Indian Defence Review

When children are paid, they often use the money to support their families.

According to an estimate in 2006, there were 109 outfits active in the region with diverse ideologies ranging from secessionism to banditry.6 The government’s strategy of offering autonomous councils and economic packages and stretching peace talks indefinitely have only encouraged more and more groups to take up arms, thereby enhancing the scope of more youths and teenagers to join such groups. Not surprisingly, there have been many instances of smaller factions deviating from the mother organisation to continue with the struggle whenever an accord has been concluded with the government. Thus, as many as three outfits emerged after the Dima National Security Force gave up arms in 1995 in Assam—the birth of the DHD was followed by the Black Widow and then the Dimasa National Democratic Force (DNDF). Therefore, insurgencies do not fizzle out in the Northeast, only insurgents do. In the absence of sufficient number of adults, these smaller groups have been found to invariably fall back on children from remote villages to swell their ranks.7

Poverty keeps many poor children out of school, and children who are out of school are at increased risk of recruitment.

Added to the adverse impact of alienation are poverty and unemployment across all the seven states in the region, and the problems are particularly acute in Manipur, which has the dubious distinction of having the maximum number of militant outfits among all states in the country. According to the latest estimate, the number of persons seeking job has gone up to around 7 lakh of a total of 27 lakh in the state.8 Many children in conflict zones hail from depressed economic backgrounds, and so the promise of getting paid by the insurgent outfits has lured many into these groups. When children are paid, they often use the money to support their families. Poverty is widely regarded as a root cause of many armed conflicts, and it interacts with and magnifies the impact of most of the other factors, facilitating the entry of youngsters into armed groups. Poverty increases the sense of helplessness, boosting the lure of the uniform and gun.

Poverty keeps many poor children out of school, and children who are out of school are at increased risk of recruitment. Although poverty does not by itself cause child soldiering, it exerts a significant impact through interactions with other influences. Tribal bodies in Manipur have made a case before the UNICEF to set up office in the state so that children affected by poverty do not face a “devastating future” and programmes can be ushered in to ensure their development9.

The Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), active in Manipur’s Churachandpur district and the adjacent region in Myanmar, offers a classic example of how children from impoverished families are supported and groomed to become guerrillas in the organisation. The author saw children as young as 9 or 10 years old in a camp near Songthal belonging to this group whose strength is estimated at around 500. Explaining the phenomenon, a commander said that villages straddling the Indo-Myanmar border are outside the daily reach of the administration.10 Hospitals do not exist, and the nearest school is about 20 kilometres away. He went on to say that many orphans and children whose parents could not afford to have them educated in missionary schools have been adopted by the ZRA.

The children are looked after well, and they are prevented from doing manual labour till they reach a certain age. Though they live in camps with adult cadres, training in the handling of weapons is given only after they reach 14 years of age. The same situation holds true for some other overground organisations, like the Kuki Liberation Army, Kuki Revolutionary Army and the United Kuki Liberation Front, which have camps in Manipur. However, in the case of some groups, children have been initiated into weapons at quite a tender age but they are usually barred from dangerous tasks like operations against rival groups. But instances have been reported when children have been involved in smuggling by such groups.11

Investment in children by a militant outfit is minimal, and returns are high and there is almost no restriction of any kind that needs to be followed. No militant outfit has ever faced sanctions in the region for recruiting children in spite of the strict laws that exist at the international level. Adult cadres may sometimes demand to be paid, but children usually lack the power to do this and are usually content with what they are given. Children fit the bill during times of financial crisis, when groups have to run on shoe-string budgets and salaries have to be reduced.

Though they live in camps with adult cadres, training in the handling of weapons is given only after they reach 14 years of age.

In the Northeast, many groups have complained of financial hardships, which partly explain their increasing involvement in illicit activities like gunrunning.12 Besides, the expenditure of most groups has gone up after they signed ceasefire agreements with the government and came overground.13 Unlike life in the underground, staying regularly in fixed locations means daily expenditure on different overheads, including food, training to new cadres and maintenance of infrastructure. In some camps, cultural shows are regularly organised as part of the groups’ effort to maintain support among the local populace. In violation of the ceasefire ground rules, most of the overground groups regularly purchase arms and ammunition, and their rates have been going up steadily since the past few years, mainly due to an increase in the number of middlemen in the illicit trade.