supply or land link-up.
• Plans for exfiltration of troops in unfavourable circumstances will be prepared but divulged only to a selected few.

Review of the Situation by the Defence Cabinet Committee, Pakistan

‘Plan-X’ had to remain only on paper, it seemed, due to various compulsions of the Mghanistan situation and later due to General Zia’s sudden demise. An overall review of the Kashmir situation in general and Siachen in particular was undertaken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and the Defence Council after Ms Benazir Bhutto came to power. In the analysis of options, one fact stood out clearly, that Pakistan was in no position to opt for a military solution of the Kashmir issue; even a limited military action in Siachen may not be feasible at present. Any military operation, however limited in scope, may open multiple options for India to gain a tactical victory in a sector of its own choosing. If pressed hard, India may even t widen the conflict with serious repercussions for Pakistan.

A radio station calling itself Voice of Islamic Republic of Kashmir came on the air off and on from 15 August onwards. It exhorted the people of the valley to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic order.

The political leadership appeared to be n totally against any military adventure in Kashmir. However, they were persuaded to W’ turn a Nelson’s eye to the ongoing covert operations in Kashmir. A summary of major conclusions drawn during various deliberations was as follows:

A note of dissent

It appears that during various discussions, certain ‘Generals’ were not in favour of postponement of ‘Plan-X’. Their main argument was that India was bound to help the present Afghan regime militarily and must be taught a lesson in Siachen in such a situation. These Generals may not have their way immediately but it cannot be assumed that they will not have their way in the future.

General situation in J&K – The Next Twelve Months

The periodic eruption of violent anti-Indian sentiments had now become a permanent feature in the Kashmir Valley. The political leadership continued to be ambivalent, in spite of mounting evidence that Jammu & Kashmir was slowly drifting towards a total political and administrative collapse due to a ‘low-intensity conflict’ situation. If the Government had any action plan or had learnt any lessons from the havoc wrought by mob violence and ever-increasing terrorist activities, it was not much in evidence. As usual, complete bandhs were observed in all major towns in the valley on Republic Day and Independence Day. Violent incidents further marred these occasions. On Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August, a large number of Pakistani flags appeared on many public buildings and no one seemed to be in a hurry to pull them down. Local police appeared to be a demoralized force as it had to face the wrath of the people without let-up. A state of stupor seemed to have overtaken the whole Government machinery. The Secretariat had become a cauldron of intrigue and the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service were divided on Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri lines.

Towards the end of September, there were mob attacks on civil trucks carrying military stores, when they were passing through some crowded areas of Srinagar and Sopore.

Terrorist activities continued unabated in the’ valley and caches of sophisticated weapons and explosives were discovered quite by chance in Bodh Bungus, Kanil and Gangabal areas. This indicated that large stocks of arms and ammunition were being built up in selected areas over a period of time. The tourist season opened with bomb and grenade attacks on tourist facilities, buses and shopping centres, in tourist resorts. Indian tourists were the main targets of attack. As only minor injuries were caused by these attacks the aim seemed to be to scare away the indigenous variety of tourists. Soon, however, shikarawaLas and petty shopkeepers were incited to block the roads in Srinagar and Pahalgam. The agitationists asked for subsidies and accused the Government of diverting tourist traffic to Patni Top and Batot, outside the valley, in order to punish the poor Kashmiri.

Strikes by lower Government employees and truck drivers came next. This created major problems for the Government as strikers frequently blocked the main highways and brought life in the vclley to a standstill. These strikes seemed extremely well organized and they started and stopped suddenly, as if on a signal. Another disturbing feature was the total passivity of the police duringbandhs and strikes, which almost amounted to connivance.

A radio station calling itself Voice of Islamic Republic of Kashmir’ came on the air off and on from 15 August onwards. It exhorted the people of the valley to overthrow the Government and establish an Islamic order.

In this crisis situation, there seemed to be a further falling apart of the Centre and State leadership, resulting in the lack of a well-coordinated plan or strategy to meet the situation.In the first incident of its kind, a truck carrying three CRPF jawans and a Sub-Inspector was fired upon with automatic weapons. The truck suffered major damage but the men escaped with minor injuries. Immediately afterwards, baseless reports of atrocities purported to be committed by BSF and CRPF were circulated through leaflets and posters. Some similar reports appeared in the vernacular press also.

