Indian Defence Review

Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Dalai Lama

FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy was not a priority for Indira Gandhi when she came to power. For there were array of domestic issues that needed her urgent attention, including the consolidation of her own authority in the face of emerging dissidence within her own party. Some of her weighty colleagues, who had throned her, were now out to oust her.

Neither any conceptualised framework was discernible nor any broad principles were detectable in her foreign policy actions. She neither had the time – heavily involved as she was domestically – nor the mental inclination to venture into any fixed direction.

There were other problems too, like a serious drought, or the fractious language issue, that required imperative scrutiny; but remaining in power obviously was primordial since there was nothing much she could do to address these issues without having an assailable charge of the country.

Indira Gandhi, therefore, applied herself earnestly to remain in power. With a combined strategy of rhetoric, open confrontation, devious intrigue, overwhelming courage and a calculated political swing to the left she confronted themThat she finally came out victorious was indeed remarkable—remarkable in terms of risks she had to take and the courage she had to show.

But, in the process, India had to pay a price, a downside from which it has never recovered—even years after her disappearance. For Indira Gandhi had debilitated the country’s democratic framework, enhanced an unsightly decisional process, developed intrigue and corruption into an art, and projected onto the Indian political scene a distasteful group of people—at least in the domestic sector. It was indeed a total departure from the ethical mode of conduct that was so dear to her father and to her immediate predecessor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, both of whom embodied a set of moral principles and political consistency to which they remained faithful to the end of their lives. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, was a chamelonic leader who changed whenever it suited her.

But, what about the substance of foreign policy. Did Indira Gandhi establish any broad framework of action, or institute any basic principles that underpinned her actions, or architectured any road map that steered the country?

It would seem not. Neither any conceptualised framework was discernible nor any broad principles were detectable in her foreign policy actions. She neither had the time—heavily involved as she was domestically—nor the mental inclination to venture into any fixed direction.

Given her personality and character, it could be suggested that she strove to maintain an autonomy of action to defend and safeguard what she perceived to be Indian national interest. This was a ubiquitous phenomenon in all her diplomatic actions.

CONFIGURATION OF GREAT POWERS

The US Dimension

One of the first visible changes she introduced in foreign policy was to slowly jettison Shastri’s objectives of building bridges to the US. It was not so much because she had any principled objection against such an initiative as the fact that they never really took off despite some discernible efforts from both sides to introduce an element of warmth in Indo-US relations. The Johnson Administration showed a conspicuous tendency of exercising exacting pressures on India that none of the preceding administrations had venture to exert.

However, notwithstanding these reservations about Washington, her first trip abroad was to the US. Apparently this seemed unavoidable and made consummate sense. India badly needed massive food aid which only the US was in a position to provide. Besides, Washington had shown some visible signs, during Shastri’s mandate, of wanting to get closer to India in which Chester Bowles’ role was crucial. She wanted to see personally and directly what Johnson had in mind.The Prime Minister had indeed received a very warm welcome from Lyndon Johnson personally. Finding her irresistible, Johnson had proclaimed in his typical Texan style to all and sundry that he wanted to see to it that “no harm comes to this girl,” and immediately promised 3 million tons of food and 9 million dollars of aid.212 But, it was a promise that had to be processed through normal US channels, and it was a promise which entailed concessions from the Indian side.

On the face of it, the visit was successful, but given India’s serious economic difficulties, the US Administration opted in favour of exercising leveraged pressure on the country. From all indications it would seem that Washington wanted to push India to take another course domestically and internationally. While the whole idea had originally spawned during Shastri’s time it was earnestly put into operation when Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister.

In foreign affairs she became even more powerful and even more defiant. The domestic dimension was no more there to restrain her authority and to question her diplomatic actions.

To risk a generalisation it would seem that the US had manifold objectives: (a) to encourage India to move away from the heavy industry model to a more benign objective of focussing on consumerism and agricultural development; (b) to establish a greater equilibrium in foreign policy, which, in American perception, had tilted excessively in the Soviet direction; (c) to push India to adopt a neutral position on Vietnam in which Washington was heavily involved; and (d) to devalue Indian currency so that India could become more export-oriented and more integrated into the international capitalist system.

In exchange for these mutations, Washington would give a massive food aid, allocate $900 million in non-project aid, and push the World Bank to give additional project loans.

Clearly, Johnson was more ambitious in pushing India to radically change its policies than any of his predecessors. Already, during his visit to India as Vice-President, he had sensed “an intellectual affinity or an affinity of spirit” between India and the US, and had recommended to President Kennedy that this be exploited.213 While, in his confidential report to Kennedy, he did not consider it necessary or probable to draw “India into our sphere,” he favoured a deep-rooted “cementing… an India-US friendship which would endure beyond any transition of power in India”214 But, when he became President he did show signs of taking a more ambitious interest in India—an interest that went beyond the simple maintenance of the existing status quo in Indo-US relations.

To counter what had really become a serious threat to her power, she mobilised everything in her armour to stage the “great split” in the party.

But the US strategy never materialised. It is still not clear what really happened. Opinions differ. Could it be, as alleged by Indira Gandhi, years after the events (1979), that Johnson sat over the urgent Indian appeal for immediate assistance “in order to push India to modify its policy of friendship with the Soviet Union,”?215 Or, even more so, could it be that the Johnson sat over the Indian request for assistance particularly after Indira Gandhi’s refusal to change India’s friendly posture towards North Vietnam, an issue on which the US President had very firm views.?

