Indian Defence Review

PM meeting with President of China Hu Jintao in New Delhi

Today, there is a pronounced asymmetry between India and China. This is visible in terms of international influence that China wields owing to its strategic stature that flows from its economic might, scientific strengths, technological advances and military muscle. As a result, Beijing enjoys a regional influence that stretches from West Asia through South and South East Asia and up to the Korean Peninsula. China has also sensed India’s inability and unwillingness to confront her. Steps initiated by India to reduce the trust deficit would, therefore, have to be carefully calibrated to demonstrate a forward movement while at the same time not compromising or foreclosing its options. China should also be required to reciprocate by addressing substantive issues of India’s interest. China continues to follow a policy of destabilisation that suits her strategy to keep relations with India within certain parameters.

“India’s ‘peaceful rise’ has obviously added to Beijing’s worries, especially the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) particularly the Hawks”.

The main difference between the two emerging powers in Asia – India and China lies in their political systems. India’s democratic system contrasts sharply with China’s authoritarian regime. The advantages of democratic systems in governance and conflict management are widely acknowledged and are attributed to India’s political stability. The common democratic traditions are regarded as the desire for a closer cooperation between India and like-minded systems such as the UK, USA, Canada and Europe.

Since its Independence, India has had the unique experience of dealing with governments in its neighborhood that were represented by either a single political entity or regimes that subverted democracy and seized power for a variety of reasons. India’s political direction of its foreign policy and strategic affairs has remained constant, despite the inauguration of the coalition dharma in the mid-1980s. India’s political leadership was challenged immediately following Independence, beginning with Pakistan’s abortive attempt in 1948 to detach Kashmir from India. The other was China’s brazen military occupation of Tibet in 1950. Both developments altered India’s security environment considerably and resulted in complications that remain unresolved till today.

Trust Deficit

In 2010, India and China marked the 60th anniversary of establishment of bilateral relations. The Beijing-based China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) brought out a twelve-page article entitled ‘China-India Relations: New Starting Point and New Framework’ to mark the event. It made several noteworthy points especially on the political dimension of the relationship and spoke of a road map to further develop the bilateral interaction. Need to enhance mutual trust was advocated and it added that despite enormous efforts on either side by the political leadership, there was a negative perception created by the media and public opinion. The CIIS article did not bring anything new to the table when it highlighted the existence of trust deficit in India-China relations. Efforts to reduce the trust deficit between the two Asian neighbors are necessary to ensure peace and India’s smooth uninterrupted progress. Importantly, such efforts would be equally beneficial to China, which can continue its enunciated policy of keeping a peaceful border till it achieves its modernisation goals. It is imperative to note the backdrop in which such measures are initiated and not allow them to be interpreted as indicative of fear or weakness.

Today, there is a pronounced asymmetry between India and China. This is visible in terms of international influence that China wields owing to its strategic stature that flows from its economic might, scientific strengths, technological advances and military muscle. As a result, Beijing enjoys a regional influence that stretches from West Asia through South and South East Asia and up to the Korean Peninsula. China has also sensed India’s inability and unwillingness to confront her. Steps initiated by India to reduce the trust deficit would, therefore, have to be carefully calibrated to demonstrate a forward movement while at the same time not compromising or foreclosing its options. China should also be required to reciprocate by addressing substantive issues of India’s interest. China continues to follow a policy of destabilisation that suits her strategy to keep relations with India within certain parameters.

Building Trust

Certain “red lines” will, therefore, have to be demarcated like non-interference in India’s internal affairs related to sanctuary given to the Dalai Lama, no territorial concessions on Tawang or in Arunachal Pradesh or in northern Sikkim or elsewhere in that state and insistence that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part. Additionally, India must continue to follow an independent foreign policy tailored to meet her self-interests including inter-alia preservation of her interests in the neighborhood, highlighting her concerns over Pakistan and Sino-Pakistan collusion, concern at the diversion of Brahmaputra waters, climate change in Tibet, unrestricted preservation of its status as a nuclear power and her ambition of securing a permanent seat at the UNSC. Such a demarcation of these interests is necessary if India wants to avoid being muscled into granting concessions or being marginalised even in South Asia by China.

In a major democracy like ours, steps to reduce trust deficit require to be gradual, deliberate and confined to areas where tangible results are visible. This will entail selection of mutually beneficial areas including those where the Chinese have indicated interest. Economic, cultural and education are the areas to make a good beginning. It would be prudent not to include the armed forces in the process at this stage as they are separately engaged in confidence building measures.

