The criticism implicit in these paragraphs is a restrained expression of my feelings at that first meeting with Jogi in the CGS’ office, the remembrance of which has not dimmed with the years. After summarising developments in the Towang sector, he told me that my responsibility as DMO would now be to ensure that the concentration of troops at Lumpu and in the Dhola area was proceeding at an adequate pace. He added that since it had been confirmed that there were only about sixty Chinese at Dhola, one battalion (9 Punjab) was considered adequate for the task of evicting them.Ignoring the implied dimunition of the DMO’s function, I tried to explain to Jogi the constraints imposed on troop movements, even’ on foot, by the terrain, weather and lack of mule-tracks and footpaths forward of Towang, and I expressed doubt that adequate logistical support could ever be built up at Lumpu, let alone within the time stipulated. When he glibly remarked that Army and Air HQ would ensure sufficient air supply sorties to fulfill 9 Punjab’s requirements, I countered by pointing out that the high Lumpu spur had never been tried out as a dropping zone, that the weather at that time was most uncertain and that the collection and retrieval of loads in the mountains was a major problem.
Jogi remained unimpressed. He assured me that the Army Commander was confident about the task being carried out successfully. I told him that I knew the terrain lat Lumpu, whereas Bogey Sen had never visited the mountains of NEFA; nor had Umrao, to the best of my knowledge. I urged Jogi to obtain the views of the Divisional and Brigade Commanders before the Army Chief took a final decision but he rejected this suggestion as improper and quite contrary to procedure. He told me that I could best serve the army by ensuring that Lumpu base was developed and stocked as early as possible.
When I raised a point about possible reprisals by Chinese forces north of Thag-la, he assured me that there would be no major Chinese attack across the watershed.
Jogi remained equally adamant when I changed tack to discuss operational matters. When I raised a point about possible reprisals by Chinese forces north of Thag-la, he assured me that there would be no major Chinese attack across the watershed. As for my concern about the defence of the divisional vital ground at Towang after the move out of 7 Brigade, he said that a brigade from Ranchi was being sent there for the purpose.
It was obvious that Jogi was not open to persuasion. I suspected that he had been so fascinated by his chance involvement at the summit of the decision-making process that he was not going to allow it to be threatened by doubts cast on what should have been his main purpose: the ordering of priorities. He focused on the political decision the attack to clear the Chinese from Thag-la ridge rather than on the logistical and tactical factors that clearly denied the feasibility of that option. His mind-set was so rigid that further discussion could only become banal and defeatist and, in the final analysis, irrelevant.
Before I left I broached the subject of formal staff procedure. I said that I had found no papers in MO Directorate recording the various decisions taken at the Defence Minister’s conferences and that I would like’ to have all such documents to start maintaining proper records of decisions taken and orders issued. Jogi glared at me; and the otherwise informal conversation changed to a formal tone. Sternly the officiating CGS instructed his DMO that he, the DCGS, was in full control. The records were being maintained, he said, by Joint Secretary Sarin in the Ministry. He, the DCGS, was satisfied with that procedure, because he had access to those records at all times and I was not to concern myself with them. He emphasised that I had a full job on my hands and I was to get on with it.
“¦focused on the political decision the attack to clear the Chinese from Thag-la ridge rather than on the logistical and tactical factors that clearly denied the feasibility of that option.
Back at my desk, I called a meeting of MO-I staff to improvise a system of maintaining aide memoirs, in the absence of formal records, on Operation Leghorn (as the Namka-chu operation ‘had been codenamed). In addition, I directed Pritpal to maintain a day-to-day situation report on the build-up of ammunition and stores at Lumpu. He was to try to obtain figures of airdrops directly from 4th Division (whose main HQ was still at Tejpur) and not rest content with information provided by the air force because the latter could indicate only tonnages dropped, not quantities retrieved by the troops.
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