Military leaders at all levels have to girdle up to protect the exclusivity of the military establishment from attempts of misguided, even if unintentional, dilutions from within the fraternity as well as from the environment. Within the army fraternity, stress would have to be laid on its unique characteristics and the ethos of soldierly ‘calling’ while repudiating the comfort of compromise. Similarly, in relation to the state, the hierarchy has to stand up to steps that might weaken the military edifice. In short, the army hierarchy needs to revisit practices that lead to its ‘goal displacement’.
“Disorders and weaknesses which might have passed unnoticed in civil life emerge with potentially catastrophic consequences in wartime.” —Eliot A Cohen.
The Burden of Military Administration
Even at the best of times, when the political and military goals of a nation are clearly defined, homing in onto the right course of military management is a challenge of extreme complexity. Thus, even the most experienced governments have found the exercise of seeing through the unpredictable future course of politico-economic developments and focus on preparing their armed forces accordingly, as a daunting challenge that requires visionary approach.
In the Indian context, this challenge has so far been managed only tentatively – bouts of disorientation often subsuming foresight. Such disorientation has caused our military institution to go through diverse phases of incarnations since independence. Thus, we had the armed forces marginalised during the first fifteen years, strengthened after the debacle of 1962, then left to atrophy between the early 1990s to mid-2000s before being infused with incremental modernisation schemes that would take some years yet to make any reckonable difference in the army’s operational capability. Notwithstanding such ‘ups and downs’, the army leadership did not allow dilution of the hoary fundamentals of soldiering and so preserved that institutional character which could turn a defeated army of 1962 to a victorious one in just three years. The situation had a re-run in the 1990s when the army was rendered to a state that prompted the then Army Chief to state while briefing his political masters that, “the spirit is strong but the flesh is weak.” The Kargil War followed soon enough, when gallant young officers led their men to clear the mess with their blood.
Indeed, anomalies of military-specific policy making in our state-apparatus need no emphasis. These anomalies impose self-inflicted adversity in the nation’s ‘military power-to-cost-effectiveness’ while injecting avoidable weakness into its power of ultimate resort: the Army. However, even if the governing establishment may have, in good faith or innocence, extended John Stuart Mill’s concept of democratic dispensation i.e. governance by compromises and consensus – in management of its military institution too, when such misconceptions find way into military fraternity’s thinking, it is time to wake up and apply control measures – drastic ones, if necessary.
While the anomalies in military administration at the national level have been discussed (See July-September 2011 Issue of IDR) and this lacunae must remain a concern, the focus is on an even more sensitive issue – a dismal growth of disorientation within the Indian military establishment that abets institutional ‘self-depredation’. But prior to discussing these cases of disorientation, it would be in order to reiterate the aspects of cultural orientation in military policy-making.
Cultural Dimensions of Soldiering
Prosecution of warfare transcends well beyond the application of force and weaponry; it is an exercise in articulation of military intellect and material resources under the most trying circumstances. These two constituents of military institution, however, do not coalesce to secure victory unless firmly ensconced within virtues of military culture and the soldier’s code of conduct. We understand that soldiering is a spiritual ‘calling’ that requires overcoming the natural human instincts of avoidance of danger, deprivations and the ‘fear of unknown’, and at the same time, developing an intrinsic urge to perform beyond the bounds of specified call of duty. Furthermore, we also know that this soldierly ‘spirit’ is moored to the intrinsic sense of commitment to the cause, truth, honour, sacrifice, professionalism and camaraderie – gentlemanship to be exact. Obviously, it is this spirit that is more complex to foster as compared to its tangible material dimensions, and for that a firm and effective back-up of unique institutional practices and procedures is imperative. These are the sacrosanct twin conditions for the armed forces to deliver.
