The Jihadi War - II - Indian Defence Review

By Col Harjeet Singh

Issue Vol 23.2 Apr-Jul 2008 | Date : 01 Nov , 2011

The National Caveats have to be revised. Some allies commit forces to a NATO operation, then impose restrictions – “national caveats” – on tasks those forces may undertake. These restrictions, for example, may prohibit forces from engaging in combat operations or from patrolling at night due to a lack of night-vision equipment. In addition to caveats, some governments do not permit their forces to be transferred to other parts of Afghanistan. Caveats pose difficult problems for force commanders, who seek maximum flexibility in utilizing troops under their command.

The French government reduced its caveats and agreed to allow its forces in Kabul and elsewhere to come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an emergency. Turkey, in contrast, refused to change its proscription against its forces use in combat.

At the alliance’s summit in Riga, Latvia, in late November 2006, NATO leaders sought to reduce the caveats in Afghanistan. The United States, Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands have forces in southern and eastern Afghanistan, highly unsettled areas, and have appealed to other governments to release combat forces to assist them in moments of danger. The French government reduced its caveats and agreed to allow its forces in Kabul and elsewhere to come to the assistance of other NATO forces in an emergency. Turkey, in contrast, refused to change its proscription against its forces’ use in combat. The Italian and Spanish governments said that their force commanders in the field could make the decision to send forces to assist in an urgent situation. It remains unclear whether and when these commanders would have to request permission from their capitals to do so, a complicating factor that could delay a decision.

Some allies have singled out Germany for special criticism, given that Germany has a large contingent of 2,800 troops in a relatively quiet area of northern Afghanistan and it is unclear whether it will send combat forces to assist in an emergency. The issue moved into the public arena in November 2006 in meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Quebec City. One British Member of Parliament asked his German colleagues, “If the situation was reversed and German soldiers were in imminent danger, how would you feel if the British commander responded to a German request for urgent assistance with the answer, ‘Sorry, we can’t come across the line to help you.’”10

The Counter-Narcotics Policy needs to be objectively reviewed. The allies are struggling to combat Afghanistan’s poppy crop. Afghanistan supplies 92% of the world’s opium as of 2006. The crop is a major factor in the economic life and stability of the country, and by one estimate accounts for 40% of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).11 Opium poppy farmers are heavily concentrated in the southern part of the country. The repercussions of Afghanistan’s poppy crop for the future of the country and for ISAF operations are extensive and complex. The Afghan government lacks the law enforcement apparatus, including a well-functioning judicial system, to combat the narcotics trade successfully. Narcotics traffickers can exploit the country’s primitive transportation network, as an extensive road system is not needed to move opium to market; a small load of opium can yield a high financial return.

“¦crops cannot compete with poppies; income from a hectare of poppies can reach $4600 a year, while wheat, one of the suggested substitute crops, can bring only $390.

The opium trade has a corrosive effect on Afghan society. At the same time, farmers in parts of the country view the poppy as their only source of income. Eradication of crops without a substitute source of income would throw these farmers into destitution, and they violently resist any effort to destroy their crops. ISAF has decided against the destruction of poppy fields, but they provide training, intelligence, and logistics to Afghan army units and police who destroy opium labs.

The Afghan government’s destruction of poppy fields is too random to be effective. Another component of the counter-narcotics effort is to persuade farmers to switch to alternative crops. Such crops cannot compete with poppies; income from a hectare of poppies can reach $4600 a year, while wheat, one of the suggested substitute crops, can bring only $390. Licensing poppy cultivation for medical purposes is the only way to break the Taliban’s growing control and bring Afghan farmers into a supportive relationship with the Karzai government.

The licensed poppy cultivation systems in India and Turkey are an example for Afghanistan. India has licensed poppy cultivation for export of raw poppy materials and for the internal manufacture of medicines since independence in 1947. Controlled by the Indian Government, the controlled exploitation of this natural resource brings the country a gross profit of $ 40 million each year. Apart from the obvious benefits to the national economy and to the pharmaceutical industry, which produces cheap poppy-based medicines for severe pain relief, licensed poppy cultivation has also had significant benefits for Indian farmers. Sustainable attractive incomes have resulted in economic diversification and an improvement in socio-economic conditions in rural villages.12