Indian Defence Review

It was soon obvious that Mullik had himself become one of the ‘hawks’ on Operation Leghorn, and if a seasoned general like Sen could be so oblivious to logistical realities, it would dearly be impossible to impress Mullik with my arguments. I therefore changed tack and asked him why we had suddenly revised operational policy by going on to the offensive in NEFA.

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Why were we not following the same policy as in Ladakh – that of ‘chessboard’ tactics to outmanoeuvre, and thus try to forestall, Chinese encroachments? Mullik would not have that either; he countered that unlike the Aksai Chin, where the Chinese were trying to creep forward into territory claimed by them, in the Thag-la region they had been blatantly provocative by intruding into territory held by us and which they had tacitly conceded as being Indian. He said that the Indian people would not stand for that and the government might fall if we did not take steps to evict the aggressors. He advised me not to create obstacles but to assist Command and Corps HQ to prepare for the operation against the Chinese.

Why were we not following the same policy as in Ladakh ““ that of “˜chessboard tactics to outmanoeuvre, and thus try to forestall, Chinese encroachments?

I asked Mullik if there had been any signs of a recent Chinese troop build-up south of Tsona Dzong. He replied that there had; the Chinese had massed nearly two brigades between Tsona Dzong and Le (4 km north of Thag-la), which were well stocked with rations and ammunition. I was taken aback at this information. As I have recorded, there was a period of a few months during which I had become out of touch with affairs in NEFA; the last I had heard, there had been only a battalion or so forward of Tsona Dzong. Mullik went on to explain that the build-up had been continuing over a long time, but the move forward of the Chinese forces as far south as Le was a recent development. At the same time, he assured me that they would be unlikely to cross into Indian Territory in large numbers.

I do not remember if we argued about the validity of this assumption, but I was able to get him to agree to raise at next morning’s conference the issue of tactical ail’ support for our troops in case a large Chinese force did march into Indian territory across the Thag-la ridge. I convinced him that 7 Brigade, under-strength, under-provisioned and lacking artillery and heavy mortars, would not be able to stand up to even one fully equipped Chinese battalion unless it were given air support.

I stipulated that once Chinese troops crossed into Indian Territory in strength, the IAF should be permitted to strike at targets in Tibet, especially at Le and Tsona Dzong. I also urged that permission to use air strikes should include Ladakh, by arguing that the Chinese might react to our NEFA operations by mounting an offensive to overrun or push back our posts in the Chip Chap and Galwan valleys.

I convinced Mullik of the urgent need to do this and he agreed to do as I asked. If I remember correctly, he told me that General Daulet Singh was in Delhi just then and had also raised the question of a possible attack by the Chinese in the Chip Chap and Galwan regions. Mullik said that he would talk to Daulet and suggest that he also ask for offensive air support.

I convinced him that 7 Brigade, under-strength, under-provisioned and lacking artillery and heavy mortars, would not be able to stand up to even one fully equipped Chinese battalion unless it were given air support.

Before leaving Mullik’s office I made one final request. I urged him to intervene in the matter of the missing CGS and to get Kaul back from Kashmir. I did not, of course, tell him about Jogi’s demarche in as Branch, but I convinced him that Kaul’s presence at Army HQ had become both essential and urgent. Mullik, who had long established a close rapport with Kaul, readily agreed and said that he would put in a word with both Menon and Thapar.

I returned from my visit to Mullik with mixed feelings. I had reason to be elated by my success in getting him to agree to argue a case for air support. His standing with Menon, as with Nehru, was high and his counsel was always respected. I’ felt certain that he would succeed with both the proposals he had agreed to take up at the meeting. Where I had not achieved my purpose was in persuading him to ask for a relaxation of the operational pressure on the Namka-chu front; the main purpose of my visit.

