Indian Defence Review

An engineer patrol was now sent to reconnoitre the bridge over the Dhaleswari. It brought the welcome news that a tarmac road, not marked on the Indian map, linked Safipur, South-East of Kaliakair, with the Mirpur Bridge, which lay on the outskirts of Dacca. The patrol also came upon Brigadier Qadir and nine of his officers in a clump of trees. They had taken three days to reach the place. Hungry and exhausted, they surrendered without any fuss.

While keeping the enemy on the Turag fully engaged, Nagra now ordered the rest of his troops in Tangail, including Sant Singh’s force, to join him. While 167 Brigade reinforced 95 Brigade on the Turag, he sent Sant Singh with 13 Guards and a mountain battery on the newly discovered route. 2 (Para) Battalion also advanced from Tangail on 15 December and by the evening they had joined Sant Singh.

At 2200 hours that night the paratroopers took up the advance, reached the vicinity of the Mirpur Bridge around 0200 hours on 16 December and sent out a patrol. When it was halfway across the bridge the Pakistanis on the far end opened up and two of the patrol’s jeeps were shot up. The rest of the patrol returned to the near end of the bridge.

THE SURRENDER

By this time orders had already gone out from Niazi’s Headquarters to his subordinate commanders to cease fire and surrender. But these orders took time to reach the troops. According to Pakistani evidence, Niazi had lost heart within a few days of the commencement of the war. He is said to have broken down completely when he went to meet Governor Malik on 7 December.19 After the meeting Malik sent a message to President Yahya Khan to arrange a cease-fire but there was no response from Islamabad.

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Niazi’s despondency was shared by some of his commanders and senior advisers. Another communication was sent to Yahya Khan three days later, suggesting a political settlement and cease-fire. In reply the President delegated the authority for further action to the Governor. The latter got in touch with Paul Mark Henry, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, who happened to be in Dacca at the time, and handed him a note. It called upon the UN to arrange, among other things, an immediate cease-fire, transfer of power to elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan and repatriation with honour of Pakistani Armed Forces to West Pakistan. When this note reached New York its contents received wide publicity. This upset Z.A. Bhutto, who was at the time pleading Pakistan’s case at the UN. He hoped to obtain better terms and this prompted the Pakistani Government to disown Malik’s note.

It called upon the UN to arrange, among other things, an immediate cease-fire, transfer of power to elected representatives of the people of East Pakistan and repatriation with honour of Pakistani Armed Forces to West Pakistan.

It was about this time that the rumour about intervention by friends from the North and friends from the South’ was spread. We have seen its effect at Tangail. It did bolster the flagging spirits of the Pakistani troops for a day or two. But in retrospect, it would seem to be a very questionable way of boosting morale. The subsequent disillusionment must have hurt the prestige and credibility of Pakistani commanders.20

According to Niazi’s original plan, Dacca was to have a double line of defences: an outer line and an inner line. These defences were to be manned by formations falling back from various sectors. When none of them managed to do so, all available men in uniform were mustered for the task. Only about 1,500 regular soldiers, including services personnel, could be got together. In addition, about 3,500 police and paramilitary personnel were available. Surplus staff officers and others pulled out from offices and depots were sent to command the groups and detachments into which these men were divided. To support this last-ditch stand were a few mortars and recoilless guns, a squadron of tanks, two six-pounder anti-tank guns and some light machine guns. However patriotic and brave they might be, this motley collection of men and arms could not have kept the Indian divisions out of Dacca for long.

These men were not given much of a chance either. Niazi’s senior staff officers and the Governor’s chief advisers had lost the will to fight. On 12 December, another urgent message had gone to the President of Pakistan to save ‘innocent’ lives. There was no reply from him till 14 December. That day, a high-level meeting was scheduled at the Government House in Dacca, at which Dr Malik was to preside. A radio intercept alerted the Indian authorities and while the meeting was on, the Government House was raided by Indian aircraft. The roof of its main hall collapsed and Dr Malik rushed to the air-raid shelter and wrote out his resignation. Soon after, the Governor, his cabinet and senior civil servants, including West Pakistanis, moved to the neutral zone, which had been created by the International Red Cross at the Hotel Intercontinental.