While the build-up of tangible trappings of military power may take some years or more, depending on political will, to be visible, display of distinct military ethos and practices are but eternal societal phenomena. Preservation of spiritual and practical dimensions of the military institution, therefore, continues to remain in national focus even when the façade of military structure is kept dormant or downsized in tune with the need of the day. This is an observable practice in all mature nations. Indeed, it was so in India too until the British rule excluded Indians from higher hierarchy of political and military leadership. Post-Independence, the national leadership, bereft as it was of exposure to the soldiery, wisely chose to let the army handle its internal management with odd exceptions. As a result of that choice, the nation reaped benefits and continues to do so. Thus, while on account of some other reasons, the Indian Army’s potential for war-fighting capability is presently somewhat straight-jacketed, it is one of the few institutions that stands tall today. Indeed, the army is looked up to, not because of its weapons and accoutrement – that comes later – but because of the values and practices it espouses. Preservation of our military standards, therefore, must remain in continuous focus. Arguably, it is for the military hierarchy to play the role of unflinching custodian in upholding that distinct institutional character which is necessary for the greater good of the nation howsoever archaic or draconian it might appear to those who are uninitiated to matters military. Let us see how well that role is being played.
We go by “Selection and Maintenance of Aim” as the first ‘Principle of War’. Considered in totality, the aim of an army is to win wars and at any cost. This, after all, is the fundamental compulsion for the state to maintain an army as its ultimate political recourse. Therefore, all aspects of military management must be focused on that singular aim and religiously maintained thereafter. The paradox is that while no military commander can ever think of compromising with this First Principle when it comes to operations, when it comes to military administration, the Indian Army has, in many recent cases, acquiesced with its dilution – possibly under duress but avoidable nevertheless. Viewed from this perspective, it appears that many of the compromises that have sneaked into administration of our army might have been countered by sound articulation of military logic yet this has not happened. Though past recourses may not be rightfully contested, self-scrutiny is also inherently necessary for an institution to evolve, to learn. Hard introspection, may therefore, help in convergence of appropriate focus among the contemporary military fraternity; this is imperative for the Indian Army to preserve its distinct and haloed institutional identity.
The stage is now set to discuss some of the glaring anomalies that weaken our purpose by the methods we adopt.
Disorientations Within: Purpose vs Methods
Enthused by the licence of democracy, votaries of potentially dangerous ideas seem to have emerged within the military establishment. Misplaced articulations of these groups are exemplified by a succession of developments that have gained ground in the recent years – matters which have negative fallouts on the army’s mandate of winning wars. These glaring cases of diversions from the right focus need to be discussed. In so doing, it would be wise to keep to the terms of reference – that is we are in India.
Quality of Soldiery
We profess dependency upon the quality of soldiery to cover our material and technological constraints. We appreciate the need for fully committed, physically tough, mentally alert and technically competent soldiers who must be young, audacious and unencumbered with social concerns yet we are goaded in the opposite direction by the powers-that-be and fail to find quality candidates to carry the nation’s excruciating mandate. Thus, we recruit the barely literate, acquiesce to fall in physical standards and absorb aged or medically unfit ‘rank and file’ in the name of ‘welfare’ rather than asking the state to undertake that sanctified charter. Second, our recruitment and training practices favour the urbane against the hardy, the clever against the ingenuous, the officious against the adventurous and the defensive against the spirited. We speak of an ‘honour code’ and yet encourage trainees to be crooks; we talk of the importance of ‘initiative’ in warfare and then proceed to kill that quality. Third, our solution to the need for better educated soldiery has been to raise the age of intake instead of recruiting younger candidates and then moulding them through in-house education – so as to foster a personality that is distinct not just in form but also in character.
Lastly, we have saddled the army with such a top-heavy hierarchy of grossly upgraded appointments that it diverts rather than ensures its mandate to fight. No doubt, the military administration must submit to the greater wisdom of the policy-makers, but the least one could do is to abstain from ready acquiescence with such distractions from the army’s ordained mandate. It may be noted that in tune with the call of the day, a great re-moulding of the state-apparatus is underway today; this may be the right time to articulate the concerns and ask those at the helm to determine effective solutions to the army’s problems. In all likelihood, that suggestion would be heard.
