India’s “peaceful” rise has obviously not gone down well with the hawks in the PLA and despite the efforts of the party leadership, there are bound to be differences in perspective. The internal security environment in China has always been a subject of debate especially handling of the ethnic minorities. China’s efforts to put a lid on the militant activities in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have not been successful despite several “Strike Hard” campaigns. China may not have heard the last of it. This also worries the PLA considerably on account of its cascading effect. Another emerging area of concern relates to the strategic Xinjiang-Gwadar multi-modal corridor transiting through POK and the presence of large contingent Chinese personnel in the area. It is only a matter of time before things get ugly.
From the Chinese perspective, apart from its visible merits and advantages, India’s strategic rise also raises concerns as under:
- Prospects of resolving Sino-India boundary issue.
- Unstable India-Pakistan ties in constraining and neutralizing India’s efforts to rise at the regional level.
- Implications of India’s rise for countries in the region and immediately beyond.
- India’s relations and interaction with major powers – with the US in particular.
- Relevance and limitations of regional/multi-lateral strategic regimes/institutions.
- India’s maritime strategy serving as an essential part of its ambitious rise and security dimension of the Indian Ocean.
- India’s interest calculus in Central Asia and ramifications for China.
- India’s Look East Policy with its geo-strategic connotations.
Although relations between India and China are on even keel, the ties are not free from tension and are periodically tested in a strategic sense. The border dispute is far from resolution. The two-day sixteenth meeting of the Special Representatives (SR) of India and China that was scheduled to be held at Delhi on November 28 and 29, 2011 was postponed indefinitely. The border talks between the two countries have not seen any noteworthy progress. On the plus side, there have been face-offs between the two sides or shots exchanges in anger over the past 20 odd years, which is an achievement, but violations continue almost daily in all the three sectors. The nature of violations has not followed any particular pattern for discerning new patterns so as to cause alarm.
As India and China deliberate over this dispute, the latter continues to engage Bhutan to negotiate settlement of their common border. There is a perception that unlike in the past, the parliamentary system may be seeking to take more interest in the dispute. India will have to guard against Bhutan making concessions since it will add to India’s difficulties especially in the Chicken’s Neck area in the critical Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal. China has restored the Defence Secretary level meeting in early 2012.The last such meeting was held in Beijing in January 2010. It may be time for India to consider the possibility of military interaction at the level of the service chiefs by rotation while continuing with exchanges as per a pre-arranged calendar of events. Military-to-military relations have also been restored with a PLA Commander visiting India a few weeks ago. An Indian military delegation led by a former GOC of Romeo Force/Rashtriya Rifles also visited Beijing, Shanghai and Urumqi in June 2011.
South China Sea Dispute and India
The Airavat incident is noteworthy. It has a precedent. Dr BM Chengappa, in his book ‘India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post Cold War Period’ mentions the ‘Maritime Incident – 1958’. It pertains to the goodwill visit of the INS Mysore to Shanghai in August 1958, which among other events hosted the then Defence Minister, Peng The-Huai. Surprisingly, a few days after the departure of INS Mysore, the Chinese government protested that, “An Indian warship had trespassed into Chinese territorial waters on a certain day in August 1958.” Chinese media, blog-spots and others continue harping on territorial disputes. They also continue a war of words on the perceived Indian presence in South China seas. The statements emanating from the Chinese media even after the Bali summit indicates that Beijing is not going to tolerate India’s efforts towards petroleum related activities in the region.
The South China Sea (SCS) region is important to China for reasons as under:
- In the past 20 to 25 years, China has put into place several strategic plans to maintain an uninterrupted supply chain for meeting its energy requirements as also to ensure that these are less susceptible to disruptions.
- The second part of the strategy is the land-based pipeline corridors that avoid sensitive Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) such as the Strait of Malacca. In 2008, China had imported 56 per cent of its oil needs which is expected to go up to two thirds by 2015 and increase substantially by 2020.
- The massive investment in Myanmar is one example, the other is the gigantic multi-modal project it has initiated in Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan going down to Gwadar port and it has already entered into energy related agreements with several Central Asian States.
- It has at the same time attempted to find off-shore oil/energy shelters to meet exigencies, the refurbishment of huge oil refineries in Sri Lanka at Muthurajawela (Western province) and Kandy is one example. There could be others.
- China has been involved in claims over islands and maritime zones in the SCS with Taiwan and five Southeast Asian countries. In 2009, China submitted a proposal to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) and claimed the entire SCS to include the region as core national interest, similar to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia are also claimants and each has advanced its territorial claims. This Chinese assertion was rejected by the US.
