Indian Defence Review

Deployment of Central Police Organisation (CPO) in Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO) is not a new phenomenon. Many units of CPO have served in the northeast, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and more recently in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) affected states of the country. It would be unfair to negate their contribution; as is being done, or attempted to, in certain sections of the media and intelligentsia. Recent setbacks suffered by CPOs and the state police in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra and West Bengal have heated up a debate about their operational preparedness.

Intensity of LWE, in terms of motivation of Maoists; quality and lethality of their arsenal; standard of their training and complexities of political, media and international linkages espousing their cause have increased manifold. The CPOs are no longer facing ‘rag-tag cadres’ armed with country-made weapons and living off the land. The rebels are adequately supported by modern technology. It is a conflict situation where both sides have their distinct advantages and disadvantages. Over a period of time the Maoists have established their ‘control’ over large swathes of territory. It will take some time and toil for the CPOs to wrest control from the Maoists. Overnight results cannot be expected.

Brutality exhibited by their cadres in recent attacks on CPOs is testimony to this.

The LICO is a live situation. Plainly speaking, either one kills or gets killed. Unfortunately, this is the rule of engagement. The CPOs have to observe the law of the land, human rights, avoid collateral damage and above all, treat a rebel as an Indian and not an enemy. Maoists have no such qualms – brutality exhibited by their cadres in recent attacks on CPOs is testimony to this. In live situations operational lapses are costly in terms of casualties. All forces, irrespective of the colour of their uniform have learnt this – albeit hard way. Losing men and weapons by a uniformed and mandated force to enemy is unsavory, which affects the morale of the troops. Nevertheless, in such trying times two things must not be forgotten; one, that every force at some point of time in its history must have had a ‘bad patch’; two, that motivated units have resilience to pull out from adversity and again bask in glory. There is no reason for despondency.

Much has been spoken and written about the macro issues concerning anti-Maoist operations, but the micro issues which are battle-winning factors at unit and sub-unit level have been overlooked. There could be two reasons to this apathy; firstly, grass-root level tactical problems do not fascinate those who deal with macro policy issues; secondly, the unit and sub-unit commanders neither voice their concern in right forums nor take corrective action themselves.

Victory in war is an outcome of many successful battles and a battle is won on account of many successful minor tactical operations. So, tactical operations at company and platoon level cannot be viewed as a mundane chore – unworthy of a senior commander’s indulgence. Anti-Maoist operations are company, platoon and section commander’s battle. Hence, all shortcomings at unit and sub-unit level must be addressed and rectified with due seriousness.

Also read: Police cannot take on Maoists

It seems that some CPOs, for instance the CRPF, have been raised at a pace that outstrips the aspect of individual and collective training; unit and sub-unit integration and cohesion; rank and file structure, camaraderie and operational readiness. Such hastily-raised units if pressed into anti-Maoist operations are likely to encounter problems when faced with live situations. The units can be helped by imparting additional operation-specific training in the identified ‘grey areas’.

Macro Management Issues

Employment and Deployment

Concept of employment of CPOs needs a re-look. The forces are allotted by the Central Government on requisition from the state governments. The district collector and police chief have a say in their deployment. This arrangement is alright for policing and law and order duties. For anti-Maoist operations, the battalion and range commanders should have operational freedom and given adequate time for preparation, planning, reconnaissance and deployment of headquarters, units and sub-units in a systematic counter-insurgency grid.

Grid deployment casts larger footprint, covers exit and entry routes; enables area domination, facilitates resource control and mass contact with the population. The population feels more secure and is forthcoming with information and intelligence. In a counter-insurgency grid deployment troops and sub-units are always available for each other’s cooperation and rescue.Practice of employment of CPOs in stand-alone company and platoon posts is tactically unsound. It is reminiscent of the era when the mere presence of police force was enough to deter the public. Socio-political forces have changed that mindset. It is commonly observed that a CPO battalion has its companies deployed all over the country and yet the battalion commander is expected to exercise an effective command and control over the unit. In such situations, as the unit cohesion suffers, sub-units are left to fend for themselves – operationally and administratively. A unit commander must be afforded the opportunity to train and deploy his unit together for a better operational performance. Deployment in penny packets is detrimental. A unit must not be deployed in more than two halves. CPOs employment and deployment should be spelt in terms of battalions and not in companies, as is the practice.

