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During its summer offensive, the enemy had debouched into the Sonamarg Valley through Zoji La. The task of chasing him back had been entrusted to 1 Patiala. The battalion drove the enemy back to Zoji La and thereafter established picquets around Baltal, at heights of over 4,800 metres. After the arrival of 77 (Para) Brigade, 1 Patiala came under its command. The latter carried out its mission with superb elan.
Baltal is at the foot of Zoji La, about a hundred kilometres North-East of Srinagar. The pass was a three-kilometre defile, with high peaks dominating it on either side. The enemy held both shoulders of the pass (Mukand Ridge and Chabutra Ridge) and a position further back (Machine-Gun Ridge) with a battalion, which had mountain guns, three-inch mortars and machine guns in support. It had built bunkers into the mountainside. To storm these positions, Indian troops would have to climb from the foot of Zoji La under fire.
On the night of 13 September, Atal made another attempt. It was an all-out effort to storm the pass frontally, but the enemy was again able to hold out.
Atal made an elaborate plan for Operation ‘Duck’, the code name given to the mission. Two of his battalions were to carry out a wide hook from the left, while the rest of the brigade made a frontal assault on the pass. At the same time, a small diversionary force was to be despatched from Khanabal. South of Srinagar, towards Kargil, by way of Suru. The plan was put into effect on 3 September, but the operation fizzled out. The frontal attack received adequate support from field and mountain artillery and for two days before the assault, Tempests bombed and strafed enemy positions. But all this plastering had little effect on enemy bunkers, and the infantry were forced back after some initial gains. The column on the left encountered frozen tracks and had to be recalled. On the night of 13 September, Atal made another attempt. It was an all-out effort to storm the pass frontally, but the enemy was again able to hold out.
Indian casualties in the two attacks had been heavy and Thimayya now realized that the bunkers in the mountainside would have to be cleared like the Japanese bunkers in Burma, i.e. busting by direct fire. But getting tanks to these heights was not easy. No tanks had operated at such altitudes before and bringing them up would be something never attempted before. Also, the move would have to be kept secret as the enemy could easily bring up a few anti-tank guns or mines and ruin the whole effort. But once it was decided that tanks would be used, everyone concerned with the operation set to work. At the back of their mind was the single thought of saving Leh before it was too late.
Working day and night, the Engineers built a track from Baltal to Zoji La within a month. A squadron of Stuarts of 7 Light Cavalry moved under Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Rajinder Singh (‘Sparrow’) from Akhnur, a distance of 445 kilometres. To ensure secrecy, the turrets of the tanks were removed and carried separately, while the armoured vehicles were camouflaged and moved at night. During the day, they were kept covered with shrouds in harbours and when they passed through Srinagar, a curfew was imposed. Many of the bridges on the way were too weak for the tanks and they had to be winched across, in case they collapsed with the crew inside.By 15 October, the squadron was in position at Baltal, and 20 October was fixed as D-day for the third assault on Zoji La. Additional artillery support had been arranged this time and the infantry element had somewhat changed. Now the brigade had 1/5 (Royal) Gorkha Rifles, 4 Rajput and 1 Patiala. For better luck, the name of the operation was also changed; it was now ‘Bison’ instead of ‘Duck’.
When all was ready, however, the weather gave out. It snowed for several days. After the operation had been postponed twice, Thimayya took a decision to go ahead on 1 November, regardless of the weather. It would have to be that day or next year. He also changed the plan of attack. According to the original plan, the Mukand and Chabutra features were to be attacked by infantry supported by tanks, after which the tanks were to pass on to the Gumri basin, on the other side of the pass. Now he decided on a bolder course: the tanks, followed by the 5th Gorkhas, would advance straight to the Gumri basin; thereafter, they would attack the enemy from the rear, while the Patialas and the Rajputs attacked it frontally.
The appearance of tanks came as a complete surprise to the enemy. They fled in panic when streams of bullets from their machine guns flattened on the sides of the tanks and fell away harmlessly.
As luck would have it, it began to snow heavily on 1 November, and the Air Force could not be used. But the attack began, as scheduled, at 1000 hours, after a heavy artillery concentration. Thimayya rode in the leading tank. The reduced visibility due to the snow-storm was a boon to the Gorkhas: they could advance without interference from the enemy, and by 1400 hours the column had got across to the Gumri basin. The appearance of tanks came as a complete surprise to the enemy. They fled in panic when streams of bullets from their machine guns flattened on the sides of the tanks and fell away harmlessly.
Thimayya exploited his success by ordering the Patialas to pass through the Gorkhas during the night and attack Machoi, on the far end of the pass. The battalion again did extremely well. Besides taking its objective, it captured an enemy howitzer, and a large quantity of ammunition. The whole of the Zoji La area was now clear of the enemy.
Indian troops fought at Zoji La under severe conditions. The terrain was difficult, the temperature was 20 degrees below zero, and they had no snow-clothing or special equipment. The men of 7 Light Cavalry showed great skill in manoeuvring their vehicles over the slushy, narrow track. Not a single tank got stuck in the snow. For the first time in history, tanks had participated in a battle at this height and the action received a good deal of attention in the world press.
While Thimayyas attention was focused on Zoji La, the enemy had stepped up its activities around Tithwal. The Pakistanis thought it was a good opportunity to retake Tithwal.
While congratulating everyone on the success at Zoji La, Cariappa ordered that the advance to Kargil go on at full speed. The enemy was to be given no rest till a link-up with Leh had been achieved. Atal and his team were already attuned to the task. Nothing spurs men to greater effort than a whacking success, and Zoji La had been one. By 4 November, the Rajputs had captured Matayan, 18 kilometres from Zoji La. When two strongly held features beyond Matayan barred further progress, tanks had to be brought up again. As at Zoji La, the enemy here was entrenched in caves, from where only tanks could blast them out.
It so happened that Guru Nanak’s birthday fell on 16 November that year. The Patialas, who were again in the lead, vowed they would celebrate the great day in Dras and kept their promise by entering the town a day earlier. General Thimayya was given a civic reception by the people of Dras.
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