India has a strong interest in keeping open the sea lanes in the SCS. It is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55 per cent of India’s trade with Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS. The freedom of navigation in the SCS is in India’s interest. In this connection, the following are noteworthy:
Countries in this sensitive region have been taken aback by growing Chinese assertiveness.
There is anti-China mood in several countries. In the past there have been violent anti-Chinese riots. The overseas Chinese community has been targeted. It reminds one of anti-Japanese feelings in the mid-seventies. The then Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Tanaka was forced to abandon his ASEAN sweep mid-way due to anti-Japanese violence.
Reduced US influence in this region since the Iraq War has emboldened China further.
They have noted the manner in which China coerced Japan into releasing the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel on September 07, 2010 near the Diayou/Senkaku Islands.
- The entry of India into the SCS as part of an oil exploration arrangement with Vietnam and the statement of the Foreign Minister, SM Krishna, (Hanoi, September 15, 2011) that India will go ahead with its project introduced a new dimension and came as a relief to countries affected by China’s domination of the SCS.
- The statement by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at Bali in November 2011 clarified that India’s presence in the SCS was purely for economic purposes.
- On July 18, 2011, the former Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, had in an address to the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) reiterated the region’s importance and India’s support for freedom of navigation.
- The Indian Navy’s policy document issued in 2007 laid down clearly that, “India’s area of interest extends from North of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea”.
- US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s declaration at the Hanoi ARF Summit has placed the issue in its perspective and like at Bali recently, underlined the international nature of the laws of navigation and not a bilateral issue.
It is a moot question whether China has opened a new front that has greater ramifications in the immediate future for the region and international community. For India, the decision to enter into the SCS is a new frontier for its strategic interests. India has closely linked herself with Vietnam. Taiwan is consulting Vietnam on a joint-strategy, who like India experienced a major war with China in 1979. While Vietnam has resolved its land border dispute with China, it is not in any hurry to get into any maritime understanding with China despite provocations. China’s reactions to the India-Vietnam relationship are yet to be fully articulated. It is now for India to build consensus on the subject with other countries in the region including Japan and South Korea. The recent visit of the Myanmar President to India and that of the Vietnam party chief is something that analysts need to deliberate in clear terms. The regime change in Myanmar may worry Beijing considering it has the potential to curtail Chinese influence there.
The Way Forward
The penultimate year of Hu Jin-tao and Wen Jia-bao combination may perhaps be their worst considering that China has fallen on the wrong side of international opinion and seems incapable of course correction. China’s assertiveness over the territorial issue has led to realignment in the regional calculus and re-entry of US influence into this theatre has added value to it. Despite claims of its economic prowess, China internally is unstable with record number of strikes and public protests, frightening prospect of economic bubble waiting to burst and the ethnic strife in Tibet and Xinjiang remaining on the boil since March 2008 – just to name a few. The political leadership seems to be running away with the impression that China’s assertive actions and statements will be tolerated because of its economic might and military strength. India has certainly benefited by China’s recent policies especially in South East Asia over the South China Sea dispute. India needs to exploit this new beginning and move pro-actively to reinforce its position in the region. Australia’s decision to supply uranium to India is a manifestation of the new calculus.
The irritants and trust deficit in India-China relations are not going away in a hurry. Conscious efforts by China are necessary to make relations more meaningful. India has been extremely accommodating in the past. India must now declare her “core interests” in an unambiguous manner and reinforce them as often and at as many fora as possible. China’s pique over the recently concluded Buddhist Conference at New Delhi is understandable since it disturbed Beijing’s plans to take leadership of the Buddhist community as also to reduce the importance of the Dalai Lama. Chinese mismanagement of its ethnic problems in Xinjiang and Tibet has caused its neighbors severe problems. While Pakistan has bent over backwards to please China, the plight of Buddhist monks in Tibet requires attention of the international community and India must take it up in its own way. Threat perceptions from China should not be underestimated since they are present and clear. The Indian political leadership despite the coalition compulsions has defined or refined its approach to Beijing without destabilising the conduct of diplomatic business. The danger of China’s growing shadow is ominous. The current government in Delhi has been cautious and at the same time, has stood its ground on sensitive matters. The decision to allow the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang in late 2009 is an example. Also, the Dalai Lama’s participation at the Asoka Mission’s Buddhist Conference at Delhi is yet another instance.
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