The Se La defences were outflanked from the West also by a sub-detachment of a special grouping called 419 detachment. The conventional break-in at Se La was delivered by 54 Division followed up by 11 Division of the Chinese. This frontal assault combined with the cutting of 4 Division’s lines of communication North-West of Dirang Dzong and Bomdi La and posing a threat to the denuded Bomdi La brigade defended sector completely unhinged the defences echeloned linearly along the lines of communication.
The Assam Rifles had a platoon post at Poshing La (4,170 metres). On 6 November, Pathania sent a platoon from 5 Guards (ex 48 Brigade) to reinforce it. On the third night out, the porters and ponies accompanying the platoon deserted. This was possibly the work of Chinese agents. Captain Amarjit Singh, who was in command of the platoon, sent a radio signal to his battalion for replacements.Meanwhile, patrols from units at Se La and beyond had reported that the Chinese were sending large numbers of troops towards Poshing La in small parties, using tracks North of the Towang Chu and the Mago Chu. Some of the patrols had even clashed with the Chinese. At first the divisional Headquarters refused to believe these reports but when they persisted, Pathania ordered 48 Brigade on 11 November to get 5 Guards to build up the post at Poshing La to a company.
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Amarjit Singh established his platoon at Poshing La by 13 November. On the following day, he set out with 22 of his men to reconnoitre the route beyond. Around 0900 hours on 15 November, his party was ambushed. Amarjit Singh and his men fought gallantly but were overwhelmed by superior numbers. He was killed, and only four men from this party came back.
The presence of the enemy on the Dirang Dzong-Bomdi La road caused shock and dismay at Pathanias Headquarters.
Poshing La was attacked that afternoon. By then, the resupply column sent by 5 Guards had reached the post. The Guardsmen fought back for an hour; thereafter, the remnants fell back on Chhang La. The Chinese followed close on their heels and drove them further South to Lagam, where they joined the Headquarters of their company and two platoons which had been despatched from Bomdi La. The Guardsmen thereafter tried to hold a hill North of Lagam but the attempt proved futile. The Chinese were already there.
When a report of the ambush of Amarjit Singh’s party reached divisional Headquarters, Pathania ordered another company from 5 Guards to proceed to Poshing La. This company could leave Bomdi La only on the morning of 16 November. When it had moved about nine kilometres, Brigadier Gurbux Singh, Commander 48 Brigade, came up and ordered it to establish a firm base for its battalion at Thembang. Pathania had by then ordered that the remainder of 5 Guards should move there. The mission given to the battalion was to retake Poshing La.
The Guards arrived at Thembang on the morning of 17 November; by the afternoon, they had established themselves on the high ground East of the village. The Chinese were not far away. They soon brought the battalion under mortar and machine-gun fire. The Guards’ mortars opened up in answer but the mountain guns supporting them could not fire as the radio set with the forward observation officer refused to work. Soon after, about 500 of the enemy were seen forming up for attack. The Guards’ mortars took them on but the Chinese began to rush across regardless of casualties. Thereafter came probes against the Guards’ flanks. At the same time, a large concentration of the Chinese was seen in a nulla South of the village.
Extensive patrolling had been undertaken to build up morale and to reconnoitre the likely approach routes of the enemy.
The coup de grace was delivered by a force that was estimated at about 1,500. The Guards fixed bayonets and took a heavy toll of the enemy. However, their mortar and light machine-gun ammunition having almost finished, they could not hope to hold the position much longer. The brigade commander authorized a withdrawal but, in the ensuing nightfall the battalion disintegrated. The Chinese suffered an estimated three to four hundred casualties in this action. The Guards’ casualties totalled 162, including 95 missing.
By the time the Guards began their withdrawal from Thembang, the Chinese had cut the Dirang Dzong road about nine kilometres North of Bomdi La; the rest of 5 Guards reached the Tenga Valley and Charduar in small parties.
The presence of the enemy on the Dirang Dzong-Bomdi La road caused shock and dismay at Pathania’s Headquarters. The Walong defences had crumbled on 16 November and Kaul had spent most of that day flying over various parts of the sector, organizing a new defence line. That night he sent a long radio signal on the situation to Eastern Command and Army Headquarters. In this communication, he urged that in strength as well as equipment, the Government should get such armed forces from outside as were willing to come to India’s aid. The idea of getting help from foreign armies had been in Kaul’s mind for some time. While he was in Delhi during his sickness, he had given to Khera, the Cabinet Secretary, a paper recommending that India should seek such assistance.23
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Kaul spent most of 17 November also in the Lohit sector, looking for the survivors from Walong, arranging food for them and organizing a new defence line. By the time he turned his attention to 4 Division, the situation was already beyond control. In the night, he ordered 48 Brigade to send a mobile column of two infantry companies and two tanks to open the Dirang Dzong road. This order was cancelled after an hour or so when it was explained to him that 48 Brigade now had only six infantry companies at Bomdi La. Of the two battalions there, one company of 1 Sikh LI was on detached duty at Phutang to cover the Western flank of 48 Brigade. A company from the other battalion — 1 Madras — had gone to Dirang Dzong the previous night on Pathania’s orders. He wanted to reinforce the troops guarding his Headquarters.
