Indian Defence Review

The Way Forward

Counter-insurgency operations have been anathema to the American military establishment for at least three decades. It appears that the US has a greater propensity to destroy than to build societies in Asia. Reliance on their strength in technology rather than massive manpower have led US military forces to lay down rules of engagement that are wholly inappropriate to the situation at hand. In the first instance the campaign is not a war on terror but a counterinsurgency effort.

Insurgencies are enormously stressful and frustrating for forces combating them. The use of improvised explosive devices, booby-traps, snipers, by an adversary who hides among civilians, creates a vicious and explosive environment to the point where most soldiers forget that non-combatants should be treated with dignity and respect. Given such attitudes, preventing future incidents is extremely difficult despite all efforts. The conflict for Afghanistan should, therefore, focus upon the following:

In effect, the insurgents have an unfair advantage. The government can lose if its forces lose on the battlefield, but the government does not necessarily win if its forces win on the battlefield.

Treat the conflict as a counterinsurgency campaign and not an anti-terror war. Terrorism is a tactic, which contributes to an insurgent aim. An insurgency is an armed revolution against an established political order, which is sustained by external support. The struggle against insurgents is protracted against the central role of the insurgent political infrastructure, the subsidiary role of insurgent military forces, and their use of guerrilla tactics. All these issues need to be addressed in tandem.   Without question, rebel military actions play a primary role in an insurgency. But the success of rebels on the battlefield is not crucial to the success of the insurgent movement. Insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the war. In effect, the insurgents have an unfair advantage. The government can lose if its forces lose on the battlefield, but the government does not necessarily win if its forces win on the battlefield.

The counterinsurgency force should establish secure areas. It should focus upon bringing security to a densely populated or strategically important town, enabling non-military agencies to undertake developmental projects in a secure environment. It requires one set of troops to be engaged in static security tasks, with a strong forward mobile presence aimed at preventing the insurgency from disrupting the development work.

Reduce the use of air power to strike at civilian targets. One of the most controversial issues today is the role of airpower in counterinsurgency operations. While no one advocates the use of force except when truly necessary, killing insurgents…cannot itself defeat an insurgency. Bombing, even with the most precise weapons, will cause unintended civilian casualties and its euphuism of “collateral damage” turns people against the military and government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war, bombings bring media coverage that works to the insurgents’ benefit.

Reintegration of ‘marginal insurgents’. A significant proportion of the Taliban are fighting for economic as opposed to ideological reasons. Establishing viable, sustainable alternative income sources in secure environments will deprive the movement of their support.

As difficult and long as this process may be, it will be the only way to get trustworthy information from an insurgency that relies on human relations to operate.

A greater emphasis be placed upon intelligence, in particular, human intelligence. Intelligence gathering is a key factor in the implementation of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Insurgents are exceedingly difficult to find and engage in battle, a fact which places more emphasis on superior intelligence operations. Additionally, the identification and destruction of the covert insurgent infrastructure requires criminal intelligence operations (identification, correlation, tracking, and apprehension).  It is imperative to operate at the grass-roots level, establishing a relationship of trust with the locals, who are historically suspicious of any outsiders. As difficult and long as this process may be, it will be the only way to get trustworthy information from an insurgency that relies on human relations to operate.

Electronic intelligence, overhead imagery, and other technologically sophisticated techniques often are not very useful in finding soldiers who make minimum use of electronic communications, move in very small groups on foot, and are difficult to distinguish from the general population. The same holds true for the identification of members of the covert infrastructure-the problem is to separate the wheat from the chaff, a task not well suited to technologically-sophisticated intelligence-gathering means.

The intelligence task is much more difficult if population movement is not tightly controlled. A key ingredient when working against the infrastructure is the knowledge of who is who and identifying aberrations to the pattern.

The military has a central role to play in supporting the activities of development agencies. As such, it should be tasked to deliver aid to ravaged areas of the south and east, and be granted control of development aid budgets. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) mean well but are not the right channel to provide assistance in strife-torn areas, where insurgencies are raging.