In order to be even-handed in reporting these events, I must in all fairness make one thing quite clear, lest, I be accused of laying claim to greater percipience and keener judgment than others. I have to acknowledge that .my misgivings about the developments on the Namka-chu arose not so much because I foresaw a massive Chinese reprisal. That would not be the truth; like all’ the others in the ‘kitchen cabinet’, I also had come to accept the DIB’s assessment on ‘Chinese goodwill’ – that in the final analysis they would hold back from attacking Indian-held territory in pursuance of border claims. My anxiety and resentment stemmed from another source – that is, the gross mismanagement of troops by uncaring generals and politicians.

I strongly felt that, from a man-management point of view, the ill-considered and’ hasty despatch of a brigade of under-equipped troops on an ad hoc man-pack basis to the freezing heights beyond Lumpu was a thoughtless, callous and futile act amounting to outrage. I could not condone the extreme folly of sending troops to live and fight at ‘heights of 4,000 metres and more without adequate clothing and rations, and with only fifty rounds of ammunition per man with which to wage war.

Perhaps I felt it all the more deeply because it was my former command – 7 Brigade – that was being so monstrously misused. I am sure that most officers reared’ in the culture of the Indian Army would have felt the same about such ill-use of the uncomplaining and dutiful Indian jawan Knowing Niranjan Prasad and Dalvi as well as I did, I could not believe that it was either of them who could have advised the move of 7 Brigade to the Namka-chu.

I suspected that Umrao and Sen, more senior in service (both had been commissioned from Sandhurst in the early 1930s) had possibly grown out of touch with the troops following their rapid promotion to high rank after independence and, in my mind, I blamed this move on them, as also I blamed Thapar and Jogi for being so lacking in vision as to countenance this absurd deployment under political pressure. (It would have added greatly to my disquiet had I then known that a battalion of my regiment, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, only recently sent down to the Assam plains after a three-year tenure in Towang, had been virtually pulled out of railway carriages on their way to the Punjab and summarily ordered to march back all the 250 miles to Towang, still in their summer uniforms.

Thence, without a re-issue of warm clothing or bedding, they were hustled to Lumpu and beyond, where several men would soon die of pneumonia, oedema and other pulmonic afflictions.)

Even if fresh battalions were rushed up to Towang They could not, unacclimatised, unrehearsed and under-provisioned, effectively conduct a defensive battle against a determined thrust from Khinzemane or Bum-la and certainly not from both.

It was not until much later in the Namka-chu episode that I foresaw a major attack across the Thag-la ridge; earlier, as I have acknowledged, I too had accepted the DIB’s persuasion that this would not happen. Mullik’s revelation of the forward build-up at Le had given me cause for alarm but I was still beguiled by his main assurance. I also drew some consolation from my conviction that 7 Infantry Brigade could not be made ready for an offensive on Thag-la before the winter set in.

I must also add, however, that although we had come under the DIB’s spell, it was by no means a total capitulation – not by the General Staff, anyway. MO Directorate had been alive to the responsibility of preparing contingency plans in case the Chinese did mount an offensive, either local or general. We had undertaken a revision of long-range strategic and logistical preparation based on the Chiefs of Staff appreciation; and, in the short term, the Commands concerned had done their best to draw up plans to meet possible threats from the Chinese.

In Ladakh, Western Command’s strategy was to fight a delaying action back 10 Shyok valley and then hold the enemy offensive at Leh. In NEFA, the strategic planning had been less well developed, mainly thanks to Menon’s egotistical response to Thorat’s proposals in 1959 and his risible solution to counter a possible Chinese threat. Only in Kameng had there evolved a feasible defensive posture, based on the defence of to wang; not the best tactical solution perhaps, but a sound enough basis for operations.

 In the last few days Bogey Sen had willy-nilly abandoned that plan for a blind gamble in the unknown reaches of the Thag-la nexus; and Jogi, entranced with his newly acquired eininence, would not heed the danger. Even if fresh battalions were rushed up to Towang, they could not, unacclimatised, unrehearsed and under-provisioned, effectively conduct a defensive battle against a determined thrust from Khinzemane’ or Bum-la and certainly not from both.