A powerful time bomb with a sophisticated fIring device was discovered at the Srinagar Airport Luggage Lounge. It was disarmed by an IAF expert squad which was luckily near at hand. A similar device was found in a room of the Press Information Bureau on the Residency Road in Srinagar. A number of noted journalists were present when the bomb, which was to explode soon, was found and disarmed. These discoveries pointed towards an increasing sophistication of means but the lack of expertise of the “saboteurs” was also apparent.

Towards the end of September, there were mob attacks on civil trucks carrying military stores, when they were passing through some crowded areas of Srinagar and Sopore. Military convoys were fired upon in remote areas of Kupwara district. In Bandipore area, grenades were lobbed on an ammunition dump. Gradually Paramilitary forces and some reserve Army formations were getting tied down with the ever-increasing static guard duties at vulnerable points and important bridges and culverts on the highways. The Army now started providing armed escorts to convoys, and guards at .rear depots and formation Headquarters were strengthened. This affected the fighting strength of combat arms on the posts. Normal maintenance and advance stocking schedules could not be kept due to various constraints and non-availability of civilian vehicles. Army convoys from base depots to Srinagar and to Ladakh were often delayed for more than twenty-four hours due to disturbances in the crowded areas, en route to Zojila. Plans for alternative routes to avoid these bottlenecks existed on paper for many years, but had remained unexecuted.

In a dangerous escalation of terrorist activities, the airfields at Avantipur and Badgam were subjected to commando-type attacks in which a couple of IAF transport aircraft and one IA Boeing were damaged.

It was obvious from a graduated escalation of insurgency that Phase 2 of Op Topac as visualized by the late General Zia-ul-Haq was taking concrete shape. In this crisis situation, there seemed to be a further falling apart of the Centre and State leadership, resulting in the lack of a well-coordinated plan or strategy to meet the situation.

Parleys on Siachen at the Secretary level made headway but Pakistan insisted on the status quo existing prior to 1984. The sequence of major incidents recorded in Jammu & Kashmir indicated a definite pattern leading towards the objective of destabilizing the Jammu & Kashmir Government and facilitating the passage of insurgency with the ultimate aim of creating an “Afghan-like situation”.

Details of Major Incidents in J&K

Kashmir Valley

Major fires broke out in J&K Road Transport Corporation (JKRTC) and Army Petrol Depot near Srinagar almost simultaneously. It seemed a hand:-held model, MZ-A17 Flame-Thrower, firedfrom a hill overlooking this depot, was used to start the fire. Even though the fire was brought under control within a few hours by an efficient Army fire-fighting organization, a large quantity of fuel was lost. It was also noted that the approach to this depot was through a crowded area, and as such fire-fighting vehicles and personnel had to force their way through a one-way, narrow and crowded street. This spot was obviously no longer suitable for a large FOL Depot.

The fire in JKRTC depot caused much greater damage and created panic in the town. It was evident that no serious attempt was made to fight this fire. A report suggested that the passage of fire brigade vehicles was obstructed en route by a violent mob.

Simultaneous attacks were made on Avantipur and Badgam airfields in which one AN-32, one Cheetah helicopter and one Boeing 737 were rendered unfit for flying due to major damage. It was apparent that small teams of specially trained terrorists had mounted rocket attacks on the aircraft parked on the tarmac. In the ensuing confusion, the terrorists made good their escape. A new variety of specially trained commando teams were obviously operating in the valley.

The staff of Radio Kashmir was held at pistol-point by a couple of intruders during the broadcast of the programme ‘Wadi ki Awaz’. An attempt was made to force the broadcasters to say ‘Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir apse mukhatib hai’ (This is Radio Islamic Republic of Kashmir). This attempt, however, did not succeed and the intruders fled in a jeep after throwing two petrol bombs on soine transmission facilities. Significantly, no one either made an attempt to catch the culprits or offered any resistance. The armed guard at the gate remained oblivious of this incident, or so it was said.

Some reports suggested that some youths dressed in blue shalwar suits were collecting taxes in the name of Islamic Republic of Kashmir.

Power stations and transmission towers were being regularly damaged in Baramulla district, Gund and Bandipur. In most cases high explosives were used. .

One tube of Banihal Tunnel was blocked for more than twenty-four hours when a truck blew up half-way. It seemed the driver of the truck had stopped the vehicle and walked away on the pretext that it was defective. Two vehicles behind this truck were badly damaged and the drivers/cleaners sustained serious injuries.