Discipline
Notwithstanding our conviction on observance of unflinching discipline to tackle adversities, the dilution of the military laws has been permitted under misplaced notions of fairness and justice. We forget to appreciate that the socially mandated call for sacrifice imposed upon the soldiery is in itself fundamentally unfair when measured in terms of democratic liberty and human rights of rest of the citizenry – and that howsoever unpalatable, it is a necessity for the sake of survival of the nation. The underlying principle, that the army’s severe mandate requires immediate, exemplary and pre-emptive stricture against infringement of military law and its exacting customs, seems to have been lost sight of. Thus, over the years, dispensation of military justice has become so cumbersome that its fundamental characteristics has been lost, more or less. For instance, instead of rationalising the system of ‘field punishments’ this simple provision has been completely done away with. As a result, soldiers who could be let off after some ‘pack drills’ or ‘extra duties’, now have to face the severity of trial while commanders are expected to master legal intricacies and engage in voluminous paper work to administer law rather than focusing on training and leading troops with élan.
Influenced by civil norms of jurisprudence, court-martials today take as much time as civil court proceedings do. The results are disconcerting – misdemeanor against the code of soldierly conduct, manipulation of postings, taking liberty of orders, acts of indiscretion, corruption and plain lying are assuming serious proportions by the day. Meanwhile, enthusiastic armchair rights activists professes dilution of the Summary Powers delegated to commanders. Of course, these champions of ‘individual rights’ do not have to lead troops on excruciating exercises or under fire and yet demand from them whole-hearted commitment in the naturally detestable task of grappling with death and deprivations. If such misplaced tinkering with military law is not checked with alacrity, it will not be long before lying patrol leaders, shirking assaulters, malingerers and petrol-selling soldiers would be allowed to set examples. Of course, measures to prevent stray cases of high-handedness have to be instituted without diluting the severity of military law. In true context, soldiers, as the sacrificial guardians of our nation, have to repudiate the misplaced application of democratic ideals on the military institution even if it is unpalatable to the ideologues for the sake of the nation.
In Preparedness for War
Another disconcerting development is the farcical make-believe that seems to have found place in professional articulations among the fighting formations with regard to operational objectives, plans and even training. While conscious of constraints in terms of manpower, level of training, weaponry, warlike equipment and efficient mobilisation of defence production and transportation resources, our planning and tasking continues to be theoretical and over-ambitious. Operational planning and field manoeuvres are based on an idealistic notion of a hundred per cent availability of personnel, weaponry, ammunition and equipment even when commanders at the cutting edge hardly ever get to practice deployment of their full complement of troops and resources.
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Besides, banal expectations of ideal response from backup civil institutions – the railways, oil companies, road transportation and labour-impressment – within a matter of few hours are taken for granted. Thus the dictates of practical military wisdom, that makes commanders conscious of their constraints and so promotes an urge to search for winning formulae through ingenious tactics, remain dormant. History is replete with examples of armies living in such make-believe world of their own and letting themselves down at the time of reckoning – the Iraqi Army being the latest example. It is time we recognise ‘a spade as a spade’ even if it deflates the ‘feel good’ factor, and infused with tactical acumen, prepare ourselves to seek success within the actual resources at hand. Indeed, as history shows us, it is possible to do so.
The Caveat of Cost-effectiveness
The cliché that “when it comes to national security, no cost is ever high”, is no more sacrosanct in open and assertive societies; the well-being of people is equally important, particularly when the concept of ‘national power’ encompasses wider range of factors in today’s world.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon the military planners to devise such strategies that secure political aims in the most cost-effective way – the term in military connotation also includes better efficiency and affordability in war. Unless this condition is appreciated, national collapse may occur when military expenditure subsumes the exchequer – as it happened with the USSR and many others. Accordingly, military planners have to examine each scheme in terms of economic justification in the end and adopt such ‘joint’ inter and intra-service options that avoid redundancy and so limit the cost of operational preparedness.
No doubt there is redundancy within the Indian defence structure – overlapping headquarters, compartmentalised operational and logistic wherewithal and duplication in training institutions are some examples wherein savings could be effected and committed to modernisation. In matters of political mandate, dis-proportionality manifests in expecting the Indian Army to deter our militarily aggressive adversaries when resources allocated are short, or to control insurgency when other state-institutions are left free to choose their independent course.