Political Matrix

There are certain questions that have been asked as to who formulates India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China. Doubts have arisen out of several decisions taken by the Government that reflected an in-built reluctance to confront China on several important issues. This contrasts sharply to the strident policies of China. There is constant criticism of India in the Chinese media as also by the think-tanks. While the Ministry of External Affairs is the nodal agency to draft India’s external policies, it is not fully clear whether the inputs of other departments and agencies form part of the decision making process. The political leadership is the ultimate authority in all such cases including the strategic and economic regimes. This uniform pattern has been visible in the past over six decades. Each Prime Minister brought his own signature to the policy. The 1962 debacle is one example of a political decision to drive out the Chinese even before evaluating own preparedness and the possible consequences. On issues of national importance, there is absence of public debate. Such activity is confined to government circles. The information made available to the public by the government is also limited. Is there a role for civil society or think-tanks in policy formulation?

Mao Zedong is noted to have said, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and “the gun must never be allowed to command the party.” This has remained so till now. There have been aberrations in the past but the lines of command have remained clear. Participation by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign affairs is through the Foreign Affairs Small Leadership Group (FASLG) in the party, a body is headed by Hu Jintao, Chairman of the CMC. The PLA is known to have had its way in several sensitive strategic issues. Ten of the 12 members in the CMC are Generals and are known to be outspoken critics of the United States. India may not be far behind the US is the above category. The other dimension relates to the Polit Bureau Standing Committee (PBSC), the highest policy making body in China. Of the nine-member PBSC, four that have visited India include Hu Jintao, President and General Secretary, Wu Bangguo, President of the National People’s Congress, Wen Jiabao, Prime Minister and Zhou Yangkang, Security and Legal affairs. Notably, Xi Jinping, Vice President and Li Keqiang, Deputy Prime Minister, two important leaders of the PBSC are yet to visit India. It remains to be seen how the next generation of leaders will relate to India.

The equation between the party and PLA under Xi Jinping regime will be a significant factor for consideration. There is also the fact that several important ministers such as of defence, commerce, finance and industry are yet to visit India. The approach of the new PBSC in the period 2012-2013 towards India-specific issues such as the future of bilateral relations, border dispute, Tibet, successor to the Dalai Lama and the South China Sea dispute, would have to be analysed.

Influence of the Military in Decision Making

The White Paper on “China’s National Defence – 2010” released in March 2011 laid down three basic tasks for the PLA, namely, to play an active role in dealing with various security threats, to safeguard national security and to play an important role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development. Currently, China does not face any external threat to its national security. Any threat arising in the future could be consequential to its actions overseas. Several academicians and strategic thinkers, both Indian and others, have followed the PLA’s growing influence in foreign policy formulation. China remains focused on Taiwan, Tibet, trade and now increasingly on securing its maritime interests. Salient points from their research with reference to India are as under:

A comprehensive coverage of this aspect by the Chennai Centre for China Studies in its paper 874 dated September 28, 2011, makes understanding the PLA-Party equation easier. It is pertinent to mention that it was the PLA that forced the cancellation of an official visit to China in 2010 by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, Indian Army, on the grounds that he was in-charge of forces in Jammu and Kashmir. It transpired that China’s political leadership was taken aback by the PLA’s decision which was instigated by Pakistan. The line of command was reiterated subsequently.

India’s “peaceful” rise has obviously not gone down well with the hawks in the PLA and despite the efforts of the party leadership, there are bound to be differences in perspective. The internal security environment in China has always been a subject of debate especially handling of the ethnic minorities. China’s efforts to put a lid on the militant activities in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have not been successful despite several “Strike Hard” campaigns. China may not have heard the last of it. This also worries the PLA considerably on account of its cascading effect. Another emerging area of concern relates to the strategic Xinjiang-Gwadar multi-modal corridor transiting through POK and the presence of large contingent Chinese personnel in the area. It is only a matter of time before things get ugly.

From the Chinese perspective, apart from its visible merits and advantages, India’s strategic rise also raises concerns as under:

Although relations between India and China are on even keel, the ties are not free from tension and are periodically tested in a strategic sense. The border dispute is far from resolution. The two-day sixteenth meeting of the Special Representatives (SR) of India and China that was scheduled to be held at Delhi on November 28 and 29, 2011 was postponed indefinitely. The border talks between the two countries have not seen any noteworthy progress. On the plus side, there have been face-offs between the two sides or shots exchanges in anger over the past 20 odd years, which is an achievement, but violations continue almost daily in all the three sectors. The nature of violations has not followed any particular pattern for discerning new patterns so as to cause alarm.

As India and China deliberate over this dispute, the latter continues to engage Bhutan to negotiate settlement of their common border. There is a perception that unlike in the past, the parliamentary system may be seeking to take more interest in the dispute. India will have to guard against Bhutan making concessions since it will add to India’s difficulties especially in the Chicken’s Neck area in the critical Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal. China has restored the Defence Secretary level meeting in early 2012.The last such meeting was held in Beijing in January 2010. It may be time for India to consider the possibility of military interaction at the level of the service chiefs by rotation while continuing with exchanges as per a pre-arranged calendar of events. Military-to-military relations have also been restored with a PLA Commander visiting India a few weeks ago. An Indian military delegation led by a former GOC of Romeo Force/Rashtriya Rifles also visited Beijing, Shanghai and Urumqi in June 2011.