It took me some time, and then only in retrospect, to descry what appeared to be a fundamental limitation in the thought processes of our senior generals. Strategic planning seemed to focus on short-term solutions, too often concerned with producing a blueprint for battle rather than a plan for sustained campaigning. Whether it was Thimayya propounding a policy for the Aksai Chin, Daulet Singh planning the defence of Leh, or Thapar precipitately ordering 7 Brigade up the Thag-la slope, there was no evidence of a long-term agenda of follow-through forecasts, or of any planning for requirements beyond the immediate.

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Throat was the only one among the top commanders who had produced a policy (and a style) that aimed at an eventual solution rather than a stop-gap gambit. Even Kaul, who could think things through a little more persistently than others, was too inclined to be bewitched by the spell that surrounds an immediate venture rather than thinking objectively in the long-term. I remember that even at the time when I had argued the case for a long-term army ‘Master’ Plan’, an overview placed in a ten-years time frame, it was the novelty of the project and not the need for it that had caught his fancy, I suspect that intrinsically many of our generals thought like Mullik: it was the emotive and immediate gesture that appealed.

A large proportion (nearly 50 percent by some accounts) of the (recycled) parachutes failed to open; of those that did a goodly number were wafted over the precipices to the steep valleys below; of those among the latter that were eventually located, many loads were found to be too heavy to be manhandled up the steep slopes.

During the next three or four days most of my time was occupied in progressing the stocking programmt for Lumpu (and, later, Tsangdhar). Since Eastern Command could not undertake the logistical effort with its own resources, Jogi took charge. He held a co-ordinating conference every afternoon at which representatives from the air force, the railways, QMG’s Branch, Eastern Command and others would report progress and discuss means of further expediting the build-up.

Air Vice-Marshal Jaswant Singh from Shillong, AOC-in-C East, himself attended one or two meetings. Jogi excelled at these performances and did his utmost to ensure that there was no shortfall in the despatch programme; if it had been physically possible to receive and distribute most of the loads Army HQ arranged to be dropped, there might have been some chance of equipping 7 Brigade for a limited operational role. As I commented in my Summary:

The Officiating CGS himself coordinated the combined effort of all branches at this Headquarters to ensure that all possible efforts were being made to support Eastern Command for Operation’ Leghorn. As a result of this, forward movement of stocks to Gauhati was begun almost immediately and the position had improved considerably by the time hostilities had started. The process of delivering these stocks to formations deployed in the mountains, however, continued to pose serious difficulties.

 I knew that no amount of air effort at Ltimpu could enable logistics to catch up with the requirements for a whole brigade.

With the cooperation of Air Headquarters, the airlift capacity was raised from 20–30 tons per day at Gauhati to 60-70 tons by the beginning of October; and to 150–200 tons per day by the middle of October. As for the road lift capacity, 80 one-ton vehicles from the Ordnance Depot at Jabalpur were sent forward to increase the Corps resources in NEF A. (Some 225 others were later ordered forward from the Armoured Division and XI Corps, but arrived too late to influence the operations.)

As for porters, one pioneer company from DGBR (Border Roads) resources in Kameng was moved up to Lumpu.

Witnessing this truly impressive scale of air effort, some of my gloom lifted and my concern for the plight of the troops deployed at the Namka-chu was temporarily allayed. It was not till many days later that we heard the full tale of the fiasco at the dropping zones.