The next day Bomdi La itself came under attack. Before recounting this attack however, let us take a look at the happenings at Se La and in the Dirang Valley.
Brigadier Hoshiar Singh was in command of 62 Brigade at Se La. He had come over from the National Defence Academy and taken over on 29 October. Hoshiar Singh was a soldier with combat experience. He had won the Indian Distinguished Service Medal, the Indian Order of Merit and the Croix de Guerre. He had commanded a battalion of the Rajputana Rifles and knew how to inspire confidence in his men. Though there were large shortages of equipment in 62 Brigade, he had managed to establish it fairly well. Extensive patrolling had been undertaken to build up morale and to reconnoitre the likely approach routes of the enemy. The Chinese too had been probing the brigade’s defences.
The Chinese threw in more and more men and, after fierce fighting, were able to gain some ground.
The most serious patrol encounter took place in the early hours of 16 November. The previous day, Hoshiar Singh had sent a three-company-strong fighting patrol to reconnoitre the area North-East of Se La. Its two forward companies, from 2 Sikh LI, were surrounded in their night harbour and lost one officer and 60 men killed and missing. Another ominous happening of 16 November was the sighting of a Chinese column, about a thousand-strong, moving South along the India-Bhutan border. Two companies of 4 Sikh LI, deployed in the Twin-Lakes area North-West of Se La, observed the movement and all guns of 5 Field Regiment engaged the column. But it soon disappeared into a nulla and was lost to view. This meant that Se La had been bypassed on both flanks.
The Chinese launched their attack on Se La from the North around 0500 hours on 17 November. Their advance guard was led by men in Monpa dress.24 The Garhwalis holding the screen position fought back valiantly. They were able to blunt three enemy attacks and inflict heavy casualties. However, the Chinese threw in more and more men and, after fierce fighting, were able to gain some ground. By 1600 hours the battalion’s telephone line was cut and it was also out of radio contact with Brigade Headquarters.
Around 1700 hours, Hoshiar Singh sent two liaison officers to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel B.M. Bhattacharjea; they carried orders for the withdrawal of the battalion during the night. Two of its companies were to be deployed in the Brigade Headquarters area and the rest of the battalion was to take up positions on the pass so as to give more depth to the defences held by 1 Sikh. At the same time, the two companies of 4 Sikh LI in the Twin-Lakes area were ordered to withdraw to the main Se La positions.
Hoshiar Singh’s intention was to hold Se La as a fortress. He had enough supplies for a week. Unfortunately, he received no support from Pathania and the withdrawal from Se La, which took place later, was the sorriest episode of the 1962 debacle.
Pathania’s first reaction to the road-block on the Bomdi La-Dirang Dzong road was to ring up and tell 62 Brigade to withdraw to Dirang Dzong. Hoshiar Singh protested that he was prepared to remain at Se La and fight provided he was assured of air supply. This happened around 1700 hours on 17 November. A little later, Pathania rang up again. He told the brigade commander that air supply could not be guaranteed and that he must withdraw that night. His plan for 62 Brigade was that it should join 65 Brigade and Divisional Headquarters, after which the combined force would fight its way to Bomdi La. Hoshiar Singh explained that a withdrawal that night would cause panic and that the earliest he could pull out was on the following night. Pathania approved the latter course. He was however worried about the security of his own Headquarters and told Hoshiar Singh to send two companies of infantry to Dirang Dzong quickly. The task fell to 13 Dogra.
Pathania had been in touch with 4 Corps to get approval for abandoning Se La. Kaul had not yet returned from the Lohit sector and when Pathania rang up Brigadier K.K. Singh, the latter asked him to speak to Sen. The reverse at Walong had brought Thapar as well as Sen to Tezpur but both refused to take a decision. Pathania was told to wait for the corps commander’s return. Both were fully in the picture regarding the situation and the proper course would have been for them to take a decision and convey it to Pathania straightaway. But they chose to shirk responsibility.
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