No doubt there is redundancy within the Indian defence structure – overlapping headquarters, compartmentalised operational and logistic wherewithal and duplication in training institutions are some examples wherein savings could be effected and committed to modernisation. In matters of political mandate, dis-proportionality manifests in expecting the Indian Army to deter our militarily aggressive adversaries when resources allocated are short, or to control insurgency when other state-institutions are left free to choose their independent course.
As a corollary, the political leadership may have to be advised to tailor its mandate in proportion to the operational wherewithal it chooses to place at the disposal of its military establishment – as many European nations have done. The aforestated incongruencies need concerted efforts to ameliorate through adoption of hard measures. Being the worst affected, the Army may have to take the lead in initiation of such a process in order to steer clear of a state of stagnation.
When Part Subsumes the Whole
There remain on the army’s roll, many outdated establishments that are kept alive just to protect what is considered as arm or regimental ‘turf’. This is an affliction that prevents implementation of structural reforms simply because modern force-structure can emerge only through restructuring of the old yet any ‘cut’ is seen as loss of ‘turf’ in ‘favour’ of another group and stone-walled even at the cost of overall operational preparedness. Modernisation of all arms and services are thus stymied under the stranglehold of the votaries of status quo who seem to rule the roost. In the process, balanced force structuring to win wars remains stymied. Similarly, stuck up in systemic hurdles is the infusion of overdue reforms in the logistics system and training methods in keeping with the progress all around. In this respect there is little to choose between the mind-set among the military and civil bureaucracy. We have to find a way to control such afflictions that sabotage our own future.
Group Versus Organisational Interests
Instances of according priority to short-term group interests, even when militating against organisational interests, are discernible today. This affliction is exemplified by mass upgrade in ranks, acceptance of higher aged soldiery and retention of physically unfit personnel – the last one has led to nearly eight percent of our soldiers being ‘left out of battle’ in a set up where every soldier is bound to a specified role. It is also exemplified by the long resistance put up before the Air Defence and Aviation Corps could be created; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles going to the Artillery rather than the Aviation Corps is another example. Further, commanders are no longer put through taxing ‘test exercises’, short command tenures to accommodate the ‘waiting list’, occasioned by upgrade of higher vacancies, ensures that. Adequate experience of command is thus denied in what is stated to be a ‘command oriented army’. Indeed, these steps have placed excruciating and avoidable burden on the army at the cost of time and funds that could be better devoted to live training and equipment upgrades. The need of the day therefore is to repudiate the lure of group interests in favour of organisational interests in the event of a clash between the two.
In the overall context, such ‘displacements’ render the mandate of winning wars more difficult to fulfill. Thus, while in higher matters, the state may falter in devising quick-fix measures to somehow overcome management hurdles, the army too flounders in succumbing to internal pressure to adopt measures that defy the majesty of military logic and culture. Indeed, civilian as well as military policy makers must be wise to appreciate the sanctity of the institutional culture in their armed forces, and so repudiate any measure that weakens its fundamental strengths.
Before proceeding further, it may be worthwhile to see as to why the policy-makers sometimes fail to see the light a phenomenon that manifests itself worldwide.
The Phenomenon of ‘Goal Displacement’
It is true for any nation that at the apex level, competing and conflicting demands make it difficult for the state to adhere to the ideals. Serious military issues, unless devoutly protected against the lure of easier options, tend to be settled through expedient solutions that appeal to the gallery. Policy-makers worldwide are thus easily attracted to the comfort of compromise with their military’s goal-specific rules and procedures and fall for fiscal expediency and socio-political rhetoric. As a corollary, peacetime military leaders tend to acquiesce with such steps by the force of circumstances or sometimes even by their own coloured perceptions. Systemic retard of the very purpose of maintaining an army then follows and many policies that have adverse effect on its operational efficiency are unwittingly endorsed. This is a phenomenon of ‘goal displacement’.
The US administration’s disregard of military advice to adopt higher force-density in Afghanistan, softening of soldierly commitments in European armies, the stale rhetoric of a ‘people’s war’ – now corrected – in the People’s Liberation Army and acceptance of the Indian Army’s pre-Kargil ‘hollowness’ are some examples of the aforesaid phenomenon. In each case, weakening of the military muscle with an eye on expediency, has eventually caused the nations to suffer political setbacks and incur heavy expenses to repair the damage done. It is therefore a duty of the military fraternity to repudiate such measures, even if apparently well intended, which detract a military institution from its goal in the long run.