Last minute requisition (or release) of CPO causes many problems – the unit or sub-unit commanders have to rely on the tactical wisdom and ground knowledge of others as they did not have a chance to reconnoiter the area. The unit may get deployed in a tactically unsuitable area. Due to administrative problems commanders are loathe to relocate and continue occupying wrong locations, inviting offensive actions from the insurgents. Such mistakes have often proved fatal.

Intelligence Network

Short notice move of units and sub-units adversely affects establishment of intelligence network and the unit has to depend on the view point (may be biased) of the district officials. As an input their view point may work but it has to be worked upon by developing new sources and spreading the area of influence. For the success of a unit in anti-Maoist operations, tactical intelligence is important; strategic intelligence is just a ‘could know’ subject and matters very little.

For the success of a unit in anti-Maoist operations, tactical intelligence is important; strategic intelligence is just a “˜could know subject and matters very little.

Poor intelligence has been the most profound cause of recent reverses suffered by CPOs. Otherwise, how does one explain the inability of oblivious troops to discern the presence of hundreds of Maoist cadres in the near vicinity of a camp location, assembled with an intention to carry out a raid or ambush?

Intelligence gathering is a dynamic process. Commanders cannot be rooted to their bases, if the intelligence is to be generated. They have to devise an intelligence collection plan, employ troops, sources and other agencies to collect intelligence. At the same time intelligence to Maoists has to be denied. Human-intelligence and technical-intelligence should complement each other. Flow of intelligence in real-time for units and sub-units to act up on is necessary. There is a palpable frustration among the commanders regarding the paucity of intelligence in anti-Maoist operations. They need to be patient and try all alternatives. Flow of intelligence is related to the degree of the fear of Maoists in the hearts and minds of population – more the fear, lesser the intelligence.

Equipment Profile

Post-Dantewada a debate in the media was unleashed about the use of ‘third dimension’ for fighting the Maoist. Lots of views regarding use of helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones and aerial fire power were put forth by the informed and otherwise. No one cared to ask the troops or units on the ground about their requirement in terms of small arms, night vision devices, communication sets, body armour, mine detectors, anti-mine vehicles, electronic intelligence devices, etc.

Also read: Army: A Need for Introspection

Techniques and equipment for LICO have undergone sea change. Technology is all pervasive and is helping police and armies in fighting insurgents at minimal casualties. It would be prudent if we learn from all available sources and then calibrate our operational responses. Procurement of modern gadgetry is need-based. It has to be fulfilling an operational void. It should be a force multiplier. Training and administrative requirements arising from such procurements should also look in to.

Maoists’ Attacks: Post-event Analysis

Post-event analysis of Maoist attacks (2005-2010) establishes a pattern of operation by Maoists against CPOs:-

Also read: India losing war against terrorism

Same applies to the incidents of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, deliberate and chance ambushes and attacks on unsuspecting body of troops – the elements of thoroughness of preparation, secrecy, surprise and boldness in execution are the hallmark of all Maoist attacks against the CPOs.

Key Result Areas

Leadership

For a uniformed force, slated to take up counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism role dynamic leadership from officers, subordinate officers and NCOs is absolutely necessary. Leaders should lead by personal example; they should be physically very fit; and their competence in every professional field should be inspiring to the men. When it comes to hardships, a leader must be prepared to toil with men and not lead by proxy.

After executing a high profile attack, the cadres did not leave their area, because their hold over population is complete as state sympathizers have been eliminated”¦

Maoist’s ideology has a certain degree of romanticism to it. Media and political parties paint them as underprivileged and exploited class – fighting for a just cause. Such projections must not affect troops as these are percolating to them from various sources (many troops belong to these regions as well). Commanders must be vigilant against ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ wherein troops develop affinity towards the Maoists for want of clear perspective and motivation.