As a corollary, the political leadership may have to be advised to tailor its mandate in proportion to the operational wherewithal it chooses to place at the disposal of its military establishment – as many European nations have done. The aforestated incongruencies need concerted efforts to ameliorate through adoption of hard measures. Being the worst affected, the Army may have to take the lead in initiation of such a process in order to steer clear of a state of stagnation.
When Part Subsumes the Whole
There remain on the army’s roll, many outdated establishments that are kept alive just to protect what is considered as arm or regimental ‘turf’. This is an affliction that prevents implementation of structural reforms simply because modern force-structure can emerge only through restructuring of the old yet any ‘cut’ is seen as loss of ‘turf’ in ‘favour’ of another group and stone-walled even at the cost of overall operational preparedness. Modernisation of all arms and services are thus stymied under the stranglehold of the votaries of status quo who seem to rule the roost. In the process, balanced force structuring to win wars remains stymied. Similarly, stuck up in systemic hurdles is the infusion of overdue reforms in the logistics system and training methods in keeping with the progress all around. In this respect there is little to choose between the mind-set among the military and civil bureaucracy. We have to find a way to control such afflictions that sabotage our own future.
Group Versus Organisational Interests
Instances of according priority to short-term group interests, even when militating against organisational interests, are discernible today. This affliction is exemplified by mass upgrade in ranks, acceptance of higher aged soldiery and retention of physically unfit personnel – the last one has led to nearly eight percent of our soldiers being ‘left out of battle’ in a set up where every soldier is bound to a specified role. It is also exemplified by the long resistance put up before the Air Defence and Aviation Corps could be created; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles going to the Artillery rather than the Aviation Corps is another example. Further, commanders are no longer put through taxing ‘test exercises’, short command tenures to accommodate the ‘waiting list’, occasioned by upgrade of higher vacancies, ensures that. Adequate experience of command is thus denied in what is stated to be a ‘command oriented army’. Indeed, these steps have placed excruciating and avoidable burden on the army at the cost of time and funds that could be better devoted to live training and equipment upgrades. The need of the day therefore is to repudiate the lure of group interests in favour of organisational interests in the event of a clash between the two.
In the overall context, such ‘displacements’ render the mandate of winning wars more difficult to fulfill. Thus, while in higher matters, the state may falter in devising quick-fix measures to somehow overcome management hurdles, the army too flounders in succumbing to internal pressure to adopt measures that defy the majesty of military logic and culture. Indeed, civilian as well as military policy makers must be wise to appreciate the sanctity of the institutional culture in their armed forces, and so repudiate any measure that weakens its fundamental strengths.
Before proceeding further, it may be worthwhile to see as to why the policy-makers sometimes fail to see the light a phenomenon that manifests itself worldwide.
The Phenomenon of ‘Goal Displacement’
It is true for any nation that at the apex level, competing and conflicting demands make it difficult for the state to adhere to the ideals. Serious military issues, unless devoutly protected against the lure of easier options, tend to be settled through expedient solutions that appeal to the gallery. Policy-makers worldwide are thus easily attracted to the comfort of compromise with their military’s goal-specific rules and procedures and fall for fiscal expediency and socio-political rhetoric. As a corollary, peacetime military leaders tend to acquiesce with such steps by the force of circumstances or sometimes even by their own coloured perceptions. Systemic retard of the very purpose of maintaining an army then follows and many policies that have adverse effect on its operational efficiency are unwittingly endorsed. This is a phenomenon of ‘goal displacement’.
The US administration’s disregard of military advice to adopt higher force-density in Afghanistan, softening of soldierly commitments in European armies, the stale rhetoric of a ‘people’s war’ – now corrected – in the People’s Liberation Army and acceptance of the Indian Army’s pre-Kargil ‘hollowness’ are some examples of the aforesaid phenomenon. In each case, weakening of the military muscle with an eye on expediency, has eventually caused the nations to suffer political setbacks and incur heavy expenses to repair the damage done. It is therefore a duty of the military fraternity to repudiate such measures, even if apparently well intended, which detract a military institution from its goal in the long run.