However, as the world of democratic dispensations indicate, even when articulated single mindedly, political directions in many cases may still override military concerns yet that does not absolve the military leadership from rendering professional advice and forcefully articulating the righteous stance. Indeed, the military leadership of most democratic nations including India, have and continue to espouse their concerns, occasional rejections notwithstanding. In case of the Indian Army, the problem is exacerbated due to limited understanding of the nuances of military management among the political leadership, the bureaucracy’s misplaced conviction in their ‘better judgment’ and misconceived rhetoric of societal pressure groups. Under Indian conditions, therefore, what counts is the stature of the military leadership – one that is secured with professionalism, honour, dignity and probity. To that extent, our military leaders would do well to distance themselves from such disconcerting associations which have come to the fore recently and strictly conform to the army’s mandated ‘goal definition’.
An Appropriate ‘Goal Definition’
The aforesaid conditions encourage us to reiterate what is eternally obvious – ‘All measures adopted in management of the military institution must go to strengthen its goal of winning wars in the most cost-efficient manner, and that the goals set for the military institution by the political leadership must be proportionate to the wherewithal placed at its disposal.’
Indeed, adherence to ‘goal definition’ and avoidance of ‘goal displacement’ in the context of Indian conditions are the burden of our military leadership.
Emergence of Cultural Incongruities
By far, the most damaging effect inflicted upon the military institution has been the emergence of certain debilitating influences over the soldierly ethos from within, some apparent and some latent but all disconcerting nevertheless. These are discussed in the succeeding lines; of course there are ‘role models’ still around, but they may have to be saved from extinction. Some indicators are glaring:-
We profess training for war as our ‘religion’ yet training is our first compromise in expediency. In some manner, the thrust has shifted to ‘form’ rather than the ‘content’ – rehearsed demonstrations, media spectacle and excuses in the name of ‘welfare’ or various ‘commitments’ taking precedence over real, hard training for war. Furthermore, we emphasize on a unit’s ‘fitness for war’ yet certify its ‘fitness’ by overlooking debilitating deficiencies in men and war material. The result is disconcerting – Special Forces is required to undertake tasks which any arm should be competent to perform and two units are required to perform the task of one. The downslide is, therefore self-triggered.
We all subscribe to the exclusivity of soldiering and the custom of ‘brothers-in-arms’, and exemplify it by all wearing the same uniform yet we have fallen in embracing irrelevant terms, honouring seniors not just as ‘the General’, ‘Colonel’ but as ‘V or VVIP’, just as we have reduced the soldiers to the class of mere ‘individuals’. We talk of ‘brotherhood’ of the officer corps and then go on to foster class distinction by laying ‘VIP tables’ – even menu – in messes and official functions under conveniently perceived ‘administrative constraints’. We have introduced feudal terms such as ‘audience’ for interview, ‘indulgence’ for attention, ‘blessing’ for endorsement and ‘submission’ for statement. We have grown uncomfortable with initiative, delegation and innovative thinking while failing to stamp out self-deception in the form of reporting half-truths and soft-cheating in performance that are becoming endemic. May be, our officers and men need to curb the ‘huzoor-mai-baap’ culture and stop groveling; becoming proud, upright soldiers that they are. Jesters, after all, cannot make good, proud soldiers.
Seniors hardly mix and interact with younger officers and men, thus allowing them to fall prey to misconceptions. Sloth in discipline, dress and movements are overlooked, and ceremonial military dresses and dignified practices, our identity, given a ‘go-bye’ on the pretext of misplaced ‘convenience’. Committed to leading by example, we set double standards in ostentatious habits and scrounge men and material by forcing ‘attachments’ from subordinate’s resources. The ‘giver’ turns ‘usurper’ and thus becomes an object of piqué among the younger lot.
Conscious of our status in the society, we routinely degrade ourselves within our own set-up. We offer seat and tea to a ‘patwari’ or a Sub-inspector but never to our JCOs or NCOs; we forbid even officers – unless they are of the “COs and Flag Cars Only” variety – to alight at the office porch. We look the other way when our men are mistreated or when our men act arrogant with officers. For the lure of vacancies in other departments, we offer senior ranks to tenant lower appointments – Brigadiers as DIGs, for example – rather than stepping one higher. We wish to be treated with respect and yet dilute our honour in public dealings, by unscrupulous practices and in seeking a slot in the ‘rat-race’ of self-promotion!