South China Sea Dispute and India

The Airavat incident is noteworthy. It has a precedent. Dr BM Chengappa, in his book ‘India-China Relations: Post Conflict Phase to Post Cold War Period’ mentions the ‘Maritime Incident – 1958’. It pertains to the goodwill visit of the INS Mysore to Shanghai in August 1958, which among other events hosted the then Defence Minister, Peng The-Huai. Surprisingly, a few days after the departure of INS Mysore, the Chinese government protested that, “An Indian warship had trespassed into Chinese territorial waters on a certain day in August 1958.” Chinese media, blog-spots and others continue harping on territorial disputes. They also continue a war of words on the perceived Indian presence in South China seas. The statements emanating from the Chinese media even after the Bali summit indicates that Beijing is not going to tolerate India’s efforts towards petroleum related activities in the region.

The South China Sea (SCS) region is important to China for reasons as under:

India has a strong interest in keeping open the sea lanes in the SCS. It is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55 per cent of India’s trade with Asia-Pacific transits through the SCS. The freedom of navigation in the SCS is in India’s interest. In this connection, the following are noteworthy:

Countries in this sensitive region have been taken aback by growing Chinese assertiveness.

There is anti-China mood in several countries. In the past there have been violent anti-Chinese riots. The overseas Chinese community has been targeted. It reminds one of anti-Japanese feelings in the mid-seventies. The then Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Tanaka was forced to abandon his ASEAN sweep mid-way due to anti-Japanese violence.

Reduced US influence in this region since the Iraq War has emboldened China further.

They have noted the manner in which China coerced Japan into releasing the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler that collided with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel on September 07, 2010 near the Diayou/Senkaku Islands.

It is a moot question whether China has opened a new front that has greater ramifications in the immediate future for the region and international community. For India, the decision to enter into the SCS is a new frontier for its strategic interests. India has closely linked herself with Vietnam. Taiwan is consulting Vietnam on a joint-strategy, who like India experienced a major war with China in 1979. While Vietnam has resolved its land border dispute with China, it is not in any hurry to get into any maritime understanding with China despite provocations. China’s reactions to the India-Vietnam relationship are yet to be fully articulated. It is now for India to build consensus on the subject with other countries in the region including Japan and South Korea. The recent visit of the Myanmar President to India and that of the Vietnam party chief is something that analysts need to deliberate in clear terms. The regime change in Myanmar may worry Beijing considering it has the potential to curtail Chinese influence there.

The Way Forward

The penultimate year of Hu Jin-tao and Wen Jia-bao combination may perhaps be their worst considering that China has fallen on the wrong side of international opinion and seems incapable of course correction. China’s assertiveness over the territorial issue has led to realignment in the regional calculus and re-entry of US influence into this theatre has added value to it. Despite claims of its economic prowess, China internally is unstable with record number of strikes and public protests, frightening prospect of economic bubble waiting to burst and the ethnic strife in Tibet and Xinjiang remaining on the boil since March 2008 – just to name a few. The political leadership seems to be running away with the impression that China’s assertive actions and statements will be tolerated because of its economic might and military strength. India has certainly benefited by China’s recent policies especially in South East Asia over the South China Sea dispute. India needs to exploit this new beginning and move pro-actively to reinforce its position in the region. Australia’s decision to supply uranium to India is a manifestation of the new calculus.

The irritants and trust deficit in India-China relations are not going away in a hurry. Conscious efforts by China are necessary to make relations more meaningful. India has been extremely accommodating in the past. India must now declare her “core interests” in an unambiguous manner and reinforce them as often and at as many fora as possible. China’s pique over the recently concluded Buddhist Conference at New Delhi is understandable since it disturbed Beijing’s plans to take leadership of the Buddhist community as also to reduce the importance of the Dalai Lama. Chinese mismanagement of its ethnic problems in Xinjiang and Tibet has caused its neighbors severe problems. While Pakistan has bent over backwards to please China, the plight of Buddhist monks in Tibet requires attention of the international community and India must take it up in its own way. Threat perceptions from China should not be underestimated since they are present and clear. The Indian political leadership despite the coalition compulsions has defined or refined its approach to Beijing without destabilising the conduct of diplomatic business. The danger of China’s growing shadow is ominous. The current government in Delhi has been cautious and at the same time, has stood its ground on sensitive matters. The decision to allow the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang in late 2009 is an example. Also, the Dalai Lama’s participation at the Asoka Mission’s Buddhist Conference at Delhi is yet another instance.

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