Thimayya’s plan was to advance with two brigades: 161 Brigade on the Uri-Domel axis and 163 Brigade on the Handwara-Tithwal axis. To give an element of surprise to the main effort—the advance to Domel—the operations of 163 Brigade were to commence a couple of days earlier. The defences of the Uri-Mahura area were to be taken over by 77 (Para) Brigade, under Brigadier P.S. Nair. He had under command 2 (Para) Madras, 2/3 Gorkha Rifles and the Sawai Man Guards. By the middle of May, all was set for Operation ‘Behram’, the code name for the plan; and to round off the briefing of unit commanders taking part, they were taken on an aerial reconnaissance of the area over which they were to operate. Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah paid a visit to the front a few days before the operation was due to commence.
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Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Harbakhsh Singh had recently taken over command of 163 Brigade and its progress was unexpectedly swift (see Fig. 3.5). The enemy was estimated to have over 1,600 men between Handwara and Tithwal, a distance of 64 kilometres. Under him, Harbakhsh Singh had 1 Sikh, 1 Madras, 3 (Royal) Garhwal, a squadron of armoured cars of 7 Light Cavalry, 4 J&K Mountain Battery and a battery from 11 Field Regiment. On the night of 18/19 May, this brigade, with its base at Handwara, struck out. Chowkibal was taken by the Sikhs on 20 May after the Madrassis and the Garhwalis had taken intermediate objectives in a two-pronged drive.
The enemy was surprised by their sudden appearance and bolted without a fight.
Between Chowkibal and Tithwal lay the 3,048-metre Nastachun Pass. The enemy was expected to make a stand on the pass, but the field guns could not move beyond Chowkibal, and the distance between the two places was just outside the range of the 25-pounders. The battery commander was, however, a resourceful person. He had left behind two brand new guns which were known to be overshooting by a few hundred yards, just enough to strike the pass. By dawn on 21 May, he had them moved to Chowkibal over the narrow, slippery road, and they fired a timed concentration before the Madrassis attacked. Surprisingly, there was little resistance; the enemy had fled.
The Madrassis spent the night on the pass without greatcoats and blankets: the advance had been so fast that the mules carrying the unit’s baggage had not been able to keep pace with the men. Meanwhile, the Sikhs had passed through and taken Chamkot, eight kilometres short of Tithwal, by the evening of 22 May. Then after a night move, they secured a spur overlooking Tithwal at first light the next day. The enemy was surprised by their sudden appearance and bolted without a fight. Thus, in five days, Harbakhsh Singh had advanced 64 kilometres across very difficult terrain and captured his objective. Besides killing 67 of the enemy, his brigade took a number of prisoners.
Intelligence estimates of enemy strength in the Uri-Domel area placed it at one infantry brigade and some tribesmen; although Sen put it at two brigades – one Azad Kashmir and one regular Pakistan Army – plus the tribesmen. He had four infantry battalions under him: 4 Kumaon, 2 Dogra, 7 Sikh and 6 Rajputana Rifles. In addition, he had 11 Field Regiment (less a battery), Patiala Mountain Battery, and a squadron of armoured cars from 7 Light Cavalry. The brigade plan was simple. To begin with, a battalion group was to advance along the Qazinag Range, North of the Jhelum and capture Pandu so as to threaten the enemy’s position at Chakothi, on the road to Domel (see Fig. 3.6). Another battle group was to advance along the hills South of the Uri-Domel road. In co-ordination with these moves, an armoured column was to move along the road.The advance on the Northern flank was entrusted to 4 Kumaon. The battalion’s route lay over extremely rugged terrain and entailed the climbing of a snow-covered mountain 3,962 metres high. The Kumaonis, under Lieutenant Colonel Man Mohan Khanna, were in their element and captured Pandu by the morning of 25 May. The Kumaonis had taken on an entrenched enemy battalion echeloned along the length of this high range, and ejected the whole lot with great dash. The story elsewhere was, however, different. On the Southern flank, the operation started off badly. The Dogras, who were to take the Salamabad feature on the night of 19/20 May, lost their way despite the moon, and failed to take the feature. Sen had to send his reserve battalion, the Rajputana Rifles, to extricate the Dogras, some of whom had been encircled. The hill was taken by the Rajputana Rifles on 21 May. The armoured column advanced thereafter, but came to a halt when it encountered two blown bridges. These could not be repaired due to hostile fire.
7 Sikh, however, made good progress by capturing Urusa, about 17 kilometres from Uri. By then it was clear that besides the tribals and the Azad Kashmir troops, four regular battalions of the Pakistan Army were opposing 161 Brigade and no further progress would be possible on the main road unless more troops could be brought up. But Thimayya had no reserves. As an alternative, he decided to take advantage of the success at Pandu and ordered Nair to bring up 77 (Para) Brigade, hold Pandu with it, and with 4 Kumaon and 2 Dogra under command, capture Points 6873 (Kathai) and 10027. At the same time, he ordered Harbakhsh Singh to send a battalion group from Tithwal towards Muzaffarabad to divert enemy strength to that sector. The Kumaonis took Point 6873 on 2 June after a stiff battle. The Dogras could not take Point 10027, and the move towards Muzaffarabad was not attempted as the extra battalion needed for the purpose was not available.
The Gunners of the Patiala Mountain Battery provided valuable support in driving the enemy from its bunkered positions. Pir Kanthi and Ledi Gali were the dominating features in the area and were Sens objectives.
Balked for the second time, Thimayya did not give up. He now turned his eyes South of the Jhelum, and ordered Sen to attempt a sweep along the Pir Panjal Range. His aim again was to get behind the enemy. This time the 2/3 Gorkhas were to lead. This battalion and the Sawai Man Guards had been placed under Sen, the third battalion to take part in the mission being Rajputana Rifles. By 14 June, all three had captured their initial objectives. The Gunners of the Patiala Mountain Battery provided valuable support in driving the enemy from its bunkered positions. Pir Kanthi (3,330 metres) and Ledi Gali (3,315 metres) were the dominating features in the area and were Sen’s objectives. The Gorkhas’ first attack on Pir Kanthi failed but in the second attempt (on 28 June) they captured the ridge after a khukri charge. On the same day, the Sawai Man Guards captured Ledi Gali.32 Unfortunately, Brigadier Sen was taken ill during this operation and was evacuated to Delhi.
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A crucial information that is missing here is that – Ledi Gali was captured by the Sawai Man Guards under the command of Lt. Col. Raj Singh of Jaipur State Forces. This can be verified from the records.