In fact, she made her views quite clear when Vice President Hubert Humphrey was in India for Shastri’s funeral. When L.K.Jha emphasised, in the presence of Indira Gandhi, that it was “of utmost importance that India remain friendly with North Vietnam, otherwise there would be an erosion of Ho Chi Minh’s trust in India,” Humphrey declared “My God, am I to go back and say to the President that India feels closer to Vietnam than to the US.”216 Or could it be that Indira Gandhi was irritated by US pressures and was not prepared to introduce fundamental changes in India’s economic and foreign policies. Howsoever valid the US argumentation may have been regarding the options India had taken, it was unlikely—given Indira Gandhi’s character and personality—that she would have reneged on the fundamental politico-economic and diplomatic options India had consensually taken at the time of independence.

The bureaucracy in Washington demanded too much, and that even continued during the very first year of her mandate when she was busy consolidating her political power. Besides, it was hardly realistic to expect India to introduce fundamental changes in its economy, and turn their back to the Russians at a time when Indira Gandhi was using left-wing rhetoric to undermine the power of her adversaries.

India badly needed US aid and Indira Gandhi knew well that she would have to cede on something; and she decided to cede on devaluation.

In any event, Chester Bowles, US Ambassador to India confirmed Washington’s irritation with New Delhi. “Cables from Washington,” he wrote “burned with comments about ‘those ungrateful Indians,’ and the shipments of wheat were further delayed. Our official logic in regard to India seemed to run as follows… If India cannot support US policy, it should at least refrain from criticising it, or accept the consequences. The spirit at its worst was reflected in a remark a White House official made to me…Mrs.Gandhi, I asserted was only saying what (UN Secretary General) U Thant and the Pope had said over and over and over again. ‘But, replied the official, ‘the Pope and U Thant don’t need our wheat’.” 217

The only issue on which India went along with the US was on the devaluation of the Indian rupee. The pressures were indeed very great; and not only from Washington but also from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and from some of her own close advisers. India badly needed US aid and Indira Gandhi knew well that she would have to cede on something; and she decided to cede on devaluation.

But on the other issues, the Indian response was a firm no. In fact, she did the opposite. Instead of moving in the direction of market-oriented policies, she tilted even more to the left and nationalised all the commercial banks; instead of establishing some distance with Moscow she maintained the traditional Indian posture of friendliness vis-à-vis the Communist world; and finally, instead of adopting a prudent policy on Vietnam she became even more openly critical of US policies there.

While all these policies were a continuation of the traditional foreign policy pattern designed by Nehru, the rhetorical re-assertion of them all was prompted by domestic factors. Indira Gandhi was really facing the prospects of loosing power. Many of those who had manoeuvred to place her in power were now out to dethrone her. For the majority of her party colleagues, she was becoming too independent, and too defiant of the existing Congress leadership. She had to be, therefore, ousted. For them, there was no other alternative, for her continuation in power would unavoidably result in their marginalisation in Indian politics.

The whole Indian political system had taken an oligarchic turn with Indira Gandhi as the stellar figure. In the eyes of the New York Times she had become “a prime minister on her own right, and not a transitional figure trading on her legacy as the daughter of Nehru”.

To counter what had really become a serious threat to her power, she mobilised everything in her armour to stage the “great split” in the party. She mobilised her own instinctive courage, her dynastic name, her popularity, and a great leap to the left consensually acceptable to the country.

Indira Gandhi came out of this political battle with flying colours, seriously weakening the dissidents who were clearly slow on the uptake.

The “great split” of the Congress Party in 1969 marked a milestone in the development of Indira Gandhi’s personality, and a salient turning point in Indian politics. She “had come into her own,”218 gaining considerable confidence in herself and in her actions; so much so that she arrived at the ominous conclusion that she was the only one capable of leading the country.

But the ramifications of this psychological revolution in her personality was calamitous for the country. She centralised power in her own hands. The Congress Party was no more a loose organisation where different ideological groups co-existed and functioned democratically. The decisional process was further narrowed with her son, Sanjay Gandhi, always there playing a crucial but underhand role on an array or issues. The Cabinet members, radically reshuffled, were reduced to sycophancy with most of them attempting to outbid each other in oleaginous behaviour. The state leaders, who had failed to support her in her battles against the “Syndicate,” were ousted, and the Indian intelligence, split into two (internal and external), was brought firmly under the direct control of the Prime Minister.

The whole Indian political system had taken an oligarchic turn with Indira Gandhi as the stellar figure. In the eyes of the New York Times she had become “a prime minister on her own right, and not a transitional figure trading on her legacy as the daughter of Nehru”.

Her hand was further strengthened by going to the polls in 1971 and returning with a landslide victory.

It was this victory that gave her the real legitimacy that she needed. Isolating and defeating the “Syndicate” was one thing, but popular electoral victory was another matter, since it was this success at the polls that gave her the confidence she needed, and pushed her to become politically even more active.

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In foreign affairs she became even more powerful and even more defiant. The domestic dimension was no more there to restrain her authority and to question her diplomatic actions. None of the Prime Ministers, before and after, had acquired such a large leverage as she had. And, She used it to the hilt.