However, as the world of democratic dispensations indicate, even when articulated single mindedly, political directions in many cases may still override military concerns yet that does not absolve the military leadership from rendering professional advice and forcefully articulating the righteous stance. Indeed, the military leadership of most democratic nations including India, have and continue to espouse their concerns, occasional rejections notwithstanding. In case of the Indian Army, the problem is exacerbated due to limited understanding of the nuances of military management among the political leadership, the bureaucracy’s misplaced conviction in their ‘better judgment’ and misconceived rhetoric of societal pressure groups. Under Indian conditions, therefore, what counts is the stature of the military leadership – one that is secured with professionalism, honour, dignity and probity. To that extent, our military leaders would do well to distance themselves from such disconcerting associations which have come to the fore recently and strictly conform to the army’s mandated ‘goal definition’.
An Appropriate ‘Goal Definition’
The aforesaid conditions encourage us to reiterate what is eternally obvious – ‘All measures adopted in management of the military institution must go to strengthen its goal of winning wars in the most cost-efficient manner, and that the goals set for the military institution by the political leadership must be proportionate to the wherewithal placed at its disposal.’
Indeed, adherence to ‘goal definition’ and avoidance of ‘goal displacement’ in the context of Indian conditions are the burden of our military leadership.
Emergence of Cultural Incongruities
By far, the most damaging effect inflicted upon the military institution has been the emergence of certain debilitating influences over the soldierly ethos from within, some apparent and some latent but all disconcerting nevertheless. These are discussed in the succeeding lines; of course there are ‘role models’ still around, but they may have to be saved from extinction. Some indicators are glaring:-
We profess training for war as our ‘religion’ yet training is our first compromise in expediency. In some manner, the thrust has shifted to ‘form’ rather than the ‘content’ – rehearsed demonstrations, media spectacle and excuses in the name of ‘welfare’ or various ‘commitments’ taking precedence over real, hard training for war. Furthermore, we emphasize on a unit’s ‘fitness for war’ yet certify its ‘fitness’ by overlooking debilitating deficiencies in men and war material. The result is disconcerting – Special Forces is required to undertake tasks which any arm should be competent to perform and two units are required to perform the task of one. The downslide is, therefore self-triggered.
We all subscribe to the exclusivity of soldiering and the custom of ‘brothers-in-arms’, and exemplify it by all wearing the same uniform yet we have fallen in embracing irrelevant terms, honouring seniors not just as ‘the General’, ‘Colonel’ but as ‘V or VVIP’, just as we have reduced the soldiers to the class of mere ‘individuals’. We talk of ‘brotherhood’ of the officer corps and then go on to foster class distinction by laying ‘VIP tables’ – even menu – in messes and official functions under conveniently perceived ‘administrative constraints’. We have introduced feudal terms such as ‘audience’ for interview, ‘indulgence’ for attention, ‘blessing’ for endorsement and ‘submission’ for statement. We have grown uncomfortable with initiative, delegation and innovative thinking while failing to stamp out self-deception in the form of reporting half-truths and soft-cheating in performance that are becoming endemic. May be, our officers and men need to curb the ‘huzoor-mai-baap’ culture and stop groveling; becoming proud, upright soldiers that they are. Jesters, after all, cannot make good, proud soldiers.
Seniors hardly mix and interact with younger officers and men, thus allowing them to fall prey to misconceptions. Sloth in discipline, dress and movements are overlooked, and ceremonial military dresses and dignified practices, our identity, given a ‘go-bye’ on the pretext of misplaced ‘convenience’. Committed to leading by example, we set double standards in ostentatious habits and scrounge men and material by forcing ‘attachments’ from subordinate’s resources. The ‘giver’ turns ‘usurper’ and thus becomes an object of piqué among the younger lot.
Conscious of our status in the society, we routinely degrade ourselves within our own set-up. We offer seat and tea to a ‘patwari’ or a Sub-inspector but never to our JCOs or NCOs; we forbid even officers – unless they are of the “COs and Flag Cars Only” variety – to alight at the office porch. We look the other way when our men are mistreated or when our men act arrogant with officers. For the lure of vacancies in other departments, we offer senior ranks to tenant lower appointments – Brigadiers as DIGs, for example – rather than stepping one higher. We wish to be treated with respect and yet dilute our honour in public dealings, by unscrupulous practices and in seeking a slot in the ‘rat-race’ of self-promotion!