Niazi also received a message that day from Yahya Khan to end the hostilities. However, when he requested the US Consul-General in Dacca to negotiate a cease-fire, that official refused to undertake the mission, but agreed to send Niazi’s message. Addressed to General Manekshaw, the message asked for an immediate cease-fire. It reached New Delhi via Washington.

This upset Z.A. Bhutto, who was at the time pleading Pakistans case at the UN. He hoped to obtain better terms and this prompted the Pakistani Government to disown Maliks note.

Manekshaw was himself keen to end the hostilities. He had been making repeated calls in broadcasts to Pakistani forces in East Pakistan to surrender. Leaflets in Urdu, Pushtu and Bengali were also dropped. His reply to Niazi was, however, quite firm. It stated that cease-fire would be acceptable provided the Pakistani Armed Forces in Bangladesh surrendered to the advancing Indian troops by 0900 hours on 16 December. He also gave the radio frequencies on which the Pakistani GOC-in-C could contact General Aurora’s Headquarters to co-ordinate the surrender. As a token of good faith he made it known that all action over Dacca would cease from 1700 hours on 15 December. At Niazi’s request the deadline for the surrender was later extended to 1500 hours on 16 December. His Headquarters sent out a signal around midnight (15/16 December) to lower formations to contact their Indian counterparts and arrange the cease-fire.

Returning to the Mirpur Bridge on the morning of 16 December, we find the paratroopers still on its Western end. Kler’s Headquarters had picked up Niazi’s radio signal to his commanders and he told Nagra of it when the two met that morning. It was good news and the exhilaration of victory that suffused Indian commanders and troops was very natural. But in their enthusiasm to set foot in Dacca without loss of time, some of them overlooked the fact that the two armies had been fighting an all-out war; unless precautions were taken casualties could arise. Pakistani and Indian troops had not been briefed as yet regarding the modalities of surrender.

Around 0830 hours Nagra sent his ADC and some officers from 2 Para with a message for Niazi, asking him to surrender. Their jeep was flying a white flag. When the jeep reached the Pakistani defended post at the Eastern end of the Mirpur Bridge, the post commander took Nagra’s message and sent it on to Niazi’s Headquarters. While the Indian officers waited for a reply the Pakistanis served them tea. A short while later, Major General Jamshed, Area Commander of the Dacca area, arrived for a meeting with Nagra.

The Indian jeep now led Jamshed’s car to the other side of the bridge. While halfway across, the paratroopers accidentally opened fire on the jeep. Some of them had moved to a flank of the bridge after the jeep carrying Nagra’s message had gone across. The white flag on the jeep had been removed while the party was with the Pakistanis on the other side. The firing resulted in the wounding of one Indian and one Pakistani officer. Later during the day there were other incidents of this nature, some more serious. In fact, fighting around Dacca continued till late in the afternoon.

The surrender ceremony at Dacca took place during the afternoon. There was hardly anything “˜military about it, except the guard of honour provided by 2 Para and a small Pakistani contingent.

Nagra drove to Niazi’s Headquarters around 1100 hours. About the same time 2 Para, followed later by units of 95 Brigade, entered Dacca. Jubilant crowds welcomed them with garlands and shouts of Joi Bangla and Indira Gandhi Ki Jai. Major General (later Lieutenant General) J.F.R. Jacob, Aurora’s chief of Staff, flew into Dacca at 1300 hours with the draft instrument of surrender. It covered all of Pakistan’s Armed Forces in Bangladesh, including her Navy and Air Force, and Paramilitary personnel. It also guaranteed the rights of prisoners under the Geneva Convention, as also the protection of foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and people of West Pakistani origin.

