Geopolitics

Organisational and Structural Evolution – Lessons from Al-Qaeda
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Issue Courtesy: Aakrosh | Date : 21 Nov , 2013

Strategic Innovations: Force Multipliers

Al-Qaeda has brought in innovative concepts and practices to fine-tune its operational and organisational capabilities. These innovations are the cornerstone of its success and ability to survive. Some arose at the strategic level while others arose at the tactical level. A few of them are listed as follows.

By forging alliances, it utilised the human, financial and intellectual potential of other groups.

Strategic Alliances and Mergers

As stated earlier, al-Qaeda forged close ties with many like-minded organisations across the globe. These relations increased their operational reach, effectiveness and efficiency by harnessing the expertise or strength of other groups.20 In business terms, these relations give access to new target markets, helping gain capabilities and share the financial risk. Al- Qaeda was able to operate in newer territories out of their bounds earlier. By forging alliances, it utilised the human, financial and intellectual potential of other groups. Similar to legal entities which enter into joint ventures with local partners to gain foothold in new markets, al-Qaeda started using its alliances to expand its reach. Al-Qaeda’s partnerships and alliances in various states are diagrammatically represented in Figure below.

Al-Qaeda's Affiliates

Research and Development

Most terror groups have their own styles of conducting terror operations. Some groups might target hard targets, like government combatants and government installations, which are protected, while some might target soft targets, like civilians, who are not protected. Al-Qaeda’s own signature methods have been coordinated simultaneous multiple attacks against hard targets as well as soft ones. Terror operations like the 9/11 attacks and the Tanzanian Embassy bombings need meticulous planning and execution, which rests on knowledge already possessed with respect to proposed terror operations. Al-Qaeda has specialised in learning from its failed operations conducted earlier. The September 11, 2001, terror attack in the United States and the October 2000 USS Cole attack in Yemen were the most successful ones. Many are not aware that these terror attacks were actually preceded by failed terror attacks similar to the well-known ones.

Al-Qaeda has long recognised that it must engage the enemy on several fronts simultaneously and that its media strategy is both crucial and complementary to its operational activities in achieving its strategic objectives.

Operation Bojinka was the failed predecessor to the 9/11 attacks22 while a suicide attack similar to the successful USS Cole attack on a US naval ship failed as the boat sank because it was overladen.23 Al-Qaeda learned from its past mistakes and extracted the much needed knowledge in the form of learnings from its previous failures. It is a classic example of adaptive management, wherein al-Qaeda used its existing knowledge from its failed attacks, fine-tuned and cleared the obstacles by exploring an alternative method and conducted the attacks successfully later.

After 9/11, al-Qaeda, under Osama bin Laden, encouraged free flow of information from lower echelons to higher ones. This set the stage for new ideas emanating from lower-level cadres. This kind of liberal democratic information flow from employees in business aspects can be attributed to participative management, where employees are allowed to participate in the decision-making process facilitated by a vertical flow of information. These kinds of interactions have never been cited in other terror groups, most of which are highly tyrannical. Some experts have likened al-Qaeda to the Ford Foundation, where projects presented by researchers are evaluated and only some are funded while most are discarded.24 It has also encouraged new research and invested in new ideas. A chemical and biological weapons program called The Yoghurt Project, costing a meagre $4,000, was the brainchild of Ayman Al Zawahiri (the current leader of al-Qaeda) and can be cited as one of the instances where al-Qaeda shows an inclination towards investing in destructive research.25 Some experts have classified al-Qaeda as a multinational and its associate Islamist groups as its subsidiaries, with al-Qaeda providing venture capital.26 JI submitted a proposal to al-Qaeda to attack the Yushun Mass Rapid System in Singapore. The proposal was presented to Bin Laden and accepted in principle though it is still not clear why it was never carried out.27

By encouraging free vertical flow of information, which facilitates new ideas, and by closely monitoring earlier processes to fine-tune system lacunae, al-Qaeda has fostered evolution both structurally and organisationally. Essentially, it has created a team environment at the midmanagement level and below to protect its goal. This has also allowed the central leadership to support without participating but still have a commanding and motivating impact.