Disorientation within is best exemplified by the manner we have chosen to address the problem of shortage of young officers in line units. Instead of delegating to the JCOs and NCOs for them to take on the mantle of junior leadership, we have saddled hapless young officers with multiple responsibilities. Thus, an officer with two years of service commands two Companies besides performing the duty of Adjutant, and occasionally, that of a Liaison Officer! Indeed, rather than incessantly parroting a problem that has no solution in the horizon, it would have been more sensible to train the JCOs and NCOs in shouldering higher responsibilities, give them time to assimilate, accept temporary drops in performance and then delegate. Translation of standing orders, SOPs, routine instructions and correspondence into vernacular language would add to their confidence. We could thus ‘empower’ them with due authority and demand accountability. That would leave young officers time to hone their professional skills, read and write, enjoy entitled leave and mix hard work with fun and adventure that are so important in making of military leadership. Indeed, this recourse has been a customary practice in all militaries down the ages that has stood the test of combat.
There is mounting perception of parochialism in the military establishment today than ever before. Officers and soldiers perceive, and not without reason, that regimental loyalty, past association and patronage determine plum postings and promotions. Nepotism perceived has caused en masse representations against supersession, postings and nomination on career courses. Even at the organisational level, we dilute our dignity to solicit ‘kind indulgence’ of the higher ups, auditors and civil authorities to push our justified cases or to get what is duly entitled to us, thus whetting their appetite for our prayers. ‘Pairvi’ (soliciting influence), is fast becoming an accepted, nay expected, practice in the army just as it is in politics and bureaucracy, and officers and men are blatantly soliciting awards. Morale-sapping perceptions must be eliminated because in a close-knit military fraternity, distorted perceptions could affect behavior adversely.
Examples are too many to recount. The sum effect of all such non-military practices finding way into our military institution is the aforestated phenomenon of ‘goal displacement’. In the process, the system is losing the confidence of the ‘rank and file’. That the traditional bondage between the leader and the led is fast being eroded, is a disturbing thought. Indeed, to avoid ruination of our great military institution in the name of expediency, we have to rededicate ourselves towards our exclusive ‘calling’ and maintain the distinct military dignity of our soldiery.
Need of the Day
The signs are ominous. Cracks on the Indian military edifice are appearing. Military precision, commitment and efficiency are on the downslide while cases of indiscipline and moral as well as fiscal corruption are rising. In aping the civil services and the corporate organisations, we all have gotten into a ‘rat-race’ amongst ourselves in a profession that permits such competition only with the enemies of the nation. No doubt, the root cause of this downslide is our displacement from upholding the military culture and succumbing to compromise with its exclusive character in the name of easier options – that in a profession wherein nothing comes simple or easy. Unless in-house efforts are made to enforce conduct of military affairs in accordance with its unique customs and practices that have emerged from institutional experiences over the centuries, moral foundations of Indian Army would stand to gradually weaken. In the ultimate analysis, this would affect the army’s efficiency and consequently, its ability to stand up to the tough mandate ordained to it by the nation. Indeed, permitting such a situation to develop would be tantamount to an omission that militates against the national interests. Hard but true words nevertheless.
Military leaders at all levels have to girdle up to protect the exclusivity of the military establishment from attempts of misguided, even if unintentional, dilutions from within the fraternity as well as from the environment. Within the army fraternity, stress would have to be laid on its unique characteristics and the ethos of soldierly ‘calling’ while repudiating the comfort of compromise. Similarly, in relation to the state, the hierarchy has to stand up to steps that might weaken the military edifice. In short, the army hierarchy needs to revisit practices that lead to its ‘goal displacement’. Only then can our soldiers be transformed into ‘knowledge warriors’ of the highest quality and extreme lethality; to a class that displays high degree of training, initiative and audacity, revels at being proud soldiers and inspires awe and fear among potential adversaries.
Ye all armymen, history is watching!
“It takes a great deal of courage to stand up to your enemies, but even more to stand up to your friends” —JK Rowling
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