It is often said that, “Truth is the first casualty of war.” Truthful reporting is an indication of morale and courage of conviction in leader and men. Commanders and troops should report what they see and perform on ground. ‘Padding-up’ of reports to hide operational shortcomings must be curbed.

Leading a sub-unit in a live situation such as anti-Maoist operations is most difficult. A leader has to have some sort of permanency with his sub-unit, so that men know him and he knows the men. Knowing men becomes easy if officers and SOs train with the men. Training, in both formal and informal manner is a way of forging officer-men relationship.

In live situations, spirit of camaraderie helps. It can be inculcated by toiling together whether during games or training or operations. Anti-Maoist operations demand a very high standard of team spirit and camaraderie. “Every man to himself”, attitude must be discouraged at all levels. Troops should be in ‘buddy pairs’ – playing friend, philosopher and guide to each other. Camaraderie is a stress buster too; it helps in building of morale and overcoming setbacks.

A leader must be humane too. His administrative acumen must be instinctive to gauge the morale of his sub-unit and spot the malaise. Such qualities come with honest involvement in sub-unit’s affairs. Troops engaged in anti-Maoist operations have been found stressed up and need counseling from officers. Leaders must be trained to identify the symptoms of ‘fragging’ – a malaise very common amongst the troops engaged in counter-insurgency operations.

Training

Much has been said about the training needed for anti-Maoist operations. First and foremost, training is a command responsibility. Unit and sub-unit commanders have to find time and inclination to train their outfits. Training for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism is the culmination of a set of individual training in sub-unit training format. Here field craft, endurance, reflex shooting, section and team leading skills find a collective expression. Unless a situation-based training programme is devised, which has the ingredients of terrain, enemy and Maoists’ tactics, the objectives of collective training remain unfulfilled.

Maoists ideology has a certain degree of romanticism to it. Media and political parties paint them as underprivileged and exploited class ““ fighting for a just cause. Such projections must not affect troops”¦.

While deployed in operations it is futile to expect a formal opportunity coming your way to train. Informal training conducted by unit-reared trainers is the most effective method, wherein troops receive ‘hands-on’ training from their seniors and peers. All ranks should be sensitized about this requirement and every opportunity should be availed to impart or receive training.

Orientation to operational situation at unit and sub-unit level is something which should be institutionalized. Units and sub-units must receive proper orientation training before being deployed in operations.

Physical Fitness

Physical fitness of a high order to withstand severity of anti-Maoist operations needs no emphasis. Personnel who are unfit, obese, hypertensive or nursing some other ailment cannot cope with the operational stress. A unit slated for induction into anti-Maoist operations must pay attention to physical fitness of all ranks. Exercises having the elements of long-range patrol, forced marches, living off the land, prolonged outings, night operations, etc. must be conducted as a culmination of individual/ collective training programmes.

A physically fit soldier exudes elan and confidence; while in operations he doesn’t rely on local resources for survival or comfort. It is the first building block on which special troops are trained. A sub-unit commander will have to find ways and means to keep his unit in a fit condition.

Use of Weapons

Use of personal or battalion/company support weapons, with remarkable proficiency, during day and night is a must quality for all ranks; especially for the officers. Unless a leader is physically fit and proficient in weapon handling, he cannot command respect of the troops. The formal range tables for classification firing have to be suitably modified to add the aspects of jungle warfare, counter-insurgency, camouflage, ambush and engagement of opportunity targets at unit level.

Troops should be educated about the IEDs and various tactical drills to avoid casualties. As a thumb rule no road or track unless screened for IEDs should be used by troops or vehicles.

All ranks must be proficient in firing of personal and support weapons. Improvised ranges could be catered for at battalion headquarter level. Troops returning from leave of absence must undergo a short capsule on weapon handling and firing before being employed on active duties.