 A large proportion (nearly 50 percent by some accounts) of the (recycled) parachutes failed to open; of those that did a goodly number were wafted over the precipices to the steep valleys below; of those among the latter that were eventually located, many loads were found to be too heavy to be manhandled up the steep slopes. Little wonder that my Summary ruefully recorded:

However, in spite of all efforts, the build-up achieved by 17/18 October was still far short of minimum targets for the sustenance of operations. Against a target of 5 first lines of ammunition and 15 days supplies only the following reached the forward troops:

(a) Tsang Dhar
      (i) Supplies 8 days
      (ii) SAA (small arms and ammunition) 1/16 first line
      (iii) 4.2 in mortar 3/4 first line
      (iv) 75 mm 0.5 first line

 (b) Lumpu
      (i) Small arms and ammunition about 0.5 first line
      (ii) Supplies about 5 days

(c) Towang
      (i) Small arms and ammunition 2 first lines
      (ii) 4.2 in mortar 1 first line
      (iii) 3.7 in 1.5 first lines
      (iv) 25 pdr 2 first lines

For the benefit of readers unacquainted with military terms, the definition of a first line scale is the amount of ammunition required for just one day’s fighting when in contact with the enemy. Thus, all that had been dropped at Lumpu and Tsangdhar by the time the Chinese attacked at Namka-chu was barely sufficient for about an hour’s battle – and that only if all air-dropped items were located, retrieved and transported to the troops, which would have been impossible, as neither mules nor porters were available.

However, all that knowledge belonged to the future. For the moment, if appeared to us in Delhi that the maintenance system might have a chance to catch up with the troops deployed on the riverline.

In mid-September Jogi informed me that Bogey Sen had revised his plan and decided, after all, to use the whole of 7 Brigade for the attack. He had, therefore, postponed the date of attack, estimating that the operation could not be launched before early October. I rejoiced at this because it meant that Kaul would in ali probability be back at his post as CGS before the operation started and I was confident that I could persuade him to have some of the bizarre decisions reversed.

 I knew that no amount of air effort at Ltimpu could enable logistics to catch up with the requirements for a whole brigade. (MO-I had calculated that the tonnage required for a brigade attack including an air-drop of four pack artillery pieces and a minimum stockpile of ammunition would by themselves amount to 560 tons.) Kaul, I felt sure, would appreciate the unreality of these figures. 

During the next two or three days only tidbits of information came my way, either garnered from messages passing through MO Directorate or from Jogi’s briefing sessions. It was from him I learned that 7 Brigade was not expected to sit idle during the period of preparation for the attack; it had been ordered to infiltrate small groups forward to occupy tactical points on the main ridge or on its flanks – for instance at Tsangle, or at minor passes such as Karpo-la or Yumso-la (lesser passes to the west of Thang-la).

I saw this signal at about the time that I learned from Mullik that he had failed in his efforts to persuade either Menon or Thapar to recall Bijfi Kaul.

I could not locate Jsangle on the map. According to Jogi it was a herders’ shelter a couple of miles to the west, near a group of small lakes that formed the headwaters of the Namka-chu. It later turned out to ­be two days’ march to the west of Dhola! In retrospect it appears incredible that senior officers with no knowledge of the terrain could sit around a table with politicians and bureaucrats and conduct chessboard strategy as a kind of blind-man’s buff. Tactically Tsangle was irrelevant to the Tsedong deployment; yet, inexplicably, the urge to occupy it remained an obsession with Menon and Thapar.

The Chinese facing our troops on the Namka-chu had been generally quiet after the first encounter on 8 September, but busy improving their defences with the help of barbed wire, digging tools, power saws and sandbags – all of which our troops lacked. (During those earlier days there had even been a degree of fraternisation between troops of the opposing forces – exchanges of cigarettes and greetings and the like – till orders. were issued to put a stop to any’ such display of camaraderie.)

On the night of 20 September they made their first attempt to infiltrate forward and harass our posts by throwing grenades. This led to exchanges of fire, which continued intermittently thereafter both by day and night, with both sides suffering casualties.

On the 20th, HQ XXXIII Corps informed 4 Infantry Division of its operational task: to evict the Chinese from our territory. The division was ordered to send its operational plan for approval. At the same time 5 Infantry Brigade in eastern NEF A was ordered to reinforce its forward positions at Limeking, Taksing, Mechuka, Tuting and Walong.

