Indian Defence Review

Lastly, granted that there were compulsions upon the Central as well as the State governments in dealing with the rise of Maoist insurgency in the ham-handed manner as they did. However, to view the insurgency as merely a law-and-order issue and then leave it for the affected States to deal with as they deemed beneficial, is no doubt a weak policy. Even giving the due consideration to India’s federal structure, there are two questions which need to be settled: one, at what stage an ostensibly law-and-order problem grows into a national internal security threat, and two, which institution, segregated from political equations, may be competent to decide if that stage has been reached at a point of time.

Political thinkers are right when they aver that the Maoist rebellion is but a direct fallout of democratisation of governance and politicisation of interest groups. In other words, the rebellion is an extreme form of expression of dissent and demand that is propagated under the democratic advantages enjoyed by the weaker sections – advantages which give voice to the voiceless and encourage them to demand participation in governance. Therefore, in the overall context, Indian polity has to take serious note of the paradox that while at one end, people’s alienation with the government’s overlook of their fundamental concerns can not be suppressed by force, at the other end, the state is woefully short of resources that could ameliorate in one sweep, all the causes of people’s agitation. Further, there is a grave danger to the Indian nationhood if democracy becomes inter alia the rule of majority votes rather than the rule of law and fosters a system in which injury to one section of the people is endorsed to preserve the interests of a another section of beneficiaries of that system. In other words, the government’s challenge is to find means reasonable to protect the interests of the plateau-land tribes even while harnessing natural produce for economic development, and similarly, uplift the deprived sections among the plainsmen without imposing any major upset upon the better-off lot.

Concluding Remarks

In the end, it may be in order to mention certain theological impressions that appear in dealing with the subject of Maoist rebellion.

One, the Maoist revolution is driven by an urge to decimate ‘class enemies’ who are identified as the benefactors of ‘home grown imperialism,’ feudalism and ‘comprador bureaucratic capitalism’. The revolutionaries aim to do so by the means of ‘armed aggression,’ ‘protracted people’s war’ and finally, ‘armed seizure of state-power’. According to them, armed aggression is ‘not negotiable’; that is, any solution that may be found by other peaceful means will not do. This is a strangely diabolic affliction with blood-letting, and indeed, out of tune with the times. Apparently, the Maoist’s solidarity with the people’s difficulties, women’s cause, support to separatists and movement against class and caste system are but the tools to justify and propagate that affliction with armed aggression. In contrast, there are many among them who are inclined just to pay lip service to the party ideals, their sole purpose being to continue to reap the rewards of being revolutionaries, no more. Then there are many break-away groups, besides the factions within, who differ with the mode, manner and methods adopted by the Maoist leadership. These may be weaned away to isolate the fanatic Maoists.

Two, the Maoists seem to have moved away from their traditional base constituency of the peasant class, to connect with rich landholders, creamy sections among the backward communities and the business community. In their contemporary version, the Maoist revolutionaries seem to have built up a nexus of common cause with the better-off classes. This may be a tactical understanding with the realisation that while the armed struggle may highlight the people’s difficulties, it can not find solutions to these – that endeavour has to bank upon the wielders of money power. As a result of this remarkable revision of communist ideology, its traditional support-base of working and peasant class may not be alive any more. Recourse to intelligence-based operations with participation of the masses to weaken the rebellion therefore may pay good dividends in countering the Maoist insurgency.

Three, with the leadership of the insurgency so broad-based – like the Al Qaeda – the rebellion may not be liable to be contained in just few strokes – it would need regular and steady conduct of counter operations over a long period to control. The state may therefore girdle up for a long grind.

Four, the state may need to take cognisance of the fact that there is a widespread perception that in many ways, the coverage of governance across the country-side may have retracted when compared to the days of the British Rule. This is a serious indictment of an independent India that needs urgent redress.

Five, the Maoist rebellion can not be controlled unless alongside the other measures, the process of criminal investigation and prosecution is restituted and effective judicial system is active.

Six, looking at the rural youth of today, it becomes clear that the energy of the fast growing young population needs to be kept productively engaged for them to be kept away from becoming mobsters. The approaching ‘youth bulge’ is therefore a fearsome prospect, as much as it may be as an asset to the nation. The society has very limited time to find ways to deal with this situation.

Lastly, in a long confrontation between a flaw prone democratic system and communist revolution, people’s perception would play a crucial role, particularly so in the information age. So far, the Maoists, aided by their attractive – and assertive – propaganda that is well substantiated by the blatantly callous attitude of the governing class, has scored over the government. To turn around that negative perception, the government has to first come clean of its policies that agonies the voiceless people and then bring the facts to the notice at the grass-roots level.

Maoist rebellion is a topic of extensive dimensions. Therefore, the focus in this book has been confined to what comes out from visitations and interactions at the ground level and sharing the impressions gained with the community at large. Obviously, there would be differences of perceptions and opinions, may be even certain facts, but that may be set aside in favour of understanding of the Maoist rebellion from another angle. If these inputs help in the complex call that the policy makers face in negotiating through the problem, the purpose would be met.