Troops should be taught to hold fire till they are sure about the target. They should avoid collateral damage and most importantly – should not be perceived as ‘trigger happy’ by the populace and media.

Use of Equipment

There is a plethora of equipment in a battalion – night vision devices, weapon sights, optical equipment, GPS, communication equipment, metal and mine detectors, etc. These can be used as a force-multipliers, if troops use these effectively. Amassing costly gadgetry alone would not help; their inclusion in overall sub-unit operational plan is most important.

Temptation to use alternate technology such as internet, cellular phones, walkie-talkie etc. should be avoided at sub-unit level, as it results in equipment proliferation and unrestricted use of these gadgets leads to security breach.

IEDs

The IEDs have taken a heavy toll in anti-Maoist operations. Counter-insurgency and counter-terror training is incomplete without training on IEDs – their innovation, fabrication, use, detection and diffusing. A training module on IEDs can educate troops on various aspects of safety and detection.

Troops should be educated about the IEDs and various tactical drills to avoid casualties. As a thumb rule no road or track unless screened for IEDs should be used by troops or vehicles. Taking chance by using vehicles could be fatal. Walking cross country helps as it increases contact with the locals and in area domination. Vehicles carrying provisions and administrative loads should be allowed to ply only after due sanitization of the road.

Field craft

At sub-unit level troops must know the ground over which they have to operate. It can only happen, when they walk on the ground and get familiar with each fold and landmark. Knowledge of the ground is important for success of operations. A sub-unit commander should carry out terrain analysis and establish his operational grid, over which his sub-unit will conduct operations. Platoon and section commanders should remember all distances, landmarks and features of tactical importance in their area of responsibility.

The writ of Maoists in the area of operations must be challenged. They should not be allowed to hold “˜kangroo courts and dispense justice. The local commander should be seen as a dependable alternative”¦

Use of ground, cover and its denial to the enemy is the essence of field craft. It applies to everyone – from commandant to constable. Lethargy on part of troops could prove fatal. Most common mistake that sub-units commit is to camp on a tactically unsuitable ground because of administrative reasons. Availability of pucca house, electricity, water, telephone connectivity etc. should not outweigh tactical considerations. Selection of harbours and patrol bases again need careful selection of ground.

Troops should be so familiar with the ground that they can spot even minutest of alteration. This ability will help them in fighting against IEDs and ambushes. Such ability can only come by ensuring continuity of commanders and troops in a location.

Intelligence

Intelligence in anti-Maoist operations is a major challenge. Partly because of local support to the insurgents and largely because of act of reprisals against the ‘informers’ by the Maoist, the intelligence is not forthcoming. This situation can only be reversed by extensive area domination and regular contact with masses by junior leaders. The commanders should rely on common tactical wisdom to appreciate the hide outs, trails and movement pattern of the insurgents. In the absence of specific intelligence a commander has to cast his net wider and farther to increase the chances of establishing ‘contact’ with insurgents.

Intelligence comes to the ‘winning side’. At present the initiative is with the Maoists. This equation needs to be altered. It can only be done by establishing extensive contact and area domination. Sub-unit commanders and troops should be friendly and yet firm towards the population. Remaining rooted to camps in the absence of information would hardly help the matter. At times, in the absence of intelligence, ‘jungle bashing’ helps. Commanders must take chance and plan operations on ‘blind intelligence’. Success will follow.

Also read: Blueprint to tackle Maoists

The writ of Maoists in the area of operations must be challenged. They should not be allowed to hold ‘kangroo courts’ and dispense justice. The local commander should be seen as a dependable alternative should the population wishes to defy the rebels. Initial setbacks would be disheartening but our aim should be long-term.

Troops must know the local customs, religious rituals and sensitivities. There should be a structured training module on this aspect. A commander should understand the importance of village elders, religious institutions (church) and local power equations.