I saw this signal at about the time that I learned from Mullik that he had failed in his efforts to persuade either Menon or Thapar to recall Bijfi Kaul. Mullik explained that Menon and Kaul had earlier fallen out; as for Thapar he was adamant that he could deal with the crisis without his CGS. Mullik told me that his suggestion for air support had also been turned down. Aspy Engineer had been enthusiastic about bombing targets in Ladakh and Tibet, but the Defence Ministry decided not to risk air action over Chinese territory for fear of retaliation against Indian cities.

I think it was then that my mind was first troubled by forebodings of disaster. I had banked on Kaul’s early return from leave, certain that he would be able to restrain Menon’s reckless gambits. Unlike Thapar, Kaul could not’ be browbeaten into acquiescence in some operational misadventure, or sol thought at the time. News of the refusal to recall him struck me like a physical blow.

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Soon after this, Umrao’s BGS at HQ XXXIII Corps, ‘Jaggi’ Aurora, rang up from Shillong with a long list of complaints and reproofs about the order to evict the Chinese, which he assumed had issued from my office. (I should explain that he could take the liberty of berating me because seniority in the General Staff chain in Eastern Command was exactly topsy-turvy. Jaggi in Corps IJQ was a year and more senior in service to Krishen Sibal BGS at HQ Eastern Command who, in turn, was six months senior to me; whereas, of course the placements should have been precisely the opposite.)

It was Jaggi Aurora who first informed me that both Corps and Divisional HQ had consistently and emphatically advised against any offensive across the Namka-chu. The riverline, he added, had become the de fzeto border between the opposing troops; the Chinese would react strongly to any crossing of it by our troops. He expressed surprise that a former commander of 7 Brigade, familiar with the terrain in that forbidding region of NEFA, should have sent out orders for an attack on Thag-la.

It was Jaggi Aurora who first informed me that both Corps and Divisional HQ had consistently and emphatically advised against any offensive across the Namka-chu.

I mumbled some excuses over the line, none of which could have improved my standing with Jaggi. I could not, of course, explain my dilemma about Jogi’s ‘cornering of the market’, or the communication gap in GS Branch created by Kaul’s absence. I told him that I had been away from Delhi for nearly a fortnight but would do what I could to project his views in the right quarters. I felt somewhat of a sham but I could think of nothing else to say.

During my afternoon session with Jogi Dhillon – I think it was on the same day (21 September) or perhaps the next – I told him about Jaggi Aurora’s eri de eoeur from Shillong and that according to him Corps HQ opposed any operational commitment forward of Lumpu. We argued about the contradictions in the situation but Jogi felt that Bogey Sen was a much more seasoned soldier and his assessment must be given greater weight than that of Umrao, who had little operational experience. My own advice seemed to count for little.

I did succeed in one area. I persuaded him that we should start maintaining our own documents on these momentous decisions in case things went disastrously awry. Later in the day, or perhaps on the day after, Jogi handed me a record of a meeting held in the Ministry the previous day and said, ‘There you are. Now you can keep that in your files.’

Checking back on dates I find that by 22 September Menon had left for New York so it must have ‘been the Minister of State in charge of Defence Production, Raghu Ramaiah, who p-resided at the meeting of which Jogi Dhillon handed me the record which follows:

RECORD OF A MEETING IN THE DEFENCE MINISTER’S ROOM ON SATURDAY 22 SEP 62

After giving the up-to-date position in the Bhutan- Tibet-NEFA trijunction area, the COAS gave his appreciation of the Chinese reactions to our operations in the Dhola area.

He stated that the Chinese could do any or all of the following:

He considered that it was most likely that the Chinese would attack our posts in Ladakh in the area of the uncharted Chip Chap and Galwan rivers, as by so doing they would be achieving their aim of reaching their 1960 claim line. They were only about 8 to 10 miles from the claim line and we were comparatively much weaker to resist any determined attempt on their part, to achieve their aim.