A number of houses in Karen Nagar were set on fIre in Srinagar. A number of cowsheds and grain bins were destroyed by fires in Pulwama, Bijbiara, Kulgam and Hajan in the southern part of the valley. Some reports suggested that some youths dressed in blue shalwar suits were collecting ‘taxes’ in the name of Islamic Republic of Kashmir. However, the police denied these reports.

Two civilian trucks which were part of ‘Up Convoy’ at Zojila were damaged by what seemed to be improvised mines planted at ‘Capt’s Mor’.

As there are only a few army personnel stationed here and the depot is located far away from any military station, major damage was caused before the fire could be brought under control.

A spate of bank robberies were reported throughout the valley. In each case, cash was handed over without much resistance.

On a Sunday, fire from automatic weapons was directed on the offIcers’ mess in the Army ammunition depot at Khundru. Almost simultaneously, a devastating fire broke out in certain ammunition sheds. As there are only a few army personnel stationed here and the depot is located far away from any military station, major damage was caused before the fire could be brought under control. The majority of workers being locals, ran away at the first signs of trouble. A company had therefore to be located here for protection duties.

Two Army trucks carrying winter stocks to Keren Sector were fired upon and damaged near Sirpat. A similar incident took place near Lashdat in Gurez Sector, near Razdhani Pass.

Along the Line of Control

Pakistani troops remained unusually quiet all along the LC. There were no attempts at encroachment or the usual unprovoked firing. Any cattle straying across on the POK side were promptly returned. The company commanders on the LC were chatty and friendly. However, some additional stocking was noticed in Lipa Valley and some posts north of Jhelum River in Uri Sector. There was a marked increase in vehicles plying on the Neelam Valley road. It seemed a lot more ‘artillery ammunition’ was being stocked this year.

Large-scale infiltration through ‘Northern Gallies’ was reported but remained unconfirmed. It was more likely that very small parties crossed the LC on days of bad weather over a period of time.

In Ladakh

Ladakh remained quiet as usual, except for one anti-Salman Rushdie demonstration in ‘Sum Valley’ which has a predominantly ‘Shia’ population, who even in normal times display posters and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini in their homes. A protest march was also held in Kargil demanding more water from the newly built canal and a road block was set on the highway near the Kargil airstrip.

A large number of tourists were stranded in Leh this year due to disturbances in the valley. There was a paucity of civilian trucks available to the Army as many owners did not operate from Jammu to Srinagar this year.

Along the Line of Control

There were reports of Pakistani encroachment in Dras/Kargil area as an outpost vacated by Indian troops in winter was found occupied by Pakistani troops. The incident however was not played up and was being dealt at the local commander’s level through flag meetings. This incident was preceded by frequent helicopter reconnaissances all along the LC in this area.

Saltoro Ridge in the Siachen area was also quiet except for a few exchanges of artillery fire. There was a marked increase ill-stocking convoys coming to the bases in Siari and Khapalu areas. Air transport sorties to Gilgit and Skardu airfields also showed an upward trend.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) of the Indo-Tibetan border remained quiet except for normal Chinese patrols. Small parties were seen observing forward defences around Chushul and Hanle, from the distant ridges on the Chinese side of the LAC.

In Jammu

State Government offices were attacked with petrol bombs during the summer when the Government was functioning at Srinagar. No major damage was therefore caused. Sporadic bomb blasts in the crowded areas of Jammu, Akhnoor and Punch created occasional panic. A new temple. near Jammu was desecrated resulting in communal tension. Communal riots broke out in Rajauri during Holi and tension prevailed in other towns.

 One of the main reasons for this failure on the part of ISI in their plans was the mature handling of the situation by the Indian Army, which did not quite react the way they were expected to

An attempt to blow up a section of the railway line between Madhopur and Kathua was foiled by a vigilant track patrol. A bomb blast at the crowded Jammu Tawi station caused a large number of injuries to civilians and some military personnel proceeding on leave. This along with occasional bomb blasts in buses on the Pathankot-Jammu route imposed caution and created a fear psychosis.

Along the LC

Concentration of troops was noticed opposite Punch, Mendhar, Jhangar and Naushera. Dumping of artillery ammunition was also reported. Intermittent firing continued in the Punch-Rajauri area. Aggressive patrolling by Pakistani troops was reported all along the LC.