The surrender ceremony at Dacca took place during the afternoon. There was hardly anything ‘military’ about it, except the guard of honour provided by 2 Para and a small Pakistani contingent. A million Bangladeshis, jostling and shouting slogans, watched as Lieutenant General Aurora21 inspected the two guards of honour. When Niazi and Aurora sat down to put their signatures to the instrument of surrender, an Indian Air Marshal, a Vice Admiral and Corps Commanders stood in a huddle behind them, with sundry civilians looking over their shoulders.

After he had put his signature to the surrender document Niazi took out his revolver and handed it over to Aurora. Pakistani troops were not, however, disarmed straightaway. They were allowed to retain their weapons for their own protection till Indian troops were available in sufficient numbers to take control. In other sectors, surrenders took place under local arrangements and continued for a few days after the cease-fire. Of a total of 91,000 prisoners, 56,694 belonged to the armed forces, 12,192 were paramilitary personnel and the rest civilians. During the last hours of the shooting war an aviation squadron (helicopters) of the Pakistan Army had flown out about two dozen families, Major General Rahim Khan and some others to Akyab, in Burma. Thence they travelled to Karachi. Indian casualties in the campaign totalled 5,586: 1,525 killed 4,061 wounded.22

 NOTES

1. The account of the meeting as given here is based on the author’s interview with Field Marshal Manekshaw in January 1979.
2. Interview with author.
3. Witness to Surrender, by Lieutenant Colonel S. Salik, p. 118.
4. Ibid p. 116.
5. Ibid, p. 116.
6. The Liberation of Bangladesh, by Major General Sukhwant Singh, p. 72.
7. The commanding officer of 14 Punjab and the squadron commander of 45 Cavalry, who supported the battalion, were awarded the Maha Vir Chakra.
8. Pakistan Cut to Size, by D.R. Mankekar, p. 40.
9. The battalion won three Maha Vir Chakras during the two battles.
10. 50 Independent (Para) Brigade (less a battalion group) was later flown out to the Western theatre.
11. India’s Sword Strikes in East Pakistan, by Major General Lachhman Singh. p. 53.
12. Victory in Bangladesh, by Major General Lachhman Singh, pp. 76-8.
13. The commanding officer of the Guards’ battalion and one of his platoon commanders were awarded the MahaVir Chakra for gallantry in this action.
14. Witness to Surrender, by Lieutenant Colonel Salik, p. 153. The author writes of Charkai as Ghirai.
15. Some days earlier 20 Mountain Division had been ordered to part with 63 Cavalry and 340 Brigade; the former was to move to the Western theatre and the latter to Dacca along with a squadron of 69 Armoured Regiment. However, the move could not take place in the absence of ferry facilities over the Brahmaputra.
16. It is of interest that among the Indian generals who fought in Bangladesh, there were four paratroopers: Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora, Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, Lieutenant General T.N. Raina, Major General B.F. Gonsalves. Major General I.S. Gill, Director of Military Operations at Army Headquarters, was also a paratrooper.
17. This rifleman won the Maha Vir Chakra, besides which the battalion won two Vir Chakras and one Sena Medal in this action.
18. These figures are from Victory in Bangladesh, by Major General Lachhman Singh. According to Lieutenant Colonel Salik (Witness to Surrender) 311 Brigade abandoned seven tanks in running condition.
19. Witness to Surrender, by Lieutenant Colonel Salik, p. 194.
20. A task force from the Seventh Fleet of the United States did enter the Bay of Bengal on 14 December. The US Government declared at the time that it was meant for an ‘evacuation contingency’ to rescue American citizens in Bangladesh. However, Henry Kissinger, special assistant to the US President, later gave out that the move of the task force was a part of gunboat diplomacy to exert pressure on India. The aim, according to him, ‘was to stop India from destroying West Pakistan’.(White House Years, by Henry Kissinger)
21. Lieutenant General Aurora came to Dacca accompanied by Mrs Aurora. This was perhaps the only instance in military history of a victorious commander taking his wife to witness a surrender.
22. Figures from ‘The Fall of Dacca’, an article by Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora in The Illustrated Weekly of India, dated 23 December 1973.