Propaganda and Public Relations

The media represents two-thirds of the battle. —Ayman Al Zawahiri

Al-Qaeda has long recognised that it must engage the enemy on several fronts simultaneously and that its media strategy is both crucial and complementary to its operational activities in achieving its strategic objectives.28 Violence as a product of ideology and capacity has been brought out well by al-Qaeda. It has used all forms of media and technology to disseminate its messages to the general public, which is its target segment. Most successful of them have been acts of violence, which by themselves are a very powerful marketing tool but with very negative connotations. It has a dedicated media committee, which handles the propaganda part (Fig. 1 above).

The growth trajectories of terror groups like al-Qaeda are a result of borrowing and implementing concepts from legal entities. It is now imperative for us to learn from these terror groups, who have customised and implemented these concepts to fine-tune their efficiency and activities.

The organisation has used a combination of marketing communications to project its messages to the outside world. It has integrated various tools and media to market its message to active customers (members, potential members and like-minded groups) and passive customers (general public), which form the core of its effective communications strategy. Al-Qaeda has been especially adept at manipulating television through the release of videos.29 In addition, virtually every incident conducted by the terrorist organisation is talked about on its website, targeting potentials for recruitment and spreading the message of bloodshed. Al-Qaeda has successfully aimed and achieved two major returns through its programs, one is “fear” and other is “support,” the latter helping to build equity while the former helping to build resilience through fear-driven deterrence.

Conclusion

The growth trajectories of terror groups like al-Qaeda are a result of borrowing and implementing concepts from legal entities. It is now imperative for us to learn from these terror groups, who have customised and implemented these concepts to fine-tune their efficiency and activities. These terrorists groups advertently and inadvertently are imparting lessons of terror to other terror groups and to the law enforcement agencies as well.

Terror groups like al-Qaeda have shown great adaptability, nimbleness and resilience in managing their organisations. On one hand, these aspects make them competitive. On the other hand, these make them as vulnerable as business entities in a competitive business environment. Law enforcement agencies can enlighten themselves on this vulnerability aspect by studying and understanding their evolution models, which may eventually bring about their downfall. Instead of fighting terror organisations with laws and guns, nation states need to study the strength of their flexible structures, which brings about efficiency, and frame policies. These efforts have to be focused to ensure more attrition in terror groups, which will steer human capital away from these groups, causing the groups to lose their financial capital and fall into recession.

The irony is that law enforcement efforts have proved to be counterproductive, forcing these groups to transform themselves into virtual networks and making it much harder to detect and disrupt them. It is imperative that any efforts to counter these be planned taking into account their constant and consistent evolution.

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In the end, al-Qaeda has followed its objectives by evolving its goals, structure and functionality as the situation demanded and attempting to progress towards those goals. In the process, the organisation has often tasted success while failures have been far and few.