General Situation in J&K in the near future

In spite of an overall explosive situation prevailing in the valley, the escalation of conflict as visualized by the late General Zia at the end of Phase 2 of Op Topac did not fully develop. Firstly, the Mghan situation did not develop favourably for Pakistan. Secondly, the Kashmiris had neither risen in a mass revolt against the regime nor did they acquire an armed capability to confront the security forces. One of the main reasons for this failure on the part of ISI in their plans was the mature handling of the situation by the Indian Army, which did not quite react the way they were expected to. The Army, despite perpetual pinpricks, went about its tasks in a cool, businesslike manner and refused to be EP: provoked to take any harsh repressive An measures against the local population; in fact, they continued to help them as usual. Of course, this did not happen because of any deliberate attempt or directions issued from above, but only because of the self discipline and resilience imbued in all ranks of the Indian Army. ISI, it seemed, had miscalculated here.

Despite things not going too well in Afghanistan, various offensive plans for Siachen were repeatedly discussed and reviewed to give concrete shape to Phase 3 of Op Topac.However, what the insurgents had successfully achieved was to disturb normal life in the State, paralyse the administration and discredit the State Government. Some lobbies unfriendly to India, in certain countries, accused India of genocide of Kashmiri Muslims and published exaggerated reports of the Kashmir situation with a view establishing that Kashmir was like another ‘Afghanistan’. The Indian Army was compared with the Soviet Army and it was predicted that it would be forced to leave Kashmir soon.

The Pakistani Army brass, which was never very fond of ISI, openly blamed the latter for the mess in Afghanistan and the failure in Kashmir. In this respect, the attitude of the Pakistani Army and Ms Benazir Bhutto was almost identical. Some Generals were, however, itching to have a go at Siachen to retrieve what they called their honour. Despite things not going too well in Afghanistan, various offensive plans for Siachen were repeatedly discussed and reviewed to give concrete shape to Phase 3 of Op Topac. This would give the regular Army a bigger role and cut ISI down to size. The covert aid to Kashmir insurgency still continued, but a kind of stalemate set in due to diverse pulls and the expected results were still nowhere in sight.

Ms Benazir Bhutto, although keen to settle the Siachen Glacier issue, was not in favour of committing her forces in a military adventure, with no guarantee that it would remain confined to the Glacier area or even Jammu & Kashmir. But would she be in complete command of the situation?

Epilogue

Another kind of war

The likelihood of a conventional war over Kashmir has gradually diminished over the years due to India’s commanding military dominance and Pakistan’s increasing commitments on the Afghan front. The imminent nuclear capability of India and Pakistan could further lead towards a ‘stand off situation. The Kashmir dispute however tl remains. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it will continue to assert that a satisfactory solution must be found in the interest of peace. India does not accept this position because this, in essence, means reopening of the question of Kashmir’s accession to India.

The Afghan conflict provided him with an excellent lte opportunity to import the latest weapons…

The options of military confrontation in W various forms have failed in the past. The failure of infiltration of special groups of the ‘Gibraltar Force’ and its aftermath in 1965 finally convinced Pakistan that a successful uprising could not be created from outside. Zia eventually decided to wage another kind of war in Kashmir. He also decided to provide assistance to Punjab terrorists for good measure. He was, however, fully aware that as it would take a long time to indoctrinate and train the Kashmiri insurgents. The Afghan conflict provided him with an excellent lte opportunity to import the latest weapons for m, the Kashmiri insurgents, besides the expertise required to covertly fuel insurgency in Kashmir. According to General Zia and his advisers, this kind of war would be cheaper and far more effective in Kashmir.

A definition of Low-Intensity Conflict, once current in the US Army, will perhaps help us to understand the present scenario in in Kashmir a little better. Low-Intensity Conflict has been defined as:

Dangers of inadequate response

The dangerous dimensions of the situation in Kashmir, it seems, have not been fully appreciated. It should be realized that this is not merely a ‘Punjab-like’ situation but something much more. A special kind of war has been initiated here of which assistance to Punjab terrorism is only an adjunct. In spite of clear indications that this ‘war’ has already crossed the initial threshold India’s response has been quite inadequate. No long-term strategy or action plan to fight the unrest, terrorism or insurgency is yet discernible. The recent announcement of the Government that IS I was involved in Afghanistan, Punjab and Kashmir was obvious for at least a year or so to any keen observer of the situation.

The dangerous dimensions of the situation in Kashmir, it seems, have not been fully appreciated. It should be realized that this is not merely a ‘Punjab-like situation’ but something much more.

Belated reaction, misdirected drives, patchwork solutions worked out in isolation by various central and state agencies can lead to no crisp or clear-cut directions, so essential in such situations. An overall ‘strategic vision’ must therefore be evolved so that the problem can be seen in its proper perspective. A drift of the kind apparent today will allow the situation to slide into utter chaos.