The Foreign Secretary then explained the PM’s instructions on the subject of our posts in Ladakh and elsewhere. He further stated that the Government’s view was that we must not accept any infringement of our border in NEF A. He was of the opinion that as we built up strength in the Dhola area we should evict the Chinese from our territory even at the cost of Chinese reaction in Ladakh, where owing to our weakness, we may lose further territory. He felt that in Ladakh the Chinese would probably NOT react strongly but may try and capture one or two posts.

The COAS then asked for written instructions of the Government, to evict the Chinese in the Dhola area. After some discussion, the MMD [Minister, Ministry of Defence] decided to issue instructions as drafted in the meeting.

The instructions issued are at 1-A.

Sd/- as Dhillon)
Maj Gen
Officiating CGS
24 Sep 62

Annexure 1-A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

At a meeting in MMD’s room, this morning COAS raised the specific question whether action to evict the Chinese can be taken as soon as the Brigade has concentrated. The decision throughout has been, as discussed at previous meetings, that the Army should prepare and throw the Chinese out as soon as possible. The COAS was accordingly directed to take action for the eviction of the Chinese in the Kameng Division of NEFA as soon as he was ready.

11987/JS(G)/62
COAS of 22-9-62

Sd/- (HC Sarin)
Joint Secretary}
22-9-62

If the instructions at ‘I-A’ had not been attached in the original, I would have had difficulty in believing that orders to launch an offensive against the armed forces of a great power had been issued by a middle-ranking civil servant, endorsing the decision of a minister who did not have cabinet rank and who, into the bargain, had till then not been connected with operational matters. Furthermore, in retrospect it seemed incredible that it was the Ministry of Defence and not the Foreign Ministry that had ordered the army to commit an act of war.

I could not understand Thapar’s thought processes. The very fact that he had asked for a written order from the Minister indicated that he was not wholly in agreement with the content of the verbal one. Despite the DIB’s and the Foreign Secretary’s optimistic speculations about Chinese reactions, clearly he was alarmed about a possible riposte in both Ladakh and NEFA, and he must have known that in either event our forward posts stood no chance of withstanding a co-ordinated attack. Furthermore, since Menon was away he would not have to face any browbeating; so why did he not resist the pressure on him to amount a reckless offensive at Thag-la?

I do not recall whether I discussed these oppressive misgivings with Jogi on that occasion. Perhaps not, because by then I had rather given up on him, but I do recall his telling me that he would himself draft the signal to the Commands conveying government’s orders, an uncalled for arrogation that did not, as it turned out, serve him well.

These posts were therefore deployed in “˜penny packets, not mutually supporting and could neither be reinforced. nor logistically maintained in case of open hostilities. In these circumstances, it would be wrong to lay down from this Headquarters that there would be no withdrawals.

At home later in the evening I received a message from Thapar’s ADC summoning me to the Chiefs residence. I walked over to White Gates and found the Chief and Jo-gi Dhillon busily discussing the text of Jogi’s draft signal to the Commands. Thapar showed it to me and asked for my views.

Not expecting this sudden readmission to the insiders’ circle, I was perhaps somewhat wary, uncertain how far to press my views. The signal to Eastern Command was brief and to the point: Chinese troops who had entered Kameng FD were to be evicted as soon as preparations had been completed.

When I began to discuss the feasibility of such an operation Thapar cut me short and told me that I had not been called to question the government’s directive but to suggest ways of implementing it, especially in regard to Western Command. Irresolutely, I gave way and did not pursue the matter. I glanced at the sub-paragraph in Jogi’s draft addressed to Western Command:

Since it was likely that the Chinese might react to the above, by attacking some of our forward posts in Ladakh, all posts will be alerted, their defences strengthened and, if attacked, would fight it out. No withdrawal would be permitted.

When I had finished reading I found Thapar looking at me questioningly, as though he expected me to raise an objection. I did. To quote from the Summary:

On being asked to give my comments…, I pointed out that the deployment of forward posts in Ladakh had been based on an administrative rather than a tactical plan…. These posts were therefore deployed in ‘penny packets’, not mutually supporting and could neither be reinforced. nor logistically maintained in case of open hostilities. In these circumstances, it would be wrong to lay down from this Headquarters that there would be no withdrawals. This flexibility should be left in the hands of the local commanders. The COAS agreed and the signal was amended.