Routine in the Posts

A post should be defensible and well-guarded. There should be no laxity as far as protection of the post is concerned. Adequate observation posts, listening posts, ambushes and patrols should be sent out so that post is not surprised by Maoists. An illumination plan should be drawn up for bringing down accurate fire on the rebels. Any stand-off attack on post should be taken seriously as it has been, in most of the cases, a precursor to a full-fledged raid. All ranks must be briefed and rehearsed about their role and responsibilities in the eventuality of a raid.

Intelligence comes to the “˜winning side. At present the initiative is with the Maoists. This equation needs to be altered. It can only be done by establishing extensive contact and area domination.

There should be a reinforcement plan drawn by the battalion headquarter, to come to aid of a post under attack. Post commander should motivate troops to defend post at all costs.

Administration in Field

A sub-unit deployed in anti-Maoist operations is to be supported administratively by the parent unit or headquarters. Over-indulgence in administrative matters by combat troops dilutes focus on operational priorities. Most of the administrative issues should be shouldered by the battalion administrative staff.

At sub-unit level commanders must ensure rations, billeting, amenities, communication, leave, rest & refit; medical and evacuation of casualties. At times troops need counseling on a variety of issues. It must not be neglected. Commanders must reach out to troops regularly; they should be seen as ‘accessible’ by them.

Training Need: Analysis

Event analysis and training Key Result Areas (KRA) establish the need of training of commanders, junior leaders and troops on various aspects of LICO. The training could be organized, at training academies, recruit training centres (RTC), ad hoc training centres or ‘in situ’ at units deployed in anti-Maoists operations. Before imparting training, the existing standards need to be gauged by conducting dip-stick audit of training skill of troops engaged in anti-Maoist operations.

Ability to understand and execute specialized roles and tasks of anti-Maoist operations such as, area domination, area sanitization, road opening, cordon and search, ambush and raid.

Individual Training

Following areas of individual training would need special focus during evaluation:-

Collective Training

Following aspects of collective training at unit and sub-unit level need evaluation:-

Anti-Maoist operations are manpower intensive operations; taking out manpower exclusively for training may be hard on operational efficiency of the units and sub-units. In situ training of officers, junior leaders and troops is something very innovative and cost-effective method.

Junior Leaders’ Training

Under-mentioned aspects of junior leadership would require quantification:-

Senior Officers’ Training

The officer cadre is required to be trained on following aspects:-

Method Analysis

Senior Officers

A training team can organize training workshop at the training academies. It can also visit range headquarters and organize training in situ for the benefit of those officers who cannot be spared due to operational commitments. Lectures, seminars, workshops can be organized on following topic (s):-

Junior Leaders

A training team can organize cadres for junior leaders at the CPO academies or at range or battalion headquarter. This will enable junior leaders to get an exposure to latest concepts. Following subject (s) can be covered:-

Troops Training

Training teams from RTCs and units not deployed in anti-Maoist operations can be formed to impart in-situ training to troops. Help of ex-servicemen who have served in counter-insurgency and been instructors at RTCs and other training institutions of the army can also be taken. A training cadre of suitable duration at unit and range level can train troops in situ. Following topics could be covered:-

There is no shortcut to training ““ operational shortcoming once noticed must be taken cognizance of and corrected.

Training Venues

A training module of LICO needs to be included in the curriculum of officers, SOs and troops training at officers’ training academies and RTCs. Advance courses on anti-Maoist operations can be run at academies conducting advance courses. Each unit must raise its corpus of trainers, which will help it in running cadres and other training activities.

Training for officers, SOs and troops who cannot be spared due to operational commitment can be organized at range and battalion headquarters, ad hoc training centres and state police training centres by training teams.

Conclusion

Popular dictum “the more we sweat in peace, the less we bleed in war” is still very relevant. Training of senior officers, junior officers, junior leaders and men assumes importance if we want to succeed in operations with minimum casualties. Anti-Maoist operations are manpower intensive operations; taking out manpower exclusively for training may be hard on operational efficiency of the units and sub-units. In situ training of officers, junior leaders and troops is something very innovative and cost-effective method. There is no shortcut to training – operational shortcoming once noticed must be taken cognizance of and corrected.