Disorientation within is best exemplified by the manner we have chosen to address the problem of shortage of young officers in line units. Instead of delegating to the JCOs and NCOs for them to take on the mantle of junior leadership, we have saddled hapless young officers with multiple responsibilities. Thus, an officer with two years of service commands two Companies besides performing the duty of Adjutant, and occasionally, that of a Liaison Officer! Indeed, rather than incessantly parroting a problem that has no solution in the horizon, it would have been more sensible to train the JCOs and NCOs in shouldering higher responsibilities, give them time to assimilate, accept temporary drops in performance and then delegate. Translation of standing orders, SOPs, routine instructions and correspondence into vernacular language would add to their confidence. We could thus ‘empower’ them with due authority and demand accountability. That would leave young officers time to hone their professional skills, read and write, enjoy entitled leave and mix hard work with fun and adventure that are so important in making of military leadership. Indeed, this recourse has been a customary practice in all militaries down the ages that has stood the test of combat.
There is mounting perception of parochialism in the military establishment today than ever before. Officers and soldiers perceive, and not without reason, that regimental loyalty, past association and patronage determine plum postings and promotions. Nepotism perceived has caused en masse representations against supersession, postings and nomination on career courses. Even at the organisational level, we dilute our dignity to solicit ‘kind indulgence’ of the higher ups, auditors and civil authorities to push our justified cases or to get what is duly entitled to us, thus whetting their appetite for our prayers. ‘Pairvi’ (soliciting influence), is fast becoming an accepted, nay expected, practice in the army just as it is in politics and bureaucracy, and officers and men are blatantly soliciting awards. Morale-sapping perceptions must be eliminated because in a close-knit military fraternity, distorted perceptions could affect behavior adversely.
Examples are too many to recount. The sum effect of all such non-military practices finding way into our military institution is the aforestated phenomenon of ‘goal displacement’. In the process, the system is losing the confidence of the ‘rank and file’. That the traditional bondage between the leader and the led is fast being eroded, is a disturbing thought. Indeed, to avoid ruination of our great military institution in the name of expediency, we have to rededicate ourselves towards our exclusive ‘calling’ and maintain the distinct military dignity of our soldiery.
Need of the Day
The signs are ominous. Cracks on the Indian military edifice are appearing. Military precision, commitment and efficiency are on the downslide while cases of indiscipline and moral as well as fiscal corruption are rising. In aping the civil services and the corporate organisations, we all have gotten into a ‘rat-race’ amongst ourselves in a profession that permits such competition only with the enemies of the nation. No doubt, the root cause of this downslide is our displacement from upholding the military culture and succumbing to compromise with its exclusive character in the name of easier options – that in a profession wherein nothing comes simple or easy. Unless in-house efforts are made to enforce conduct of military affairs in accordance with its unique customs and practices that have emerged from institutional experiences over the centuries, moral foundations of Indian Army would stand to gradually weaken. In the ultimate analysis, this would affect the army’s efficiency and consequently, its ability to stand up to the tough mandate ordained to it by the nation. Indeed, permitting such a situation to develop would be tantamount to an omission that militates against the national interests. Hard but true words nevertheless.
Military leaders at all levels have to girdle up to protect the exclusivity of the military establishment from attempts of misguided, even if unintentional, dilutions from within the fraternity as well as from the environment. Within the army fraternity, stress would have to be laid on its unique characteristics and the ethos of soldierly ‘calling’ while repudiating the comfort of compromise. Similarly, in relation to the state, the hierarchy has to stand up to steps that might weaken the military edifice. In short, the army hierarchy needs to revisit practices that lead to its ‘goal displacement’. Only then can our soldiers be transformed into ‘knowledge warriors’ of the highest quality and extreme lethality; to a class that displays high degree of training, initiative and audacity, revels at being proud soldiers and inspires awe and fear among potential adversaries.
Ye all armymen, history is watching!
“It takes a great deal of courage to stand up to your enemies, but even more to stand up to your friends” —JK Rowling
Please wait...