I gathered that there had been some argument between the two on this point and Thapar seemed gratified at my response. He at once amended Jogi’s draft, but he did not want to leave it entirely in the hands of the local commanders’ as I had suggested, because (he said) Daulet Singh had recently asked permission to withclraw all his border posts as a precautionary measure – and his intention had been to pull in all his resources to Leh for its defence. This had not been permitted. Thapar felt that if he were given a completely free hand now he might do just that.

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The signal approved by the COAS read:

Firstly(.) personal from CAOS for GOC in C Eastcom (.) govt has decided that the Chinese troops who have entered the Kameng Frontier Division of NEF A will be evicted as soon as you are ready (.) all necessary arrangements required to achieve this aim will be made at top speed (.)

At the same time Peking issued a notification to New Delhi that active patrolling had been ordered along the McMahon border ““ as if to betoken that not all its threats were empty.

Secondly(.) for GOC-in-C Westcom and GOC XV Corps (.) the above action is likely to have repercussions in Ladakh to the extent that Chinese may attack some of our forward posts (.) all posts will therefore be alerted and their defences strengthened as far as possible (.) if attacked posts will fight it out and inflict maximum casualties on the Chinese (.) any adjustments which may be considered necessary to strengthen our present positions may be carried out.

By 25 September our casualties at Namka-chu had risen to eleven and Chinese losses were reported to be even higher. On one occasion our troops opened fire on the Chinese with 3-inch mortars, inflicting a number of casualties whom they could see being carried away on stretchers.

Protests from Peking were not long in arriving, proclaiming ‘the most serious and strongest protest… [against] the frenzied criminal provocations of the intruding Indian troops in the Tsedong area… [where] the flames of war may break out any time’. At the same time Peking issued a notification to New Delhi that active patrolling had been ordered along the McMahon border – as if to betoken that not all its threats were empty.

More than these diplomatic developments, it was the skirmishing on the Namka-chu that I found ominous. Since no one in Delhi had any idea of the exact lie of the land, or how the troops were tactically disposed on the ground, we could not understand the reason for these constant exchanges of fire despite strict injunctions to avoid’ them.

“¦I would be failing in my duty if I were not to point out the undesirability of higher headquarters giving orders on the deployment of platoons and companies.

It is an indication of the irrationality of the situation that although Army HQ was attempting to direct 7 Brigade’s operations, none of us had any idea about what was actually going on at the front. That the two forces were strung out along a riverline, facing each other across a narrow mountain stream in eyeball-to-eyeball hostility, would have seemed the least likely probability.

I tried to ring up Niranjan Prasad at Tezpur to find out more about the situation, but was told that he was not available; he too had been prodded up the mountain by HQ Eastern Command and was on his way to Lumpu, out of communication with both 7 Brigade and his own HQ, temporarily hors de combat; HQ 7 Brigade, by then located at Lumpu in route to Namka-chu, had not yet established wireless communication with Tezpur.

Almost on the eve of battle everyone appeared to be out of touch with everyone else. If one could have retained one’s sense of humour in these trying times, it all would have seemed quite comical, like an act in a vaudeville show.

On 26 September HQ Eastern Command ordered XXXIII Corps to establish a company post at Tsangle. Having been briefed earlier by Jogi I assumed that the order had originated at the Minister’s conference. Umrao, however, mistook it for undue interference by Sen and it was then that I received the first inkling of strained relations between Sen and Umrao – and, indeed, between Command and Corps HQ.