Danger in Kashmir is real and unless effective steps are taken immediately, the separatist movement is bound to gather further momentum. A study of such situations the world over would indicate that force alone, however effectively used, can never suffice. To fight a movement and eliminate insurgency, the battle of the hearts and minds must be waged from ‘Day One’. This would require enmeshing of political, economic and psychological efforts rather than purely an armed response, in the shape of paramilitary forces or the army.

Essential steps

As no single ministry or agency can focus attention on the problems of Kashmir exclusively, a joint command, control and intelligence set-up should be established which should lay down the overall strategy and long-term aims. It may be desirable to associate certain ‘non-officials’ to provide inflow of fresh ideas.

A vigorous campaign for winning the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri people should be initiated. This will require much more here than the normal techniques of ‘mass contact’.

Danger in Kashmir is real and unless effective steps are taken immediately, the separatist movement is bound to gather further momentum.

The first step should be to objectively analyse the state of mind of various classes and the extent of disaffection in the valley. The population here is not as homogeneous in its political preferences as is generally believed. The Guj ars , Gaddis, Hanjis and Batals do not all have the same attitude and background as the urban Kashmiri Muslim from Srinagar, Sopore, Anant Nag and Baramulla.

Personnel of various central agencies functioning in Kashmir must learn the language and familiarize themselves with the customs and religious practices of various classes and castes if they have to break down the wall of misunderstanding being erected by false propaganda. Accurate and wide media coverage oriented towards the special tasks in hand must be planned and provided. This would prevent rumours and planted-information to be believed by people. Television and radio so far have played only a marginal role and must be utilized fully and effectively. At present, it is e~sier to receive Pakistani television programmes in the valley than our own national hook-up. The urban Kashmiri who is most affected by Pakistani propaganda will require proper presentation of facts. Newspapers, especially Urdu papers, can playa very constructive role but there is no such thrust at present, hence the local Urdu papers with an anti-India bias have a field day.

Special time-bound educational and socio-economic programmes should be launched through Government and non-Government agencies. The Kashmiri youth must also get a chance to see India (not only Delhi or Taj Mahal) through well-organized cultural exchange programmes.

The terrorists and guerrillas can playa deadly game of urban-cum-rural insurgency in Kashmir Valley with assured local support. Tactics to counter this twin threat must be worked out jointly by the civilian authorities with the Army and the Paramilitary forces.

The assistance of locals to insurgents either through propaganda or intimidation must be prevented. It should be clearly understood that widespread searches, suspicion of a class or community as a whole and repressive measures help the insurgents to gain local sympathy and support. The guerrilla and the insurgent would like to portray the Government as the enemy of the people and repressive measures will appear to confirm this.

The capacity and capability of POKj Pakistan to influence events in Jammu & Kashmir must be objectively assessed and measures to counter these influences be precisely stipulated. It may be worthwhile to use ‘think-tanks’ for this purpose.

The terrorists and guerrillas can playa deadly game of urban-cum-rural insurgency in Kashmir Valley with assured local support. Tactics to counter this twin threat must be worked out jointly by the civilian authorities with the Army and the Paramilitary forces.

A single specialized intelligence agency to deal both with Punjab and Kashmir is necessary. This agency should develop and deploy sources with the express purpose of dealing with the current developments. This should be capable of penetrating terrorist and insurgent organizations in both these states. The nexus between ISI of Pakistan, Kashmiri and Punjabi terrorists should be realistically assessed and countered through such an agency.

Considering the terrain and the weather I conditions it is obvious that special equipment and transportation system must be provided to forces operating against insurgents.

The role of the Army, intelligence agencies, Paramilitary forces and the local police in various scenarios and spheres should be worked out precisely and coordinated by a I central agency.

Considering the terrain and the weather I conditions it is obvious that special equipment and transportation system must be provided to forces operating against insurgents. Sophisticated communication network, helicopter and swift river transport systems suitable for this area must be planned and provided early for quick reaction by security forces.

A special force on the pattern of the Assam Rifles may be required. In the long run, such a force is likely to prove more effective than BSF or CRPF units inducted from outside for short durations.

Develop suitable strategy, doctrine and tactics to deal with challenge in Kashmir.In brief, India should:

In conclusion it may be befitting to quote Nehru who said, ‘’The strongest bonds that bind will not be of your armies or even your constitution-but bonds which are stronger than the constitution and law and armies-bonds which bind through love and affection and understanding.”