Notes and References

  1. The reason that al-Qaeda alone has been selected is because it is the only group that has survived a concerted, coordinated multinational campaign. This group has shown tremendous resilience and tenacity and maintains status quo as the deadliest group even after Osama’s death.
  2. J. Stern and A. Modi. “Producing Terror: Organisational Dynamics of Survival.” In Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Edited by J. Biersteker and E. Eckert. New York, NY: Routledge, 2008. p. 22.
  3. R. Gunaratna. Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. London: Hurst, 2002. p. 54.
  4. Op cit, n. 2, p. 29.
  5. R. Gunaratna and A. Oreg. (2010). “Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and Its Evolution.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 12, 2010. pp. 1043– 1078.
  6. Ibid., p. 1066.
  7. Government of the United States. “Overview of the Enemy, Staff Statement No. 15.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004. <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/staff_statement_15.pdf>.
  8. Op cit, n. 3, p. 49
  9. Ibid., p. 49.
  10. D. Smith. “Africa’s Islamist Militants Co-ordinate Efforts in Threat to Continent’s Security.” 26 January 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/africa-islamist-militantscoordinating- threat>.
  11. J. Rollins. ”Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy.” Government of the United States, Congressional Research Service, 25 January 2011. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ terror/R41070.pdf>.
  12. Op cit, n. 2, p. 33.
  13. Op cit, n. 7, p. 11.
  14. M. Sagemen. “Understanding Terror Networks.” E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2004. <http://www.fpri.org/>. Sageman conducted a survey on biographies of 400 terrorists belonging primarily to al-Qaeda.
  15. United States General Accounting Office. “U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms.” Report to Congressional Requesters, November 2003. <http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 250/240616.pdf>.
  16. Financial Action Task Force. ”Terrorist Financing.” 29 February 2008. < h t t p : / / w w w . f a t f – g a f i . o r g / m e d i a / f a t f / d o c u m e n t s / r e p o r t s / FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf>.
  17. M. Levitt. “Al-Qaida’s Finances: Evidence of Organizational Decline?” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 5, 2008. < h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n i n s t i t u t e . o rg / u p l o a d s / D o c u m e n t s / o p e d s / 4807814218aed.pdf>.
  18. Z. Abuza. “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.” NBR Analysis 14, no. 5, 2003. <http:// www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/vol14no5.pdf>.
  19. Op cit, n. 17.
  20. K. Cragin, P. Chalk, S. A. Daly and B. A. Jackson. “Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth, Terrorist Groups and the Exchange of New Technologies.” RAND Corporation, 2007. < h t t p : / / w w w. r a n d . o rg / c o n t e n t / d a m / r a n d / p u b s / m o n o g r a p h s / 2 0 0 7 / RAND_MG485.pdf>.
  21. The figure has been derived by the authors from multiple sources, such as the congressional research service and US government reports like the 9/11 staff statement, and supplemented with information derived from works of Rohan Gunaratna, Aviv Oreg and David Smith.
  22. Government of the United States. “The 9/11 Commission Report.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004. <http:/ /www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Operation Bojinka was originally planned and conceived by 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 1995, when he was not a member of al-Qaeda. It envisaged bombing of commercial airliners over the Pacific and flying a Cessna filled with explosives into the CIA headquarters, Langley. This attack was aborted as there was an accidental fire in the safe house in Philippines. This is the operation which gave al-Qaeda the idea of using aircraft as weapons.
  23. Ibid. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, Rahim Al Nashiri originally planned to attack USS The Sullivans in January 2000 using an explosives-laden boat. It failed as the overladen boat sank. The al-Qaeda learned from this failed attempt that the bomb needed to be a “shaped charge,” which would cause more damage per pound of explosive and allow the attackers to carry a lighter-weight, more effective bomb, which would not sink the boat.
  24. Op cit, n. 3, p. 68.
  25. A. Cullison. “Inside al Qaeda’s Hard Drive: Budget Squabbles, Baby Pictures, Office Rivalries—and the Path to 9/11.” 1 September 2004. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/09/inside-al-qaeda-s-hard-drive/ 303428/>.
  26. Op cit, n. 3, p. 69.
  27. Ministry of Home Affairs, the Government of Singapore. ”White Paper – the Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism.” January 2003. <http://www.mha.gov.sg/publication_details.aspx?pageid=35&cid=354>.
  28. A. Gendron. “Al Qaeda: Propaganda and Media Strategy.” Trends in Terrorism Series 2007, no. 2, 2007. <http://www.itac.gc.ca/pblctns/tc_prsnts/ 2007-2-eng.pdf>.
  29. Op cit, n. 7
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About the Author

Dr. S. V. Raghavan & Dr. V. Balasubramaniyan

Dr. S. V. Raghavan is an associate professor and the head of the Research Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Guru Nanak College, Chennai. & Dr. V. Balasubramaniyan is a research scholar at the Research Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Guru Nanak College, Chennai.

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