On 28 September BGS Eastern Command forwarded a copy of a XXXIII Corps signal to me, in which the Corps Commander had given vent to what appeared to me to be a justifiable grievance:… submit humbly while I welcome any suggestions advice and guidance from you I would be failing in my duty if I were not to point out the undesirability of higher headquarters giving orders on the deployment of platoons and companies.’ The BGS requested that I bring his signal to the notice of the COAS. I ‘sent the file to Jogi without adding any comment from the DMO.

The next day, on learning that the Army Commander was to visit Delhi on I October, I rang up Krishen Sibal, the BGS, to invite them both for breakfast at my house after their early morning flight from Lucknow. What I planned to do was, first, to determine who exactly had inspired and counselled the unfortunate Namka-chu venture; and, thereafter, to try to subdue the enthusiasm with which 7 Brigade was being urged into an offensive, hoping to convince them by using my firsthand knowledge of the difficulties of the terrain and weather and their impact on logistics forward of road-head or dropping zone.

I knew Bogey well enough to do this without being thought presumptuous, and I knew I could count on moral support from Krishen. 

Unfortunately, Bogey arrived in a dour mood, which not even the banter that usually passed between him and my wife could dispel. Breakfast over; we repaired to my study to discuss the Namka-chu operation. It was not long before I began to realise, with something of a shock, that it was Bogey who was mainly responsible for promoting the idea of an offensive at Namka-chu.

It would not have occurred to me to suspect that he and his staff would commit forces to a crucial operation without having considered all its logistical and tactical aspects (although, indeed, that is exactly what this general officer and his staff did in fact do).

It also become obvious that he had little knowledge of the terrain but, uncharacteristically, he would not back. down from his commitment. He told me that he’ had just returned from a visit to Tezpur. Niranjan and Dalvi, who knew the terrain, had between them drawn up a plan of attack: a sweep across the Thag-la slope from west to east to clear it of the Chinese presence. The plan had his approval; he added that the opposition to it came mainly from Umrao, who ‘was not exerting himself fully to ensure that the build-up in the Tsedong area was being carried out with maximum speed and capacity.’

I tried to probe into Bogey’s mind, only to come up against a doggedness that, instead, had the effect of undermining my own conviction in the matter. Although I knew him to be somewhat unimaginative by nature, he nevertheless had wide (and successful) experience of battle – more than any other general officer still in service. It would not have occurred to me to suspect that he and his staff would commit forces to a crucial operation without having considered all its logistical and tactical aspects (although, indeed, that is exactly what this general officer and his staff did in fact do).

Before the meeting broke up, Bogey said that he would appreciate any help I could give him in replacing his Corps Commander. My Summary records:

I advised the GOC-in-C to bring this matter to the notice of COAS. I also advised him that so far as Army Headquarters was concerned, we would hold HQ Eastern Command responsible for the success of the operation; if he felt dissatisfied with his subordinate commanders, it was always open to him, at this operationally vital juncture, to assume personal command .at Corps Headquarters to ensure that the operation did not fail by default.

I suggested to him that in this national emergency if he were dissatisfied with the conduct of operations in a lower formation, he could not leave it at that. The GOC-in-C stated that he was not willing to act according to this advice.

When I went to the Ops Room after breakfast I was told that Mullik had been asking for me on the telephone. I walked over to his office and found him greatly troubled about the command crisis in NEFA. He had been told about the Sen-Umrao clash by Krishna Menon on the latter’s return from the UN the previous day and felt that a new corps commander should be appointed: Umrao, Menon suspected, was obstructing the execution of Army HQ orders.

 I countered that this was not the time to introduce a. new man into the chain of command. It would be much more effectual and appropriate if Sen took over direct command of the corps. I told him about my morning meeting with Sen and my advice to him to assume command in Tezpur – and his rejection of this advice. Mullik said that he would have a word with Thapar and recommend the course I had suggested.

I had been sickening for a bout of ‘flu for the past day or so and, as luck would have it, I had to take to .bed that afternoon with a sudden high temperature. Bogey Sen was to have stayed over in Delhi till the next day but I was in no condition to meet him for a further discussion.

Continued…: Paper Tigers on the Prowl – III