Use of Weapons
Use of personal or battalion/company support weapons, with remarkable proficiency, during day and night is a must quality for all ranks; especially for the officers. Unless a leader is physically fit and proficient in weapon handling, he cannot command respect of the troops. The formal range tables for classification firing have to be suitably modified to add the aspects of jungle warfare, counter-insurgency, camouflage, ambush and engagement of opportunity targets at unit level.
Troops should be educated about the IEDs and various tactical drills to avoid casualties. As a thumb rule no road or track unless screened for IEDs should be used by troops or vehicles.
All ranks must be proficient in firing of personal and support weapons. Improvised ranges could be catered for at battalion headquarter level. Troops returning from leave of absence must undergo a short capsule on weapon handling and firing before being employed on active duties.
Troops should be taught to hold fire till they are sure about the target. They should avoid collateral damage and most importantly – should not be perceived as ‘trigger happy’ by the populace and media.
Use of Equipment
There is a plethora of equipment in a battalion – night vision devices, weapon sights, optical equipment, GPS, communication equipment, metal and mine detectors, etc. These can be used as a force-multipliers, if troops use these effectively. Amassing costly gadgetry alone would not help; their inclusion in overall sub-unit operational plan is most important.
Temptation to use alternate technology such as internet, cellular phones, walkie-talkie etc. should be avoided at sub-unit level, as it results in equipment proliferation and unrestricted use of these gadgets leads to security breach.
IEDs
The IEDs have taken a heavy toll in anti-Maoist operations. Counter-insurgency and counter-terror training is incomplete without training on IEDs – their innovation, fabrication, use, detection and diffusing. A training module on IEDs can educate troops on various aspects of safety and detection.
Troops should be educated about the IEDs and various tactical drills to avoid casualties. As a thumb rule no road or track unless screened for IEDs should be used by troops or vehicles. Taking chance by using vehicles could be fatal. Walking cross country helps as it increases contact with the locals and in area domination. Vehicles carrying provisions and administrative loads should be allowed to ply only after due sanitization of the road.
Field craft
At sub-unit level troops must know the ground over which they have to operate. It can only happen, when they walk on the ground and get familiar with each fold and landmark. Knowledge of the ground is important for success of operations. A sub-unit commander should carry out terrain analysis and establish his operational grid, over which his sub-unit will conduct operations. Platoon and section commanders should remember all distances, landmarks and features of tactical importance in their area of responsibility.
The writ of Maoists in the area of operations must be challenged. They should not be allowed to hold “˜kangroo courts and dispense justice. The local commander should be seen as a dependable alternative”¦
Use of ground, cover and its denial to the enemy is the essence of field craft. It applies to everyone – from commandant to constable. Lethargy on part of troops could prove fatal. Most common mistake that sub-units commit is to camp on a tactically unsuitable ground because of administrative reasons. Availability of pucca house, electricity, water, telephone connectivity etc. should not outweigh tactical considerations. Selection of harbours and patrol bases again need careful selection of ground.
Troops should be so familiar with the ground that they can spot even minutest of alteration. This ability will help them in fighting against IEDs and ambushes. Such ability can only come by ensuring continuity of commanders and troops in a location.
Intelligence
Intelligence in anti-Maoist operations is a major challenge. Partly because of local support to the insurgents and largely because of act of reprisals against the ‘informers’ by the Maoist, the intelligence is not forthcoming. This situation can only be reversed by extensive area domination and regular contact with masses by junior leaders. The commanders should rely on common tactical wisdom to appreciate the hide outs, trails and movement pattern of the insurgents. In the absence of specific intelligence a commander has to cast his net wider and farther to increase the chances of establishing ‘contact’ with insurgents.
Intelligence comes to the ‘winning side’. At present the initiative is with the Maoists. This equation needs to be altered. It can only be done by establishing extensive contact and area domination. Sub-unit commanders and troops should be friendly and yet firm towards the population. Remaining rooted to camps in the absence of information would hardly help the matter. At times, in the absence of intelligence, ‘jungle bashing’ helps. Commanders must take chance and plan operations on ‘blind intelligence’. Success will follow.
Also read: Blueprint to tackle Maoists
The writ of Maoists in the area of operations must be challenged. They should not be allowed to hold ‘kangroo courts’ and dispense justice. The local commander should be seen as a dependable alternative should the population wishes to defy the rebels. Initial setbacks would be disheartening but our aim should be long-term.
Troops must know the local customs, religious rituals and sensitivities. There should be a structured training module on this aspect. A commander should understand the importance of village elders, religious institutions (church) and local power equations.
Routine in the Posts
A post should be defensible and well-guarded. There should be no laxity as far as protection of the post is concerned. Adequate observation posts, listening posts, ambushes and patrols should be sent out so that post is not surprised by Maoists. An illumination plan should be drawn up for bringing down accurate fire on the rebels. Any stand-off attack on post should be taken seriously as it has been, in most of the cases, a precursor to a full-fledged raid. All ranks must be briefed and rehearsed about their role and responsibilities in the eventuality of a raid.
Intelligence comes to the “˜winning side. At present the initiative is with the Maoists. This equation needs to be altered. It can only be done by establishing extensive contact and area domination.
There should be a reinforcement plan drawn by the battalion headquarter, to come to aid of a post under attack. Post commander should motivate troops to defend post at all costs.
Administration in Field
A sub-unit deployed in anti-Maoist operations is to be supported administratively by the parent unit or headquarters. Over-indulgence in administrative matters by combat troops dilutes focus on operational priorities. Most of the administrative issues should be shouldered by the battalion administrative staff.
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